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Abstract

The People Behind the Presidential Bully Pulpit

by

Kara S. Alaimo

Adviser: Professor Stanley Renshon

“The People Behind the Presidential Bully Pulpit” argues that civil servants best serve the
interests of both the President of the United States and the American people as public affairs
officers in the Department of the Treasury. Using interviews conducted with political appointees
who served as Treasury spokespeople during the administrations of Presidents Barack Obama
and George W. Bush, civil servants who served in public affairs for the Treasury, and Treasury
reporters who interacted frequently with the government officials, the study finds that civil
servants better advance the goals of the President in the press than the political appointees
personally selected by the President. This is the case because civil servants have greater
knowledge of the policies they advocate and because reporters apply greater skepticism to the
arguments of political appointees because reporters assume that appointees are always
attempting to advance political agendas – a phenomenon this study calls the “appointee
discount.” While scholars have previously argued that presidents accept the lower competence
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of appointees in order to attain their greater loyalty, this study suggests that no such tradeoff
exists. It finds that political appointees and civil servants leak information to the press that does
not serve the interests of the President with roughly the same frequency. The study also finds that
civil servants better serve the interests of the American people in such roles. The study finds that
neither political appointees nor civil servants in the Treasury’s public affairs department are
conducting the “permanent campaign” to build support for the President that White House aides
have been accused of practicing, by governing based upon public opinion polls and appealing to
the emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people. However, political appointees
are significantly more likely to withhold information requested by reporters than civil servants.
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Introduction
The Politicization of the American Presidency
Though the U.S. Constitution is silent on the subject of the bureaucracy, which did not
grow until the 19th century, in The Federalist #72 Alexander Hamilton laid out a dilemma for
staffing the government that presidents have grappled with ever since.
On the one hand, Hamilton argued,

the actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the preparatory plans of finance, the
application and disbursement of the public moneys in conformity to the general
appropriations of the legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of
the operations of war – these, and other matters of a like nature, constitute what seems to
be most properly understood by the administration of government. The persons,
therefore, to whose immediate management these different matters are committed, ought
to be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate, and on this account,
they ought to derive their offices from his appointment, at least from his nomination, and
ought to be subject to his superintendence.

By this line of argument, presidents of the United States should rely heavily on political
appointees – staffers who the chief executive personally appoints and is free to dismiss at any
time.
On the other hand, Hamilton warned that the propensity of the president to reverse the
policies of his predecessor, combined with “the influence of personal confidences and
attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to promote a change of men to fill
1

the subordinate stations; and these causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and
ruinous mutability in the administration of the government.” (Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1987,
412-413). By this argument, presidents should rely more heavily on civil servants – staffers who
enjoy protection from dismissal for political reasons and serve across administrations, bringing
needed continuity and stability to the government.
The balance that American presidents have struck between appointees and civil servants
has varied. President Andrew Jackson famously claimed that “the duties of all public officers are,
or at least admit of being made, so plain and simple that men of intelligence may readily qualify
themselves for their performance” – and went on to create a vast spoils system to reward party
supporters with government posts (Rourke 1984, 17). Calls for reform of the patronage system
reached a crescendo following the 1881 assassination of President Garfield by a disappointed job
seeker. In 1883, the Pendleton Civil Service Reform Act created a civil service system to select
employees for federal posts based upon the results of competitive exams and protect employees
from being fired for political reasons.
However, modern-day presidents have shifted the pendulum back in the direction of
Hamilton’s first hand. The number of federal political appointees increased steadily during the
1950s-1980s, while overall government employment decreased relative to the U.S. population
(Richardson and Pfiffner 1999, 179). While the number of appointees has remained relatively
stable since the 1980s, today, an incoming president fills almost 4,000 jobs – double the number
of positions as during the middle of the 20th century (Lewis 2012, 587; Lewis 2011, 48-49).
Scholars refer to the phenomenon of the increased number of political appointees serving in the
federal government today as the “politicization” of the American presidency (Lewis 2008, 3).
While political appointments remain a tiny fraction of the federal workforce, the
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American system nevertheless stands in marked contrast to that of nearly every other mature
democracy. For example, an incoming British prime minister, German chancellor, or French
president would make about 100-200 appointments (ibid., 2).
The increased use of appointment power is one part of a larger strategy pursued by
American presidents since Nixon to exert increased control over the executive branch – an effort
that Richard Nathan famously dubbed the “administrative presidency.” (Nathan 1983). Terry
Moe has argued that the strategy is a rational response by presidents, who are faced with limited
constitutional powers yet held responsible by the electorate for solving so many of their
problems (1999, 147-148).
Presidents began to implement the strategy at a time when it became simultaneously
harder yet more critical for them to utilize the government to achieve their aims. Since the New
Deal era, presidents have increasingly assumed responsibility for managing the economy,
national security, and broader domestic policy. The New Deal expansion of the federal
government made it more difficult to manage the ballooning bureaucracy, leading President
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Brownlow Committee to conclude that “the president needs help.”
(1937, 5).
At the same time, the rise of divided government (in which the president and the majority
of at least one house of Congress are members of opposite parties) has made it harder for
presidents to achieve their goals legislatively (Rourke 1991, 114; Waterman 1989, 5). The 2013
government shutdown, in which the Republican House of Representatives battled the Democratic
White House in an effort to delay or repeal the Affordable Care Act, is just one example of this
conundrum.
The increased difficulty presidents have faced in harnessing the government to achieve
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their goals came at a time when it was more critical than ever for them to do so. The decline of
political parties and party loyalties and growth of primaries as venues for the selection of
candidates led presidents to wage more individualized campaigns, replete with promises to the
various groups forming their electoral coalitions.
Pfiffner has argued that, in order to keep fickle constituents happy, presidents must find a
way to achieve greater control of the government so they can actually deliver on their electoral
pledges (1999, 3). Moe has posited that the president’s reelection prospects, personal standing,
and historical legacy all depend upon his ability to govern. With such high stakes, it is no
surprise that “to the extent he has the freedom to move in this direction, the president will find
politicization irresistible. The appointment power is simple, readily available, and enormously
flexible.” (1999, 152). Of course, it is also possible that presidents may have be wary of
extending their control too heavily, since with greater political power comes increased political
vulnerability and reduced ability to blame other actors when things go wrong – which could
explain why politicization leveled off in the 1980s.
Two key modern institutional changes speeded the politicization process. In1953,
President Eisenhower – who feared that the civil servants working when he came to office were
too loyal to previous New Deal programs – created “Schedule C” positions, which allow the
president and agency heads to hire appointees for confidential or policy-determining positions
without congressional approval (Pfiffner 1996, 74). In 1978, under President Carter, the Civil
Service Reform Act created the Senior Executive Service (SES) for the highest-level civil
servants, allowing for up to ten percent of such positions to be filled by appointees and giving the
president greater flexibility to re-assign such top-tier civil servants.
In addition to appointments, the administrative presidency also entails tools such as

4

centralizing government decision making in the White House, using the budget as a vehicle for
policymaking, regulatory review, and the creation of new administrative agencies (Nathan 1983;
Lewis and Moe 2010, 389; Howell and Lewis 2002). But scholars generally agree that the
appointment power is the “most potent weapon” in the president’s administrative arsenal
(Waterman 1989, 49).
Robert Maranto has noted that straightforward institutional demands have made it
necessary for presidents to hire more appointees. The skyrocketing growth of interest groups,
congressional staff, and media over the past several decades has led to increased demands by
these groups for contact with the government. Liaising with such groups is a political task, which
civil servants themselves seek to avoid (1998a, 7). But a principal reason that presidents have
come to see appointments as so powerful is because appointees are generally assumed to have “a
single-minded devotion to the president’s interest.” (Rudalevidge 2002, 11). President Clinton’s
senior adviser George Stephanopoulos described his job this way: “doing the president’s bidding
was my reason for being; his favor was my fuel.” (2000, 210).
On the other hand, much-maligned civil servants are assumed to be less responsive to the
president. In The American Presidency, Clinton Rossiter suggested that members of the
bureaucracy may be more of an impediment to the president than Congress itself. “Were the
Presidents of the last fifty years to be polled on this question,” he claimed, “all but one or two, I
am sure, would agree that the ‘natural obstinacy’ of the average bureau chief or commissioner or
colonel was second only to the ‘ingrained suspicions’ of the average Congressman as a check on
the President’s ability to do either good or evil. Several would doubtless go further to insist that
the President’s hardest job is, not to persuade Congress to support a policy dear to his political
heart, but to persuade the pertinent bureau or agency or mission, even when headed by men of
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his own choosing, to follow his direction faithfully and transform the shadow of the policy into
substance of a program.” (1987, 45).
The literature thus suggests that the increased use of political appointees allows the chief
executive to harness the bureaucracy to work in support of his goals. By contrast, this study
questions the conventional wisdom that politicization has benefited modern presidents by
helping them achieve increased control over the executive branch.
The Lack of Evidence to Guide Presidential Staffing Decisions
President Carter once said, “this stuff is boring.” (Lewis 2008, 219). (President Garfield
might have begged to differ.) In reality, though, the question of how to staff the government is
one of the most important choices the American people face. As Hugh Heclo has argued,

presidents and department heads make few choices that are more important than those
concerning the type of people who will serve with them in the administration. In affecting
the everyday work of government, these … personnel selections add up to a cumulative
act of choice that may be at least as important as the electorate’s single act of choice for
president every four years. (1977, 88).

The people who staff the government, after all, are responsible for policies and decisions
impacting the safety of America’s food, medicine, and environment; the regulation of the
economy; and the country’s security and continued existence. Yet even at the founding of the
nation, long before Americans looked to Washington, D.C. to solve so many of their problems,
President Jefferson reported that “there is nothing I am so anxious about as good nominations,
conscious that the merit as well as reputation of an administration depends as much on that as on
6

its measures.” (Labiner and Light 2001, 234).
To date, the absence of research available to guide presidents in their staffing decisions is
truly remarkable – shocking, even. As Heclo has noted, the current system of presidential
staffing is not a product of any rational process of study or consideration. Rather, it simply
“emerged as a by-product of … microcalculations of political advantage.” (1988, 39). As a
result, each incoming presidential administration tends simply to start with the same number of
appointees as the last administration, instead of analyzing specific positions to determine whether
appointees or civil servants would best serve the president in such roles (Lewis 2008, 206). Of
course, the short timeframe from election to Inauguration Day would make it difficult for any
incoming administration to conduct systematic analysis. Yet the absence of scholarly direction
would make it impossible even for a president attempting to make more informed decisions to do
so based upon evidence and experience. This is because scholars have generally failed to provide
presidents with the kind of research that could serve as guideposts.
The need for such scholarship has long been recognized. In 1985, the National Academy
of Public Administration noted that “more attention must be paid to the development of criteria
for determining where the country will be best served by a career executive and where by a
political appointee.” (29). In 1999, Moe likewise found that “presidents and their advisers have a
serious knowledge problem: even if they had the resources to impose any reforms they liked,
they would not know how to design an institutional system optimally suited to presidential
needs.” He noted that the social science of organizations is so underdeveloped that “no
systematic body of knowledge is available to presidents – or anyone else for confidently linking
alternative institutional designs to alternative sets of consequences. Presidents may know where
they want to go, but science cannot tell them how to get there.” (149). In 2011, David E. Lewis
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likewise concluded that, when it comes to government staffing decisions, “we know very little
about the tradeoffs and where the ‘sweet spot’ is for appointee management, either to maximize
the president’s interest or to optimize some general form of agency performance.” (60). The
present study represents an effort to begin to correct this deficit.
Much previous scholarship, such as that of the Presidential Appointee Initiative, has
focused on the highest-ranking political appointees. While useful in other respects, such work is
less helpful in guiding presidential staffing decisions. There is no question that the positions of
cabinet heads and assistant secretaries should be filled by appointees. The highest-ranking posts
also tend to be created by Congress. However, over the past fifty years, much of the growth in
appointees has come in Schedule C positions – those over which the president has the most
control. It is here that presidents could easily swap civil servants for appointees. It is also here
that research is most lacking. Such appointees are so little-studied that Lewis and Waterman
have dubbed Schedule C and SES appointments to be the “invisible presidential appointments.”
(2013, 35). I will begin to correct this imbalance by making Schedule C appointees a key focus
of my research.
Many previous works – such as Lewis’ 2008 study of aggregate ratings of government
programs and the surveys of the National Academy of Public Administration and Presidential
Appointee Initiative – are also useful in providing a macro perspective of appointee competence
and loyalty. But such works are less helpful in helping differentiate the specific agencies,
environments and positions in which appointees better serve the president – and/or the people –
vis a vis their careerist counterparts. The professional backgrounds and organizational goals of,
for example, staff in technocratic agencies such as the Department of the Treasury, are likely to
differ significantly from those of officials employed in social service agencies, such as the
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Department of Health and Human Services, or regulatory agencies, such as the Environmental
Protection Agency. As a result, we must be careful about drawing such sweeping generalizations.
I will therefore interview political appointees and civil servants who work in public
affairs for the Treasury and its subsidiary bureaus, in order to determine which group serves as
more effective and loyal advocates for the president – and what guideposts the results offer to
presidential administrations regarding how to fill other positions and the wisdom of
politicization.
Gatekeepers to Government Information
Government public affairs officials were selected for this study because of their critical
roles as gatekeepers to the majority of the information released by the executive branch. The
framers of the Constitution were clear that they intended the American people to hold their
elected representatives accountable. In order to do so, the American people require information
about the state of the government and the economy. Jeremy Waldron has argued that the
principle of accountability places an obligation on government leaders to provide such
information proactively to the people, and in a form in which they understand (2014, 7). Of
course, the framers indicated that it is also sometimes legitimate for the government to withhold
information, and they did not explicitly name a right to information. However, it is also clear that
citizens could not judge their government if key information about agency activities were
withheld.
For example, the Declaration of Independence makes clear that governments derive “their
just powers from the consent of the governed.” The intention of the Framers is also evident in
The Federalist #51, authored by James Madison or Alexander Hamilton, which states that “a
dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary control on the government.” (Hamilton,
9

Madison and Jay 1987, 320). Of course, citizens could not consent to government actions
without knowing about them. The Constitutional mechanisms providing for a unitary executive
and eligibility for re-election were also designed to foster the accountability of government
leaders to the American people. (Hamilton, Madison, and Jay 1987, 344-345, 413, 405-406).
As a result, in arguing for a provision that both houses of the Legislature be required to
publish their proceedings, on August 11, 1787, James Wilson noted that “the people have a right
to know what their Agents are doing or have done.” (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, 260). James Madison,
known as the “father of the Constitution,” elsewhere made his views on this subject more
explicit. In his Report on the Virginia Resolutions, he wrote that the “right of freely examining
public characters and measures, and of free communication among the people thereon … has
ever been justly deemed the only effectual guardian of every other right.” (1800). And in his
Letter to W.T. Barry, he famously quipped that “popular Government, without popular
information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or, perhaps
both.” (1822).
Former Senator Thomas C. Heninngs, Jr. also noted that the Preamble to the Constitution
says that “We the People” establish the Constitution. According to Hennings, “since, under our
theory of government, sovereignty resides in the people, it logically and necessarily follows that
the people have a right to know what the Government – which they themselves established – is
doing, and that government officials properly may interfere with the free exercise of that right
only to the extent the people themselves consent. Thus, while it is not mentioned, the people’s
right to know is an implicit part of the Preamble of the Constitution.” (1959, 669).
Of course, this right to information is also not absolute. Farrand’s debates make it evident
that the Framers recognized the need for the suppression of information regarding matters such
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as military activities. For example, according to Madison’s account of the Constitutional
Convention, on August 11, 1787, Elbridge Gerry and Roger Sherman proposed a clause in the
requirement that the houses of the Legislature publish their proceedings which would exempt
matters related to “treaties and military operations.” (Farrand 1911, vol. 2, 256). Hamilton also
made clear that he believed “secrecy” is vital to the executive branch when he argued in The
Federalist #70 that a plural executive would reduce the executive branch’s capacity for it
(Hamilton, Madison and Jay 1987, 403). The Founders ultimately settled on the clause in the
Constitution that “each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time
publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy” – clearly
recognizing the legitimacy of suppression when it was required (art. 1, sec. 5).
Obviously, national security concerns will at times preclude government disclosure;
otherwise, the very existence of the nation would be put at stake. It may also be necessary for the
government to withhold more information during emergencies – however the Constitution says
little about this issue. It will also arguably be legitimate for the Treasury public affairs officials
who are the subjects of this study to withhold information that would roil global markets.
Likewise, it may be counterproductive for government officials, like the Framers, to share the
minutiae of deliberations and negotiations before they have been finalized and are ready for
public deliberation.
Furthermore, some have noted that the Constitutional Convention was itself conducted in
secret. However, it was of course the initial stages of the Convention’s deliberations that were
conducted in secrecy (indeed, it would be impossible to enforce a requirement that political
negotiations be made public). Upon agreeing on a proposal, what did the Framers do? They
immediately made it available to the people for public review and deliberation.
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To be sure, no constitutional mechanism guarantees that citizens will actually avail
themselves of the opportunity to observe their government so that they make informed
judgments at the ballot box. Anthony Downs argued that it is rational for the ordinary citizen to
be ignorant of many of the activities of his or her government. Obtaining information “requires
time and is therefore costly,” and so it is rational for a citizen to only seek such information if it
will yield a return that exceeds the cost of obtaining the information (1957, 146). Morris P.
Fiorina and Matthew S. Levendusky have described a modern political class disconnected from
the majority of the American people (2006, 49). Ilya Somin has argued that “political ignorance
[in the United States] is extensive and poses a very serious challenge to democratic theory.”
(2013, 3). Furthermore, citizens often do not make informed decisions on issues; John Zaller has
shown that when asked their opinion in a poll, many Americans simply respond with whatever
argument they have heard recently, and those that do have more well-formed opinions resist
information which does not comport with those beliefs (1992, 76, 44).
However, the debate regarding whether a democracy requires that citizens inform
themselves falls outside of the scope of this study. My research simply argues that the Framers
were clear that the American people should have an opportunity to judge their leaders, and
therefore the people should generally be able to access information about what is happening
inside their government, should they choose to do so. Even if only a tiny percentage of
Americans actually avail themselves of the right to examine most government information, this
small group can, in the famous formulation of Mathew McCubbins and Thomas Schwartz, pull
“fire alarms” if they notice wrongdoing or disagree with the government’s actions, to raise
broader awareness of the problem (1984). Therefore, even if only a small number of Americans
read any single document the government releases, the system can still work, because they can
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publicize troubling results.
Of course, the fact that not all citizens will lucidly evaluate the information that the
government releases does not absolve the government from the responsibility to disclose
information. Regardless of the challenges that an uneducated or apathetic citizenry poses to
democracy theory, a government that operated under a veil of secrecy by claiming that citizens
could not understand what their leaders were doing would be dangerous, undemocratic, and
unconstitutional indeed.
Thus, it is clear that the intention of the Framers was for sovereignty to ultimately rest in
the people and for citizens to assess their representatives based upon their performance. Access
to information about what representatives are doing is a prerequisite for such accountability and
assessment, and thus clearly a part of their intention; as Madison noted, other rights would be
jeopardized without it. Accordingly, as Grossman and Kumar have noted, every president
promises to run an open government. (1981, 273).
However, American citizens face a knowledge problem: it is difficult to know whether
government officials withhold or distort information requested by the media, and if so, whether
their reasons for doing so are legitimate. To ascertain this, we must study the actions of the
public affairs officers, who control the people’s access to this information. Unfortunately,
government public affairs officials are the subject of little scholarly research. Stephen Hess’
(1984) anecdotal study – which reported on the results of his year spent observing public affairs
officers in government agencies and the White House – is now three decades old. The growth of
the “permanent campaign” since that time makes it particularly critical to bring our knowledge
up to date.
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The Permanent Campaign
In contradistinction to the goals of the founders, critics have charged modern White
House staff with conducting a “permanent campaign.” Under the permanent campaign,
presidential aides are said to focus on courting public opinion rather than good governance
(Heclo 2000). Furthermore, former White House Press Secretary Scott McClellan has reported
that, in conducting the “permanent campaign,” government officials distort the truth and
withhold information from the American people (2008, 4). Theodore Lowi has warned that this
pathology of the presidency has become so serious that it threatens the future of our nation itself
(1984, 20).
However, scholars have not yet measured how deeply the campaign penetrates. Is it
conducted exclusively from the White House? Or are government agencies also involved? If
agency resources are being utilized in the service of this campaign, its potential scope and scale
is dramatically expanded. This study begins to answer this question, by querying agency public
affairs officers about their practices.
Theories to be Tested
To preview my arguments, I posit that modern presidents have been misguided in hiring
more political appointees in an attempt to strengthen their control over the executive branch. I
argue that, in fact, career civil servants serve the president more effectively than appointees and
are no more likely to engage in acts of disloyalty to an administration. I further argue that
government public affairs officers are not conducting a “permanent campaign” because the
immense workloads of political appointees leave them lacking the time to engage in such
proactive tactics – resulting in a previously unstudied and extraordinary, if tenuous, mechanism
of democratic protection.
14

My theory questions the political science literature on the administrative presidency,
which suggests that political appointments are a potent and effective tool of executive control
(Nathan 1983; Moe 1999). It also fills a void in the communication literature by beginning to
identify, for the first time, the boundaries of the “permanent campaign” which scholars and
critics have accused modern White House aides of conducting (Heclo 2000; Blumenthal 1982;
McClellan 2008). Finally, it begins to provide a clearer picture of the activities of government
public affairs officers, who serve as critical gatekeepers to the information that the American
people receive about the activities of their government and state of the economy, but have been
almost entirely neglected in a White House-focused literature.
I will begin by reviewing the extant literature on appointees and civil servants (chapter 1)
as well as public affairs officers in government agencies and the permanent campaign (chapter
2). I will then outline my research design (chapter 3) and discuss the results of my research on
the relative efficacy of appointees vs. civil servants (chapter 4), the relative loyalty of appointees
vs. civil servants (chapter 5), and whether a permanent campaign is being conducted in the
Treasury Department (chapter 6). Finally, chapter 7 will discuss my conclusions and the
implications of my findings.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review: Political Appointees vs. the Bureaucracy
This chapter reviews the extant literature on political appointees and civil servants.
Although the conventional wisdom is that civil servants will be less loyal to the president than
political appointees, and perhaps incompetent as well, I argue that there is reason to believe that
this view is mistaken – a proposition which I will go on to test.
Modern presidents of both political parties have made no secret of their displeasure with
bureaucrats. As James Q. Wilson has noted, “no politician ever lost votes by denouncing the
bureaucracy.” (1989, 235).
President Franklin D. Roosevelt exclaimed that “the Treasury is so large and far-flung
and ingrained in its practices that I find it almost impossible to get the action and results I want,
even with Henry [Morgenthau] there. But the Treasury is not to be compared with the State
Department. You should go through the experience of trying to get any changes in the thinking,
policy, and actions of the career diplomats and then you’d know what a real problem is. But the
Treasury and the State Department put together are nothing as compared with the Na-a-vy.”
(Maranto 1993, 28).
President Nixon wrote in his memoir that he believed the liberal beliefs of civil servants
made them unsympathetic to his agenda (Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 96). He also argued: “we
can’t depend on people who believe in another philosophy of government to give us their
undivided loyalty or their best work … If we don’t get rid of those people, they will either
sabotage us from within, or they’ll just sit back on their well-paid asses and wait for the next
election to bring back their old bosses.” (Maranto 2005, 101).
President Carter reported: “Before I became president, I realized and I was warned that
dealing with the federal bureaucracy would be one of the worst problems I would have to face. It
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has been even worse than I had anticipated.” (Edwards 1983, 204).
President Reagan identified the government as the source of the country’s problems,
indicating the need to “get the bureaucracy by the neck and shake it loose and say, stop doing
what you’re doing.” (Golden 2000, 5)
Their senior advisers have been no less dramatic in their denunciations. Arthur
Schlesinger, Jr. wrote that, during the Kennedy years, “the problem of moving forward seemed
in great part the problem of making the permanent government responsive to the policies of the
presidential government.” (Cronin 1980, 231). Before becoming Secretary of State, Henry
Kissinger noted: “First of all, you have to weaken the bureaucracy! … They all want to do what
I’m doing! So the problem becomes: how do you get them to push paper around, spin their
wheels, so that you can get your work done.” (ibid.).
While President George H.W. Bush ushered in a softer tone of rhetoric on the civil
service, the suspicion of modern presidents towards the bureaucracy remains evident in the
decisions of modern presidents to maintain the record numbers of political appointees reached in
the 1980s (Lewis 2012, 587).
Many scholars concur with these officials. According to George C. Edwards III, “one of
the safest predictions about a new presidential administration is that the president will often find
the federal bureaucracy unresponsive to his desires.” (1983, 203). Thomas Cronin noted that “it
is difficult to overestimate the degree of frustration and resentment that White House aides
develop about the seeming indifference of the permanent government toward presidential
policy.” (1980, 224).
A Typology of Why Civil Servants Are Bad
While a scholarly chorus concurs with politicians that civil servants will not serve the
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president’s interests, they offer a wide range of reasons for why this will be the case. Scholars
have contended that:

1. Managers cannot effectively control civil servants.
In contrast to the private sector, federal civil service rules make it hard for public sector
managers to fire staff (Wilson 1989, 120-121). John Brehm and Scott Gates argued that “even if
these rules do not explicitly ban certain sanctions or rewards, the time and energy required to fill
out all the forms to justify the special treatment of an employee effectively rules out such
activities, especially when supervisory resources are otherwise constrained.” (1997, 42-43).
Robert Maranto has actually called for abolishing the tenure system in the civil service, arguing
that managers can only fire staff with “extreme difficulty.” (1998, 630). “The games that federal
managers must play to get work done under current personnel rules sap morale by … forcing
federal employees to work beside a small number of nonperformers who cannot be separated.”
(ibid., 631).
Another legendary tool that civil servants are said to have in eliding the control of their
bosses is their informational advantages. In contrast with appointees, who tend to serve for short
periods, civil servants typically acquire their informational advantages through many years of
work in their agencies. As far back as the Theaetetus, Plato distinguished between the expert and
the layman (1987). According to Max Weber, “under normal conditions, the power position of a
fully developed bureaucracy is always overtowering. The ‘political master’ finds himself in the
position of the ‘dilettante’ who stands opposite the ‘expert,’ facing the trained official who
stands within the management of administration.” (Gerth and Mills 1958, 232). Weber made
clear that civil servants wield these power positions to their own advantage: “Every bureaucracy
seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed by keeping their knowledge and
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intentions secret. Bureaucratic administration always tends to be an administration of ‘secret
sessions’: in so far as it can, it hides its knowledge and action.” (ibid., 233). Michael Sanera has
further argued that this is an especially pronounced problem in the federal government, because
“when the political executive issues instructions to his staff, he is not aided in checking on the
results of his subordinate’s actions by a profit statement. Knowing this, subordinates realize that
they automatically have more discretion.” (1984, 532).
Since they are not incentivized by variable monetary rewards to pursue the interests of
their bosses and are able to elide the detection of behavior that would displease their bosses, civil
servants will, by this line of argument, be free to pursue their own agendas. In his important
work, Inside Bureaucracy, Anthony Downs argued that civil servants will be significantly,
though not entirely, motivated by their own personal interests (1967, 87). Whenever they have a
measure of discretion, they will use some of it to advance their own goals (ibid., 64). According
to Downs, their complex array of personal goals will include power, income, prestige,
convenience, security, personal loyalty, pride in their work, desire to serve the public interest,
and commitment to a specific program (ibid., 84).
Others argue that civil servants will seek to maximize their leisure time at work. In their
study of the firm, for example, Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz highlighted the difficulty of
detecting shirking when employees work in teams; since monitoring behavior has costs,
employers will stop monitoring at the point at which the cost of monitoring begins to exceed the
gains they receive from doing so, which will allow employees to indulge in leisure time on the
job (1972, 779-780). While it is possible that an appointee would seek to maximize his or her
leisure time as well, attempts to evoke detection would likely be much more difficult, since they
typically serve in much higher profile positions.
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2. The organizational cultures of civil servants are perverse and/or preclude accountability.
According to scholars, the perverse organizational cultures of bureaucracies will further
inhibit responsiveness to the executive. In his classic analysis, Weber identified impersonality,
hierarchy, and rule governance as essential qualities of bureaucracies, indicating that the
“characteristic principle of bureaucracy [is] the abstract regularity of the execution of authority.”
(Gerth and Mills 1958, 224). Robert K. Merton likewise argued that “goal displacement” causes
civil servants to focus more on following rules than on achieving goals, even when the
conditions which initially made the application of a particular rule appropriate no longer apply
(1957, 198-199). Similarly, Downs and others have argued that bureaucracies will be
characterized by inertia, resisting change when possible (1967, 174).
In The Bureaucratic Experience, Ralph Hummel posited a norm of “bureaucratic
detachment” which causes civil servants to treat their clients as cases instead of humans (1977,
10). “To the Social Security official, a man’s death is just another form filled out; to his wife that
death is the death of her beloved or hated husband and all he meant and all the things they ever
did together.” (ibid., 9). For Hummel, bureaucrats who behave in this way are “a new personality
type, headless and soulless.” (ibid., 3). They lack some of the features of normal human beings
as described by Freud, with the ego which would normally control a person yielding to the rules
of their jobs, and the superego which acts based upon social norms yielding as the bureaucrat
carries out orders, even when they do not seem to be the right thing to do (ibid., 7, 14). A
“psychology of dependence” instead takes root in bureaucrats, as they become dependent upon
others to direct their actions (ibid., 80). “Both their emotions and actions, to say nothing of their
wills, are bound by the structure to which they have surrendered their souls for the sake of a
salary and institutional identity.” (ibid., 39). They become so inured to not showing affect that
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they become incapable of intimacy in their personal lives. “In the end,” according to Hummel,
“bureaucracy destroys the family.” (ibid., 51). It also stunts the growth of the individual, which
Freud indicated to be necessary for social progress (ibid., 112). The effect is a government
focused on process instead of people (ibid., 28).
Merton, who shared this assessment of bureaucratic impersonality, voiced little hope that
the problem could be rectified. “This source of conflict may be minimized in private enterprise
since the client can register an effective protest by transferring his trade to another organization
within the competitive system. But with the monopolistic nature of the public organization, no
such alternative is possible.” (1957, 203).
Another factor posited to reduce bureaucratic responsiveness to the executive is
professionalization. The time has long passed when President Jackson could claim that the
ordinary citizen was fit for most government posts. (Rourke 1984, 17). In Democracy and the
Public Service, Frederick Mosher noted that the government has become increasingly staffed by
professionals with specialized training, such as scientists or economists. “The choice of these
professionals, the determination of their skills, and the content of their work are now principally
determined, not by general governmental agencies, but by their own professional elites,
professional organizations, and the institutions and faculties of higher education.” (1982, 142).
Lawrence Lynn likewise argued that “agencies in which … career personnel have strong
professional identities … probably constitute the most difficult challenges to a political
appointee.” (1985, 362).
Finally, civil servants may promote the organizational interests of the bureaucracies with
which they come to identify. Merton argued that “the esprit de corps and informal social
organization which typically develops in such situations often leads the personnel to defend their
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entrenched interests rather than to assist their clientele and elected higher officials.” Furthermore,
he said, “bureaucratic officials affectively identify themselves with their way of life. They have a
pride of craft which leads them to resist change in established routines.” (1957, 201). By
contrast, appointees are typically experienced in working in political environments, which
require regular adaptation to changing conditions.

3. Civil servants will be driven by their own personal ideologies and program loyalties instead
of the directives of appointees.
Downs’ typology of the five types of bureaucrats includes the “zealot,” who narrowly
pushes his or her own pet policies and priorities (1967, 88). Scholars worry that civil servants
will attempt to sabotage or shirk administration efforts with which they personally disagree.
Sanera, for example, argued that “the simple expectation that the private political beliefs of
bureaucrats will not interfere with the political executive’s control of the government is naïve.”
(1984, 517). Clinton Rossiter reported that “public servants are no less anxious than [the
President] to get on with the business of good and democratic government. But his idea and their
idea of what is ‘good’ or ‘democratic’ must often be at stiff odds with one another, especially
when he is pushing some untried and unconventional policy.” (1987, 46). By contrast, appointees
are ostensibly appointed by the presidents for whom they serve at least in part on the basis of
their ideological agreement.
Downs noted that civil servants may also resist the administration they serve, if they do
not believe particular directives to be in the best interests of the programs to which they are loyal
(1967, 84). Weber, Chester Barnard, and numerous other scholars have also warned that
bureaucrats may be driven by the goal of organizational maintenance, in part due to self-interest,
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since they depend upon their organizations for their livelihoods (Gerth and Mills 1958, 220;
Barnard 1968, 230; Niskanen 1971).

4. Civil servants will serve masters other than the president.
Scholars argue that the roles of Congress in determining agency mandates and funds and
of outside interest groups in providing support for agencies may cause civil servants to be more
loyal to these masters than to the president. (Heclo 1977, 226; Moe 1999, 148; Sanera 1984,
491). The traditional view of “agency capture” posited the idea of “iron triangles,” in which
congressional committees, interest groups, and bureaucrats aligned to protect each others’
interests, with the President visibly excluded. While this theory was disproven by the
deregulation that occurred in the 1970s, some scholars continue to argue that bureaucracies will
be beholden to these outside actors, whose support for their organizations is often longer-lasting
than that of the less-permanent executive (Wood and Waterman 1994, 17-20). Terry Moe, for
example, argued that “a pervasive problem is that all organizations have their … own bases of
support, and the president cannot expect to control them easily. This is clearly true for the usual
government agencies, whose interests and worldviews center around their own programs, and
whose support (which they orchestrate) comes from congressional committees and interest
groups with political muscle.” (1999, 148). Bureaucratic leadership may also have a vested
interest in maintaining their own power positions which could cause them to defy presidential
directives (Michels 1978). Conversely, as previously noted, appointees are ostensibly appointed
by presidents at least in part on the basis of their loyalty and/or ideological agreement.
As a result of these four factors, scholars argue that civil servants may shirk their
assignments or sabotage administration efforts, instead of faithfully executing administration
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orders. Brehm and Gates posited two different types of possible shirking: leisure shirking or
“dissent-shirking,” the latter of which is due to opposition to a particular policy (1997, 30). At
worst, bureaucrats will actively attempt to sabotage administration efforts. In the past, French
weavers would stick sabots (clogs) in their looms during industrial disputes, to sabotage the
outputs of their employers. Brehm and Gates report that the devices of modern-day bureaucratic
saboteurs are delay, hindrance, bungling, and obstruction (ibid., 28).
For a number of presidents and scholars alike, politicization has been seen as the solution
to weakening the likelihood and impact of such behavior. In the “most extreme” view, Sanera
has called for the appointment of political staff who serve as “jigsaw puzzle” managers by
shielding the entirety of their controversial aims from civil servants in order to guard against
sabotage (Pfiffner 1987a, 59). Under such a scheme, bureaucrats see only enough of the pieces to
do their individual jobs. (Sanera 1984, 514-515).
The Competence of Government Managers
Yet this literature is seemingly contradicted by a variety of evidence indicating that civil
servants perform well on the job – better, in fact, than political appointees.
In a survey conducted by the Presidential Appointee Initiative in 1999-2000 of hundreds
of appointees who served in the Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Clinton administrations, just
eleven percent reported that their fellow appointees were the “best and brightest America has to
offer.” (Light and Thomas 2000, 8). By contrast, when asked to assess the competence of the
civil servants with whom they worked on a scale of one to five, with five being “high
competence,” eighty-three percent of the appointees gave the careerists a score of four or five
(ibid., 32).
In an earlier survey of political appointees by the National Academy of Public
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Administration in 1985, eighty-four percent rated the competence of civil servants as high or
very high, and eighty –three percent reported the responsiveness of civil servants to be high or
very high. The Academy reported it “striking” that “presidential appointees stand second to none
in their admiration of career executives.” (1985, 29). Similarly, Judith Michaels – who conducted
a survey of 639 Senate-confirmed appointees during the administration of President George
H.W. Bush, as well as follow- up interviews – found that Senate-confirmed appointees consulted
members of the career Senior Executive Service (SES) more than they consulted other Senateconfirmed appointees or non-career members of the SES; the appointees also “found careerists
generally more helpful than the other two groups in accomplishing their work tasks.” (1995,
279).
By contrast, scholars have been warning for generations that wherever political
appointees go, government performance tends to deteriorate. In his seminal work, A Government
of Strangers, Hugh Heclo described government as “a system that depends on political amateurs
for leadership in an operating environment that is distinctly inimical to amateurism.” (1977,
155). He reported that appointees lack the substantive expertise of their careerist counterparts,
who typically learn on the job and stay in government for decades. Heclo found that appointees
stay in their jobs for such a short time that they depart about the time they have finally figured
out how to do their work (ibid., 110). He further reported that appointees persistently reported an
absence of teamwork in government. Their previous lack of acquaintance with one another and
their rapid turnover meant that they never quite figured out how to work together as a group
across departments and agencies (ibid., 104). Indeed, their short stints have earned appointees the
moniker in some quarters of the “Christmas help.” (Maranto 2005, 2).
But as far back as 1939, at the dawn of our New Deal-spawned system of larger
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government, a study of federal administrators by Arthur Macmahon and John Millett warned that
“tenure [of appointees] has been short, and even when the appointees have happened to possess
cognate knowledge, they have been unacquainted with all the complicated and distinctive
settings in which governmental action is conducted.” (1939, 123). The possession of such
“cognate knowledge” was, however, unusual: They found that Assistant Secretaries were
appointed “with little regard for qualifications or the needs of the posts.” (ibid., 302).
“Unacquainted with procedures and limitations, unfamiliar with the background of each activity,
they have often begun with the belief that all needs changing. Impatience of this sort may
produce chaos.” (ibid., 128). Furthermore, they found that the “haphazard” system of
appointment resulted in a government without coherence (ibid., 290). Some of the appointees
chosen to serve particular cabinet heads found themselves “at odds” with their bosses (ibid.,
123).
Fast forward seven decades. Researchers are still saying the same thing. A 2008 study by
David E. Lewis analyzed how the government rates the performance of its own programs, under
the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). Using this tool, the federal government rates the
effectiveness of its own programs by assigning a score of 0-100 to each program in four areas:
program purpose and design; strategic planning; program management; and program results
(174). Lewis found that programs run by appointees are rated significantly lower than those run
by careerists. The average PART score for programs run by members of the career SES was
69.58 out of 100. Average PART scores dropped to 63.50 for Senate-confirmed appointees and
to 58.66 for SES appointees. Lewis also found that the higher the number of appointees in an
agency, the lower its program scores (ibid., 178). Of course, this fails to account for the
possibility that appointees might be used by presidents to sabotage programs with which the
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president disagrees. Nevertheless, the aggregate evidence questioning appointee competence is
striking.
Researchers argue that a big part of the problem is that appointees are often hired off of
political campaigns, yet the skills needed to be successful on a campaign may be quite different
from those needed for governing (Edwards 2001, 83; Rudalevidge 2002, 35; Pfiffner 1996,18).
Campaigns focus on simplifying issues for voters – which may be necessary to sell or defeat an
idea – while in the White House presidents must build coalitions and offer complex solutions to
policy problems that often defy such simplicity (Pfiffner 1996, 18). Campaign staff also tend to
lack both policy and management experience. This was certainly the case for many of the
Treasury appointees who I interviewed.
In particular, appointees often do not have experience in the policy areas for which they
are responsible. Declaring that we have an “amateur government,” David Cohen argued that “no
one would ever have brain surgery performed by a science policy expert without a medical
degree who had never set foot inside an operating room … And surely no multimillion dollar
corporation would ever place at the head of a major operating division a young man a few years
out of college who had never managed funds or supervised more than a handful of people – even
if he were the son of the CEO’s boyhood friend. Yet the management qualifications of most
political appointees in our federal government – and even the technical qualifications of many –
are no more relevant to their positions than those of these … hypothetical candidates.” (1996, 1).
While unlike brain surgeons, political staff have civil servants to help them, it nevertheless seems
peculiar that those with less experience would assume the most important positions in
organizations which often have a dramatic impact on the lives and livelihoods of American
citizens.
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Cohen also argued that proper management and supervisory skills are necessary to
government leadership, and can only be gained by years of experience in planning, managing
resources, negotiating, building coalitions, and fostering healthy workplace environments (ibid.,
16-18). Yet “we entrust the administration of the largest ‘company’ in the country, with the
biggest budget and staff, the widest range of products and services, and the greatest impact on
the life of every American, to a cast of well-meaning political loyalists with little or no
management experience. They may be smart, committed, and frequently high-energy
workaholics, but most have never run anything, except, perhaps, a political campaign.” (ibid., 1).
Unsurprisingly, then, numerous studies affirm that political oversight diminishes agency
competence. In a review of 170 case studies of 104 federal agencies, Patrick Wolf reported his
most important finding to be that a key contributor to agency performance is autonomy from
political control by the president and other political actors (1997, 337).
Paul Light has also argued that it is the quality of political oversight that is important; he
found that the better prepared that appointees were for their jobs, the more likely they were to
report viewing civil servants as responsive and competent, suggesting that they understood how
to manage their subordinates effectively (1987, 170-171). Light reported that appointees
generally do come to realize that their civil servants are responsive and competent, but often by
then it is too late (ibid., 157). Even when they come to this realization, they tend erroneously to
conclude that their own civil servants are anomalous – not that bureaucrats as a group possess
these qualities (ibid., 160). Pfiffner has argued that a “cycle of accommodation” occurs, in which
appointees initially distrust careerists but eventually come to appreciate their value (60, 1987a).
Other scholars find that the overuse of appointees also reduces the overall competence of
government. Light has argued that increasing numbers of political appointees over the past
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several decades has led to the “thickening” of government. Presidents are increasingly removed
from the front lines of policy development and implementation, so they do not benefit from the
advice of careerists; information is often distorted as it is transmitted through so many people,
and this makes it harder for innovative ideas to make their way to the top (1995, 8, 70; see also
National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 26; Dunn 1997, 25). The report that never
made it to the Oval Office on the war game played by civil servants in 1965 predicting that a
conflict in Vietnam would end in stalemate comes to mind here (Rourke 1991, 127). Light found
that the explosion of appointees has also diffused accountability. With so many people now
involved in every decision, no one person can be held accountable for anything (1995, 166).
Cohen reported that the large influx and turnover of appointees causes civil servants to
spend much of their time training their bosses instead of managing their programs, further
reducing overall government competence (1996, 40). The short tenure of appointees also leads
appointees to neglect strategies to build the long-term strength of the government organizations
they lead. Cohen argued that “political appointees have no real stake in the future of the
organizations they manage. They do not see themselves as the caretakers of ongoing public
institutions, as responsible for leaving those institutions stronger than when they arrived.” (ibid.,
46).
Meanwhile, numerous scholars have argued that as top jobs go to appointees, the civil
service becomes less attractive to bureaucrats, because the more prestigious opportunities
become foreclosed to them. This results in recruiting problems and diminished incentives for
bureaucrats to upgrade their skill sets in preparation for top posts – further reducing aggregate
government competence (Lewis 2008, 58; National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 25;
Light 2007, 409; Suleiman 2003, 204). By the same token, Heclo argued that the government has
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become “a passing parade of people with mythical mandates.” He argued that by reducing the
number of appointees, presidents could exert greater control over the executive branch because
the remaining appointees would hold positions of true power (1988, 54).
Finally, numerous studies have found that the increased overall number of appointees is
at least partly responsible for the increased amount of time it now takes for appointees to be
recruited and confirmed, resulting in prolonged vacancies in important posts that further erode
government competence (National Commission on the Public Service 1989, 26; Twentieth
Century Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process 1996, 8; Light 2007, 409;
Mackenize 2002, 28; Presidential Appointee Project 1985, 5). Scholars also argue that the sheer
volume of appointments presidential staff are required to make seriously inhibits their ability to
recruit the very best talent (Pfiffner 1987b, 141; National Academy of Public Administration
1985, 4; Panel on Presidentially Appointed Scientists and Engineers 1992, 12; Ingraham,
Thompson and Eisenberg 1995, 270).
A Loyalty-Competence Trade-Off?
Of course, none of these scholars have proposed a government staffed exclusively by
bureaucrats. While civil servants are generally seen to bring the neutral policy expertise,
institutional memory, and continuity that government requires, appointees bring outside
perspectives and perhaps more innovative thinking that is also needed (Lewis 2008, 212, 219).
Furthermore, appointees are generally viewed to be legitimate because they represent the
president, who has received a mandate from the people in the most recent election. As Delmer
Dunn noted, “accountability in a democracy requires that non-elected officials give an account of
their actions and activities to elected officials.” (1997, 166).
The real question, then, is how to strike the right balance in numbers. Given the evidence
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of the relative competence of the two groups, numerous scholars have called for a reduction in
appointees in order to improve government performance (Cohen 1996, 52; Lewis 2012, 592-593;
Meier 1997, 197; National Academy of Public Administration 1985, 2; National Commission on
the Public Service 1989, 18; Panel on Presidentially Appointed Scientists and Engineers 1992,
18; Twentieth Century Task Force on the Presidential Appointment Process 1996, 8; United
States Commission on National Security/21st Century 2001, xv). In doing so, the United States
Commission on National Security/21st Century characterized the current appointments system as
“putting in jeopardy the leadership and professionalism necessary” for our country’s national
security (2001, xv). Paul Volcker, Chairman of the National Commission on the Public Service,
characterized the call to reduce appointees as the Commission’s most important recommendation
(1996, 31).
However, even if civil servants are more competent, a president might still prefer
political appointees if appointees indeed prove to be more loyal. This has led George C. Edwards
III to question whether presidents face a “loyalty-competence trade-off” in staffing the executive
branch (2001, 81). Lewis has likewise argued that presidents will trade competence in order to
achieve agency responsiveness (2008, 202). Christopher Hood and Martin Lodge have described
a similar dilemma facing political leaders from time immemorial. From dynastic monarchs such
as Frederick the Great of Prussia, to Britain’s Queen Victoria, to twentieth century communist
regimes, to J. Edgar Hoover’s FBI, Hood and Lodge trace a familiar tension between leaders’
desire for competency and loyalty in their staff (2007).
Downs argued that loyalty is critical to managers in a bureaucracy because they cannot
avoid actions which they wish to shield from the public. This will be the case because managers
cannot be aware of all actions their subordinates undertake; managers will sometimes make
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mistakes; and managers will sometimes take shortcuts in order to achieve rapid results (1967, 7172). As a result, leaders will sometimes utilize second-rate subordinates, in order to obtain
requisite loyalty (ibid., 74).
According to Barnard, presidents are right to prize loyalty in selecting their subordinates.
He argued that “the most important single contribution required of the executive, certainly the
most universal qualification, is loyalty, domination by the organization personality. This is the
first necessity because the lines of communication cannot function at all unless the personal
contributions of executives will be present at the required positions, at the times necessary,
without default for ordinary personal reasons.” (1968, 220).
Thus, despite the evidence regarding the relatively lower competence of appointees, the
strategy of politicization pursued by modern presidents might still make sense – but only if 1)
civil servants are found not to be reliably loyal to the president and 2) the greater loyalty of
appointees is determined to redound to the president’s benefit. There is reason to doubt that
either is the case.
The Loyalty of Civil Servants
Heclo has argued that civil servants effectively have a veto over policy. If they are intent
upon thwarting an administration’s efforts, they can leak information to allies in the press,
Congress, and interest groups, or wrap politicians in red tape. More simply, they can just not
volunteer valuable information that will be critical to the success of an initiative (1977, 172-174).
Yet many scholars concur that civil servants generally – though not always – neither shirk their
work nor sabotage administration efforts (Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 129; Brehm and Gates
1997, 107; Ferrara and Ross 2005, 46; Golden 2000, 126).
In fact, in the Presidential Appointee Initiative’s 1999-2000 survey, more political
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appointees said it was “very difficult” to successfully work with the White House than said it
was “very difficult” to direct civil servants! Just five percent of the appointees found managing
careerists to be “very difficult” – the same percentage who found the substantive details of their
programs to be very difficult. The “very difficult” scores of every other responsibility they were
asked about – including managing large programs, working with Congress, working with
networks who affect their agency, the federal budget process, and agency decision-making
procedures – were significantly higher. When asked to rank the responsiveness of the civil
servants they worked with on a scale of one to five, with five being “very responsive,” eightyone percent of these appointees gave careerists scores of four or five (Light and Thomas 2000,
31).
In another study of bureaucrats which reviewed three large surveys of civil servants
conducted in 1979, 1983, and 1992 and case studies of social workers and police officers, Brehm
and Gates found no evidence of mass shirking. Rather, they reported “high levels of productivity
and superior performance.” (1997, 74). In a 1993 survey of officials in fifteen agencies, Maranto
found that “by an … 81-8% margin the appointees trust the career executives in their
organizations.” (78). And, even during the height of the anti-government protests of the late
1960’s, Cary Hershey reported that “no more than 2 percent of the approximately three hundred
and thirty thousand Washington-based federal workers have ever participated in any of the
numerous forms of protest.” (1973, xi).
Of course, some appointees have claimed otherwise. For example, President Nixon’s
chief of staff, H.R. Haldeman, claimed that bureaucratic shirking or sabotage “happened every
day.” Yet when pressed in an interview with James Pfiffner for examples of such activity, he
could come up with exactly one: the IRS had refused to audit the tax returns of rival politicians
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(Pfiffner 1996, 74).
What accounts for all of this evidence of the loyalty of civil servants? Scholars have
found that it is largely the inverse of the expectations in the typology of civil servants examined
earlier.
1. Managers have carrots and sticks to control civil servants, though they are often
unnecessary.
In his seminal work Bureaucracy, Wilson considered why bureaucrats work at all rather
than shirk at every opportunity.” He argued that “in part the answer is that even in government
service managers to some extent can control the material rewards of their subordinates. It may be
hard to fire or demote anybody, but it is not too hard to give people attractive or miserable job
assignments or to speed up or slow down their prospects for promotion.” (1989, 156). A variety
of scholars concur that an array of incentives are effective in inducing civil servants to adhere to
the policies and practices set by their managers. As Pfiffner argued, “career bureaucrats want to
keep their jobs and their paychecks. They realize that if they are found to be undermining
administration policies in any important way, they can be fired, demoted, moved geographically,
or given a job with no function.” (1996, 84).
Even Sanera conceded that “while it is part of popular opinion that federal employees
cannot be rewarded or punished, they can.” (1984, 526). He outlined a range of tools appointees
have for managing civil servants, including trading access to high-level staff and high-profile
projects for loyalty; the merit pay provisions for top-level civil servants in the SES; and the
prerogative to move staff to less-desirable positions and locations (1984, 525-529). Maranto
concurred that because “Washington is a competitive, status oriented company town” and just
7,000 of the 1.8 million civil servants will be promoted to the upper-echelon SES, the power of
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promotion that appointees wield is an efficacious tool (2005, 4). Edward Lazear has further noted
that a system such as that of the civil service, in which a worker’s wages grow over time, serves
to incentivize the productivity of the worker, who is motivated to secure future benefits (1981,
606). Meanwhile, the threat of exiling civil servants to “turkey farms,” where low performers are
sent, is likewise a potent weapon in the arsenal of appointees; “Research suggests that a single
such bonus, promotion, or exile to a turkey farm can send a message throughout an entire
organization.” (Maranto 2005, 105).
Marissa Martino Golden’s study of four agencies that President Reagan attempted to alter
dramatically also confirmed this finding. She found that self-interest compelled obedience on the
part of civil servants because they sought to avoid the wrath of appointees and feared losing their
jobs or being transferred to undesirable positions or geographical locations (2000, 159). As a
result, the motive of self-interest resulted in increased bureaucratic compliance during the
Reagan administration, despite the fact that many civil servants disagreed personally with the
policies their agencies pursued (ibid., 23).
Stephen Hess’ study of government public affairs officers during the Reagan
administration echoed this finding: “Press officers perform a services function, and as staff
officers they wish to develop special relationships with the supervisors on whom they must
depend for advancement.” (1984, 12). He reported that “most of the conflicts I witnessed were
between political appointees, usually within an agency” and “most fights turn out to be not us
against them but us against us, including some internecine quarrels among career personnel.”
(ibid., 12-13).
Similarly, Joseph A. Ferrara and Lynn C. Ross interviewed political appointees and civil
servants in 2004 and found that the careerists wanted their political bosses to succeed. The
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researchers concluded that this was the case in part because “an unsuccessful appointee is
probably an unhappy appointee, and an unhappy appointee is probably an unpleasant manager,
which erodes the quality of work life. Ultimately careerists, like most people, want to please their
bosses.” (2005, 50).
These studies, then, confirm that superiors can exercise control over their subordinates.
Yet they leave open the possibility that bosses will be unable to do so if they cannot detect
insubordination in the first place, as Weber and Downs have warned. However, Francis Rourke
has argued that legislators often specialize in policy areas and politicians may do so as well,
offsetting the informational advantage Weber posited bureaucrats to possess (1984, 169). Both
congressional committees and interest groups affected by agency decisions closely monitor
agency behavior, and can pull “fire alarms” by notifying the president if they are unhappy,
providing the president with an additional check on bureaucratic expertise (McCubbins and
Schwartz 1984; Calvert, McCubbins and Weingast 1989, 599).
Furthermore, a variety of other evidence suggests that the goals and preferences of
bureaucrats often align with those of their bosses in the first place. For example, Rourke has
argued that “a private vice can, as Adam Smith long ago noted, often be transformed into a
public virtue. The community may also be as well served if rank-and-file employees are allowed
to gratify their continuing desire for improvements in remuneration and working conditions. It is
certainly reasonable to expect that satisfied employees will be more efficient…” (1984, 102).
In keeping with this theory, in their study, Brehm and Gates found no evidence to support
the leisure-maximization hypothesis of Alchian and Demsetz – nor other claims of bureaucratic
shirking (1997, 198). In fact, in a 1992 survey, when federal workers were asked whether they
desired paid time off, it was the least popular of seven possible types of rewards (ibid., 79).
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Similarly, in 1979 and 1983 surveys, more than ninety-two percent of workers agreed with the
statement “I work hard on my job.” (ibid., 90). In the 1992 survey, more than eighty percent
agreed with the statement “when I don’t feel well in the morning, I still try to come to work
because I know my contribution will be missed.”
Brehm and Gates found that while supervisors do impact subordinate compliance, their
influence is small (ibid., 107). Staff were motivated primarily by what they termed “functional”
benefits, in which “the subordinate acquires utility by performing the very things that he is
supposed to do.” (ibid., 75). In the 1979 and 1983 surveys, employees reported the most popular
aspect of their job to be “getting a feeling of accomplishment from your job.” The second most
popular in 1979 was “the chances you have to accomplish something worthwhile.” After
functional benefits, the second most-important driver of their behavior was solidarity benefits:
“rewards one receives from the camaraderie and recognition of ones’ peers” – such as respect
and friendship (ibid., 74-75, 80).
The research of James L. Perry and Lois Recascino Wise concurs on this finding that
civil servants often possess innate desires to do their jobs, rather than shirk, making monitoring
and/or coercion by superiors unnecessary. They have found that individuals who possess what
they term “public service motivation” are more likely to become civil servants (2010, 693). This
motivation “is associated conceptually with six dimensions: attraction to public policy making,
commitment to the public interest, civic duty, social justice, self-sacrifice, and compassion.”
(ibid., 5). Dennis Wittmer’s survey of civil servants likewise found that they “exhibited a higher
value for doing work that is helpful to others” than individuals in the private sector (1991, 379).
Individuals so driven would seem unlikely to eschew work in favor of leisure while on the clock.
Vice President Al Gore’s report “From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government that
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Works Better and Costs Less” similarly reported that “our interviews with hundreds of federal
workers support what survey after survey of public service workers have found: People want
challenging jobs.” (1993, 7). Wilson likewise argued that bureaucrats are motivated by a “desire
to do the job.” (1989, 156). Pfiffner noted that such a desire should incentivize cooperation on
the part of civil servants, because “…they cannot fulfill their professional roles if they are not
part of the action.” Therefore, “this professional and psychological need to be included on the
part of career executives is not compatible with foot dragging, sabotage of administration
policies, or merely adequate performance of duties.” (1996, 84). Maranto likewise found that
“given constrained public sector salaries, career executives get important psychological income
from playing for a winning team.” (2005, 4). Likewise, Barnard noted that “the accomplishment
of an organization purpose becomes itself a source of personal satisfaction and a motive for
many individuals in many organizations.” (1968, 89). Similarly, Ferrara and Ross found that
“careerists care about adding value to the process. If a careerist’s political boss does not
accomplish his or her goals, this diminishes the careerist’s perception that he or she is
contributing.” (2005, 50).
These studies thus suggest that the civil service system has not completely hamstrung the
executive; administrations still have tools at their disposal for punishing and rewarding staff.
While superiors will only be able to effectively wield their powers to the extent that they can
accurately detect the behavior of their subordinates, much evidence suggests that this problem of
incomplete information will not result in leisure-shirking on the part of careerists. This is
because careerists are predisposed to work hard in the first place, driven by the sense of
accomplishment they derive from their work.
A final indication that civil servants work hard lies in the quality of the results they
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produce. In a review of the extant literature, Charles Goodsell noted that “numerous individual
citizen surveys, conducted at all levels of government, in just about every functional area
conceivable, and over several decades back even to 1929, all yield the same essential result:
Most citizens are satisfied with their personal experiences with bureaucracy most of the time.
The proportionate levels of satisfaction generally range from perhaps two-thirds to 70 or 75
percent, and sometimes much higher.” (1994, 29). In another indication of the quality of the
work of the U.S. federal bureaucracy, a comparative study of popular confidence conducted by
the European Value Systems Study Group and reported in 1982 found that the reputation of the
civil service in the U.S. was better than that of both the U.S. Congress and the civil service in
any other country (ibid., 70-72). Furthermore, Goodsell noted that studies do not even generally
find that private-sector firms are more efficient than the bureaucracy (ibid., 63).

2. Organizational culture may promote loyalty to appointees.
A large body of work focuses on how the culture of an organization comes to influence
the behavior of its members. Wilson described organizational culture as “a distinctive way of
viewing and reacting to the bureaucratic world – that shapes whatever discretionary authority
(and it is often a great deal) the operators may have.” (1989, 27). In his seminal work
Administrative Behavior: A Study of Decision-Making Processes in Administrative Organization,
Herbert Simon noted that these ways of viewing the world are initially imposed on a person who
joins the organization, but soon become internalized and a part of the person’s psychology and
attitudes (1957, 198). This culture influences how the individual comes to make decisions “by
limiting the range within which an individual’s decisions and activities are to lie.” (ibid., 199).
Through the process of identifying with the organization, “the individual substitutes
organizational objectives … for his own aims as the value-indices which determine his
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organizational decisions.” (ibid., 218).
The effects of organizational culture may be powerful. Wilson noted the famous study of
the Hawthorne plant of Western Electric Company, which found that workers reduced their
output to adhere to group norms, essentially placing higher priority on peer rewards than on
monetary rewards (1989, 48). John DiIulio found that civil servants in the Bureau of Prisons
prioritized the goals of the organization over their own personal goals (Dunn 1997, 33). A
similar dynamic is seen in soldiers at war. “By almost any standard, the rationally self-interested
behavior for a soldier facing the prospect of imminent death or injury is to break and run.”
(Wilson 1989, 45). Why do they fight? At least in part because of peer expectations and concerns
for their reputations – two forces which scholars say make organizational culture a particularly
potent influence on behavior (ibid., 46-47).
D.M. Rousseau has argued that “people who share beliefs about the behaviors they are
committed to demonstrate are in a sense doubly bound to those behaviors, both by their personal
commitments as well as by social pressure to fit in and be accepted.” (1995, 48). But people
conform not merely for superficial reasons. Doing so may also have great utility. The desire for
cognitive and behavioral consistency is a well-documented human need (Brehm and Gates 1997,
51). Brehm and Gates argue that the reason people conform to specific behaviors is because at
some point someone initially derived a better outcome from the behavior, and following standard
operating procedures is more rational than undergoing a complicated decision-making process
for each occurrence (ibid., 72, 5). As a result, they found that employees learning by imitation
could end up working hard for rules which they personally disliked (ibid., 73). Additionally,
Downs and Moe have both argued that individuals invest in their reputations with the expectation
of future rewards (Downs 1967, 69; Moe 1989, 272).

40

A variety of additional evidence suggests organizational culture is a powerful influence
on the behavior of civil servants. Bernard Mennis, for example, studied foreign service officers
and military officers. In keeping with the cultures in which they worked, Mennis found foreign
service officers to be more liberal, and military officers to be more conservative (Wilson 1989,
68). Kenneth Meier and Lloyd Nigro found that it was agency membership that determined the
attitudes of the civil servants they studied (1976, 465-467). Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman
also found that the ideological stances of civil servants were related to the departments in which
they worked (2000, 48-49).
All of this has led Wilson to conclude that “people matter, but organization matters also,
and tasks matter most of all.” (1989, 173). This means that we must study particular workplaces
to determine whether compliance is a shared value, behavior and expectation among civil
servants.
While, as noted previously, many scholars have argued that organizational culture
reduces the responsiveness of civil servants, others argue that it is or may also be an important
force promoting bureaucratic compliance to the aims of appointees. Wilson, for example, noted
that an organization may be said to have a mission when its organizational culture is broadly
shared. When this occurs, managers may be confident that subordinates will do what managers
desire because they have common understandings, helping to overcome the problem of shirking
(1989, 95, 109). Similarly, Evan Ringquist has argued that “the most effective restraint on
bureaucracy is not adversarial power, but the values, mission, and role expectations of agencies
and their personnel,” and that these elements of organizational culture can be shaped by
appointees through processes such as re-education, bargaining or replacing staff (1995, 352).
In particular, scholars have found that two factors that should influence organizational
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cultures – particular shared group norms regarding the role of civil servants and professional
training – may promote civil service compliance.

Civil Service Norms
In the bureaucracies envisioned by Weber and Woodrow Wilson, there would be a neat
dichotomy between political appointees who determine policy, and civil servants who execute it
(Gerth and Mills 1958, 220; Wilson 1886). Today, scholars generally agree that such distinctions
are not feasible in practice. Yet a variety of evidence suggests that civil servants continue to see
their proper role as neutral executors of the directives of their political bosses, in recognition of
their supposed electoral mandates. This is likely due to the fact that, as Rourke has noted, “the
political executive, whether elected or appointed, is in some sense a symbol of public control of
the governmental process. In a society highly impregnated with democratic ideology – as is true
of the United States, for example – this is a formidable source of authority.” (1984, 113).
In Golden’s interviews, she found that civil service norms prevented careerists from
sabotaging Reagan’s initiatives, even though they often disagreed with them personally. The
bureaucrats explained that the president had a legitimate electoral mandate to effect change, and
it was their job as professionals to execute policy as directed. They “believed that loyalty to
presidential leadership was “the right thing.” (2000, 24). Or, as one bureaucrat told her: “Of
course there will be changes around here – there’s been an election and nobody elected me.”
(ibid., 22).
The interviews conducted by Ferrara and Ross interviews echoed this finding. “Many
careerists spoke of the administration as having the right to make its mark on the government by
virtue of its electoral legitimacy. There is a sense among careerists that an important part of
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doing their job is serving the agenda of the current president because he is the current president
and regardless of his party. In general, we found that careerists check their personal politics at
the door because they view their role in the political process as technical, not partisan.” (2005,
45).
Additionally, Maranto and Hult conducted surveys of senior civil servants in 1987-1988
and 1993-1994 and reported an “absence of relationships between careerist ideology and
evaluations of the political appointees of both presidents Reagan and Clinton” which they noted
“arguably point to the general centrism of civil servants and to norms of bureaucratic
accommodation.” (2004, 211).

Professional Training
Wilson noted that bureaucratic behavior is often attributable to their professional norms.
(1989, 59). “In a bureaucracy, professionals are those employees who receive some significant
portion of their incentives from organized groups of fellow practitioners located outside the
agency.” (ibid., 60). Such professionals “will bring to the agency their skills but also their biases:
Lawyers, economists, and engineers see the world in very different ways.” (ibid., 371). In
Democracy and the Public Service, Frederick Mosher outlined the reasons why this will be the
case: people first self-select into their professional fields; next the selection process weeds out
those who are unlikely to conform to professional expectations; the individuals then undergo
training, providing another opportunity to remove non-conformists; on the job, the systems of
supervision, review and promotion reinforce professional norms; and many people stay on the
job for decades. (1982, 162-164). “The holding of a single perspective for so long a time – up to
forty years – is almost inevitably a sculptor of viewpoints, values, and methods” (ibid., 164).
As previously noted, Lynn has contended that “agencies in which … career personnel
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have strong professional identities … probably constitute the most difficult challenges to a
political appointee.” (1985, 362). Mosher likewise argued that, as a result of professionalization,
bureaucratic behavior is controlled by professional organizations and the values inculcated
during training, as opposed to by government agencies themselves.
Yet Golden found evidence to suggest that professional norms may actually redound to
an administration’s benefit. She found that the professional norms of attorneys at the Department
of Justice’s Civil Rights Division led them to follow the directives of their political superiors,
despite their personal disagreements with the administration. The lawyers who Golden
interviewed told her that they thought they did a better job of arguing the administration’s cases
than appointees – even though they generally did not agree with what they were actually arguing
(2000, 96). Golden reported that the lawyers “were quite explicit that they viewed their job as
winning the case and serving their client, and that in this case their client was the Reagan
administration. They were quite explicit that they made the arguments they were told to make,
even though they believed that many of the arguments were misguided.” (ibid., 99).
Golden attributed this to their legal training, which indoctrinates attorneys to make the
best possible case for their clients (ibid., 103). Furthermore, she found that the impact of
professional training is a key variable in how civil servants approach situations in which they
disagree with appointees; the legal backgrounds of the Department of Justice lawyers (who were
essentially trained to argue) also caused them to be more comfortable with voicing
disagreements internally. By contrast, the engineers at the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, who were trained to present scientific evidence, were less comfortable voicing
their disagreements to appointees (ibid., 164-165). This suggests that it is necessary to study the
professional norms of other occupations in order to determine how they affect civil service
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compliance. My study will therefore build on this literature by studying government officials
who work in public affairs.
Autonomy and Responsiveness
What about the claims that the organizational cultures of bureaucrats are perverse?
Merton and Hummel argued that civil servants would follow processes instead of focusing on
people and outcomes. Yet a variety of evidence contradicts these claims. Brehm and Gates, for
example, reported that “most of the federal employees feel a moderate degree of autonomy on
the job, quite in contrast to popular speculations about bureaucrats in faceless jobs with little
control over their own circumstances.” (1997, 98-99.) John Foster’s study of the extant literature
found no evidence of bureaucratic rigidity; Melvin Kohn studied 3,101 male bureaucrats and
found them to be more open-mined, receptive to change, and flexible than other men. (Goodsell
1994, 118).
Similarly, as previously noted, citizens themselves generally report satisfaction with their
interactions with bureaucrats – even those at the much-maligned Internal Revenue Service!
(Wood and Waterman 1994, 2; Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 197). The widely-accepted lack of
a clear distinction between policy and administration and degree of discretion that civil servants
enjoy, which were previously discussed, also clearly contradict these claims.
And what of the claims of Downs and others that bureaucracies will be characterized by
inertia? They have been directly contradicted by the evidence presented by Brehm and Gates,
Gore, and others that civil servants are responsive and desire challenging jobs. As Cohen argued,
“contrary to popular perceptions, career managers get their kicks from the challenge of
implementing new initiatives. Administering the same programs or functions year after year
eventually wears thin, and the greatest professional growth and satisfaction usually come from
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successfully launching new projects or programs.” (1996, 11).

3. Civil servants are not largely driven by their personal ideologies; their concern for the
reputation and efficacy of their organizations prevents them from sabotaging administration
efforts.
Contrary to the charges of Sanera and others that civil servants will shirk or sabotage the
efforts of presidents with whom they personally disagree, psychologists tell us there is not a lot
of evidence that attitudes drive behavior. For example, in a wide review of the extant literature,
Icek Ajzen and Martin Fishbein noted that, while they question the methodology of many past
studies, “reports of rather low or nonsignificant relations between attitudinal predictors and
behavioral criteria have been accumulating for more than 40 years.” (1977, 888).
James Q. Wilson laid out a rather large body of work that concurs on this finding. For
example, a study by Jeffrey Manditch Prottas found that the decisions of government welfare
officers were driven by the exigencies of particular situations – not their personal attitudes (ibid.,
52).. Similarly, Samuel Stouffer’s study of soldiers in World War II found no correlation
between a soldier’s morale and his effectiveness (Wilson 1989, 46). Most relevantly, numerous
scholars have failed to document a relationship between a person’s job satisfaction or morale and
performance at work, as measured by productivity, absenteeism and tardiness (Ajzen and
Fishbein 1977, 897).
The reason for this, Wilson said, is because “our behavior toward an object will be
influenced not only by our evaluation of it but by the rewards and penalties associated with
alternative courses of action.” These are controlled by those in authority – or, in the case of civil
servants, by appointees. “When we realize that attitudes must compete with incentives for
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influence over our behavior, it is not surprising that attitudes often lose out to the rewards we
seek or the penalties we try to avoid.” (1989, 53).
Even if it turned out that civil servants were driven by their personal beliefs, it is unclear
that this would lead to sabotage. For example, Herbert Kaufman’s famous study of the Forest
Service found that the bureaucracy’s leadership was successful in deliberately manipulating the
preferences of rangers, so that they aligned with those of their bosses. They used a variety of
tools to accomplish this, including training; linking the fortunes of the rangers with those of the
organization through promotion policies not based merely on tenure; transferring new rangers
frequently to steep them in organizational culture; and promoting agency identification by
including them in decision-making processes. (1960, 170, 176, 181-182, 185). Falsification of
records, for example, was prevented by psychological preference controls: “The observer of the
organization quickly gets the feeling such behavior would be regarded as not only immoral, but
cowardly, unmanly, degrading to the individual and to the Service (whose members have a fierce
pride in it), and that any man who practices it must end with contempt for himself for not having
the courage to fight for those departures from policy that he believes right or to admit his errors
when he is wrong.” (ibid., 130). As a result of this successful indoctrination and acculturation,
rangers unconsciously pursued the preferences of their superiors. “From the Rangers’ point of
view, they are not obeying orders or responding to cues when they take action on their districts;
they are exercising their own initiative.” (ibid., 222).
Another reason that the personal ideologies of civil servants would not impact their work
is if they were not particularly ideological people to begin with. Brewer and Maranto’s survey of
government workers in 1987 found that political appointees were more likely to embrace the
“zealot” role that Downs described than civil servants, which they ascribed to the appointees’
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“background in politics and desire to implement the president’s policies.” (2000, 79, 81).
Likewise, after interviewing officials in agencies that President Reagan attempted to alter
dramatically, Golden reported that “most of the careerists I studied did not seem to be motivated
primarily by partisanship or ideology.” (2000, 166). Furthermore, Golden found that the civil
servants she studied did not necessarily believe they had all the answers (ibid., 143). In fact,
many of the civil servants told her that they had changed their personal views over time (ibid.,
166). Aberbach and Rockman separately also reported evidence of ideological openness on the
part of civil servants, finding that, between 1970-1987, as political appointees became more
conservative, so too did civil servants (2000, 107, 109).
Stephen Hess, who studied government public affairs officers, likewise reported that
“politicians assume that civil service employees have the same abiding interest in partisan
politics that they have, but this is rarely the case. Career personnel often have an abiding interest
in bureaucratic politics, the internal machinations of their agencies, which may or may not work
to the advantage of political appointees but not because an administration is Republican or
Democratic.” (1984, 12).
Furthermore, a variety of evidence suggests that civil servants would leave agencies if
they did not agree with the goals they were pursuing. Glenn L. Starks, for example, has found
that “when people become ‘citizens’ of the organization and find that they do not fit their work
environments, they will tend to leave.” (2007, 61). Likewise, James L. Perry and Lois Recascino
Wise argued that “if individuals are drawn to public organizations because of expectations they
have about the rewards of public service but those expectations go unfulfilled, they are likely
either to revise their preferences and objectives or to seek membership in organizations
compatible with their interest.” (1990, 370). Similarly, when Ferrara and Ross interviewed civil
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servants in 2004, their subjects reported that if they felt strongly against a policy, they would
leave – not sabotage the initiative (2005, 46). Hummel concurred that “functionaries who cannot
accept the restrictions of bureaucratic service leave, or are forced to leave, the bureaucracy.”
(1977, 23).
Another reason why the personal policy beliefs of civil servants do not lead them to
sabotage agency efforts is because they believe that doing so would harm the reputation and
efficacy of their organizations. In Judith E. Michaels’ interviews with Senate-confirmed
appointees in the administrations of George H.W. Bush and Bill Clinton, the appointees reported
“that as a group, careerists want to help their bosses, in large part because they identify with their
programs so much more than they identify with the political party of the incoming or outgoing
administration.” (2005, 14). The interviews conducted by Ferrara and Ross with both appointees
and civil servants in 2004 concurred on this finding. They reported that the civil servants cared
about the reputations of their organizations and believed that these reputations would be
enhanced if the appointees for whom they worked succeeded (2005, 49). Ferrara and Ross
speculated that this might be the case because the success of the organization reflects well on
civil servants themselves (ibid., 50).
Golden’s research also confirmed this finding. In interviews with careerists at the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), where a few civil servants were whistleblowers, she
found that civil servants uniformly disdained their colleagues who leaked information to the
press. They “attributed nothing but the basest motives” to these people, complaining to Golden
that the individuals were disgruntled and publicity hungry and were undermining the agency’s
work. (2000, 136). Golden reported that “the careerists I interviewed were more concerned with
protecting the EPA’s reputation than with protesting policy change or challenging the Reagan
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appointees.” (ibid., 136).
Robert Durant’s study of the implementation of natural resource policy in the Reagan
administration likewise found that the concerns of civil servants for the interests of their
organizations made them loath to sabotage appointees by appealing to outside actors such as
Congress or the press (1992). Durant found that when civil servants disagree with appointees,
they are likely only to make “limited appeals” by discussing their concerns with their bosses,
since they fear that resistance would cause delays that would be harmful to their organizational
missions (1990, 328). When civil servants offer greater resistance, Durant found that often
“manipulated agreement” may be reached because the careerists fear that mobilizing outside
groups would result in negative publicity that would be harmful to their organization (ibid., 323).
When civil servants view changes that an administration pursues as costly, extensive, and
illegitimate, they may mobilize outside actors, but they will also be eager to reach settlements
with appointees because they will fear losing control to these outside players (ibid., 324).
Therefore, it is only when appointees pursue changes that civil servants view as
detrimental to an agency’s core mission that civil servants will be willing to engage in protracted
battles involving outside actors (ibid.). Of course, sometimes presidents actually are hostile to an
agency’s core mission. However, as we will soon see, even in such instances bureaucratic
rebellion tends to be muted. In general, however, as Rourke has argued, bureaucrats cannot work
to undermine the president without undermining the agencies “with which their personal fortunes
are linked”; the president “is the best salesman they have for the achievement of the agency’s
goals and the continued replenishment of its resources.” (1984, 113).
In all, civil servants do not appear to be driven by personal or organizational interests –
other than an interest in seeing their agencies succeed.
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4. Civil servants are more responsive to the president than to other masters.
Finally, contrary to the charge that civil servants will serve other masters, a host of
studies of agency outputs have concluded that they are responsive to the president’s agenda.
Studies have repeatedly found that while agencies do respond to other actors, they are
most responsive to the president. For example, B. Dan Wood and Richard Waterman studied
eight federal agencies, finding that they were responsive to the president, Congress, and the
courts – but the most frequent mechanism for changing the behavior of the agencies was the
appointees chosen by the president to lead them (1994, 74). The authors also studied the outputs
of the EPA, finding that the agency responded to numerous actors, including the president,
Congress, the judiciary, media, and interest groups, but “administrative resources and leadership
are the most important determinants of adaptive movements by the bureaucracy.” (1993, 524).
Additionally, Wood and James E. Anderson studied antitrust regulation, concluding that “in all
cases, it is obvious that antitrust enforcement levels depend critically on … a politics … driven
mainly by executive prerogatives.” (1993, 34). Numerous other studies concur in finding that
regulatory agencies which are ostensibly independent are in fact responsive to the president
(Brigman 1981, 244-245).
Other studies have confirmed the responsiveness to the president of bureaucracies that
could have been expected to be the most resistant. For example, Thomas J. Weko studied the
responsiveness of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare to the Nixon and Reagan
administrations, arguing that careerists in the social service agency could be expected to be
hostile to the conservative agendas of these administrations. Instead, he found compliance to
political appointees– arguing that “responsiveness can emerge even in the most challenging
environments.” (1995, 128, 148). Ronald Randall’s study of President Nixon’s successful
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changes to welfare policy, which included interviews with bureaucrats, found that his
administration was able to control the bureaucracy through tactics, such as decentralizing control
to regional bureaucrats who were more receptive to the policy changes the administration sought
than Washington-based bureaucrats (1979, 802-803, 806). And, as previously noted, Golden’s
study of four agencies that President Reagan attempted to alter dramatically found that the
compliance of civil servants actually increased during his tenure (2000, 23).
Scholars have also confirmed the responsiveness to the president of organizations
designed specifically to resist political influence. Moe studied three independent commissions –
the National Labor Relations Board, Federal Trade Commission, and Securities and Exchange
Commission and found that their regulatory behavior changed in accordance with the positions
of presidents (1982, 198; 1985, 1109). Joseph Stewart, Jr. and Jane S. Cromartie also studied the
Federal Trade Commission, concurring that it issued more complaints of deceptive practices
under Republican presidents, in keeping with presidential preferences (1982, 572). B. Dan Wood
studied the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, which in theory should also be
insulated from political stimuli, finding instead that agency outputs corresponded with the
preferences of presidents (1990, 503). John Kingdon’s interviews with civil servants in the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare found that when they disagreed with the Nixon
administration’s policies, they were not able to pursue their own priorities. They responded,
rather, by continuing to develop ideas and proposals, which they could offer up when a more
receptive administration came to power (1984, 32-33).
Karen Holt studied civil servants in the Department of Justice, who “almost universally
supported more rigorous enforcement” than the Reagan administration pursued of the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, which allows the Attorney General to file lawsuits
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against states for unconstitutional conditions in institutions, such as prisons and hospitals for the
mentally ill. While she did report a few cases of sabotage, such as leaks to Congress and the
press and assistance to other agents, who could advance the goal of better enforcement, Holt
concluded that “despite pervasive policy disagreement among holdover careerists, few resorted
to sabotage. … Most carryover attorneys initially tried to stay and work within the system after
the new Administration took office.” (1998, 98).
And, in perhaps the hardest test, Irene Rubin conducted case studies of offices whose
programs the Reagan administration cut or eliminated, and found that “there was little, if any,
footdragging by career officials in the implementation of policy.” She reported that she found
“no evidence that new policies, such as turning programs over to the states or deregulation, were
purposely delayed or ignored. The agencies’ employees did what they were supposed to do,
including terminating their own programs.” (1985, 196). Rubin concluded that “if the president
can successfully order agencies to terminate programs or to destroy their own capacity to manage
or implement programs, then he can certainly control the bureaucracy.” (ibid., 23).
Of course, not all studies concur on these findings. Wood also studied the EPA, and
found that civil servants pursued enforcements in contradiction of the goals of the Reagan
administration (1988, 227-228). Yet Brian J. Cook’s criticism of Wood’s study is a glaring
example of the limits of such attempts to measure a phenomenon as nuanced as the loyalty of
staff exogenously and quantitatively. Cook noted that Wood’s model neglected to account for the
influence that Congress had on the agency, leading to potentially faulty results (1989, 967).
Marc Allen Eisner and Kenneth J. Meier’s study of antitrust cases found that neither the
President nor Congress were influential; outcomes were rather explained by the norms and
values of the economists of the Antitrust Division (1990, 281, 283). Jeffrey E. Cohen’s study of
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votes on the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) found that the appointees of a particular
president do not vote as a group significantly more frequently than they vote with others,
suggesting that appointment power was limited – though he noted that presidents have not
prioritized the vetting of ICC appointees (1985, 61, 69). Kingdon reported that, in his interviews,
some civil servants admitted leaking information to Congressional staff (1984, 34). Furthermore,
as Dunn has argued, the claims of appointees that civil servants are not responsive must be taken
into account (1997, 34). Nevertheless, the preponderance of evidence seems to point towards
responsiveness to the president.
Maranto’s studies are typical of a literature which often finds small, isolated accounts of
civil service disloyalty that earn the offenders opprobrium within their own cohort. For example,
“about a quarter of political appointees interviewed in 1999-2000 noted specific instances in
which individual careerists hid information or were in other ways less than cooperative in
supporting administration initiatives, though most saw such actions as isolated.” (2005, 54). In a
1993-1994 survey, seven percent of civil servants voiced their dissent to interest groups, two
percent to media, and seven percent to Congress (ibid., 105). Maranto found that “most career
executives see such activity as not fully legitimate,” and “organization whistleblowers lead
lonely lives as nonpersons in their own agencies. Coworkers fear being seen with them.” (ibid.,
106). As Rourke concluded, “cases where career subordinates openly repudiate the decisions of
their political superiors often receive great publicity, but they are exceptions to the general
willingness of bureaucrats to go along with policies decided upon at a higher level.” (1984, 112).
What Does Account for the Bad Reputation of Bureaucrats?
Contrary to the expectations of the scholars in the earlier typology, these findings
generally concur with Edwards’ argument that “the recalcitrance of bureaucracy is such a strong
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element of the conventional wisdom about how government works that it perseveres even in the
face of widespread contradictory evidence.” (2001, 96). What accounts for this discrepancy?
Part of it may be a tendency to blame bureaucrats for a dysfunctional system created by
other political actors. Moe, for example, argued that dysfunctional bureaucracies are the
inevitable outcome of our political process. When bureaucracies are created, interest groups
attempt to restrict them heavily through tools such as detailed mandates and decision-making
procedures, even though this sacrifices some of the competence that would accrue from giving
them more discretion, because the interest groups fear that future politicians will otherwise lead
the bureaucracies in ways averse to their group’s goals. During the creation of a bureaucracy,
however, these interest groups must unavoidably compromise with those who wish to derail the
agency’s goals through mechanisms, such as monitoring and checks and balances. The executive
will attempt to exert as much control as possible over the bureaucracy, while members of
Congress will attempt to thwart such efforts. The bureaucracy that results from the push and pull
of these forces will, unsurprisingly, not be designed for optimal performance (1989, 274-280).
Other scholars concur that the dysfunctions of the bureaucracy are due to the perverse
organizational structures that arise under our constitutional system of separate bodies vying for
power (Aberbach and Rockman 2000, 187; Meier 1997, 197; Wilson 1989, 376). Wilson traced
increased attempts to control revenues, productive factors, and agency goals by Congress, the
courts, politicians, and interest groups since the 1970s, further constraining the bureaucracy and
hindering performance (1989, 71). Each of these groups demands specific rules for governing the
bureaucracy, which are not reconciled with one another (ibid., 363). Goodsell likewise concluded
that the problem is that the bureaucracy is given “inconsistent, contradictory, and hence
unachievable goals and tasks.” (1994, 77; see also Meier 1997, 196). Wilson identified this
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American preoccupation with rule-making as unique in comparison with other countries – an
outcome of the distrust of government power whose roots stretch back to our nation’s founding
(Bruce 1984, 6; Goodsell 1994, 11; Wilson 1989, 335; Wood and Waterman 1994, 2).
Another problem is the sheer size of the government. As Emmet J. Hughes, an aide to
President Eisenhower, said: “the vast machinery of national leadership – the tens of thousands of
levers and switches and gears – simply do not respond to the impatient jab of a finger or the
angry pounding of a fist.” (Cronin 1980, 241). An additional problem may be insufficient
bureaucratic resources (Rourke 1984, 161-162; Edwards 1983, 204). Indeed, the very fact that
bureaucracies have been utilized as scapegoats for so many decades can only diminish their
ability to fight for the resources they need.
What do politicians do when agencies they have so constituted and constrained produce
perverse outcomes? They blame the bureaucrats themselves – rhetoric which itself further
contributes to the poor reputations of civil servants (Wood and Waterman 1994, 2). Other
scholars trace the public relations problem faced by these officials to the fact that, in contrast to
Europe, where civil servants were long a respected elite (with traditions ranging from the
intelligent amateur in Britain to Germany’s well-trained specialists), in America the bureaucracy
developed after the creation of our democracy (Wood and Waterman 1994, 4). Nevertheless,
contrary to their reputations, the above findings suggest that civil servants are generally, though
not always, competent and loyal.

What About Appointee Loyalty?
It is finally important to note it is not in fact clear that appointees themselves will always
be loyal to the president. Cohen, for example, has argued that the appointee selection process, in
which presidents hire individuals in part to ingratiate themselves with members of Congress,
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interest groups, and other actors, necessarily reduces the loyalty of appointees to the president.
“To strike the necessary compromises, he often ends up selecting or approving individuals who
are not loyal to him, or who are more loyal to someone else, or who have policy agendas at odds
with his own.” (1996, 12). Furthermore, Cohen pointed out, if an appointee owes his loyalty to
the White House, (s)he may not obey immediate superiors within his or her agency, ultimately
making it more difficult to implement presidential programs (ibid., 13). Lewis also drew an
important distinction between the type of loyalty that campaign workers have demonstrated to
the president personally “in a costly way” (such as perhaps in lost sleep!) and ideological fealty,
which is something different (2011, 57).
Furthermore, Heclo has argued that policy experts today are part of “issue networks,” and
appointees from such networks may be more loyal to their networks than to the president (1978,
106, 118). If a president removes an appointee who disagrees with him, Heclo said, the president
is likely to end up with another member of the same network who holds similar beliefs (ibid.,
122). Furthermore, in a study of the loyalty of cabinet secretaries – whose public affiliation with
the president makes it likely that they are the most loyal of appointees – Anthony Bertelli and
Christian Grose found that, in their congressional testimony between 1991-2002, secretaries of
agriculture publicly disagreed with the president six percent of the time; secretaries of labor
disagreed with the president ten percent of the time, and secretaries of commerce disagreed with
the president twenty-four percent of the time (2007, 237).
Furthermore, David Cohen has argued that appointees use their offices to promote
themselves (1996, 30-31); unlike civil servants, they do not enjoy tenure and are therefore likely
more concerned with their future career prospects.
It is thus far from clear that appointees will be uniformly loyal to the president.
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Nevertheless, to the extent that appointees are particularly loyal, how does this differential affect
the interests of the president?

The Impact of Appointee Zeal
The danger of too much loyalty is that it may turn into an overzealousness, which
ultimately proves detrimental to the executive. Many modern presidential scandals (such as, for
example, Iran-Contra and Watergate) have actually resulted from too much staff loyalty
(Rudalevidge 2002, 21). A more recent example of this phenomenon are the senior aides to New
Jersey Governor Chris Christie who ordered that lanes on the nation’s busiest bridge be closed,
ensnarling traffic jams for days in the town of Fort Lee, New Jersey, in an alleged effort to
retaliate against the town’s Democratic mayor for not endorsing the Republican governor –
causing a massive political scandal which weakened the governor (Zernike 2014). As Aberbach
and Rockman have argued, “the urge to command and centralize often fails to recognize that
political impulses should be subjected to tests of sobriety. Though there are a good many reasons
to argue on behalf of the basic idea of “neutral competence” and against the politicization of all
executive organizations, the most fundamental one that a president ought to consider is the
avoidance of error and illegality that have wracked recent presidencies.” (1999, 171). Pfiffner
likewise argued that it is the overzealousness of appointees – more than the efforts of political
opponents – that have been “the greatest threats to the reputation and political interests of recent
presidents.” (1999, 6).
Furthermore, legions of scholars have demonstrated that, in America’s constitutional
system, when the president pushes too far, he is usually checked by the other branches of
government (Wilson 1989, 259). In the famous formulation of Mathew McCubbins and Thomas
Schwartz, when the president overreaches, upset citizens and advocacy groups pull “fire alarms”
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and Congress intervenes (1984).
For example, Robert Durant’s study of the Reagan administration’s natural resource
policy confirmed that the more that the administration pursued policy change administratively,
the more likely it was for Congress, clients, and “an aroused, litigious public” to pull fire alarms
(1992, 76). Richard Waterman likewise found that when wielded overzealously, the tools of the
administrative presidency provoked backlash that ultimately reduced presidential influence
(1989, 189). Evan Ringquist also found that executive attempts to control the EPA in the end
reduced political control by mobilizing agency clientele groups (1995, 336).
Additionally, Kingdon’s interviews with nearly 250 appointees, civil servants,
congressional staffers, members of interest groups, and others involved in the policy process
established rather firmly that presidents cannot unilaterally drive policy change (1984, 4, 23,
128). To become viable, ideas must first be “softened” – a process of acclimating both policy
communities and the public at large to new ideas, which typically takes years. If a key event such
as a crisis or a change in the political environment occurs before an idea has gone through this
softening process, change will not be viable (ibid., 128). Thus, presidents who use appointees to
attempt blindly to ram through personal agendas lacking wider support are simply unlikely to be
successful over the long term.
Ultimately, achieving lasting change requires building political consensus, not appointing
zealots to pursue extra-constitutional measures (Rudalevidge 2002, 161; Pfiffner 1999, 19;
Rourke 1992, 544). As Rourke argued,

the hard fact that presidents must also confront is that dutiful responsiveness to
administration goals may not actually be the greatest service that appointees in executive
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agencies can render the White House. Although most presidential aides would like to see
all agency appointees demonstrate such blind loyalty to their chief executive, the ultimate
success of any administration may depend less on the unswerving allegiance of its
appointees to the President than it does on their skill and dexterity in being responsive not
only to Congress but also to the configuration of groups that their agency serves.” (1992,
544).

It therefore seems to be in the president’s interests to pursue the kinds of moderate
policies with broad consensus which actually last in our pluralist system. The evidence suggests
that this is just what civil servants are well placed to help presidents do.
Finally, the politicization of the executive branch may weaken the government’s overall
legitimacy, to which the president is inextricably tied. Ezra Suleiman has noted that “one of the
crucial elements that contributes to or detracts from responsive, accountable, effective, and
legitimate government is the instrument through which all governments exercise their authority –
the state bureaucracy.” (2003, 7). Thus, if the government is perceived by citizens to be political
instead of neutral, its legitimacy will be weakened – to the detriment of the credibility of the
chief executive.

The Lack of Comparative Evidence
Thus, while there is evidence to question the wisdom of politicization, what is missing
from the literature is studies of appointees and civil servants who are working in the same
positions, in order to draw reliable comparisons of their efficacy and loyalty to the president. My
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study will begin to address this gap by interviewing both civil servants and appointees who
worked in public affairs roles for the same agency.

Conclusion
A careful review of the literature thus leaves serious reason to question the wisdom of
politicization. A variety of evidence suggests that civil servants perform more competently on
the job than political appointees. It might still make sense for presidents to politicize if
appointees offer greater loyalty, which redounds to the chief executive’s advantage – but a wide
body of literature suggests that civil servants are, on the whole, unlikely to shirk or sabotage.
Meanwhile, it is not at all clear that appointees will all be loyal to the president, and overzealous
appointees may cause serious harm to an administration. Yet none of these previous scholars
have studied appointees and civil servants working in the same agency and position in order to
determine which group serves best under particular circumstances.
In light of this evidence, I will interview political appointees and civil servants who work
in public affairs for the Treasury Department in order to assess their relative competence and
efficacy and to test my hypothesis that the civil servants will be found to be both more competent
and no less loyal to the president than the appointees. As the next chapter will discuss, the
interviews with agency public affairs officers will also shed light on another important
phenomenon: the “permanent campaign.”
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Chapter 2: Literature Review: Public Affairs Officers in Government Agencies
The Permanent Campaign
In 1982, Sidney Blumenthal famously argued that our nation’s political leaders now
conduct a “permanent campaign.” Blumenthal, who would later serve as a senior aide to
President Clinton, wrote that “under the permanent campaign governing is turned into a
perpetual campaign. Moreover, it remakes government into an instrument designed to sustain an
elected official’s public popularity. It is the engineering of consent with a vengeance.” (23)
Blumenthal described how political consultants are hired to get politicians elected, and
then “brought into the sanctums of government to use the prerogatives of office” to continue
using the same campaign techniques – such as playing to the fears and emotions of the people,
attempting to capitalize on tragedies, covering up bad policies by diverting attention towards
images and ideology, prioritizing issues based upon the political advantages they offer, capturing
voters by entertaining them, and focusing on style over substance (ibid., 26, 126, 246, 250, 331,
23, 164, 171). “The citizenry is viewed as a mass of fluid voters who can be appeased by
appearances, occasional drama, and clever rhetoric.” (ibid., 24).
A key feature of the “permanent campaign” is the constant courting of public opinion,
which Jeffrey Tulis (1987) and Hugh Heclo (2000) note that the Constitution was, in some ways,
carefully crafted to prevent. One of the key concerns of America’s founders was that political
leaders be sufficiently insulated from day-to-say shifts in public opinion in order to be able to
govern responsibly. In The Federalist #1, for example, Alexander Hamilton warned of the
possibility illustrated by history that politicians would begin “their career by paying an
obsequious court to the people; commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.” (Madison,
Hamilton and Jay 1987, 89).
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The Constitution was designed to keep the people at arm’s length from day-to-day
governing and instead allow them to weigh in during periodic elections, in order to promote what
Heclo termed “deliberative responsiveness” in our leaders (2000, 31). Heclo noted that
Americans at the time of our founding believed that previous republics had failed because
ambitious politicians told the people what they wanted to hear. This led to factional strife and
chaos, which culminated in dictatorship and tyranny (ibid., 5). Contrary to the intentions of our
Founders, today, Heclo argued, we are governed by an “Anti-Constitution [which] prescribes
instant responsiveness to the continuous monitoring of the people’s mass opinion and mood.”
(ibid., 18).
According to Heclo, politicians today focus on instrumental responsiveness to the
people’s whims, rather than teaching them, Franklin D. Roosevelt-style, about the long-term
challenges America faces and the sacrifices necessary to overcome them (ibid., 30-34). Of
course, Heclo’s ideal view of democracy is problematic to the degree that it views citizens
themselves as generally incapable of advocating responsible policy decisions and therefore
reliant upon more enlightened leaders to ascertain their true interests. Nevertheless, Heclo argued
that the performance of politicians has become more important than the content of what they say,
and he is justified in his concern that, as a result, citizens have been left confused (ibid., 31).
Theodore Lowi has warned that the president’s focus on the presentation of appearances has
become so serious that it threatens the future of the nation itself (1984, 20).
Furthermore, Heclo has noted that whereas the governing process should be collaborative
and grounded in rational deliberation with the end of arriving at truth, campaigns are designed to
mute one’s opponents and defeat enemies through the use of images and emotions (2000, 11-15).
Accordingly, disagreements are overplayed and politics is infused with an unnecessary hostility.

63

In fact, the word “campaign” itself invokes the imagery of warfare: the French army took to the
champagne, or fields, for operations (ibid., 30, 33, 7). As a result of this conflict, “less dramatic,
but more realistic, chances for success” via compromise are neglected (Edwards 2003, 249).
While an electorate inured to emotional appeals would be equally disturbing, all of this drama
and oversimplification clearly reduces the prospects for serious policy deliberation and
compromise.
In addition to poor policy and bitter partisanship, the permanent campaign is also said to
result in official deception. In Scott McClellan’s memoir of his time as Press Secretary to
President George W. Bush, he admitted that the Bush administration indeed conducted a
“permanent campaign,” and argued that it had resulted in a new and unprecedented level of
deception in politics (2008, xxiii). McClellan wrote: “Washington has become the home of the
permanent campaign, a game of endless politicking based on the manipulation of shades of truth,
partial truths, twisting of the truth, and spin. Governing has become an appendage of politics
rather than the other way around, with electoral victory and the control of power as the sole
measures of success.” (ibid., xiii).
McClellan reported that the Bush administration regularly manipulated the truth in order
to achieve short-term advantage in the polls – a strategy that ultimately proved disastrous for
both the American people and the President himself (ibid., 66, 77). He said that, for presidential
advisers, “fear of short-term political embarrassment leads them to reflexively manipulate, hide,
and distort the truth.” (ibid., 88). For example, McClellan reported that the administration was
guilty of “shading the truth” regarding the evidence and justification for the war in Iraq, and
argued that the President’s biggest motive – spreading democracy in the Middle East – was
carefully disguised from the American people (ibid., 131-132).
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This continual deception also resulted in bitter partisan polarization, which precluded the
administration from governing effectively. McClellan warned that “allowing the permanent
campaign culture to remain in control may not take us into another unnecessary war, but it will
continue to limit the opportunity for careful deliberation, bipartisan compromise, and meaningful
solutions to the major problems all Americans want to see solved.” (ibid., 313). Ironically,
McClellan noted that the campaign was ultimately a disservice to the president himself, severely
tarnishing his reputation. “Ultimately, that machine worked not only to spin the media and defeat
our opponents but to spin and defeat ourselves.” (ibid., 311).
Yet Blumenthal, Heclo and McClellan never indicated precisely how deeply this
campaign penetrates: Is it conducted only from the White House, or are government agencies
also involved?
In Polling to Govern: Public Opinion and Presidential Leadership, Diane Heith studied
the archives of presidents Nixon, Ford, Carter, Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, and found that,
within their White Houses, the results of public opinion polls were shared with, on average,
about thirty top staffers, and not with cabinet heads (2004, 39). She therefore concluded that
“polling did not penetrate the bureaucracy.” (ibid., 98). Yet this research needs to be brought up
to date with evidence from more modern presidencies; McClellan, for example, reported that the
administration of George W. Bush took the permanent campaign “to a higher level” than the
Clinton administration (2008, 311). Furthermore, Heith’s work cannot account for the possibility
that cabinet agencies themselves might be conducting or utilizing public opinion polls, which
would not have been captured in her examination of presidential records.
Like Heith, Mordecai Lee – an expert in government agency communications – has
claimed that government agencies engage in little survey research, but he does not cite evidence
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of this claim. For Lee, however, this is “a shame. Private corporations spend gobs of money on
survey research to be sure that they understand the views of the public.” (2012, 17).
More recently, McClellan clearly indicated that the permanent campaign has spread
beyond the White House. While he was vague regarding its boundaries, he left open the
possibility that it has permeated the bureaucracy. For example, he indicated that deception,
which he characterizes as a key tenet of the campaign, “was not isolated to one event or even to
the Bush White House. It permeates our national discourse. And … it has become an accepted
way of winning the partisan wars for public opinion and an increasingly destructive part of
Washington’s culture.” (2008, 4). McClellan acknowledged that “of course, deception in politics
is nothing new. What’s new is the degree to which it now permeates our national discourse.”
(ibid., xiii).
It is clear that the American people also perceive this change. The Pew Research Center
for People & the Press reported that public trust in government reached a record low in the
Obama administration. While in November 1958, seventy-three percent of Americans indicated
that they generally trusted their government in Washington, in October 2013 the number had
fallen to nineteen percent (2013).
The permanent campaign is also an emerging trend among communications professionals
in the corporate sector. In its most recent survey of top corporate communicators, Corporate
Communications International reported as one of its key findings that “political, financial, [and]
technological uncertainty … has led to running corporate communication like a never-ending
political campaign.” (Goodman et al. 2013).
However, if government agencies are using such polls, there is reason to believe that such
efforts might not be readily visible, given the opprobrium attached to any hint of the use of polls
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in the governance process. As Heith observed, “as much a third rail as altering Social Security,
no staffer, president, or pollster wants to admit to using polls to shape or influence leadership
while in the White House.” (2004, 13-14). “Moreover, no organizational chart of any White
House highlights formal structures or guidelines that detail the use of public opinion in
presidential activities.” (ibid., 14). It therefore seems probable that staffers in government
agencies – which are supposed to be less political than the White House – would take similar or
greater steps to conceal their use of polls if they indeed availed themselves of them.
Furthermore, Heith’s study found that “information on issues, rather than performance,
represented the bulk of exchanges” between White House staff on poll data (ibid., 49). This
would suggest that government agencies – whose work is issue-based to an even greater degree
than the White House – might use the same approach to utilizing polls to gauge public opinion
on their issue areas.
Heith found that the presidents she studied used polls not to change their stances based
upon public opinion, but rather to attempt to move the public in the directions they preferred,
leading her to conclude that the use of polling “has not trumped or triumphed over traditional
relationships and approaches to governing.” (2004, 136). Her finding echoed Lawrence Jacobs
and Robert Shapiro’s 2000 study of healthcare debates since the 1970s, which found that
politicians use polls as a resource for building support among Americans for the policies the
politicians already favor (xv). However, in 2008, McClellan suggested that this may have
changed. He reported that “opinion polling is used not only to read the mood of the electorate
and guide political leaders in the ways they communicate their messages, but also, at times, to
determine the policies they will advocate.” (64).
In my interviews, the descriptions by government agency officials of the techniques they
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engage in will provide important answers to this question of whether they are today on a
permanent campaign – and, if so, precisely what it entails.
A History of Suspicion of Agency Public Affairs Officers
As previously discussed, it is particularly important to understand the work of
government agency public affairs officers, given their critical role as gatekeepers in America’s
democratic system.
The jobs of agency public affairs officials are held in such suspicion that the work they
do is, technically, illegal. Under a U.S. law passed in 1913, in government agencies, “no money
appropriated by … any … Act shall be used for the compensation of any publicity expert unless
specifically appropriated for that purpose.” (Kosar 2005, 786.) The law is the lingering result of
the outrage of Rep. Frederick Gillette upon reading an announcement of a civil service exam for
the position of “publicity expert, for men only.” The person in this advertised post in the
Agriculture Office of Public Roads would be responsible for preparing material for the media
and “secure the publication of such items in various periodicals and newspapers” – activities
which Gillette viewed as an improper attempt at propagandizing (Herold 1981, 15). Government
agencies have, of course, hired increased numbers of “publicity experts” ever since this time –
simply skirting the law by calling their jobs by other names.
Since the passage of this law, Congress has continued to attempt to curb the practice of
public relations in federal agencies (Lee 2011). Especially memorably, during the 1950s, the
House Committee on Government Operations created the Subcommittee on Government
Information, popularly known as the “Moss Subcommittee,” which expressed outrage over
publicity operations occurring in federal agencies (Nimmo 1964, 173). Two decades later,
Senator J. William Fulbright personally wrote an entire book criticizing the Pentagon’s public
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relations activities (1970). More recently, bills introduced in both the Senate and House in early
2005 proposed imposing penalties for government officials who propagandize (Kosar 2008, 298,
304). Congress continues regularly to include language in laws indicating that “no part of any
appropriation contained in this Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes not
authorized by the Congress.” (Kosar 2012b, 184).
As David Morgan has noted, Congress has continually worked to build up its own public
relations staff and capabilities, at the same time as it has tried to curb the very same practices by
government agencies (1986, 25). But, as Kevin Kosar of the Congressional Information Service
has described, despite more recent congressional efforts to limit government “propaganda,”
barriers to congressional action include the difficulty of quantifying public relations expenditures
within agencies, the difficulty of defining the line between public relations and propaganda, and
the fact that the Department of Justice, within the executive branch itself, would have to initiate
charges against the executive branch for transgressions (2005, 792-796).
If, as discussed in the Introduction, the American people have a right to information
about their government, which is necessary to the functioning of democracy, why would
lawmakers attempt to limit the work of the officials responsible for providing the people with
such information? J.A.R. Pimlott argued that “opposition to government publicity … often
springs from opposition to the particular purpose for which it is being used” – and from
congressional fears that the publicity will give the executive increased power relative to the
legislature (Pimlott 1951, 83, 88; see also Rourke 1961, 186; Lee 2011). But is this suspicion
justified? Just how powerful are agency public affairs officers? And how do they wield the
powers they possess?
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How Powerful are Public Affairs Officials?
The potential power of public affairs officials is suggested by President Lincoln’s famous
claim that “public sentiment is everything. With public sentiment nothing can fail, without it
nothing can succeed. He who molds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or
decisions possible or impossible to execute.” (Cohen 1981, 16). But how much power do public
affairs officers in government agencies actually have to shape public opinion?

Influencing Media Coverage
One way public affairs officers shape opinion is by shaping media reports. First,
government public affairs officers serve as predominant sources in media coverage. For example,
Stephen Hess found that reporters who cover the national government reach out to government
public affairs officials regarding about half of their stories (1984, 5). In 1982, Morgan sampled
nine leading daily newspapers and found that while Congress provided about a quarter of their
stories, the Presidency and executive branch were responsible for seventy percent, with twothirds of executive branch news coming from agencies and departments (1986, 27-29, 33.)
Similarly, Judy VanSlyke Turk conducted a study of six state government agencies in Louisiana,
and found that newspaper reporters utilized half of the information that public information
officers provided to them (1986, 17). Finally, a study by Leon Sigal of foreign and national news
stories that ran on the front page of the New York Times and Washington Post between 19491969 found that more than fifty-eight percent of the information reported came from official
sources, such as press releases, press conferences, and speeches, and an additional 15.7 percent
from informal sources, such as briefings and leaks. Only 25.8 percent of the information came
from enterprise reporting, such as a reporter’s interviews and spontaneous events (1973, 120-
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121). Sigal did not address which stories were higher profile or attracted more attention.
However, he concluded that “at present, news space is still more readily available to high
administration officials than it is to spokesmen of any other organization or institution in the
society.” (ibid., 190). Pamela J. Shoemaker and Stephen D. Reese have likewise found that
“news content consists largely of statements from official sources.” (1996, 129).
This is the case because, as John Zaller noted, “one of the clearest findings to emerge
from the scholarly literature on the press is that reporters will regard as newsworthy that which
their ‘legitimate’ sources say is newsworthy.” (1992, 315). Furthermore, as Francis Rourke
noted, “their statements come from an official source and thus may have a credibility they would
not otherwise possess.” (1961, 206). Of course, this status of newsworthiness and credibility
helps government public affairs officers to not only shape what is reported but also to construct
“the context within which all other information is evaluated.” (Shoemaker and Reese 1996, 178).
Furthermore, by serving as predominant sources and influencers of media reporting,
government public affairs officers crowd out the ability of other actors to do so. As Dan Nimmo
has noted, “public explanation of policy with or without propagandistic intent competes with
other explanations publicizing conflicting policies.” (1964, 20). This is the case because, as
Norton E. Long has observed, facts are rarely presented neutrally; “indeed, if they are to do any
useful office in clarifying the real alternatives of public policy, they must foreclose some
alternatives, and in doing so give umbrage to their proponents.” (1954, 22). As a result, Dave
Gelders and Oyvind Ihlen have noted that “there is a risk that the government becomes too
powerful and that its voice is privileged in comparison with that of the opponents of a particular
policy.” (2010, 61). There is also a risk that media access is used to promote partisan policies
ibid., 59). Some have argued that the use of such resources also confers a significant advantage
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to incumbent administrations in electoral races (McCamy 1939, 15).
For example, Kosar has argued that the use of government funds to promote the president
or his policies is problematic because the money could otherwise be used to focus on public
policy; because “such promotional activities may reduce the ability of the public to assess the
wisdom of particular policies and, by implication, the competency of public officials and the
president, which may have electoral ramifications;” and because it gives the president an
advantage that threatens to disrupt the balance of power between the three branches of
government (2005, 786).
Beyond the advantages of the perceived greater newsworthiness and legitimacy of the
information they convey, public affairs officers also derive advantages from the fact that
“reporters’ hunger for news – a commodity essential to the performance of their professional task
– makes them very vulnerable to being used by an agency to disseminate information that will
reflect favorably upon it.” (Rourke 1984, 172). In particular, reporters may be unwilling to
aggressively challenge the statements of an agency public affairs officer or to refuse to cover
news the agency is actively pitching because they depend upon maintaining relationships with
their government public affairs contacts in order to secure the information they need to do their
jobs. Government public affairs officers also control access to information, which, if given
exclusively to a reporter, gives the correspondent’s media outlet an edge over rivals in a highly
competitive media market – yet another reason for reporters to stay in the good graces of their
official sources.
Another advantage that Shoemaker and Resse have described public affairs officers as
wielding to their advantage is their ability to “[monopolize] the journalists’ time so that they
don’t have an opportunity to seek out sources with alternative views.” (1996, 178). A related
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form of power that government public affairs officials wield is their ability to provide “usable
information that is easier and cheaper to use than that from other sources.” (Shoemaker and
Reese 1996, 178). Oscar Gandy has used the concept of “information subsidies” to describe this
form of influence (1982, 30). By providing journalists with information in a form that is readily
useable, government public affairs officers reduce the “costs” (in time and money) to reporters of
newsgathering. “Faced with time constraints, and the need to produce stories that will win
publication, journalists will attend to, and make use of, subsidized information that is of a type
and form that will achieve that goal. By reducing the costs faced by journalists in satisfying
organizational requirements, the subsidy giver increases the probability that the subsidized
information will be used.” (ibid., 627). Mark Fishman has therefore argued that the source of
government’s publicity power is this ability to “lure” reporters with “free, safe, easily available,
predictable amounts of raw materials for news.” (1980, 153).
Thus, public affairs officials in government agencies are uniquely positioned to influence
news reporting because of the perceived newsworthiness and legitimacy attached to their official
positions, the dependence of reporters upon continued relationships with such officials in order
to do their jobs, their ability to keep reporters occupied so that they do not seek other sources,
and their ability to offer news to reporters at a cheaper “cost” than other sources. Accordingly, in
1961, V.O. Key claimed that “the picture of the press collectively as the wielder of great power
on its own initiative does not fit the facts” (394). By this argument, media managers

should no more be held accountable for the materials that flow through their channels
than should managers of transportation concerns be blamed for the quality of the printed
matter they transport from place to place. The tone and quality of the content of the
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media tend to be mightily influenced, if not fixed, by those who manufacture news and
by those who fix the nature of other politically relevant content available for the media.
(ibid., 395).

The ability to influence media reporting is a profound source of power for two reasons.
First, agencies which are able to bolster their popularity in the press gain immense political
power. As Rourke has argued, agencies that enjoy widespread support in public opinion become
practically untouchable: it is difficult for Congress or the President to oppose them (1984, 44).
Second, as Walter Lippmann recognized in Public Opinion, in today’s world, it is
impossible for each of us to obtain most information by firsthand experience. “Each of us lives
and works on a small part of the earth’s surface, moves in a small circle, and of these
acquaintances knows only a few intimately. Of any public event that has wide effects we see at
best only a phase and an aspect.” (1966, 53). We have thus come to depend upon the press for
much of what we know about the world (ibid., 203). Thus, the ability to influence news reporting
is in a great sense the ability to define reality for the American people. Studies on agenda setting,
priming and framing effects illustrate exactly how the media content shaped by public affairs
officers comes to influence the beliefs and behavior of U.S. citizens.
Agenda Setting, Priming and Framing Effects
The reason that the influence of public affairs officers on the media is such a profound
source of power is because myriad studies confirm that media reports have agenda-setting affects
(influencing what issues Americans believe are important), priming effects (influencing the
weight Americans place on issues), and framing effects (influencing how Americans perceive
issues). (Iyengar 1991, 132-133). While, in the case of my study, many of those who follow the
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Treasury closely may be financial industry experts who have sophisticated views less susceptible
to these mechanisms, the Treasury’s comments on the overall state of the economy may
influence the views of the public at large through these mechanisms.
First, studies confirm that media coverage is a significant shaper of American public
opinion. For example, John Zaller’s study of the ways in which public opinion is formed found
that Americans do not possess fixed opinions, which they simply share with pollsters. Rather, he
found, “most people really aren’t sure what their opinions are on most political matters …
because there are few occasions … in which they are called upon to formulate and express
political opinions. So, when confronted by rapid-fire questions in a public opinion survey, they
make up attitude reports as best they can as they go along. But because they are hurrying, they
are heavily influenced by whatever ideas happen to be at the top of their minds.” (1992, 76).
Media coverage is, of course, a key determinant of what is top of mind. One of the reasons that
Americans are particularly susceptible to arguments they read or hear in the media is because
“most Americans do not rate very highly on political awareness,” and therefore “citizens will be
unlikely to exhibit high levels of resistance to arguments that are inconsistent with their values,
interests, or other predispositions.” (ibid., 59).
A small sample of studies suffice to illustrate the point: One study by Michael MacKuen
found that the political priorities of individuals change as a result of the information they
acquire; thus personal agendas “depend more on content of the information environment than on
internalized standards.” (1984, 386). G. Ray Funkhouser found that the volume of coverage in
major newsmagazines correlated strongly with the importance that Americans attributed to
particular issues (1973, 71). Benjamin Page, Robert Shapiro, and Glenn Dempsey found that
television coverage was responsible for a large percentage of changes in the policy preferences
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of Americans (1987, 23). A study by Shanto Iyengar, Donald Kinder, Mark Peters, and Jon
Krosnick found that “by drawing attention to certain national problems while ignoring others,
television news programs help define the standards by which presidents are evaluated.” (1984,
778). Americans exposed to media coverage of energy, defense, and inflation were more likely
to rate the President overall in the same way they rated him on these issues (ibid., 783).
Similarly, Iyengar studied media reports on a range of issues, including crime, terrorism and
poverty, and found that the ways in which media reports framed issues influenced how
Americans attributed responsibility (1991, 3).
Finally, David P. Fan created statistical models of the formation of public opinion on a
range of issues, such as whether the United States should spend more money on national defense
between 1977-1986 and whether unemployment or inflation was a more important issue in 19811984. He found that the media is the principal source of influence on public opinion (1988, 4).
While any individual story tends to have minimal effects on public opinion, Fan found that it is
the cumulative effect of all of the stories that is powerful (ibid., 3). He concluded that public
opinion is not a check on elite behavior; rather, elites use the media to convey their messages and
public opinion tends to reflect the messages conveyed in the press (ibid., 140).
How do they Wield their Power?
It is thus clear that public affairs officers in government agencies wield enormous power
to influence media reporting, which in turn may bolster the political power of their organizations
and shape American public opinion. Of course, such power might be used towards laudable or
questionable ends. As far back as 380 B.C., Plato drew a distinction in the Gorgias between the
rhetoric of politicians designed for the good of the people and rhetoric used simply to flatter and
achieve personal gain (Plato 2009). How do modern government public affairs officers utilize
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the power they possess: to responsibly provide the information citizens have the right and need
to possess in order for our democracy to function, or to deceive the people – whether
malevolently or, as Machiavelli would argue, for the people’s own good? Is their chief role to
inform the public or to “spin” for the administration’s policies?
To Strengthen the Administration’s Power Position?
In his history of public relations in the United States, Stuart Ewen traced the ways in
which public relations techniques have often been practiced by government officials to “justify
and package their interests in terms of the common good,” thereby supporting their own power
positions (1996, 34). Edward Bernays, the double nephew of Freud credited as one of the fathers
of the practice of public relations in the United States, for example, “described public relations as
a response to a transhistoric concern: the requirement, for those people in power, to shape the
attitudes of the general population. For Bernays, public relations reflected the refinement of
techniques developed to serve ancient purposes.” (ibid., 11).
The field of public relations developed in the early years of the twentieth century,
initially utilizing factual arguments to reply to the concerns of labor and media “muckrackers”
about big business. But practitioners soon realized that, as American philosopher William James
outlined in his 1907 book, Pragmatism: A New Name for Old Ways of Thinking, truth is unstable;
things could be made to be true, for example, in the way events are structured (ibid., 39-40). One
of the first practitioners of public relations, Ivy Lee, applied this approach to his craft. “If
suitable facts could be assembled and then projected into the vast “amphitheatre” of public
consciousness, he reasoned, they could become truth. Harnessed to the idea that the truth is
something that can be merchandised to the public was an approach to the standards of factual
evidence that represented a prophetic break from their Enlightenment roots.” (ibid., 80).
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At a time of fear that the working class revolts happening elsewhere on the globe might
spread to the United States and trepidation about the behavior of publics in mass democracies,
early practitioners of public relations in government discovered that “truths” could be presented
in the service of their aims. During World War I, the U.S. Committee on Public Information,
established by President Wilson and headed by George Creel, undertook a massive effort to
mobilize public support for the war effort – the likes of which the world had never before seen.
The country’s filmmakers, artists, journalists, advertising industry and other groups were
mobilized to create pro-war works. Opinion leaders in local communities, known as “FourMinute Men,” were trained to give speeches to their neighbors. Often, the committee appealed to
the emotions, rather than the intellects, of the American people. The enemy was presented as
lurking everywhere; one map of the United States showed the German names that conquerors
would give to American cities if the nation lost the war (ibid., 124).
By the 1920s, public relations practitioners became skilled at appealing to the
unconscious. Practitioners studied psychological manipulation to find the unconscious triggers
they could exploit to steer public passions (ibid., 127, 132). The power of pictures was harnessed
to elicit emotional responses, while pre-empting critical thinking (ibid., 210). Such manipulation
was justified with claims that most citizens were irrational. The rational few who worked in
public relations would therefore structure the thinking of the masses, in order to save the people
from themselves (ibid., 144-145). The introduction of polling offered another public relations
technique: polls could be structured to elicit virtually any desired response. The poll could then
be used as justification that its sponsor was acting in the public interest – resulting in what Ewen
characterizes as “reverse democracy” (ibid., 189).
Ewen allowed that government officials have not always approached citizens as irrational
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creatures to be subconsciously manipulated to serve their own power interests. He credited
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, with attempting to educate citizens and appeal to
them as rational thinkers in his Fireside Chats (ibid., 254-255). Likewise, the photographs
commissioned by the Farm Security Administration during the New Deal era, widely covered in
the nation’s media, helped to humanize and dignify the country’s poor – engaging the nation on
critical issues and helping to overcome previous representations of the poor as others to be feared
(ibid., 264, 277-278, 282). Ewen similarly characterized the 1970s as a time when public
relations professionals responded to African Americans, women, and other groups who were
newly asserting their rights by targeting them with specific messages.
But each time the pendulum has swung in this direction, Ewen said, it has always swung
back to practices, which attempt to preserve privileges through manipulation, demagoguery, and
tricks (ibid., 399-400). Furthermore, public relations professionals responded to the movements
of the 1970’s by narrowly targeting different groups, resulting in an increased fragmentation of
American society that made it even harder for the public to assert its collective interests (ibid.,
406, 411).
Critics of modern-day government public affairs officials charge them with similarly
sinister practices. Former New York Times columnist Frank Rich’s account of President George
W. Bush’s handling of the Iraq war suggested that not much has changed since Vietnam. Rich
accused the administration of using “inflated claims about Saddam’s WMDs and Iraq-Qaeda ties
[which] were outright lies or the subconscious misreading of intelligence by officials with an
idee fixe” in order to sell the war (2006, 218). He argued that the President himself exaggerated
other facts, such as the number of U.S. partners and Iraqi troops (ibid., 178). Rich documented
numerous other instances in which the administration conveyed false information, such as details
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of the rescue of Private First Class Jessica Lynch who was missing in Iraq; facts surrounding the
death of professional football player Pat Tillman, who the administration claimed was killed by
enemy fire but later admitted died from “friendly fire;” and the fighting in Falluja, where “a city
of 250,000 had essentially been destroyed to ‘save’ it from the enemy. The information the
administration put out about this quixotic victory was brazenly at odds with the known facts.”
(ibid., 80-81, 123-124, 129, 161).
Rich also accused the administration of the “flogging of fear for political advantage,”
arguing that “in election years, they really pulled out the stops. For the midterm of 2002, that
meant hyping Saddam’s potential for unleashing a ‘mushroom cloud.’ For 2004, it was time for
the terrorists who attacked America on 9/11 to make a comeback.” (ibid., 145). For example, he
reported that when Attorney General John Ashcroft announced the names of seven wanted
terrorists just before Memorial Day and asked for help finding them, it turned out the wanted
men were not believed to be in the U.S. and six of them were “recycled from previous warnings”
(ibid., 145-146).
Rich further accused the Bush administration of releasing fear-provoking information in
order to distract the media from news that would be damaging. For example, he noted that on the
day that damaging information about the administration’s response to Hurricane Katrina was
released, the President attempted to capture the headlines by announcing that a plan to drive a
plane into the U.S. Bank Tower in Los Angeles had been disrupted. This disrupted plot had
actually been mentioned by federal officials two years previously and the administration did not
share details with the mayor of Los Angeles prior to the President’s speech (ibid, 204). Rich
concluded that “certainly this was a White House that was very comfortable with lying.” (ibid.,
218). Reporters were intimated by being branded as “unpatriotic” for questioning the war (ibid.,
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161, 163).
Rich further documented how the Pentagon created the Office of Strategic Influence to
“plant helpful ‘news,’ some of it phony, with foreign media.” (ibid., 32). He reported that
similarly questionable tactics were used to influence domestic media coverage. For example,
more than 50 news stations around the country ran news segments about the new Medicare
prescription drug benefit that it turned out had been produced by the administration’s
Department of Health and Human Services (ibid., 166). Likewise, the Department of Education
paid Armstrong Williams to promote its No Child Left Behind initiative, and he subsequently
both served as a media commentator and interviewed the Vice President in a segment passed off
as a genuine news story (ibid.,167-168). Two newspaper columnists were paid by the
Department of Health and Human Services for promoting marriage initiatives (ibid, 169). The
Transportation Security Administration used a public affairs staffer with a fake name to act as a
reporter in a segment about airport security (ibid., 169). “The New York Times found that, all
told, at least twenty federal agencies had made and distributed hundreds of fake news segments
over the past four years, landing them even in big markets, such as New York, Los Angeles, and
Chicago.” (ibid., 169). Additionally, Bush political appointees at NASA and the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration were found to be rewriting and censoring documents
and speeches in which scientific findings conflicted with the administration’s policies (ibid.,
170).
One reporter inside the White House press corps was actually exposed to be using the
false name of “Jeff Gannon.” “A close reading of the transcripts of televised White House press
briefings over the preceding two years revealed that at uncannily crucial moments, ‘Jeff’ was
called on by McClellan to field softballs and stanch tough questioning on such topics as Abu
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Ghraib and [White House Senior Adviser Karl] Rove’s possible involvement in the outing of the
CIA officer Valarie Plame Wilson.” (ibid., 171-172) Similarly, the audience at a press
conference held by a deputy FEMA administrator in October 2007 was later exposed as FEMA’s
own employees (Kosar 2012, 191).
More recently, President Obama has been accused of lying about his signature health care
initiative, the Affordable Care Act, by falsely claiming that Americans who liked their health
insurance policies would be able to keep them under the new law (Madhani 2013). Obama and
his top aides have also been accused of lying regarding the details of the September 2012 attack
on the U.S. consulate in Benghazi, Libya, which left the U.S. Ambassador dead (Mears 2012).
Of course, charges of government distortion are not new. In The Politics of Lying, David
Wise also accused the government of regularly lying during the Vietnam era. For example, he
argued, the government lied about the circumstances surrounding the torpedo attack which
caused President Johnson to order the first bombing of North Vietnam, and continued to lie
throughout the war; the Secretary of Defense publicly and falsely denied an air attack on Hanoi
and U.S. operations in My Lai, Vietnam – the site of a grotesque massacre – were presented to
visitors as one of the military’s successful operations (ibid., 6, 10, 27-28, 181).
David L. Altheide and John M. Johnson have argued that distortions are in fact
commonplace, even in seemingly more mundane and innocuous government information. They
studied how data reported in official government reports was collected across a variety of
government offices, finding that “many of these workers were oriented to such practical concerns
as maintaining friendships, promoting individual careers, ‘covering their asses,’ getting back at
real and potential enemies, and above all, maintaining appearances of competence and legitimacy
for their superiors.” (1980, 36). As a result, they reported that they “have not discovered one case
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in which knowledge of the broader context of information processing and awareness of the
procedures used in collecting, categorizing, interpreting, and presenting data in reports has not
significantly altered the meaning and confidence in those reports.” (ibid., 239).
A key tool that the government is accused of wielding to its advantage is the
classification system. Wise argued that the government has sometimes released classified
information to serve its aims or destroy political enemies and at other times classified data to
protect incriminating evidence (1973, 28, 108-109, 118, 133). In fact, David Pozen has argued
that the reason government leakers are almost never prosecuted is because doing so could end up
“compromising the government’s instrumental use of the press.” (Coll 2013, 55). “With its
control over information supported by an official system of secrecy and classification, the
government has almost unlimited power to misinform the public,” according to Wise. “It does so
for various reasons. The government lies to manipulate public opinion, to generate public
support for its policies, and to silence its critics. Ultimately, it lies to stay in power.” (1973, 28)
An additional institution which Wise has argued wrongly promotes government secrecy and
possible manipulation is the use of executive privilege to prevent White House aides from
testifying before Congress (ibid., 64).
In the eyes of critics, it is unequal resources such as these which make what they call
government “propaganda” so fearsome. For example, former Senator Fulbright noted in his
attack on the Defense Department’s public affairs apparatus, The Pentagon Propaganda
Machine, that the Department of Defense has billions of dollars at its disposal, which it utilizes
to indoctrinate and impress audiences with skydiving paratroopers, bands, and trips around the
country to build support for its programs (1970, 6, 44). Fulbright argued that the Department also
capitalizes on the vested interests of workers and businesses tied to the military-industrial
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complex who support their aims (ibid., 12-13). While Fulbright acknowledged that it is
imperative for the government to release information, he charged that the government is also
guilty of propaganda, which promulgates ideas – the namesake of the seventeenth-century
Congregatio de propaganda which trained missionaries of the Roman Catholic Church (ibid.,
18, 24-25). In particular, Fulbright said, the military stimulates patriotism, makes claims to be
protecting the American way of life, glorifies militarism, and overplays its humanitarian work
instead of the death and destruction it wreaks, through distorted, oversimplified, and onedimensional communications designed to build support for staggering defense budgets (ibid., 45,
70, 71, 74 84). The disturbing result of this propaganda, Fulbright said, is that while war used to
be abhorrent to the American people, they have come to view the military as comforting (ibid.,
148-149). Yet, according to Fulbright, war presents a danger to the nation itself (Fulbright 1970,
155). Particularly rankling to these critics is that such propaganda is conducted with taxpayer
money, such that “the citizenry pays to be propagandized” (Chomsky and Herman 1988, 22).
Critics also charge the government with using its power to strong-arm reporters into
positive coverage. “There are … small but effective ways for the White House to retaliate against
reporters who do not ‘go along,’ according to Wise (1973, 242.) For example, as previously
discussed, according to Leon Sigal, “senior officials employ a variety of tactics against reporters
on the beat in order to confine newsgathering to routine channels. One is simply to keep them
busy with a steady stream of information through these channels on the premise that the best way
to keep the press from peering into dark corners is to shine a light elsewhere.” (1973, 54).
Likewise, there “lies the implicit threat to restrict access. Reporters can be left off a press plane,
denied a military accreditation card that would allow them on board military transport in a war
zone, barred from a briefing, subjected to harassment and investigation, or simply never granted
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an interview or a leak.” (ibid., 55).
Ultimately, Noam Chomsky and Edward Herman have argued, the media feel that they
must report doubtful information provided by government officials, “even if they tell whoppers,”
and be cautious with their criticism, because they rely so heavily on government sources to do
their work (1988, 22). As a result, they argued, the media end up serving the very privileged
interests that Bernays sought to bolster a century ago, and failing to convey the information
citizens need to exercise control over the political process (ibid., 298). While the rancor of
reporters on cable news channels today may suggest that the media was far from timid, the facts
remains that the U.S. only recently went to war on the basis of false claims of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq which it appears in retrospect the media had sufficient evidence to debunk
beforehand. Wise argued that “the consent of the governed is basic to American democracy. If
the governed are misled … the system may go on – but not as a democracy.” (1973, 18).
To Promote Democracy?
Public relations professionals and their defenders take a wholly different view of the
profession. At their most generous, press offices are described as “an entitlement that flows from
the nature of a free society and the relationship of the state to the citizen. What more natural
function of government is there in a democracy than for it to make available information about
how it is governing?” (Hess 1984, 115).
James McCamy argued that, without the information that government public affairs
officers provide, “the sheer physical inability of the press to cover Washington’s many news
sources would prevent reporters from fulfilling their role of vigilant protector of the public
interest.” (1939, 249). Ernest A. Lotito, who served as Commerce Department Public Affairs
Director, concurred, arguing that
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if, we believe an informed citizenry is the foundation of democracy, then public affairs
is one of the most critical functions of government. Without it, the job of ferreting out the
massive amounts of information it makes available would be an impossible task for the
media and the millions of business people and ordinary citizens that require it in their
daily lives. Public affairs in government is to help tell the people the facts so they can
make the enlightened decisions that ensure the survival and success of our democratic
system. (1981, 288).

Practitioners describe a range of reasons why the information they provide is critical to
the nation. First, information the government possesses – such as facts about harmful products
and drugs – may be vital to public health and safety (Settel 1968, 43). It is also critical for the
government to convey information about its own programs. Roy Swift, who served as
Information Officer for the Social Security Administration (SSA), drew a distinction between a
right to know and a need to know. “If the citizen needs to know something in order to secure his
rights or to meet his obligations under the law, the SSA cannot wait for him to ask. The
administration must actively seek him out and inform him.” (1968, 273). Former Secretary of the
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Wilbur J. Cohen, likewise noted that information
about available programs has not always reached the poor, but “…explaining the government’s
programs to the people who must pay for them is as essential in a democracy as developing the
programs and carrying them out.” (1968, 19-20).
The government also depends upon the release of such information in order to function
effectively. A. James Golato, who served as National Director of the Public Affairs Division of
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the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), for example, noted that since the U.S. tax system depends
upon voluntary compliance, it is critical for the agency to reach citizens both to educate them
about tax laws and to convince them that the law is being applied properly, since “voluntary
compliance depends to a large extent on the public’s perception and confidence that the tax law
is being administered uniformly and fairly.” (1981, 82). Public support for specific policies is
also often critical to their success. Andrew Berding, who served as Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs, noted that “virtually every major foreign policy needs the physical and
financial as well as the moral backing of the American people.” If the government does not
convey its policies well, “other countries and our own citizens give only partial acceptance to an
idea that should have been warmly welcomed.” (1968, 111, 122). In instances such as these,
Rourke noted that “the public interest can easily suffer more from the weakness than it does from
the strength of government publicity.” (1961, 15).
Additionally, the government must often spur citizens to action in order to solve
problems cheaper or more effectively. Lee has noted, for example, that government public
relations campaigns about the importance of seat belt use have saved lives and are cheaper than
hiring increased law enforcement to issue violations; campaigns about the importance of hand
washing are cheaper than the cost of medical personnel to handle flu outbreaks; and Post Office
campaigns to alert consumers to increased rates are less expensive than returning mail containing
insufficient postage. “Government agencies can encourage citizens to serve as their eyes and
ears, thus reducing the need for staffing. For example, when a person chooses to call 911 in an
emergency, he or she has been co-opted effectively by the police and fire departments to serve as
a member of its informal organization.” (2012, 21-22).
Likewise, William Ruder, who served as Commerce Department Assistant Secretary for
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Public Affairs, argued that “the problems of environmental pollution, of urban decay, of mass
transit, of unequal employment opportunity … are not susceptible to solution by the spending of
money alone. There must be a public commitment to their solution. … The government … must
learn to engage itself into the dynamics of the community so that the community will have the
will to solve these problems and make the necessary commitments.” (1968, 81). Finally, the
government may need to communicate in order to recruit staff (Posner 1968, 289).
Public affairs professionals are needed not just to release information, but to be sure that
the government does so responsibly. Michael Amrine, who served as Public Information Officer
for the American Psychological Association, noted the importance of understanding people’s
fears and how they will be unleashed by information – a responsibility that clearly carries over to
government public affairs as well. Amrine noted that policies were carefully crafted for the
release of information about progress on cancer cures, to take account of the reactions of
individuals with terminal cancer and their families (Amrine 1968, 213-214). It is likewise critical
for the Treasury public information officers in this study to account for possible global market
reactions to their announcements.
Public affairs officers are also responsible for ensuring that information is presented
clearly; as Pimlott argued, “to publish information which the members of the general public
cannot understand is certainly to “diffuse” information, but it is not to inform those who receive
it.” (1951, 80). Furthermore, as Bernard Posner, who served as Deputy Executive Secretary of
the President’s Committee on Employment of the Handicapped, has argued, public affairs
professionals should be “alert for all sorts of clues to current attitude patterns” so that they can
channel feedback from the public back into the government (1968, 290).
Thus, as Lee has concluded, “public relations can help an agency implement its goals
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better, faster, cheaper.” (2012, 18).

The tools and techniques of public relations help reach potential customers and clients,
notify the public of new laws and programs, promote the goals of the agency through
public service campaigns that encourage (or discourage) certain behaviors, or increase
public cooperation with the agency, such as through tip lines and websites. In all these
examples, public relations is an inexpensive substitute for hiring more staff, increasing
agency enforcement and regulation activities, or expanding field offices. (ibid., 19).

Some public affairs officials have noted the irony of the fact that, when they do their jobs
particularly well, their outputs are viewed as sinister. “As long as the government produces
publications which end up by the thousands in basement warehouses, read by no one, not even
officials of the sponsoring agency, then no one seems to mind,” Cohen noted. “But as soon as the
government publishes or produces an information product that is good enough to command
attention, someone yells competition!” (1968, 21). “If the government information officer wants
to catch the busy American’s attention, he must turn out a professional product that is as
attractive, exciting, and compelling as all the other communication products on the market.”
(ibid., 21).
The perspective of practitioners also provides a more nuanced view into situations in
which others have accused the government of dissembling. Former Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Public Affairs William Goulding explained such situations this way: “I misled and
misinformed the American people a good many times in a good many ways – through my own
lack of foresight, carelessness, through relaying incomplete information which the originators
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considered complete, through transmitting reports which had been falsified deliberately at lower
levels,” he said. “But I never intentionally deceived the people.” (1970, 15). Goulding outlined a
number of less diabolical reasons why the government sometimes misinforms the people.
First, Goulding said, first reports from the field on complicated events are very often
wrong, yet there is pressure from reporters to release information rapidly (ibid., 19). Matters are
made more complicated by the challenges of information-gathering within large agencies – the
staff of the Department of Defense (DoD) was larger than the population of some countries
(ibid., 118). Additionally, Goulding sometimes misinformed the people when lower-level
Defense officials misrepresented their own misconduct (ibid., 147, 151). “Every nine-year-old
televiewer knows that the ten conscientious persons in the bank at the time of the holdup will
give ten sworn statements which are dramatically different as to the ‘facts’ of the robbery,”
Goulding argued. “Sergeants, lieutenant commanders, brigadier generals and vice admirals are
no more perfect.” (ibid., 117). As a result, “too often, in any administration, DoD is charged
unfairly with deceit or cover-up when it is guilty only of great size and of the human error and
human delay that are part of great size.” (ibid., 119). At other times, Goulding said, he was
accused of withholding information when foreign nations whom the United States was dependent
upon for cooperation would not allow him to share information on activities happening within
their countries (ibid., 51, 125).
In fact, Goulding and other practitioners have insisted that public affairs officials are the
first to demand the release of damaging information about the government. “Top-level admirals
in the Navy, concerned that a mistake will be misinterpreted, are reluctant to acknowledge that a
search-and-rescue ship misunderstood a message and steamed in the wrong direction for four
hours, but the information officer knows the story will surface eventually and wants to get it out,
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on the record, before the people, on the Navy’s terms instead of as an acknowledgement beaten
out of the government by the press,” he said. “The experienced information officer knows the
press. He knows that extreme statements or phony ones will not hold up; that, for example, the
effort to hide a foolish attempt by a foolish Army commander to solicit free whiskey from
merchants for a base party will fail. A good information officer always will attempt to tell his
commander to face up to the errors publicly and get them behind him.” (ibid., 46). Grossman
and Kumar concurred that “since presidents and leading advisers often believe that it is best to
tell the public less than everything, a press secretary often has to convince them that they would
be best served by ‘going the hangout route’ (a Watergate expression meaning that it is better to
give out bad news yourself because it will look worse if it appears to have been concealed).”
(1981, 150). Similarly, in his interviews of reporters and public affairs officers, Nimmo found
that “both sets of political communicators agreed that withholding of information from the public
view is an evil.” (1964, 180).
Other public affairs officials overwhelmingly at least claim that they release negative
information in the belief that it is counterproductive to attempt to withhold or dissemble because
the press will eventually find out – and such efforts will have therefore only served to exacerbate
their problems (Brown 1976, 34; Cutlip 1976, 6; Goulding 1970, 46; Krohn 2004, 36; McClellan
2008, 51). Roy Hoopes, who served as Consultant to the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare’s Office of Public Information advised, “above all, no information officer should try to
persuade a writer that everything is perfect. If mistakes have been made, the agency should admit
them. If the author is a good reporter, he is going to find them sooner or later anyway.” (1968,
333-334). In a 1979 study of members of the National Association of Government
Communicators, ninety-two percent said they would provide information to the public even if it
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were “embarrassing,” though of course it is easier to make such claims in the abstract. (Rabin
1981, 109). Likewise, in their study of White House communications, Grossman and Kumar
concluded that “there are few people who work as White House aides in the area of political
communications who do not understand that … reporters should get answers to their questions,
and that honesty is the best policy – or at least that outright lying is usually disastrous.” (1981,
306).
A further check on the government is the presence of individuals and organizations with
competing agendas who have incentives to correct the record if the government dissembles. In
one of the first studies of government public affairs officers in 1939, McCamy noted that “the
publicists of other interests and opposition parties can be on the job to keep government
publicists from dominating the field.”(19). Similarly, Pimlott’s 1951 study of government public
relations found that “releases are prepared in the knowledge that they will be exposed to the
expert scrutiny of other newspapermen and of watchful Congressmen.” (148). As a result, he
found, “the very suspicion that the truth may not be told sets a premium upon scrupulous
accuracy about verifiable facts, and on many matters the public receives fuller and more reliable
information than would otherwise have been the case.” (ibid., 213). Rourke also noted that the
media industry has strong incentives to ensure that the government is not able to conceal
information, because “the press itself makes a living off the news.” (1961, 217). He argued: “The
brashness of American newspapermen in ferreting out information is legendary, and this,
coupled with the hound-dog inquisitiveness of Congress, makes it impossible to keep very many
things secret in American government today merely because they are embarrassing.” (ibid., 188).
The media’s suspicion of government is a deeply imbued value. Rourke has noted that
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in accordance with the ‘muckracking’ tradition of American politics, the reporter in this
country ordinarily conceives of his or her appropriate role as that of exposing the
misdeeds of public officials … representatives of the media as a group commonly
cultivate an attitude of cynical disbelief toward statements and activities at ‘city hall’ – a
term embracing executive agencies at all levels of government. This attitude creates a
built-in ‘credibility gap’ of substantial dimensions between media personnel and
government officials, and strongly reinforces the independence of reporters. (1984, 172).

Lee concurred that “the negative view of government in American journalism is as old as
America itself. The American revolutionary war was justified as a reaction to tyranny.” He
noted that “therefore, the ethos of American journalism was that its raison d’etre was to cover
government critically.” (2008, 88). As Morgan has also reminded us, the media in the United
States enjoy more freedom than the press in virtually any other nation (1986, 147). Rourke also
noted that government agencies are required by law to release much information; “failure to do
so might bring them under legal or political attack for concealing information from the public.”
(1961, 191).
Lee has argued that media coverage of government agencies focuses so heavily on
covering stories with familiar archetypes, such as the “money-wasting bureaucrat” and “the
victim of bureaucracy,” that government public affairs officers have had no choice but to strike
back with sophisticated counter-strategies. (1999, 459). Joseph P. Viteritti has likewise argued
that the press “has a serious point of view that often borders on bias, and it frequently loses its
balance on the precarious wire-thin line between reporting and editorializing. … If managing the
press is a form of manipulation, it is also a survival skill that assists the public administrator in
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transmitting information without distortion.” (2008, 328).
Furthermore, the skepticism of the American people themselves may be seen as a further
democratic check on the ability of government public relations efforts to dupe them. As Altheide
and Johnson have argued, “in the United States, as well as other modern societies, the search for
the self-serving and self-interested character of official records is always part of the scrutiny and
doubt with which these populations greet governmental and corporate organizations … the
American public is hardly a ‘pushover’ for official rhetoric or records.” (1980, xiii).
Additionally, the checking of official statements from other parts of the government
springs from America’s Constitutional system of divided, competing branches. As Rourke
memorably noted, “in the pluralist environment that is the essence of democracy, government
never monopolizes all the instruments of persuasion, and under the American system of
separation of powers, it is even possible to find the opposition entrenched within the structure of
government itself.” (1961, 203). “The existence of competing centers of power within society
serves to guarantee that official pronouncements will not go uncontested, if there is any question
of their accuracy on matters of fact or interpretation, and it insures that efforts to conceal
information will be subject to frequent challenge.” (ibid., 216). He noted that a further check is
“the vigorous competition within the cadres of bureaucracy - … which spills over and manifests
itself in the form of public exposure by one agency of suppression or distortion of information in
which another agency is alleged to be engaged.” (ibid., 221).
Leon Sigal likewise argued that it is America’s constitutional structure that results in the
release of more information in the United States than in Britain (1973, 131). As Carlton Spitzer,
who served as Director of the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare’s Office of
Public Information, put it:
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government public information officers can be as guilty of propagandizing narrow causes
and clouding issues as any huckster on New York’s Seventh Avenue, and usually with far
more serious consequences. But only the foolish or misguided would participate in such
schemes because they are doomed to failure. The whole system of government in
America is open and fragmented. Employees in various agencies are not necessarily on
the same side of all issues, although they may occupy the same offices. Leaking
information is common practice. Public information workers cannot act merely as
creatures of the Congress or spokesmen for the current administration. Their moves and
statements are scrutinized and challenged by a skeptical press and critical private-interest
associations of every kind.” (1968, 53-54).

Another reason for this strategy of preemptive release is that if information were
withheld, when the truth eventually did surface, the government would lose all credibility – with
the American people and with the press. Goulding, for example, wrote that he regretted that the
government did not preemptively explain to the American people the inevitable death and
destruction the war in Vietnam would wreak on local peoples. When the New York Times
covered the deaths of civilians and destruction of homes, Americans were shocked – contributing
to distrust of the U.S. government and lessening support for the war (1970, 89). Spitzer noted
that “Americans respond with strength and determination to discouraging news if the news is
honestly presented and a course of action is outlined. But the American people, like good editors,
rarely if ever forgive a lie” – although eventually their memories may fade (1968, 63). Hiebert
cited social science research indicating that humans are most susceptible to persuasion when they

95

hear events for the first time as further ammunition for why upfront disclosure makes strategic
sense. (Hiebert 1981, 10).
Numerous public affairs officials also report that misinforming the press for whatever
reason cripples one’s reputation and ability to do their job (Goulding 1970, 23). President George
W. Bush’s Press Secretary, Ari Fleischer, explained that “the job of the White House press
secretary isn’t to say everything you know to be true, but everything you say had better be true.”
(2005, 246). President George W. Bush’s next Press Secretary, Scott McClellan, resigned after
two top administration officials – Senior Adviser Karl Rove and Chief of Staff to the Vice
President “Scooter” Libby – both gave him personal assurances they were not involved in the
leak of the identity of C.I.A. officer Valerie Plame, which later turned out to be false (McClellan
2008, 219, 260). McClellan reported that “unknowingly passing along a falsehood … would
ultimately prove fatal to my ability to serve the president effectively.” (ibid., 3). Grossman and
Kumar likewise found that “when reporters, editors, and others concerned with covering the
President do not trust them, press secretaries lose their usefulness to news organizations and thus
to the President as well.” (1981, 131). “Thus public information officers and their peers must
hold to the truth and remain faithful to the facts of any issue in order to survive.” (Spitzer 1968,
54). Yet the ability to maintain the trust and confidence of the press is at least partly a personal
skill; Grossman and Kumar, for example, noted that while President Nixon’s Press Secretary,
Ronald Ziegler, was unable to maintain the trust of the White House press corps, when his
deputy, Gerald Warren, began replacing him at briefings, the reporters believed Warren even
though he conveyed the exact same information (1981, 155).
Rourke indicated that one of the reasons why “administrative officials are quite defensive
about withholding information and are reluctant to persist in practices of secrecy when these
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practices are exposed to public view or come under congressional criticism” is because “the
political beliefs of administrators have been framed in the same ideological tradition as those of
Congressmen and newspaper editors.” (1961, 109-110). The academic training of many
government public affairs officials in journalism may also impart values that cause them to
eschew conveying “mistruths.” In a recent survey by the Society of Professional Journalists and
National Association of Government Communicators of 154 members of the Association –
eighty-nine percent of whom worked as public affairs officers – fifty-two percent of the officials
reported that they had previously worked as a journalist and 47.3 percent reported that their
principal area of study in their education was journalism (Carlson and Jackson 2013, 12-13).
Another indication of the limited capability of public affairs officials to manipulate
information is the argument of former White House Press Secretary, George Reedy, that what
presidents consider to be problems with media coverage more often reflect problems in the real
world that the White House is powerless to present as otherwise. “Unfortunately for the mental
peace of presidents, events cannot be altered significantly by control over the printed word ...
While the White House does have at its command instrumentalities for manipulating the press,
they are effective only in regard to adjectives, not to the hard, substantive news that is the
ultimate shaper of public opinion.” (1970, 107). Reedy reported that “it is only in George
Orwell’s world that war can be labeled peace.” (ibid., 106).
Goulding allowed that the government sometimes conceals information to protect
national security. “In determining what information is to be made public, the government must
and does take into account the effect the release of that information will have on sovereign states
which are friendly to us, allied with us, neutral about us, potentially hostile or outright enemies.”
(1970, 20). He also argued that it is sometimes proper for the government to give false
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information to protect intelligence operations. “It is too bad that we need to engage in illegal
intelligence activity in this imperfect world, but it is necessary for our liberty that we do so.”
(ibid., 126).
At other times, government officials may be accused of secrecy when it would be
premature and counterproductive to discuss policies because they are still in development. For
example, when New York Times correspondent James Reston met with Secretary of State Dean
Acheson on the Secretary’s last day in office, Acheson is said to have told Reston that it would
have been impossible for them to have had a better relationship. “A Secretary of State, Acheson
said, has to germinate new policies and to nurse them along until they have reached the stage of
development when they can withstand the battering assaults of the political arena. The reporter’s
primary purpose, on the other hand, is to get news for his paper no matter what the effect on
policy.” (Cater 1959, 20).
Beyond and sometimes despite these circumstances, however, these authors say that
public affairs officials advocate within their governments for the release of information. After
spending a year observing the press offices of the White House, Pentagon, Department of State,
Department of Transportation, and Federal Drug Administration, Stephen Hess concluded that
“if they were invited to view press operations from the inside, many reporters would be surprised
to see the extent to which the press officer is their advocate within the permanent government.”
(1984, 35).
It should also be noted that, under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), it is illegal
for the government to withhold information from the public. The Act contains nine exemptions
allowing the government to withhold information related to national security; trade practices;
personnel practices; certain inter- and intra-agency messages; information exempted from
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disclosure by statute; and certain personnel, medical, law enforcement, and financial regulatory
records. In one of his first official acts, President Obama issued a memorandum to the heads of
executive departments and agencies, directing them to “adopt a presumption in favor of
disclosure” in responding to FOIA queries, quoting the maxim of former Supreme Court Justice
Louis Brandeis that “sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.” (Obama 2009). Of course,
the administration has been accused of improperly withholding national security information,
particularly in the wake of the leaks by former CIA staffer Edward Snowden; veteran CBS News
anchor Bob Schieffer recently described the Obama administration as “the most manipulative
and secretive administration I’ve covered.” (Downie 2013).
However, while a significant amount of government information is withheld and cannot
be corroborated (particularly regarding national security), the presumption of disclosure and
substantial amount of information that is disclosed annually can only promote the comportment
of government claims with reality, since public affairs officers know that reporters can utilize the
law to obtain documents to corroborate their accounts. Reporters can (and do) even file FOIA
requests for the correspondence of public affairs officials about their inquiries.
For similar reasons, these authors claim that the government is not guilty of engaging in
propaganda. Goulding reported that

‘propaganda’ is another color word which to me suggests sugar-coating information so
that the public swallows it, or deliberately repeating a false concept so often that the
public accepts it. I have seen no Assistant Secretary of Defense engage in propaganda of
this description, either in my four years in government or in fifteen years as a Washington
newspaperman, and I know of no evidence supporting any charge of this nature. (1970,
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165).

As for Fulbright’s charges that the Department of Defense promotes militarism,
Goulding claimed the very reverse to be true; he said he coordinated funding requests and
regularly forced various parts of the Pentagon to limit them (ibid., 160, 162).
Part of the reason that government public affairs officials eschew propagandizing may be
that if the government tried to “spin” facts too obviously, they would be criticized for so doing
(Helms 2012, 661). But Goulding claimed that when he worked in the government, there simply
was no organized apparatus for going beyond the release of information actually to attempt to
explain policy to the American people (1970, 81).
The claim is consistent with Hess’ fieldwork. Hess reported that “the most frequent and
serious charge against press offices- that they manage, manipulate, or control the news – I found
inaccurate for an almost perverse reason: they are simply not skillful enough or large enough to
manipulate the news.” (1984, 108). “The view from inside a press office is that most energy
seems to be devoted to trying to find out what the rest of the agency is doing (often
unsuccessfully), gathering material that has been requested by reporters rather than promoting
carefully prepared positions, and distributing information that is neither controversial nor
especially self-serving.” (ibid., 108).
Hess found that public affairs officers engage in four key activities: “informing
themselves and their colleagues, preparing material for the news media, staging events, and
responding to reporters’ inquiries.” (ibid., 38). He noted that the amount of time that such
officials spend being proactive – as opposed to reacting to reporters – is an useful gauge of the
opportunity for manipulation. This distinction will be useful for me in this study of public affairs
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officials. Hess, for example, found “that press offices spend as much time responding to
reporters’ inquiries as they do on all other activities combined. Given that a substantial number
of hours are devoted to keeping themselves informed and to pursuing internal agency business,
not more than a quarter of their time is left for staging events and preparing material for the news
media.” (ibid., 53).
In the end, Hess concluded that “most of their activities behind closed doors as well as in
briefing rooms are merely variations of shouting good news and whispering bad news.” (ibid.,
111). In other words, government public affairs officers try to convey the best possible
impressions of their agencies. It is unclear that this is different from normal human behavior.
Erving Goffman’s seminal work, The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life, for example,
depicted all people as active managers of the impressions they give to others in social situations
(1959, 4). In this sense, public affairs officers are singled out and criticized for doing what
normal people do virtually every waking moment of their lives!
Furthermore, in his interviews, Nimmo found that reporters believed that government
publicity was both necessary and positive, since it is only through the leadership of public
opinion that federal officials are able to build the support they need in order to govern (1964,
184-185). He reported that “given a choice between the danger of being used by political
officials for partisan purposes and being spared such danger by being shut out of policy matters,
reporters consistently prefer the hazards of being manipulated.” (ibid., 199).
While Hess found that such officials do not blatantly lie or propagandize, they do,
however, often tell what he calls “half-truths” by defining questions narrowly (1984, 25). “Press
officers hedge, they insinuate, but I always felt they thought they were playing by rules that
reporters understood.” (ibid., 112). Furthermore, he noted, “it is by unraveling the half-truths
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that reporters display their professional skill; consequently, they too have a vested interest in
maintaining this system despite whatever personal beliefs they have about government’s
obligation to tell the truth.” (ibid., 25).
Of course, nearly all truths are partial in the first place, given the vast array of possible
details that could possibly be utilized to describe any particular situation, as well as the influence
that the describer’s personal values and perspective has on how they interpret events and
determine what they believe to be most important and relevant. Nevertheless, public information
officers clearly have an incentive and opportunity to place their facts in the best possible light,
and it is undeniable that it would generally be better for citizens if they were more eager to share
their bad news. However, it is not at all obvious that any other system would or could be better –
especially in light of our basic human nature that Goffman has explored.
Stanley Kelley, Jr., for example, has studied the system that existed before government
public affairs officers. National leaders could not obtain party consensus or authority because
voters were reached through fragmented local party bosses. “The importance of the boss’s role in
political maneuverings … encouraged a de-emphasis on issues in American party conflict. … the
boss’s appeal to the voter was not primarily on issues and particularly not on national ones. His
entire effort was rather to tie himself, through patronage and favor, a bloc of votes on which he
could rely regardless of policy debates and regardless of candidates.” What was neglected was
building “the ability of men to understand the issues of policy, to discuss, and to govern for
themselves – these are articles of faith that lie at the center of democratic thought.” (1966, 217).
Thus, while Kelley allowed that the possibility for distortion and oversimplification by
government public affairs officers is present, and while allegations regarding the permanent
campaign make clear that, today, issues are certainly not always debated in the level of detail
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they perhaps call for, “what one is criticizing cannot be contrasted with a past age in American
politics when public issues were sincerely presented and soundly argued.” (ibid., 218).
Yet the limited and now very dated literature available to us on public affairs officers in
government agencies makes it particularly important to bring these studies up to date with
evidence from the modern, new media era.

Conclusion
Which side is right? Are government officials on a “permanent campaign” to build
support for the president, distorting and withholding the information they provide to the media in
the process? Or are they servants of the people, providing the information citizens need to judge
and participate fully in our democracy? These accounts make clear that, like other humans and
comic book action heroes, government public affairs officers have the capacity to use their
power for good or for sinister purposes. However, as previously discussed, government public
affairs officers have been mostly neglected in a literature that has focused on the White House,
and the important account of Stephen Hess is now three decades old. This study will therefore
shed light on this question and bring the literature up to date by questioning modern government
public affairs officers about their practices, in order to gain greater clarity on their tactics,
techniques, and views of their roles.
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Chapter 3: Theories and Research Design
I have already demonstrated the importance of these questions (in the Introduction) and
reviewed how the extant literature raises more questions than it answers (Chapters 1 and 2). In
this chapter, I build upon the previously-reviewed literature to develop my own theories and
research design regarding the two central issues of this study: (1) whether political appointees or
civil servants better serve the interests of presidents of the United States in key positions; and (2)
whether political appointees in government agencies are conducting a permanent campaign.
My theories are informed by logical extensions of the academic literature, as well as by
observations from my own experience serving as Spokesperson for International Affairs in the
Treasury Department, as a political appointee in President Obama’s administration from 20112012.

Theories To Be Tested
Civil Servants vs. Political Appointees
This study is designed to test two theories. First, I argue that efforts by modern presidents
to improve their efficacy by hiring more political appointees have been counterproductive. I
expect that, in positions critical to the president’s agenda and political fortunes, civil servants
will be found to be more effective and no less loyal to the president than political appointees.
I define effectiveness as success in advancing the administration’s goals. In my study, I
consider an effective public affairs officer to be one who is able to shape the tone, volume, and
content of media coverage in order to reflect positively on the administration he or she serves
and advance the administration’s policy arguments. I define loyalty as the pursuit of the
president’s goals – even when they conflict with an official’s own personal goals. This study
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investigates the practice of disloyalty, using the prevalence of leaking unauthorized information
to the press as a measure. I define leaks as information given without attribution to reporters
which does not further the interests of the administration and would not be approved by an
official’s supervisors – in contrast to plants, which I define as information given to reporters
without attribution which does further the interests of the administration and would be approved
by the official’s supervisors.
As discussed in chapter 1, a variety of evidence indicates that civil servants perform
better on the job than political appointees (Heclo 1977; Lewis 2008). Yet, as we have seen,
American presidents continue to use political appointees in unprecedented numbers globally.
George C. Edwards III has questioned whether presidents accept the lower competence of
political appointees because they believe that appointees offer greater loyalty (2001, 81).
However, this would only make sense if civil servants were less loyal to the president – a
proposition that I argue is false.
In my study of Treasury public affairs officers, I expect to find that the relative
effectiveness of political appointees with the press is diminished by several factors.
First, I expect civil servants to be more effective because political appointees tend to have
bigger portfolios and operate in more of a pressure-cooker environment, which likely leaves
them lacking the capacity to engage in the proactive practices of good communications
professionals – such as crafting strategies in advance, pitching stories (rather than focusing solely
on responding to inquiries from reporters), and coordinating with counterparts across the
government. (Of course, civil service rules generally limit the number of hours that careerists can
work, but even if careerists were assigned bigger portfolios, I suspect that they would still retain
an advantage over appointees because their greater policy knowledge, which will be discussed
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below, would allow them to respond to reporters more rapidly.)
Second, I expect that political appointees spend a greater percentage of their time focused
on the images of the officials for whom they work than their career counterparts; while a positive
image of the president’s Treasury team is ultimately beneficial to an administration, in my
estimation the president benefits more from positive coverage of his policies and achievements.
Third, the shorter tenure of political appointees likely gives them less knowledge of the
issues they are responsible for communicating in the press and weaker relationships with the
reporters who cover their agencies. After spending a year observing the public affairs offices of
the White House and several government agencies, Stephen Hess reported that “government
public information practitioners … frequently lack the fundamental awareness and understanding
of a given situation to either provide public affairs counsel to decision-makers or even respond
adequately to media queries regarding public policy, particularly during crisis.” (1984, 228). Yet
one of the most critical qualities of a successful spokesperson is being well-informed (Grossman
and Kumar 1981, 149). In Morgan’s survey, he found that the biggest complaint reporters had
about public information officers was their lack of technical knowledge (1986, 74).
Other scholars have further warned that overreliance on appointees crowds out the
knowledge and input of civil servants, who typically amass decades of experience in the
minutiae of their policy portfolios, equipping them to offer critical advice to appointees. As
Hugh Heclo has argued, “the independence entailed in neutral competence does not exist for its
own sake; it exists precisely in order to serve the aims of elected partisan leadership.” (1975, 81).
Joel Aberbach and Bert Rockman put it more bluntly: “one of the major functions … of the
permanent apparatus is to serve presidents by helping them avoid stupid mistakes that threaten
their political viability.” (1999, 171). Yet when the government becomes too top-heavy with

106

appointees, decisions lack this central input.
As a result of this tenure-based expertise, David Cohen has argued that civil servants are
actually well-placed to advise appointees on political matters, because they are accustomed to
working in an environment which requires taking account of the objectives of Congress, interest
groups and other parties. Ironically, Cohen reported, “inexperienced political appointees often
have far less sound political judgment.” (1996, 10). This claim is seemingly born out by Andrew
Rudalevidge’s study of legislation proposed by presidents between 1949-1996. He found that
bills written in departments and agencies (which, by implication, involved greater input from
civil servants) had a fifteen percent higher likelihood of passing in Congress than legislation
drafted in the White House (2002, 156). Of course, it is possible that bills drafted in agencies
were more technical or less polemical, making it easier for them to gain support. However, the
possibility that civil servants could more effectively advance an administration’s agenda is a
fascinating proposition worthy of further investigation.
Ronald Johnson and Gary Libecap have further discussed the ways in which the civil
service system serves the interests of the president by promoting government efficacy. They
have noted that the civil service was extended by presidents McKinley and Cleveland,
specifically to meet the needs of the executive (1994, 13, 72-73). While the fully patronagebased system that previously existed generated inefficiency, fraud, and scandals, the civil service
system allows presidents to meet the demands of their constituents for the more efficient delivery
of government services by improving the quality of the government workforce (ibid., 14, 20, 24).
Furthermore, the use of civil servants allows presidents to avoid becoming completely besieged
by jobseekers, as they were under the solely patronage-based system – resulting in significant
time savings for the executive (ibid., 56-57). Johnson and Libecap observed that the same
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incentives remain for presidents today (ibid., 171) – although, ironically, as a result of
politicization, modern presidents today also have more aides to handle personnel matters.
Furthermore, I expect to find that, very often, the president does not necessarily need
appointees in some of the positions they currently fill because their duties are not very political.
Since the 1970s, Congress has significantly increased its oversight of federal agencies (Aberbach
1991). The Treasury and other agencies are therefore obliged by law to operate in certain highly
specific ways. Therefore, staffers enjoy little discretion on many tasks – such as, for example, the
release of congressionally-mandated economic indicators.
However, I expect the greater overall efficacy of civil servants to be somewhat
diminished by efficacy advantages which the appointees possess. I expect that, relative to their
careerist counterparts, appointees have better access to information, work on more high profile
issues, and their superiors make more time for them because they place greater importance on the
press. This would give appointees better, faster access to information in order to make their cases
to reporters and would allow appointees to offer more interviews to reporters with senior
administration officials in order to shape media coverage.
In my study of the loyalty of government officials, I expect to find that appointees are no
more loyal to the president than civil servants. I suspect that this is partly due to the different
selection processes for civil servants and political appointees, which influence their propensity to
leak information to the press. While civil servants only advance in their careers if they follow
strict protocols, political appointees are rewarded for more independent and riskier behavior.
Political appointees also operate in a more political and high-profile environment in which there
are greater advantages to be obtained from the outcomes of leaks – such as weakening rivals or
doing favors for members of the press who will consider the value of their relationship when
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judging them in future stories. Furthermore, unlike civil servants, political appointees do not
enjoy tenure – incentivizing them to focus more heavily on bolstering their future career
prospects through strategies such as fostering relationships with reporters. I therefore expect that,
contrary to claims that civil servants will not be loyal to the president, this study will find that it
is political appointees who are more likely to leak information to reporters that does not serve
the president’s agenda.
This unconventional expectation is actually supported in the literature. As David Pozen
has noted, “journalists, researchers, and government insiders have consistently attested that
leaking is far more common among those in leadership positions.” (2013, 12). For example,
legendary New York Times correspondent and editor James Reston concluded that “government
is the only known vessel that leaks from the top.” (1967, 66). James Pfiffner likewise argued that
“incidents like … leaks to the press will surface in any administration, but as likely as not they
will be instigated by the president’s own political appointees.” (1996, 85). “Perhaps the greatest
frustration for presidents,” Hess suggested, “is when they are forced to realize that most
executive branch leakers are their own people - political appointees - rather than the faceless
bureaucrats they campaigned against.” (1984, 76). In his memoir, former Defense Secretary
Robert Gates likewise described President Obama as being infuriated over leaks, explaining that
while his agency was often accused of being the source of such leaks, “the president would
acknowledge to me he had problems with leaks in his own shop.” (2014, 358).
However, in studies of the loyalty of civil servants, leaks have never before been utilized
as a measure. Rather, as I will later discuss, myriad previous studies have attempted to measure
civil service loyalty by testing whether agency outputs conform with presidential goals.
Furthermore, what we know about leaks is largely anecdotal. My study attempts to address these
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gaps.
I further expect that civil servants will be unlikely to engage in politically-motivated acts
of disloyalty to an administration because the civil servants will not have particularly partisan
views in the first place. I suspect that individuals with strong political views would choose a
different, less constraining, line of work. The explosion of ideological think tanks and interest
groups over the past several decades has created a plethora of job opportunities for policy
professionals who are also politically ideological.
In addition, I hypothesize that the perceived greater loyalty of appointees to the president
actually works to the president’s disadvantage. I suspect that because appointees are viewed as
political, reporters may be more skeptical of their claims. For example, in his study of
government public affairs officers, David Morgan noted that “there exist a number of media
relations advisers brought in by political appointees. Such people are themselves typically
responsible only for selling their bosses, not the agency or department. Reporters certainly see
such ‘boss flacks’ that way and treat them accordingly.” (1986, xi). Likewise, Judy VanSlyke
Turk’s study of six state government agencies in Louisiana found that public affairs officers
“who view their role as providers of persuasive ‘propaganda’ that serves the interests of their
agencies are less successful in obtaining newspaper acceptance and use of their news releases
and other ‘handouts’ than are public information representatives who view themselves merely as
providers of information regardless of whether that information is persuasive.” (1986, 7). (Of
course, these studies are now significantly dated – evincing the need for more recent research on
this subject.)
Therefore, while I expect that civil servants will be found to be both more competent and
no less loyal than political appointees, I argue that the perceived greater loyalty of appointees to
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the president actually works to the disadvantage of the chief executive, by hampering the
effectiveness of his appointee advocates.

The Permanent Campaign
The workloads of political appointees are well-documented to be massive (Bonafede
1987). I therefore suspect that their large volume of responsibilities will be found to preclude
them from engaging in the more sophisticated techniques of the permanent campaign – providing
a rather extraordinary mechanism of democratic protection. As a result, I expect to find little
difference between political appointees and civil servants in the degree to which they are
engaged in the permanent campaign tactics of utilizing public opinion polls to govern, playing to
the emotions of the American people, and withholding and distorting information. I suspect that
the activities of both groups are limited to more traditional tasks, such as releasing factual data
and information about agency activities to the press and attempting to place such information in
the best possible light and in congruence with the goals of the administration – not engaging in a
permanent campaign. Furthermore, I suspect that the values of the journalism profession, such as
faithfulness to facts, will cause public affairs officers to be willing to present facts and ideas in
the most convincing and beneficial manner to the administration possible, but unwilling to distort
or withhold information. In a 2013 survey by the Society of Professional Journalists and National
Association of Government Communicators of 154 members of the Association (eighty-nine
percent of whom worked as public affairs officers), fifty-two percent of the officials reported that
they had previously worked as a journalist and 47.3 percent reported that their principal area of
study in their education was journalism (Carlson and Jackson 2013, 12-13). And in one of the
few previous studies ever to conduct interviews with public affairs officials in government
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agencies, Dan Nimmo reported that the officials told him that “withholding of information from
the public view is an evil.” (1964, 180). Of course, the evidence considered in chapter 2 makes
clear that government spokespeople have certainly withheld and distorted information. However,
I suspect that those who study journalism may be somewhat less willing to do so, as a result of
the values imbued during the course of their educations.
I expect that the public affairs officers will report that attempts to convey mistruths would
be counterproductive. As discussed in chapter 2, in America’s system of divided government and
media scrutiny, attempts to cover up information are unlikely to be successful for very long,
since someone will have an incentive to leak whatever facts are being withheld or distorted. (Of
course, it is difficult to identify information that is withheld and not exposed by other actors –
another reason why this research is so important, because I will ask public affairs officers how
often they withhold information).
I therefore theorize that, in my interviews, civil servants will be found to be more
competent and no less loyal than political appointees – and neither group will be found to be
engaging in the tactics of the permanent campaign.

Research Design
In this section, I discuss how these arguments will be tested in my case study. First, I
discuss the selection of public affairs officers, and Treasury officials specifically, as
representatives of the “career” and “appointee” categories in my theory. Next, I discuss the
qualitative data collection process (interviews) utilized in this study and how I will
operationalize the conceptual variables in my theory.
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Case Study Selection
Public affairs officers were selected for this study because of their outsize importance to
the president. The most potent weapon in the arsenal of modern presidents is widely believed to
be their power to communicate – making the jobs of officials who communicate on behalf of the
president particularly important.
Richard Neustadt revolutionized scholarship about the presidency when, borrowing the
words of President Truman, he claimed that “presidential power is the power to persuade.”
(1991, 10). Neustadt argued that since America’s leaders share authority but do not have
influence over whether other officials hold their jobs, the only way for the president to convince
other politicians to do what he wishes is to persuade them that doing so is in their own interests
(ibid., 29-30). Presidents may increase their power by burnishing their reputations and public
support, since other Washingtonians take account of the level of public support the president
enjoys in assessing the consequences they will face for disagreeing with him. (ibid., 55, 73).
Elmer E. Cornwell, Jr. likewise influentially argued that “it has been the relationship between
President and public that has given this office its power and importance.” (1969, 3). Lacking any
formal constitutional authority to dictate the law beyond the veto, “the leverage the President has
acquired in the law-making process has been indirect, based on use of the arts of persuasion, and
ultimately grounded in the popular support he can claim or mobilize.” (ibid., 4).
Of course, Edwards takes issue with this theory because he finds that presidents
(including the “giants” such as Lincoln, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Reagan, have largely been
unsuccessful in their attempts to persuade other actors (2009, 21). Edwards instead argues that
chief executives act as more modest “facilitators” who “understand the opportunities for change
in their environments and fashion strategies and tactics to exploit them” (ibid., 12). However, he
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has argued that presidents “cannot reshape the contours of the political landscape” through the
art of persuasion (ibid., 189). This raises the possibility that my study could find that neither
appointees nor civil servants were able to effectively shape media coverage on behalf of the
administrations they served.
One of the tools that modern presidents use in their efforts to persuade is the platform
which President Theodore Roosevelt famously named the “bully pulpit.” The nation’s twentysixth president did not intend the phrase to contain diabolical implications; in the vernacular of
his day “bully” meant “first-rate” or “excellent,” reflecting Roosevelt’s estimation that with the
office came an opportunity to reach a wide audience which was beneficial. The bully pulpit is
perceived to be particularly powerful because it is a prerogative all the president’s own,
unencumbered by the other branches of government (Muir 1995, 14).
Modern presidents are availing themselves of this power more than ever. Presidential
communications proliferated dramatically in the twentieth century. Jeffrey Tulis calculated that
nineteenth-century presidents delivered a grand total of about 1,000 speeches – or an average of
ten per year (1987, 16). By contrast, George C. Edwards III noted that, on average, President
Clinton spoke in public 550 times per year (2003, 3). Furthermore, while nineteenth-century
presidents had significant opportunities to speak to the people, they largely declined to do so,
instead communicating in written messages addressed to the Congress. In the nineteenth century,
less than one percent of presidential communications were delivered verbally. Today, presidents
speak directly to the people: in the twentieth century, forty-two percent of presidential
communications were delivered orally (Tulis 1987, 139).
If the source of the modern presidency’s power indeed lies in communications, then the
members of the executive branch who develop and execute communications must be particularly
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important to the president. Even if Edwards is correct that the power that presidents exercise is
limited to exploiting opportunities which exist in the environment rather than creating new ones,
it is especially important to the president that those who “facilitate” on his behalf be effective. As
Edwards explained, “change is not inevitable, and facilitators make things happen that otherwise
would not. Effective facilitators are skilled leaders who must recognize the opportunities that
exist in their environments, choose which opportunities to pursue, when and in what order, and
exploit them with skill, energy, perseverance, and will.” (2009, 12).
Furthermore, the mere fact that they shape media coverage makes public affairs officers
key staffers for the president, since as discussed in the previous chapter, press reporting
significantly influences public opinion. It is for this reason that federal public affairs officers
were selected for this case study.
More specifically, public affairs officials who work on economic issues for the
Department of the Treasury and its bureaus were selected for this study because they are
especially vital communicators. The Treasury is one of the four original cabinet agencies created
by President George Washington, which Thomas Cronin has classified as “the inner, or
counseling, cabinet positions … vested with high-priority responsibilities.” (1980, 276-277).
Since modern chief executives assumed responsibility for the performance of the economy
during the New Deal era, there have been few – if any – subjects more important to the president.
Voters heavily prioritize the economy, given that the jobs, and thus livelihoods, of most citizens
depend upon the performance of the nation’s economy. Since the 1946 inception of the Gallup
poll asking Americans to name the most important problem the country faces, the economy has
typically dominated (Wood 2007, 7-8). Re-election challengers most frequently criticize
incumbent presidents over their handling of the economy (ibid., 59-60).
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As a result, a large literature has consistently confirmed that the president’s public
approval ratings and re-election prospects are closely correlated with the state of the economy.
Incumbents reap the benefits of strong economies and suffer electoral punishment for negative
economic conditions – or, as Edward Tufte memorably declared, “as goes economic
performance, so goes the election.” (Tufte 1978, 137; Erikson 1989; Lewis-Beck and Tien 2004;
Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001; Nickelsburg and Norpoth 2000). Robert Erikson, for example,
found that income change during the previous administration was a better predictor of the
outcome of the next presidential election than whether voters even liked the candidates (1989,
568). Michael Nickelsburg and Helmut Norpoth studied University of Michigan Surveys of
Consumers and New York Times/CBS News polls from 1976-1996 and found that a president’s
handling of the economy is as important to his public approval ratings as his handling of foreign
policy (2000, 313). Additionally, in a 1992 study, Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Tom W. Rice
found that, in all but one U.S. presidential election between 1948-1988, when the unemployment
rate was declining, the incumbent or his party won the presidency – but when unemployment
was not improving, the incumbent or his party lost (32).
However, in the 1992 election, President George H.W. Bush lost his bid for re-election,
despite the fact that the economy had rebounded. The reason for this, Marc Hetherington found,
was that negative reporting about the economy in the media altered the perceptions of voters
(1996, 372). A variety of other studies confirm the importance of media coverage of the
economy to the president. Richard Nadeau, Richard G. Niemi, David P. Fan and Timothy Amato
studied the relationship between economic news and presidential popularity between 1977-1995
and found that news about the economy had significant effects on presidential approval ratings,
often accounting for shifts of two percentage points or more. Media coverage of the economy
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actually had a greater impact on presidential approval than objective economic indicators (1999,
126). Barry Burden and Anthony Mughan found that, during the Clinton administration, the
media covered America’s trade deficit with Japan more heavily than the U.S. trade deficit with
Canada, and as a result the deficit with Japan impacted the president’s approval ratings, while the
deficit with Canada did not (2003, 555). And Dhavan V. Shah, Mark D. Watts, David Domke,
David P. Fan, and Michael Fibison’s study of presidential elections between 1984-1996 found
not only that media coverage of the economy significantly predicted the selection of the
president but also that “across all elections, economic coverage is a much more powerful
predictor of presidential preference than noneconomic coverage.” (1999, 937).
A different body of studies has argued that voters judge the president in whole or in part
based upon their expectations of future economic performance (Fiorina 1981; MacKuen, Erikson
and Stimson 1992; Nadeau and Lewis-Beck 2001). However, whether the economic evaluations
of voters are retrospective or prospective, it is clear that such evaluations heavily influence their
assessments of the president.
Researchers have also found that voters place greater emphasis on the economy as a
whole, rather than their personal financial circumstances, when they factor the economy into
their voting decisions – a phenomenon known as “sociotropic voting.” For example, Donald R.
Kinder and D. Roderick Kiewiet found that “voting in congressional elections from 1956 to 1976
was influenced hardly at all by personal economic grievances. Those voters unhappy with
changes in their financial circumstances, or those who had recently been personally affected by
unemployment, showed little inclination to punish candidates of the incumbent party for their
personal misfortunes.” (1979, 495).
A similar phenomenon has been observed in presidential elections. Gregory Markus
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studied data from National Election Studies between 1956-1984 and found that “personal
financial predicaments … carry weight in individuals’ voting decisions, but changing
macroeconomic conditions are more important as determinants of election outcomes” in
presidential elections. (1988, 137). Shah et al. likewise found that voters focus more on national
economic conditions than on their own personal circumstances (1999). This provides an
important opportunity for an incumbent president in a re-election campaign. The chief executive
does not have to (and likely cannot) solve the personal economic problems of individual voters
in order to win their votes; he simply needs to convince them that the nation’s overall economic
conditions and/or prospects are good.
Therefore, presidents have an enormous incentive to attempt to influence the way the
media cover – and thus the American people perceive – the economy. As we would accordingly
expect, unless the country is experiencing a crisis, the President talks more about the economy
than any other topic (Wood 2007, 60). The extraordinary level of presidential prioritization of
and sensitivity to this issue is perhaps best evidenced by B. Dan Wood’s finding that presidents
alter their economic rhetoric in response not to changes in actual economic conditions, but rather
to changes in the perceptions of the American people about the economy (ibid., 163).
Presidential messaging on the economy is also uniquely powerful. This is because our
modern economy is grounded in psychology; economic outcomes are determined in part by the
attitudes about the economy that Americans hold. Indeed the term “public opinion” was first
used by King Louis XVI’s finance minister, Jacques Necker, following the French Revolution, as
he endeavored to boost confidence in the money market in Paris (Altheide and Johnson 1980, 8).
Today, in the United States, two-thirds of the country’s economic activity is driven by consumer
spending – and the remaining third is strongly impacted by consumer spending decisions (Wood

118

2007, 138-139). Thus, if presidents can convincingly project optimism about the economy, they
can increase consumer confidence, which is one measure of the strength of the economy. B. Dan
Wood’s study of all public remarks by twelve presidents over sixty-three years confirmed that
optimistic presidential rhetoric led to improved consumer confidence, which ultimately improved
both actual economic performance and presidential approval ratings (ibid., 159, 167). Of course,
as the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftereffects make clear, presidential rhetoric is certainly not
a panacea for the country’s economic challenges. Nevertheless, research shows that the president
can reap the rewards of increased public approval if he and his staff are successfully able to
shape the way the American people view the economy – even if actual economic conditions are
less promising than the government officials project. As we have seen, increased public
approval, in turn, helps presidents get re-elected and, as Neustadt showed, achieve their goals in
office (1990, 73).
Further confirmation of the importance of the Treasury comes from a survey of fifty
reporters who cover federal agencies and departments. Asked to rank federal agencies by their
importance, reporters gave the most mentions to the Treasury (Morgan 1986, 55). Given the
unique importance of media coverage of the economy to the president, there are, then, perhaps
no public affairs officials more crucial to the president than those who work on economic issues.
If civil servants are found to be reliable advocates for the president in such roles, the finding
would likely be applicable in lesser-stakes environments as well.
These circumstances are also ripe for encouraging officials to engage in tactics of the
permanent campaign. The fact that the president’s rhetoric responds to public perceptions about
the economy – rather than objective economic data – is a clear indication that the White House is
on a permanent campaign when it comes to this issue. Given the extraordinary importance of the

119

economy to the president, if an administration were to extend the permanent campaign beyond
the White House to any government agency, the Treasury appears to be the most likely place to
find it being waged. My interviews with public affairs officers about the tactics they employ
were designed to determine whether they are on this campaign.
This case study further poses a critical test of appointee competence because presidents
are likely to place their best appointees at the Treasury. Gabriel Horton and David E. Lewis have
found that presidents place their most competent appointees in agencies that are most prominent
and critical to their agenda (2009, 6, 8). Thus, if presidents are found to be better served by
career executives than by Treasury appointees – who should be among the most effective
appointees – the finding would likely apply to other appointees as well.
The Treasury also provides a solid, if not most extreme, test of the loyalty of civil
servants. In the United States, economic policy is clearly the subject of major ideological
dispute. The Treasury has in the past not garnered the scholarly and media attention of very
extreme cases – such as the virtual cottage industry of studies on the Environmental Protection
Agency, where civil servants were said to be activists, especially under President Reagan
(Golden 2000; Maranto 2005; Ringquist 1995; Waterman and Rouse 1998; Waterman 1989;
Wood 1988; Wood and Waterman 1993; Wood and Waterman 1994). Nevertheless, the agency
is the site of decision making on areas of significant partisan disagreement, including the
controversial responses to the 2008 financial crisis undertaken under both the administrations
studied.
Finally, I believe that using the Treasury for this case study significantly improved the
quality of my results. Because I previously served as a Treasury spokesperson in the Obama
administration and had a friend who served in the Treasury during the Bush administration, I was
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able to use my access and contacts to earn the trust and participation of research subjects, who
rarely grant interviews to discuss their work. Furthermore, because my research subjects knew
that I already had an intimate familiarity with the Department’s public affairs operations, I
believe they were at least somewhat more likely to be honest in the interviews –knowing that if
they conveyed inaccurate information, I would sometimes be able to identify it as such. My deep
familiarity with the programs, people, and myriad acronyms to which my research subjects
referred allowed for particularly rich conversations. I typically did not need to ask my research
subjects to explain references they made to particular initiatives, individuals, events or acronyms,
unless such information was actually relevant to my research.
On a practical basis, it also would not have been possible to conduct this research in a
more important government agency. The Secretary of State is considered the most important
member of the Cabinet, and is followed by the Secretary of the Treasury and then Secretary of
Defense in order of precedence. These three agencies are practically universally recognized as
the most important, and are the only three agencies which have dedicated in-house press corps
that could provide the detailed independent corroborations utilized in this study. However, unlike
the Treasury Department, the State Department relies heavily upon civil servants in public affairs
positions, which would make the comparisons of appointees and civil servants utilized in this
study unworkable. Likewise, so much of the Defense Department’s information is classified that
their spokespeople would not be able to share facts and examples highly relevant to their work in
such an interview, making it practically impossible to arrive at informed judgments.
Interestingly, the portfolios of Treasury spokespeople include International Affairs (a
portfolio that handles U.S. economic diplomacy) and Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (a
portfolio responsible for the tracking of the financial assets of terrorists). My interview subjects
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therefore included spokespeople handling the diplomatic, economic, and defense issues most
critical to the president.

Data and Measures
Most previous studies attempted to assess the loyalty of civil servants quantitatively and
exogenously, by examining whether indicators such as agency outputs or votes comport with the
president’s wishes (Cohen 1985; Eisner and Meier 1990; Moe 1982; Moe 1985; Stewart and
Cromartie 1982; Wood 1988; Wood 1990; Wood and Anderson 1993; Wood and Waterman
1993; Wood and Waterman 1994). Yet there are strong limitations to measuring a subject as
complex and nuanced as human loyalty without ever interacting with the individuals being
studied. By contrast, my study replicates Golden’s (2000) approach to qualitative analysis by
conducting detailed interviews with government officials in an effort to obtain similarly rich,
explanatory, and nuanced results.

I. Interviews with Government Officials
To test my hypotheses, I conducted detailed interviews with ten political appointees and
seven civil servants who previously worked or currently work in public affairs for the
Department of the Treasury and its subsidiary agencies. The political appointees all worked as
spokespeople for the Treasury. Examples of possible spokesperson portfolios include Domestic
Finance, International Affairs, Tax Policy, Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), through which the U.S. government purchased financial
assets in order to help stabilize the economy in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. While I will
likewise not list the exact bureaus for which my interview subjects who were civil servants
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worked, in order to protect their identities, examples of such bureaus are the Bureau of
Engraving and Printing, Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, Internal Revenue Service,
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and U.S. Mint. The inclusion of different bureaus
provided a desired diversity in my sample.
To account for any differences between the approaches of Democratic and Republican
administrations, I conducted half the interviews of political appointees with individuals who
have served or are serving under President Obama, and half with appointees who served under
President George W. Bush. All the civil servants whom I interviewed had previous experience
working in public affairs for a government agency during at least one Republican administration
(predominantly during the administration of President George W. Bush), though not necessarily
within the Treasury.
The Obama appointees whom I interviewed were all colleagues, who I met while
working at the Treasury, or individuals to whom I was introduced through my former Treasury
colleagues. I was introduced to one Bush appointee through a former Bush administration
official, whom I worked with at a national foundation several years previously. This Bush
appointee in turn connected me to several other Bush appointees who I interviewed. I reached
two other Bush appointees by contacting them directly to introduce myself via email. All of the
appointees whom I interviewed started at the Treasury in Schedule C positions. However, as I
will later discuss, the aggregate job functions of the Bush appointees who I interviewed were at a
slightly higher level than those of the Obama appointees.
One of the civil servants was introduced to me by a former appointee. I reached the other
six civil servants by researching their contact information online and calling or emailing them. In
order to make the basis of comparison between the political appointees (who typically serve in
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higher-level posts) and civil servants as comparable as possible, I interviewed civil servants who
were working at a senior level in their public affairs offices whenever possible. Four of the civil
servants served in positions in which they led public affairs for their bureau, while three served
as spokespeople or public affairs liaisons.
While every Obama appointee and nearly every Bush appointee with whom I requested
an interview agreed to participate in this research project, several of the civil servants who I
approached did not. This is likely the case in part because I did not have pre-existing
relationships with these individuals. As I will discuss in chapters 5 and 7, the willingness of these
civil servants to grant my requests for interview may be an indicator that my sample is overall
somewhat more likely than the average civil servant to be open in their interactions with
reporters, a fact that could have resulted in a sample which over-represented civil servants who
leak information to the press.
I felt that I had a comfortable, strong rapport with every appointee and civil servant
whom I interviewed, with the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who will be discussed in greater
detail below. It nevertheless remains the case that, because I was appointed by a Democratic
president and because I had previously worked closely with all or most of the Obama appointees,
the Bush appointees may have viewed me with less trust than the Obama appointees, and may
therefore have been less forthcoming. However, I was struck by the professionalism, candor, and
respect granted to me by all the Bush appointees, with the exception of Bush Appointee 5.
Of course, despite our strong rapport, it certainly seems reasonable to project that if the
officials whom I interviewed had engaged in truly egregious behavior in their positions, they
might have sought to protect themselves by not sharing such details with me. However, the
readiness with which both groups discussed situations that reflected poorly on their offices,
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which is evident in the chapters that follow, led me to conclude that my interview subjects were
overall very forthcoming (again, with the caveat of a single research subject, Bush Appointee 5).
The accuracy, validity, and representativeness of my results are considered in detail in the
Conclusion.
Prior to conducting the interviews, I tested and refined my questions by asking them to a
former public affairs official who worked in the administration of New York City Mayor
Michael R. Bloomberg.
All of the interviews lasted at least one hour; most lasted closer to an hour and a half. The
interviews were all conducted in person in Washington, D.C. or in New York City, with the
exception of one interview conducted by telephone because the personal circumstances of my
interview subject precluded an in-person meeting. This subject was particularly loquacious and
detailed in our discussion, so I did not feel that the loss of face-to-face contact diminished the
quality of his responses in a significant way.
Some of the interviews were conducted in the offices of the American Political Science
Association in Washington, which generously granted me office space in their Centennial Center
for Political Science and Public Affairs, for the purpose of conducting this research.
Following the interviews, I followed up with my research subjects by email and
telephone in order to ask additional questions and/or clarify their responses.

Measuring the Competence and Effectiveness of the Government Officials
In my interviews with the government officials, I used seven measures in order to assess
the relative competence and effectiveness of the appointees and civil servants. As will later be
discussed, in order to obtain further information about the relative competence and effectiveness
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of the two groups of government officials, I supplemented the information that the government
officials provided to me with additional questions which I asked to the reporters I interviewed.
First, I asked the officials how much access they had to the principals for whom they
worked. Greater access to senior officials would be one indicator of a public affairs officer’s
greater efficacy, since it would allow the public affairs officer to obtain important information
about the agency’s current activities and priorities, to inform their media strategies and responses
to reporters.
Second, I queried the officials on their knowledge of their subject matter portfolios, by
asking questions such as “I know that you arrange media interviews for your principal(s). If you
were to do the interviews yourself, how well do you think you’d do?” and “many of the reporters
who cover economic issues have been doing so for a long time. Do you think that gives them an
advantage over you? How do you handle it?” It is critical for public affairs officers to understand
the substance of the policy portfolio(s) for which they are responsible; otherwise, they cannot
meaningfully respond to reporters’ queries; craft substantive arguments to advance the
administration’s goals; identify inaccuracies in news reports; or develop meaningful strategies in
order to attain media coverage that accurately and persuasively conveys the administration’s
policy positions.
Third, I asked the officials to estimate their response times to media inquiries. Because
reporters work on tight deadlines, if an administration is to have an opportunity to shape and
share their point of view in news stories, they must respond to press inquiries rapidly. The ability
to do so is thus an essential qualification of an effective public affairs officer.
Fourth, I asked the officials about the quality of their relationships with the press. A
competent public affairs officer would be expected to stay in regular contact with the reporters
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who cover his or her agency, not only to respond to queries but also to proactively pitch stories
and obtain intelligence about stories on which reporters are working. It is to be expected that
officials will sometimes have disagreements with the press; indeed, the ability and willingness to
forcefully argue the administration’s point of view is a sign of an effective public affairs officer.
At the same time, a competent public affairs professional must be able to handle such exchanges
respectfully and professionally, in order to maintain productive working relationships with the
members of the press who they will seek to influence on many future stories.
Fifth, I asked the appointees and civil servants how much success they felt they had in
influencing the topics covered by reporters and the tone and content of media reports. Obviously,
their own assessments would be subjective and I sought corroboration of their claims in my
interviews with reporters. However, these queries were designed to help me obtain insight into
the standards by which the officials judged the outcomes of their work and how they defined
success and failure.
I also asked the government officials whether they thought that appointees or civil
servants are more effective at conveying the administration’s messages in the press, in order to
obtain insight into the observations they had made regarding the relative competence and
effectiveness of their colleagues.
Additionally, I considered whether the officials appeared to employ savvy tactics in order
to advance the administration’s goals.

Possible Causal Factors
My assessments of the efficacy of the officials took into account the varying levels of
importance and salience of the issues for which they were or are responsible, as officials working
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on less high-profile issues cannot be expected to exert as much influence over the media agenda
as officials working on the most newsworthy topics.
I also queried the officials on several variables in order to determine whether they
impacted their relative efficacy.
First, I queried the officials about their previous work experience, in order to determine
whether one group had more relevant and/or extensive prior professional experience that might
have increased their efficacy.
Second, I asked the officials about their educational backgrounds, as another way of
comparing the training that they brought to their jobs which might have impacted their efficacy.
Third, I asked how long the officials served in their positions. With greater tenure,
officials might become more skilled in their positions; it is also possible that they would develop
routine ways of doing their work and that individuals who came in with fresh energy and ways of
thinking could be more effective. My other measures were therefore designed in part to
determine how tenure impacted the effectiveness of my interview subjects.
Finally, I queried the officials on the manageability of their workloads and how they
spent their time, in order to determine whether the legendarily long hours that other researchers
have found appointees to work influenced their effectiveness.

Measuring the Loyalty of the Government Officials
In my interviews with the government officials, I used six measures in order to assess the
relative loyalty of the appointees and civil servants.
First, I asked the officials what someone in their position should do if asked to advocate a
policy with which he or she personally disagreed, in order to determine whether the officials
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believed that it would be appropriate to attempt to undermine an administration’s goals.
Second, I asked both groups of government officials how often they personally disagreed
with an administration policy they were required to advocate and how they reacted in such
circumstances, in order to determine whether they had ever engaged in acts of disloyalty to an
administration they served.
Third, I asked the officials whether leaks to the press occurred in their offices, and, if so,
if they were aware of whether the officials responsible for the leaks were appointees or civil
servants. This question was designed to serve as one measure of whether appointees or civil
servants were responsible for the majority of leaks during the tenure of my interview subjects.
Fourth, I asked the officials whether they personally had ever been tempted to leak
information to the press. This question was designed to determine whether they had in fact ever
leaked to the press, without directly asking the question and thereby potentially making my
research subjects defensive.

Possible Causal Factors
I also explored two possible causal factors for differences in the loyalty of the two
groups.
First, I asked both groups of officials whether their personal political views impacted
their work. This was designed to determine whether the officials attempted to pursue their own
personal goals in their work, and, if so, if such attempts ever conflicted with the goals of the
administration(s) they served.
Second, I asked the appointees whether they would consider working as a Treasury
spokesperson under an administration of a different political party, in order to determine whether
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and how loyalty to the president they served was a factor in their motivation for serving in their
positions.

Measuring Whether the Government Officials Are on a Permanent Campaign
In my interviews with the government officials, I used nine measures in order to assess
whether they were conducting such a campaign.
First, I asked the officials how much time they spent focusing on the profiles and images
of the officials for whom they worked, and whether it was a good use of their time. This question
was designed to determine whether the officials focused on the administration’s image at the
expense of policy priorities.
Second, I asked the officials to describe the most sophisticated techniques they used to
shape what reporters covered, in order to determine whether they would report availing
themselves of permanent campaign tactics.
Third, I asked the government officials whether they ever attempted to appeal to the
emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted. As
discussed in chapter 2, Blumenthal has argued that, as part of the permanent campaign,
politicians play to the emotions of the people instead of fostering rational policy debate (1982,
21).
Fourth, I asked the government officials whether they ever utilized public opinion polls in
their work, and if so, how. As discussed in chapter 2, as part of the permanent campaign, Heclo
has charged presidential aides with using public opinion polls to make policy decisions, in cases
when the country would be better served by making unpopular choices that would serve the
nation’s long-term health (2000, 30-34).

130

As also discussed in chapter 2, McClellan has reported that, as part of the permanent
campaign, presidential aides distort and withhold information requested by the media in order to
bolster short-term support for the president (2008). I therefore next asked a series of questions
designed to determine whether my interview subjects engaged in such tactics. Fifth, I asked the
government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for someone in their position to
withhold information requested by the press, what the circumstances would be, and whether this
happened often or rarely in their work. Sixth, I asked the government officials whether they
believed it is ever appropriate for someone in their position to shade the truth, what the
circumstances would be, and whether this happened often or rarely in their work. Seventh, I
asked the government officials whether they believed that it would be possible for someone in
their position to tell untruths to make the president look good, and whether they or their
colleagues had ever attempted to do so. Eighth, I asked the government officials what percentage
of the messages they sought to promulgate they would describe as ideas and narratives, as well
as how they developed and sculpted narratives to make their points, in an effort to determine
whether they distorted facts in the process. Ninth, and fnally, I asked the government officials
how their offices determined how to handle information that was potentially damaging or
embarrassing.

Possible Causal Factors
To measure possible factors that could account for whether or not a permanent campaign
was being practiced, I first queried the government officials about their workloads, in an effort to
determine how much time they had to engage in proactive tactics and therefore whether the
potential for conducting a permanent campaign existed.
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Second, I asked the officials how much of their time they spent proactively attempting to
influence the media, and how much time they spent reactively responding to requests from
reporters. This question was designed to serve as another measure of whether the potential for a
permanent campaign was present, by identifying how much time the officials enjoyed to engage
in proactive tactics.
Third, I asked the officials to describe the end goals of their work. Fourth, I asked them to
what degree their end goal was to build public support for the president. Both of these questions
were designed to determine whether the officials were motivated by the goal of the permanent
campaign, which is to build support for the president.
Finally, I observed whether those government officials who held journalism degrees
reported themselves to be less willing than the other officials to withhold or distort information
from the press – and, if so, whether this suggested that the values imbued during their journalism
training acted as a mediating variable.

II. Interviews with Reporters
For an independent assessment of the civil servants and political appointees, I also
interviewed seven reporters who interacted frequently with these officials. All of the members of
the press interviewed were individuals who reported on the Treasury while I served as a
spokesperson for the Department from 2011-2012. In order to protect their identities, I will not
disclose the specific outlets for which my research subjects work or worked. However, they all
currently cover or previously covered the economy for national, daily U.S. newspapers or wire
services, which I consider to be the most influential media outlets in the country.
Nearly every reporter whom I approached granted me an interview. I had an excellent
132

rapport with all of the reporters I interviewed, which likely stemmed in part from the fact that I
had interacted frequently and/or traveled extensively with most of them on Secretary Timothy
Geithner’s international trips, when I worked at the Treasury.
Prior to conducting the interviews, I tested and refined my questions by asking them of a
former reporter and editor for outlets including the New York Times and Washington Post, who
currently teaches journalism.
To ensure that the reporters were able to provide a basis of comparison between a
Democratic and Republican administration, I only interviewed members of the press who
covered Treasury issues under both President Obama and President George W. Bush. However,
two of the reporters whom I interviewed covered Treasury issues under the Bush administration
significantly less extensively than during the Obama administration, and a third indicated that his
memory of the Bush administration had somewhat faded, so it seems likely that the responses of
reporters were more heavily informed by their interactions with the Obama administration.
The length of the interviews was on average just over one hour. All were conducted in
person in Washington, D.C. Afterwards, I contacted several of the reporters by telephone or
email to ask them to clarify and/or expand upon their responses.

Measuring the Competence and Effectiveness of the Government Officials
To measure the relative competence and effectiveness of the appointees and civil
servants, I first asked the reporters how well they thought that both groups of government
officials knew the subject matter for which they were responsible. As previously discussed, it is
critical for a public affairs officer to understand their policy portfolio in order to effectively craft
and rebut arguments and advance an administration’s policy positions.
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Second, I asked the reporters which group of government officials responded to them
more quickly. As previously discussed, the ability to rapidly respond to media queries is essential
to a public affairs officer’s ability to shape media coverage that is often produced under extreme
deadline pressure.
Third, I asked what both groups of officials did when they were upset with the reporter’s
coverage. While, as previously discussed, it is critical for a public affairs officer to forcefully
advance an administration’s messages and rebut alternate arguments and critiques, it is essential
for them to do so while maintaining positive working relationships with reporters, in order to
preserve their ability to shape future media coverage.
Fourth, I asked the reporters to describe the degree to which both groups of officials
influenced the topics on which they ultimately reported, as well as the tone and content of their
coverage, in an effort to determine which group of officials was more successful at shaping press
reports.
Fifth, I asked the reporters whether they found themselves more skeptical of the claims
made by either appointees or civil servants. This was designed to test my hypothesis that
reporters might apply greater skepticism to the claims of appointees because reporters believe
that the raison d’etre of such officials is to make the president look good – a factor that would
diminish their efficacy.
Finally, I asked the reporters which group of government officials was better at getting
them the information they needed for their stories. While it will sometimes be in an
administration’s interests to withhold information, effective public affairs officials must
generally be able to provide reporters with the answers they seek; otherwise, they will both
damage their relationships with reporters and cede control of the narrative to other actors who do

134

respond to the press.

Measuring the Loyalty of the Government Officials
I asked the reporters whether government officials have ever leaked information to them
or otherwise conveyed their disagreement with official administration policy, and whether
political appointees or civil servants have done so more frequently. This question was designed
to measure the relative frequency with which both groups of government officials have engaged
in acts of disloyalty to the administrations they served.

Measuring Whether the Government Officials Are on a Permanent Campaign
To measure whether the government officials were engaging in a permanent campaign, I
asked the reporters to describe the savvier things that federal economic agencies did to shape the
coverage they received in the press, in an effort to ascertain whether they would describe
permanent campaign tactics.
In an effort to determine whether the officials ever distorted and/or withheld information
from the reporters, I asked whether the reporters ever became aware of practices conducted by
either group of government officials which they considered to be inappropriate. If reporters did
not respond by indicating that the officials had ever withheld information, I asked the reporters
directly whether they thought that the officials had done so. Likewise, if reporters did not
respond by indicating that the officials had ever lied to them, I asked the reporters directly
whether they thought that the officials had done so.
My complete interview questions are listed in appendix A.
Promoting Honesty and Candor in Interview Subjects
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To promote honesty and candor in my interview subjects, I pledged to keep their
identities confidential. This was necessary because I asked sensitive questions, such as whether
the government officials had ever leaked information to the press – an offense for which they
could potentially be fired. Furthermore, if the identities and responses of the officials were to
become public knowledge, their future employment prospects could have been adversely
affected. Likewise, if the identities and certain responses of the reporters were to become public
knowledge – such as, for example, their assessments of the competence of the public affairs
officers with whom they work – their relationships with officials on whom they depend to do
their jobs might have been compromised. I therefore do not disclose the identities of the
individuals who I interviewed in this study. As a further measure to protect the identities of my
research subjects, I refer to every interviewee in this publication as “he,” regardless of his or her
gender. I selected masculine language because the majority of my research subjects (seventeen of
my twenty-four interviewees) were male.
I asked my research subjects to determine the time and place of the interviews, in order to
ensure that they would be comfortable. As a safeguard to protect the identities of my
interviewees and to promote candor in the interviews, I did not record the conversations. I
instead typed notes during the interviews and stored them on a password-protected computer and
password-protected website designed for data storage. My notes were coded with letters and
numbers, instead of names, of interview subjects. The master coding sheet was stored in a locked
box in a separate location. I also requested the oral, instead of written, consent of my interview
subjects so that there would not be other written records of the identities of the interviewees.
I have omitted specific facts and details which could be used to identify research subjects
in this report. If I had questions about whether a specific detail I wished to include could be used

136

to identify a research subject, I reached out to the interviewee to ask whether it was acceptable
for me to include the information.
My use of human subjects in this study was approved by the Institutional Review Board
at the City University of New York.

Bush Appointee 5
I have a very low level of confidence in the veracity of the responses of Bush
Appointee 5, who is described in greater detail in Appendix B. While I describe his responses
throughout chapters four, five, and six, I nevertheless viewed them with greater skepticism
than the responses of my other interview subjects when conducting my analysis of the results.
Fortunately, however, I felt that I established strong trust and rapport with the other twentythree of my interview subjects (ninety-six percent of my interview subjects), leaving me
confident regarding the overall results of my research – a matter which will be discussed in
greater detail in chapter 7.
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Chapter 4: Results: Efficacy of Appointees vs. Civil Servants
Introduction
This chapter reviews the results of my interviews on the relative efficacy of political
appointees and civil servants in Treasury public affairs positions. As discussed in chapter 3, I
define effectiveness as success in advancing the administration’s goals. I hypothesized that civil
servants would be more effective administration advocates because their longer tenure would
give them greater knowledge of their policy portfolios and stronger relationships with the
reporters who covered their agencies; reporters would be more skeptical of the claims of
appointees because they would believe that the raison d’etre of appointees is to make the
president look good; the massive workloads of appointees would diminish their efficacy; and
appointees would spend more time attempting to boost the images of their principals, which is
less helpful to the president than advancing his policies. However, I also anticipated that
appointees might have efficacy advantages in that their bosses might make more time for them
because they place greater importance on the press. I used nine measures in order to investigate
which group is more effective in such roles.
First, I asked the officials how much access they had to the principals for whom they
worked. Greater access would improve a public affairs officer’s efficacy by giving him or her
greater information about agency activities and priorities, allowing the official to respond rapidly
and substantively to reporters’ questions and to craft and implement more detailed and accurate
media strategies.
Second, I queried the officials on their knowledge of their subject matter portfolios. Of
course, it would be critical for an effective public affairs officer to possess a deeply sophisticated
understanding of his or her policy portfolio in order to communicate it effectively. Third, I asked
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about their response times to media inquiries. An effective public affairs officer would need to be
able to respond rapidly to media queries in order to effectively influence media coverage prior to
reporters’ deadlines. Fourth, I asked the officials about the quality of their relationships with the
press. While it is to be expected that effective officials would sometimes disagree with reporters
and would push back against reporters’ representations of their administration when it was not
favorable, at the same time it would be critical for them to maintain ongoing dialogue with
reporters and professional working relationships in order to inform future stories. Fifth, I asked
the officials how much success they believed they had in influencing the topics covered by
reporters and the tone and content of media reports. Of course, such self assessments would be
subjective and potentially biased, however the question was designed to provide an indication of
how the officials themselves assessed their own work.
For independent assessments of the officials, I also asked the Treasury reporters whom I
interviewed to assess the appointees and civil servants with whom they worked on stories on
measures two through five: their relative knowledge of their subject matter portfolios, response
times to media inquiries, relationships with themselves, and success in influencing the topics
covered by reporters and the tone and content of media reports.
Sixth, I asked the reporters which group they judged to be more credible sources, since
reporters would be expected to give greater weight in their stories and more favorable coverage
to sources who they deemed to be credible. Seventh, I analyzed the responses of reporters
regarding whether the officials provided them with the information they sought. While it might
be in the interests of a public affairs officer not to answer every question a reporter asked, an
effective public affairs officer would be expected to generally provide reporters with information
in response to their queries; otherwise, the administration would cede control of the narrative to
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other sources and leave reporters feeling frustrated, a factor which would likely influence their
media coverage.
Eighth, I asked the government officials whether they thought that appointees or civil
servants are more effective at conveying the administration’s messages in the press.
Finally, I considered whether the government officials used savvy tactics in order to
advance the administration’s goals.

Measuring Causal Factors
I also investigated four possible factors that could account for the greater relative efficacy
of either group. First, I queried the officials about their previous work experience, in order to
determine whether either group brought greater professional experience to their Treasury roles
that boosted their efficacy. Second, I asked the officials about the educational qualifications they
brought to their jobs, in order to determine whether either group had better training that
influenced their efficacy. Third, I asked the officials how long they served in their Treasury
positions, in an effort to determine how tenure impacts efficacy. On the one hand, longer tenure
could improve an official’s skill at his or her job; on the other hand, serving for long periods of
time could cause them to become ingrained in their thinking or even exhausted, leaving the
Treasury lacking fresh ideas, perspective, and energy. Finally, I queried the officials on how they
spent their time and the manageability of their workloads, in order to determine whether the
legendarily long hours that other researchers have found appointees to work influenced their
effectiveness.
I. Access to Principals
Access to principals is an indicator of a public affairs official’s efficacy because such
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officials require information about their leadership team’s priorities and activities in order to
implement timely and accurate media strategies that advance the administration’s goals. I
hypothesized that one area in which appointees might have an effectiveness advantage is in their
access to the principals for whom they work, because the more senior administration officials for
whom appointees work might place greater value on the press. In keeping with this hypothesis,
most appointees were adamant that they enjoyed, in the words of Obama Appointee 2, a “really
high” level of access to their principals. Bush Appointee 2 described having “tremendous access
to principals;” Bush Appointee 1 was “very, very satisfied.” The only caveat among appointees
was a single appointee who indicated that it would have been helpful to attend meetings typically
attended by his boss. Additionally, one Bush appointee and one Obama appointee indicated that
it took time for them to initially gain the trust of their principals. However, many indicated that
they could walk into the offices of their principals when they needed them; “I could pull him out
of a meeting if I absolutely had to.” (Obama Appointee 3). The appointees uniformly indicated
that this access was critical to their ability to do their jobs, because they needed to be able to both
get answers for reporters and understand what was happening in the building.
There were not significant differences in the responses of civil servants, who generally
indicated they had the access they needed to their principals. The exception was Civil Servant 6,
who had enjoyed daily access to previous principals but now might sometimes not be in touch
with his principal for several days. He indicated that this “affects my level of comfort, but as far
as affecting my work, I don’t really think it has.” Otherwise, civil servants generally indicated
that they were “reasonably comfortable” with their level of access (Civil Servant 4), “very
pleased” (Civil Servant 5), “it’s not an issue” (Civil Servant 7), or they could walk into their
principal’s office anytime (Civil Servants 1 and 2, who both attributed their access to the small
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size of their offices). Civil Servant 3 was closest to the appointees in describing his access as
“100 percent, never any problem;” Civil Servant 7 likewise described his access as “key to
success.”
Thus, both groups generally reported that they had the access to the principals which they
needed to do their jobs. However, appointees placed greater emphasis on their very high levels of
access, and were more adamant that this was critical to their work. To be sure, these differences
in nuance might be explained by the fact that in politics, one’s importance is often measured by
one’s level of access, and therefore political appointees might be more eager to brag about or
even overstate the access they enjoyed. However, I suspect that the appointees did in fact have
particularly high levels of access to their principals. The accounts of appointees were certainly
consonant with what I witnessed and experienced firsthand, when I served as a Treasury
spokesperson in the Obama administration from 2011-2012.
Adding to the efficacy advantage this particularly high level of access gives to appointees
is, of course, the fact that the principals for whom appointees work are responsible for
particularly important and high-profile issues. Based upon their responses, appointees therefore
seem to enjoy particularly significant access to information that is particularly in demand by
reporters.
This finding is corroborated by the fact that, when asked about the strengths of public
affairs appointees, several reporters volunteered that appointees are able to obtain information
from key principals. The strength of appointees was described by Reporter 5 as “their more
direct access to the people who are making the decisions in the agency.” As Reporter 7
explained, “civil servants aren’t always keyed in to what’s going on in the same way politicals
are;” Reporter 2 concurred that among civil servants, there is an “occasional lack of awareness
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around political realities.” Reporter 3 likewise believed that appointees “often can be well
connected and close to the axis of power so … they can be well informed on decision making.”
I therefore concluded that this somewhat higher level of access to principals gives
appointees a slight effectiveness advantage. However, as will later be discussed, the overall
effectiveness of appointees is diminished by other factors.

II. Knowledge of their Subject Matter Portfolios
I next measured the officials’ knowledge of their subject matter portfolios. Without a
nuanced understanding of their issues, they could not effectively answer reporters’ queries,
identify inaccurate reporting, rebut arguments, or plan media strategies to achieve the
administration’s policy goals. Almost all of the political appointees reported learning the
substance of their subject matter portfolios on the job, such as by attending meetings, reading
internal memos, and otherwise learning from the Treasury policy staff. Bush Appointee 1
described the experience as “trial by fire” and “very challenging.” Bush Appointee 3 explained
that the way he learned was that he “asked a lot of questions of very smart people and read
newspapers and then asked more questions.”
As will later be discussed, only one Bush appointee and one Obama appointee reported
having previous economic and/or financial knowledge that was useful to them in their Treasury
posts. However, even the appointee with the strongest background in economics described a
“very steep learning curve.” Obama Appointee 5 recalled that he discussed his lack of
knowledge of his policy matter portfolio with a senior Treasury official when he interviewed for
his job, and the official told him that “we need someone to ask questions, to help us put this in
English, we need some people here that don’t know [the substance].”

143

By contrast, five of the seven civil servants reported already having knowledge of their
subject matter portfolios when they assumed their Treasury public affairs posts; two of these
civil servants had previously worked in policy on their issues at the Treasury and one had
previously reported as a journalist on his subject matter portfolio. One of the civil servants with
previous experience relevant to his portfolio indicated that when he interacted with Treasury
officials who were more accustomed to working with spokespeople who were appointees, they
were surprised by his command of his portfolio. “I had a lot of feedback …. that was unusual
when it comes to communications professionals,” he said.
The appointees generally indicated that it took them about six months to start to feel
comfortable with the content of their subject matter portfolios (or in the words of Bush
Appointee 3, to find it “less daunting”), and they achieved strong mastery after about a year.
While two of the civil servants indicated that it took them six months to feel comfortable with
their policy portfolios, three others indicated feeling comfortable “right away,” “within a matter
of weeks,” or “at most [within] a couple of months.” One civil servant who lacked relevant
previous policy experience indicated that it took him a year. An outlier response was that of a
civil servant who reported that it took him four to five years. This civil servant had served in his
bureau since the inception of some of its programs and previously worked on policy and
indicated that it therefore “wasn’t hard” to learn the substance, however he indicated that the
mechanics of major financial transactions were complicated – perhaps evincing a particularly
high standard for feeling fully comfortable in such a position. This suggests that the prior
experience and knowledge of civil servants may have allowed some of them to “hit the ground
running” a bit faster than the average appointee.
Asked how well they ultimately mastered their subject matter portfolios, seven of the
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appointees indicated “very well,” two appointees indicated “pretty well,” and one indicated that
he never mastered the subject, though this appointee’s subject matter was a new portfolio for the
Treasury, and an undertaking which the government had never previously attempted, making it
particularly challenging for everyone involved. There were not significant differences between
the responses of the Bush and Obama appointees in this regard. By contrast, just two civil
servants indicated that they knew the substance of their subject matter portfolios “very well,”
while five civil servants indicated that they understood the content “pretty well.”
This discrepancy is contradictory, given that, as I will later discuss, the civil servants both
brought significantly more policy knowledge to their posts and had significantly longer tenure in
their jobs. It is certainly possible that the results indicate that appointees work harder, are more
competent, and/or perceive the stakes to be higher, and therefore better master the content of
their policy portfolios. However, given that civil servants with the most policy experience
typically reported knowing their subject matters only “pretty well,” I suspect that these responses
may actually reflect higher standards among civil servants for policy mastery. Additionally and
interestingly, the two civil servants who were most confident and reported themselves to know
their subject matter “very well” ranked among the most politically experienced. Although
outside the scope of this study, the discrepancy could also point to differences in the confidence
and/or modesty of the two groups.
The responses to my next two questions further confirm my proposed explanation for this
discrepancy. When I raised the stakes, appointees became significantly less confident in their
policy mastery. Treasury spokespeople typically book and prepare senior officials for media
interviews. I asked the public affairs officials how well they think they would do if they were to
conduct the interviews themselves, in place of their principals. Here, only two appointees
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indicated that they would do “very well.” These were the two appointees, who worked at the
Treasury the longest and the only two appointees who were promoted to other public affairs roles
within the Treasury after first serving as spokespeople.
A third appointee indicated he believed he could have handled 80-85 percent of the
interviews; two appointees indicated they would do “pretty well;” one appointee indicated “okay
but not well;” and two indicated that they could do well on the overall message but not on
technical matters of policy expertise. In the words of one appointee, “I think people like us know
what we want to achieve through an interview and can tell [principals] overall what we want to
communicate, but when we have the Assistant Secretary talking to The Economist, that
conversation gets to a level I’m not familiar with.”
Two appointees were clear that they could not handle such interviews. One responded
“oh my God, not well. It depends on the interview, but if it’s an off-the-record background
briefing I don’t have a lot of confidence in my ability to do that, I could do the talking points, but
not the way [the senior administration officials] did it.” A final appointee indicated “probably not
very well because [the issues are] really complicated. Politics is easy because everyone has an
opinion. Trying to bullshit your way through financial stuff is impossible.” Overall then, even
though most political appointees indicated that they mastered their subjects “very well,” they
seemed to mean by this that they could handle the talking points. They generally (though not
always) did not master their subject matter at a level that would allow them to engage deeply and
substantively on the nuance of technical and policy issues with major reporters.
Interestingly, here the confidence of civil servants seemed slightly higher. Three civil
servants indicated that they did in fact conduct media interviews; two indicated that they would
do “pretty well” with one adding “I’m pretty comfortable with that;” one said he conducted a lot
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of interviews on background and thought he would do well on the record but might get nervous
and make a mistake; and one indicated that he would not do the interviews “nearly as well”
because he was “blessed” with a talented principal. However, the final civil servant’s response
seemed to be more reflective of his principal’s skill than his own. Indeed, we should both hope
and expect that the heads of Treasury bureaus will be more knowledgeable than their public
affairs staff. Overall, then, civil servants appeared somewhat more comfortable than appointees
with granting interviews to reporters – a concrete indication of their mastery of their policy
portfolios.
As a final way of discussing their policy knowledge and how it affects their work, I asked
the appointees and civil servants whether the fact that the reporters who cover economic issues
have been doing so for a long time gave the reporters an advantage. One appointee indicated that
the question was not applicable to him because the subject matter for which he was responsible
was new, and the Treasury had never previously conducted such an initiative. Three Obama
appointees and three Bush appointees indicated that it did give reporters an advantage, at least
initially or at times. In the words of Bush Appointee 2, “obviously it did because they have that
wealth of history and knowledge.” Bush Appointee 4 likewise indicated “it did at the beginning
and that’s what scared me.”
Two Obama appointees indicated that they did not feel reporters had a knowledge
advantage. For Obama Appointee 4, “the great thing about Treasury and its principals is they’re
excellent resources, so in arranging these interviews I always knew what the top line, big picture
stuff was and the principals knew the stuff just as well if not better than the reporters, so the
system worked, I think.” Here again, however, it was clear that reporters had greater knowledge
than this appointee; he simply found this to be unproblematic.
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Bush Appointee 3 likewise indicated that this advantage was not necessarily a problem
because reporters “were more than happy to answer questions and brag about their knowledge. I
wasn’t talking about what I didn’t know and they get that, they respect that. What they want is
your help with access, quotes, … that type of thing.” Bush Appointee 4 likewise indicated that he
“learned a lot from reporters. They were really helpful. They had a vested interest; they wanted
me to be helpful to them so they were very helpful in educating me about how the job is
supposed to go.” And, in the words of Obama Appointee 2, “where we had the advantage was we
had all the information they were trying to get at, so you could outmaneuver a reporter.”
The only appointee who did not believe that reporters generally at least sometimes
possessed a knowledge advantage was Obama Appointee 5. “One of the things most surprising
to me is I expected reporters covering this would be sophisticated on the issues, and of course
there were a handful that were – usually the columnists or extremely well-respected magazines,”
he explained. “But the day-to-day beat reporters I think we made mistakes sometimes in
overestimating, when we should have explained things more. I was under the impression they
knew more than they did and sometimes it surprised me that some knew absolutely nothing and
it was like talking to a wall, which surprised me given the gravity of the issues we worked on.”
This appointee indicated that this was the case even for reporters for some elite national outlets.
Finally, Bush Appointee 5 likewise indicated that “a lot who cover the Treasury … didn’t have
detailed knowledge,” but he ultimately declined to answer the question because he said he could
not understand how reporters would have an advantage since “they’re not trying to stump you.”
In general however, with minor exceptions, most appointees were willing to acknowledge
that they were in a position, at least at times, of being the sources of information for people who
clearly better understood their own policy portfolios. While several appointees downplayed the
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disadvantage this situation placed them in, it nevertheless seems reasonable to anticipate that
spokespeople who could go toe-to-toe with reporters on the substance of their issues would be
better positioned to influence media coverage to the advantage of their administration.
By contrast, only one civil servant believed that the superior knowledge of reporters gave
members of the press an advantage. While this civil servant had decades of experience as a
government spokesperson, he did not have prior previous knowledge of his subject matter
portfolio when he assumed his Treasury position and indicated that many of the trade reporters
with whom he worked had decades of experience on the substance of his issues. A second civil
servant indicated that while there are still a few reporters with superior knowledge, “there’s been
a lot of turnover within the press corps … [and] increasingly reporters covering us don’t have
broad nor deep knowledge.” While this likely does point to changes in the media landscape, I
suspected it also pointed to the benefits of the length of his tenure. Another civil servant
indicated that there was not a problem because if he did not know how to answer a question he
would do research and then get back to the reporter, but because he had decades of experience as
a policy specialist in his subject matter portfolio, I doubted that lack of knowledge was an issue.
However, a majority of civil servants were clear that there was no knowledge differential
whatsoever. Two civil servants were explicit that they simply knew as much or more than the
reporters with whom they worked. In the words of Civil Servant 6, “I’ve been around for a while
too … especially, I think we all lived through [the financial crisis of] 2008 together and that’s an
advantage; we all have a similar vocabulary. … I’ve read a lot of books and talked to people who
wrote them on the financial crisis, and think I’m keeping up okay. I’m old.” Another civil
servant indicated that when it came to his portfolio, “this is one area where reporters do know
their stuff;” however, he indicated that this still was not a problem: “the programs were so
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complicated that I don’t know they had an advantage.” A different civil servant indicated that
reporters likewise seemed to know too little, indicating that they have “blinders on” and he had
to educate them about how his programs were different from the issues they typically covered.
Of course, it is possible that there is less of a knowledge differential between civil
servants and reporters than between appointees and civil servants because the policy portfolios of
civil servants are less important than those of appointees, and therefore mainstream reporters
spend less time learning about and covering them. However, there are serious trade publications
which closely monitor the Treasury bureaus, and civil servants would therefore be likely to bump
up against this problem with such reporters. I therefore concluded that, overall, civil servants had
greater knowledge of the policy portfolios for which they were responsible. This conclusion was
corroborated by my interviews with reporters.
Reporters on the Knowledge of Appointees vs. Civil Servants
Reporters overwhelmingly indicated that, with few exceptions, appointees typically came
to their jobs with inadequate knowledge of their policy portfolios. In the words of Reporter 2,
“they generally do not come into their roles with a meaningful amount of background knowledge
about either their topic or the beat reporters who cover them.” Or, as Reporter 7 put it: “those
first few months at Treasury when Obama came in, it was patently obvious that the folks
working there, while some were very nice, had limited experience in the area.” However,
reporters consistently indicated that the better appointees could come up to speed rather quickly
(Reporter 2 estimated that this could happen in as little as six months).
Most devastatingly, Reporter 4 complained that “you get at Treasury people whose
careers have been working on political campaigns, and as best I can tell lack an ability to balance
their own checkbooks and misunderstand the most basic aspects of the workings of financial
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markets, and loudly insist things are true that aren’t and make fools of themselves.” He
complained that “not infrequently it’s the case that you find yourself in a position asking a
question and needing to explain the question and why it’s a question and what the possible
answers to the question are and where they might obtain possible answers. It’s more the case
with appointees than with civil servants, although it happens with both, because they’re
intermediating between you and the experts, so questions that might make perfect sense to the
end recipient need to be packaged and translated because you’re playing a game of telephone and
you need to work through an intermediary.” However, he noted this problem may be more
extreme at the Treasury than in other government agencies, because of the sheer complexity of
the issues and the divorce of these issues from the knowledge of the average person; as Reporter
7 put it, “as is frequently the case, campaign workers … haven’t been reading up on the latest
currency report or Fed regulations.” Since most government agencies handle complex, technical
issues, this may be an issue faced by other appointees, as well.
The sole exception to these complaints about the initial lack of knowledge of most
appointees was Reporter 6, who unlike the other reporters interacted with Treasury public affairs
officers only sporadically on stories for a major national publication, and reported that he had
never found inadequate knowledge to be a problem because if public affairs officials were
unfamiliar with a topic they were unafraid to say so and would indicate that they would get back
to him.
Another common complaint of reporters about the knowledge of appointees was that they
typically focused nearly exclusively on the politics of a situation. Reporter 1 explained that with
appointees, it is “sometimes … hard to get them to speak about things other than the politics of a
situation, whereas I was usually trying to gather a broader picture.” Reporter 3 explained that
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appointees “usually see things through a prism of politics that isn’t always helpful to us as
reporters or in some cases isn’t even pertinent to the subject matter.” Reporter 2 indicated that
this is the case because “they tend to see … economic and financial reporters through a similar
prism through which they saw political reporters on a campaign trail and often do not realize that
economic and financial reporters are completely different from political reporters and how they
operate. … You end up having people who talk past each other way too often.”
By contrast, only one reporter described a similar period of learning on the job by civil
servants; in the words of Reporter 1, a veteran Treasury reporter, “I don’t think I ever
encountered one who I didn’t think was up to the task right off the bat.” Reporters
overwhelmingly described civil servants as having greater knowledge of their subject matter
portfolios than appointees, stemming from their longevity in their jobs; according to Reporter 7
“the civil servants’ strength is typically that they understand the issues a lot better; they have a
lot more context and knowledge.” Reporter 2 characterized civil servants as offering “incredible
historical perspective, grounded dispassionate analysis, and … incredible depth in their job.”
Reporter 3 noted that civil servants are “more likely to be in it because they have an interest in
the topic as opposed to being moved there after completing a political job, so I consider them for
the most part better informed and also I would say probably because of that probably more
effective.” The Federal Reserve Bank was often cited as an office with civil servants who served
as particularly competent spokespeople. (While former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan
Greenspan was famous for his opaque language, New York Times columnist Douglas R. Holmes
recently reported that “those days are long gone.”) (2014).
III. Response Times to Media Inquiries
One of the most important qualities of a public affairs official is the ability to respond
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quickly to reporters working on deadline. In recent years, as print reporters have begun to file
their stories in real time online as opposed to meeting evening deadlines for the next day’s paper,
and cable news channels broadcast all day as opposed to facing set deadlines for the morning,
noon and evening news, the importance of this quality has heightened. I therefore attempted to
determine whether political appointees or civil servants are better at responding to reporters
under deadline pressure.
I first asked both sets of officials how long it typically took them to respond to media
inquiries. Appointees stressed that their response times depended upon the question, but two
Obama appointees indicated that they could often respond within an hour, with more time
required for some responses; one Obama appointee said he responded immediately to say he was
working on the reporter’s query, and afterwards the time required varied; and two Obama
appointees said responses could take several hours, with one estimating five hours and another
saying he got back to reporters within the day. Two Bush appointees likewise indicated they
would respond within a half hour or right away to say they were working on the answer; Bush
Appointee 5 responded “usually by their deadline;” and one Bush appointee said he responded
immediately if he could and usually within 24 hours.
The response of one of the only two appointees who started as a spokesperson but later
served in a higher-level Treasury public affairs post – and thus had a significantly longer tenure
than average – illustrated clearly how policy knowledge is related to response times. This
appointee indicated that when he started his job he would ask his colleagues what they
recommended he say in response to media inquiries, but he thought this process, which he called
“standard operating procedure,” took too long. As he grew to intimately understand the policy
substance of his portfolio, he was able to shift his approach. “So what I started doing very
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quickly is, instead of saying ‘what are we saying?’ I would say, ‘here’s what I’m planning’ and I
would write the talking points so I could have responses [to reporters] in an hour, I cut the time
in half, and after a while [Treasury officials] trusted me to be able to just talk to reporters without
having to go through the process of developing talking points.” Obviously the ability to do this
requires a major level of policy sophistication.
Of course, it is not possible to draw firm comparisons from such an open-ended question,
especially given the varying portfolios of the officials which by their nature somewhat dictate
response times. For example, it is possible that civil servants receive more technocratic questions
from reporters which by definition simply require more time in order to retrieve data.
Nevertheless, civil servants seemed somewhat less likely than appointees to report that they
could respond immediately to reporters. The exception was Civil Servant 5, who indicated that
he could respond “off the cuff” and believed he got back to reporters faster than political
appointees. Civil Servant 2 likewise said he could sometimes respond within 20 minutes if the
question was easy, but more complicated questions could take “a day or two.” Civil Servant 4
tried to respond “within a few hours or a half day depending on complexity,” Civil Servant 1 said
it could take several hours, Civil Servant 6 tried to respond in less than half a day, and Civil
Servants 3 and 7 tried to get back to reporters the same day, but it could take until the next day.
In comparing the response times of the public affairs officials, it seems most accurate to
rely on the assessments of reporters who interact with both appointees and civil servants. It
seems reasonable to believe that the highly seasoned reporters who were the subjects of my
interviews take the difficulty of obtaining information into account when judging the
reasonableness of response times to their inquiries and apply the same set of standards when
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judging the response times of appointees and civil servants. I therefore place particular value on
their responses to the question of which group of officials responded to them more quickly.
Reporters on Response Times
Civil servants were also somewhat – though certainly not vehemently or universally –
perceived by reporters to be slower to respond to their inquiries. Reporter 7 was the sole reporter
who found civil servants to be faster. He found this to be the case because appointees were
defensive. Reporter 3 could not discern a difference in the speed of the two groups, while
Reporter 4 found that while neither appointees nor civil servants were overall faster to respond as
a group, “the one distinction is to the extent appointees see a political advantage in a particular
story, they are the most helpful PR people.” Reporters 1, 2, 5, and 6 found appointees to be faster
to respond to them, however Reporters 1 and 5 indicated that civil servants were also generally
good at responding. Reporter 5, for example, indicated that the internal approval process delayed
the responses of both groups, while the responses of appointees could be delayed “because they
don’t know the issues.”
Reporter 2 was most critical of civil servants in this regard, arguing that civil servants
“move at a snail’s pace compared to the realities of the media and political environment” and in
some agencies “like the Bureau of Economic Analysis, Census and IRS, … you wonder what
kind of planet they’re on” and “you have to push the people who do this work a lot harder than
you think you should have to,” while other civil servants, such as those at the Federal Reserve,
were much faster.
However, reporters did not necessarily find the more rapid responses of appointees to be
helpful. Like Reporter 4, Reporters 2 and 6 attributed the faster pace of appointees to their
political motivations. Reporter 2 indicated that while appointees are “attuned to the fact that you
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need things quickly and they don’t want a story to get ahead of them,” the information they
actually provided was “not always that valuable.” Similarly, Reporter 6 indicated that “for my
purposes the politicals are more quotable, they’re more accessible on a deadline basis to give a
quote, they want to make sure their person or agency is represented in the story so in terms of the
logistics of producing a piece of newspaper content on deadline, they’re better by far.” On the
other hand, he said, in these faster responses, “it’s hard to reach that level of trust where they
really tell you what’s happening as opposed to what they want you to think is happening or how
they want you to interpret it.”
Thus, while appointees overall appear to be somewhat faster to respond to the press, the
differences in their response times was far from extreme. Furthermore, reporters indicated that
they were often left unsatisfied with or skeptical of the actual responses of appointees even if
they were faster, which indicates that their arguments were not influential with reporters, a factor
which would have diminished the effectiveness of appointees.
IV. Skill at Managing Negative Interactions with the Press
I next measured the quality of the relationships that the public affairs officers enjoyed
with the press. While disagreements would be expected in such positions, it would be critical for
an effective public affairs officer to maintain collegial relationships and close contact with
reporters in order to effectively influence media coverage on behalf of their administration. With
the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who both refused to answer the question or to provide a
reason for not answering it, political appointees generally described themselves as enjoying very
good personal relationships with reporters and placing high value on the importance of such
relationships. The appointees almost universally acknowledged that their exchanges with
reporters rarely but nevertheless occasionally became heated, but they worked quickly to repair
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relationships after such events. Bush Appointee 4 indicated that he was “embarrassed” after a
screaming exchange with a reporter in front of other members of the Treasury press corps, and
thought it was important that shortly afterwards the other members of the press saw him
communicating civilly with this reporter. However, it was unmistakable that the appointees were
willing to be forceful when they disagreed with a reporter. Obama Appointee 3 explained that his
strategy when he was upset with a reporter was to “push back and push back and push back. If
that story is never going to be corrected, with the next story you have leverage.” His definition of
pushing back entailed “getting the Assistant Secretary on the phone and lawyers to explain why
they’re fucking wrong and every question, replying with a voluminous response, making it a pain
for him to write the story.”
The Obama appointees indicated that more aggressive measures were often taken at the
behest of their bosses. For example, Obama Appointee 4 explained that “I think sometimes,
particularly at Treasury, we were overzealous in wanting stories to be written a certain way, and
I think 60 percent of the time it was reasonable asks and 40 percent of the time it was people
above us trying to [do] a lot of posturing and a lot of making sure the boss is happy as opposed
to, like, reasonable expectations.” When the Treasury was truly upset with a reporter, Obama
Appointee 5 indicated, the Deputy Assistant Secretaries for Public Affairs “would sometimes
blacklist, which is something I personally disagree with. They would stop inviting them to
briefings. I think everyone ended up on the blacklist at some point, there were three spaces on
the list and when one came off they’d find a way to get another on; it was kind of bizarre.”
Bush Appointee 1 indicated that relations with reporters became “increasingly
combative” at the end of the Bush administration, because among the press there was a “[former
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Newsweek investigative correspondent] Mike Ikikoff ‘I have a right to know’ attitude you had to
deal with, ‘what are you not telling us,’ ‘why aren’t you doing more.’” He acknowledged that he:
had some serious screaming matches with reporters in some cases and cut reporters off
sometimes. It wasn’t as blatant as I won’t take the call, I never did anything like that, I
always returned calls, but you had reporters writing incorrect stories and not taking the
time to learn their stuff [and] they became very dangerous to us because they were
misreporting. They lost a lot of privileges they could have otherwise had: access to senior
officials, my time. If you’re going to be irresponsible in your writing, which we’ve seen,
I’m not going to waste my time with you, because you’re going to write bad stories
anyways. I will help reporters who write responsibly. [That’s how I’ll] spend my time.
Like the appointees, the civil servants reported having good relationships with members
of the press. One civil servant indicated that things had never gotten heated; reporters sometimes
were frustrated if he did not immediately have information at his fingertips, but reporters tended
to understand. Another indicated that things had only gotten heated once, when a reporter was
requesting an unreasonable amount of information under FOIA, but he was able to sit down,
discuss, and resolve the matter with the reporter.
Two civil servants indicated that on the rare occasions when things became heated, they
were simply unhelpful with reporters. Civil Servant 2 explained that “the occasional reporter …
is not being transparent and usually I have a pretty good gut instinct and their frustration will rise
because if I think they’re angling at something and not being transparent, I’ll be very factual,
like, ‘Do you know what time it is?’ ‘Yes, I know what time it is.’ But I’m always very polite
and professional.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6 reported simply being unhelpful with difficult
reporters: “Someone wanted to interview a staffer and because she had not been particularly
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friendly in the past, I referred her to a report on the web and said ‘that’s all you need, it’s all
we’re offering.’ In our little world, that feels like a big deal, but that’s about as aggressive as it
got, and I said to have her editor contact me if you disagree.”
However, Civil Servant 3, who had no previous press experience before his Treasury
public affairs role, evinced a strikingly passive relationship to the press. He explained a
damaging story written by a reporter for a major national newspaper who he considered to be
“determined to make the facts fit his storyline. I got the subject matter expert on the conference
call with him to explain it, and he still didn’t report it correctly. We ended up with a front page
story … we weren’t happy, but what could we do? We gave him a call to correct the information
and he was determined he was going to have it his way, so what could we do? That’s all we
could do, we just accepted it and moved on.” By contrast, it would be difficult to imagine a
political appointee simply “accepting” a factually incorrect, high-profile story without elevating
the situation to an editor or taking other punitive measures.
Of course, civil servants covered less high-profile and less political – and therefore by
definition less contentious – issues to begin with, likely making for less contentious interactions
with the press. And, as Civil Servants 2 and 5 noted, they could also get help from the Treasury
public affairs appointees when they had issues with reporters. Nevertheless, it seemed clear from
their divergent responses that political appointees worked significantly more actively and
strategically on a day-to-day basis to attempt to influence media coverage while striking a
balance that maintained their relationships with press. Civil servants, on the other hand, appeared
from their responses to this question to engage significantly less in working to actively
manipulate the stories and reporters with which they worked. This finding was clearly
corroborated when I asked reporters what both groups of officials did when they were upset with
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their coverage of a particular story.

Reporters on What Officials Do When Upset With Their Coverage
When asked what happens when government officials are upset with their reporting,
Reporters 1, 2, and 6 indicated that appointees are quick to complain, while civil servants will
rarely do so. In the words of Reporter 1, appointees “tend to come quickly, by phone or in
person, while the civil servants are a little less likely to come to you but will probably send the
political person after you.” Reporter 2 likewise indicated that “appointees will respond
aggressively and immediately” while “civil servants rarely do anything. Sometimes you’ll hear
about it days or weeks later, in passing.” Reporter 6 concurred that “civil servants just tend to
smolder and don’t say anything unless their bosses tell them to. Two weeks later, you find out
they’re still pissed off at you for something you wrote that they never called you about.”
Reporters 3, 4, 5, and 7 said civil servants do sometimes complain, but in the words of
Reporter 3, appointees do so “more frequently, more vociferously, [and] more aggressively.”
Reporters 4 and 5 indicated that calls from civil servants tended to be about true factual errors,
though Reporter 4 indicated that civil servants may also object to the tone and perspective of
stories. Reporter 7 was most dramatic in his description of the complaints of civil servants,
reporting that “both politicals and civil servants will try to shape your coverage, as is their job,
by cajoling, wheedling, and complaining. That’s what you get paid to do.”
Reporter 5 drew a distinction between the Obama and Bush administrations, arguing that
the Obama administration “was incredibly touchy, they would call and argue about adjectives.
The Bush folks didn’t do that.”
A truly new phenomenon reporters described – which should perhaps be considered an
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additional facet of the permanent campaign – is attempts by government spokespeople to
actually edit articles written by reporters. While just a few years ago such attempts would have
been impossible, articles are now often posted on the websites of news organizations before they
appear in print in the next day’s paper. Public affairs officials monitor these websites closely,
and when they are upset with a story they now attempt to convince reporters and editors to
change them before the next day’s paper goes to print. Reporter 6 explained that there is now “a
clear recognition that the story isn’t the story in immutable form. As soon as something is up on
the web, if someone doesn’t like it or wants to shape it, they will fight for real-time change in the
content or headline. It suggests to me a really high level of sensitivity and sophistication about
how information works these days.”
Reporter 4 explained, “my wife still talks about this regular 11 pm call with the White
House, where she could hear a voice angry with me, seeking changes and objecting to
characterizations.” He argued that this strategy may actually be effective because “there is an
opportunity that didn’t exist before for aggressive PR people to modify stories in that initial
period before they’re final” and he indicated that as a result of such conversations he had made
“significant” changes to his stories, especially but not only during the financial crisis.
Reporter 6 explained that his media organization tried to resist making such changes, in
recognition of “the very slippery slope you’re on as soon as you start making changes, so unless
there is a very clear, factual screw-up that would generate a correction in the next day’s paper,
you really have to hold your guns or otherwise you’re on a merry-go-round that will never stop.”
However, reporters seemed unfazed by these complaints. They consistently indicated that
they were open to having such conversations, even when they viewed complaints as
unreasonable, and they did not report that such confrontations negatively impacted their
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reporting on their sources in the future. Reporter 2 noted that sometimes the government
spokespeople would punish reporters (“you get shut out of something later or certain people
don’t talk to you again or you have icy relations for a while, and in every case it passes.”).
Reporter 4 likewise noted that government spokespeople would “play games with access. If
they’re mad, you’re less likely to get the next interview or leak. There’s a clear reason appointees
in particular will allow themselves to get angry and yell: It does have an effect. No one likes
getting yelled at, we need access, and we don’t want to get caught out in errors – so I think in
some ways it’s effective, though it’s not optimal. … It breeds resentment and hostility in the
relationship and so it … may … curtail that tendency to write the negative, but it also curtails the
upside, to embrace your side of the story.”
But aside from Reporter 4’s description of how such interactions iced relations with
government spokespeople and made him less likely to write positive coverage, none of the
reporters indicated that they themselves held grudges against spokespeople who complained
and/or tried to edit their stories before final publication, even when they did so aggressively. The
reporters indicated a willingness to correct their stories, if they were wrong. Reporter 3, who was
one of the reporters generally most critical of government spokespeople, explained that “even if
you’ve called me five straight days to complain about something I thought was stupid, I think it’s
my responsibility on the sixth day to keep an open mind; maybe you’re right.”
Likewise, when I asked Reporter 5 if hostile reactions from spokespeople would impact
his next story, he responded, “oh, no, it’s just part of the game.” Reporter 6 described a
willingness “to forgive and forget on both sides. It’s not a war, it’s a battle. You fight it, you get
over it, you move on.” Reporter 7 explained that such confrontations were inevitable because
“there is no be all, end all truth when you’re dealing with policy.” Reporter 4 even seemed to like
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it, explaining that when spokespeople were truly incensed they would “call bosses, email bosses,
… in extreme cases issue public statements explaining why the story was wrong – which I think
is a healthy, good way to respond. … My general response is it makes me feel like it must have
been a pretty good story.”
In sum, then, although both civil servants and appointees were reported to sometimes
complain and joust with reporters, it is clear that appointees took significantly more aggressive
measures to attempt to alter the course of reporting that appeared to be headed in a direction
which they perceived as disadvantageous – and even to “edit” stories once they were published.
Of course, some of this difference clearly stems from the fact that they are responsible for more
contentious policy issues to begin with. Nevertheless, as the recent allegations into IRS
misconduct (which shall later be discussed) indicate, civil servants are certainly not immune
from handling negative stories. The fact that most reporters were adamant that the complaints
and other aggressive tactics of appointees were par for the course and did not have a lasting
impact on their relationships or coverage indicates that, to the degree that appointees are
successful in altering coverage through the tactics they pursue, the changes clearly redound to
the benefit of the administration – indicating that political appointees are simply more effective
in this regard.
V. Skill at Influencing Media Coverage
I next attempted to measure the overall influence that both groups exerted over both the
topics that reporters cover and the tone and content of media reports which they attempted to
influence.
Asked how much influence they had over the topics reporters covered, four out of five
Obama appointees believed they had little influence because reporters covered the “news of the
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day.” As will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 6, the Obama appointees generally
indicated that their massive workloads precluded them from proactively pitching stories. Obama
Appointee 4 explained that his portfolio “was so broad that … there were all kinds of things that
you could focus on, that oftentimes it was overwhelming plus we rarely even got to do any of the
proactive stuff on this because so much of what I dealt with was incoming questions from
reporters.” Obama Appointee 5 concurred that “this is probably a shortfall of the department –
there was very little time spent thinking about proactive stories,” because the amount of
incoming inquiries he received was sometimes so great that there were “times where it felt like I
couldn’t breathe because I couldn’t figure out what to do next.” Obama Appointee 1 also
indicated that “we didn’t do enough pitching,” in part because “you’re trying to keep your head
above water in that job.” Obama Appointee 2 explained, “a lot of it was so reactive … there’s
just so much incoming.” Obama Appointee 3 explained, “I played a lot of defense” and reported
that “I literally had no time.”
Obama Appointee 1 indicated that “we were more reactive than proactive in terms of
topics, or [reporters] were driven by the calendar” and reported on scheduled events, such as
mandated releases of reports or international meetings. However, he argued that this was also in
some ways a function of being a government agency responsible for the “wheels of
government;” it was the job of the White House to drive the “message of the day.” Obama
Appointee 5 indicated that “whatever was happening that day was the topic we were all talking
about.” Of course, often the news of the day was what the Treasury was doing, so in this sense
the Obama appointees may be considered to have had more influence than that for which they
gave themselves credit. Obama Appointee 3 was the sole Obama official to report having “a lot”
of influence “because I held the keys; [reporters] had to talk to me.”
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By contrast, the Bush appointees were significantly more likely to report exerting
influence over the topics reporters covered. Bush Appointee 1 described his influence as
“moderate to strong;” Bush Appointee 3 indicated that much of what reporters wrote was
influenced by the Secretary’s agenda; Bush Appointee 4 indicated that “we were able to drive a
lot of stories …not that it was easy to do.” All four of these Bush appointees reported that their
influence over topics stemmed at least in part from pitching stories or creating events that would
drive coverage, with Bush Appointee 1 describing aggressive efforts to pitch stories and Bush
Appointee 4 indicating that he was willing to engage in “banging a spoon on a highchair” if that
is what it took to get attention. Bush Appointee 5 could not remember how much influence he
had over reporters’ topics.
Thus, it appears that, overall, the Bush appointees were more likely to engage in
proactive pitching, while the Obama appointees did so in a more limited fashion. A possible
explanation for the differential between the Bush and Obama appointees is that many of the Bush
appointees served at least in part prior to the 2008 financial crisis, which was likely a more
pacific time at the Treasury than not only the crisis period but also the present, as the U.S.
economy remains fragile. This could have given them greater time to engage in such proactive
tactics. The fact that the Obama appointees realized and explained that they did not engage in as
much pitching as they would have liked indicates that they likely would have done so under
calmer circumstances – suggesting that appointees may overall have a greater propensity to
attempt to proactively influence the topics of media reports, but also that their massive
workloads may result in an effectiveness disadvantage in this regard.
Civil Servants overall reported exercising a moderate degree of influence over reporters’
topics. Civil Servant 3 indicated that he exerted no influence over reporters’ topics; Civil
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Servants 4 and 6 indicated that reporters tended to cover their announcements; Civil Servants 1
and 2 said they were able to make suggestions which influenced reporters’ topics when reporters
called regarding stories; Civil Servant 5 said he was able to pitch smaller outlets but had limited
influence over national reporters; and Civil Servant 7 likewise indicated success at pitching
stories to the press. Nevertheless, it was striking that only two of the seven civil servants reported
pitching stories.
If they considered themselves to have little influence over topics, the Obama appointees
nevertheless reported significantly shaping the tone and content of stories they attempted to
influence. Obama Appointee 1 reported a “pretty fair amount” of influence; Obama Appointee 2
reported “a lot;” Obama Appointee 4 reported “a significant amount;” and Obama Appointee 5
reported that he “was able to do that pretty effectively.” Obama Appointees 1, 4, and 5 indicated
that they achieved this influence through making their cases persuasively to reporters. The
exception was Obama Appointee 3, who indicated that “content you can mess with, but tone is
basically your relationship with that reporter [and] how they normally write anyway. Tone is
hard because unless it’s inaccurate, if you complain, they don’t give a fuck.”
The Bush appointees reported a perhaps somewhat smaller degree of influence, which in
part seemed to stem from their belief that the press was sometimes against them. Bush Appointee
2 said the administration had moderate influence over more controversial topics because “we
were just always playing against a narrative that was against us” and fairly strong influence over
other topics. Bush Appointee 1 echoed this belief, indicating that he had a “moderate” degree of
influence but “a lot of times it depends on the attitude the reporter came in with.” Bush
Appointee 3 reported that some of their influence stemmed from the fact that reporters traveled
with and grew to like his principal; “we were kind of close.” Bush Appointee 4 reported having
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influence stemming from relationships with reporters in which he tried to educate them on topics
he wanted them to cover, as well as influence stemming “less [from] messaging than having
really strong facts you can show and present in a quick way, but that’s really hard to do.” Bush
Appointee 5 could not remember.
Civil Servant 5 covered a topic so controversial that he reported having little influence
over tone and content, despite the fact that I judged from his other responses that he conducted
his work with sophistication. The other civil servants all reported exerting some influence,
although they often explained that they exercised this influence once a reporter had already
decided to pursue a story and reached out to them. They exercised this influence through
relationships (Civil Servants 2 and 4), offering access and information (Civil Servants 2 and 7),
very occasionally convincing a reporter to shift the focus of his or her story to something more
“interesting” (Civil Servant 3), or occasionally recommending third party validators (Civil
Servant 6). However, Civil Servant 6 indicated that “often I don’t think it’s really necessary
because of the line of business we’re in; most of this stuff is straightforward and factual and
matters of tone aren’t all that important.”
Interestingly, Civil Servant 1 indicated that providing such factual information was
actually a source of influence, indicating “reporters appreciate … when they call you up and
you’re very straightforward and get a subject matter expert on the phone within a couple of
hours; I think that has a positive influence on tone and content.” He indicated that when
appointees got involved in their stories, it tended to be to the detriment of the story, because
“they typically don’t want to say anything and I think that influences tone and content.” This
issue shall be further discussed in section 8.
While the responses of civil servants certainly indicated that they engaged in good
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practices, it seemed clear that appointees were in the business of actively attempting to
promulgate their arguments to a much greater degree than civil servants – even if, in the case of
the Obama appointees, they largely promulgated their messages in responses to topics reporters
were already covering or, in the case of the Bush appointees, they believed that the impact of
their arguments was somewhat hampered by a liberal media bias. Of course, this is somewhat to
be expected given the more polemical nature of their portfolios. This finding was corroborated
by the responses of reporters.
Reporters on Who Influences Their Topics and the Tone and Content of their Coverage
Interestingly, Reporters 3, 4, and 6 explained that they were rarely pitched stories from
either group of government officials. Reporter 4 explained, “I don’t think public affairs people
do a very good job of being proactive … they’re almost wholly reactive and it’s very unusual for
them to try to influence the selection of topics from the outside.” This is especially significant
given the perception of appointees as aggressively attempting to shape media coverage on behalf
of the president.
However, most reporters indicated that appointees attempted to exert greater influence
over their stories overall. For example, Reporter 5 indicated that “I probably would be surprised
if I got a pitch from a civil servant, just because they don’t do too much of that. In my
experience, it’s been initiated by the appointees.” Appointee 3 concurred that “appointees are far
more likely to push harder to try to influence a story than non-politicals,” while Reporter 2
indicated that “appointees more frequently influence the topics [he covers] because they’re trying
to push a particular line or push back against a particular line of thinking” while civil servants
“tend not to have a lot of tone in what they do.” Reporter 4 likewise indicated that civil servants
are “not trying to manage you to the same extent or get at a particular goal and when they do
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they’re not as good, so they have less influence over tone and content.” In this sense, appointees
also had an advantage because of their political access; Reporter 1 indicated that when an
appointee pitched a story he “knew that’s what the Secretary wanted discussed.”
Reporter 1 indicated that appointees were “undoubtedly better at making arguments,”
while Reporter 4 concurred that “appointees tend to be better at pursuing a particular objective in
shaping a story, arguing for their own understanding of the facts,” but he also noted that they
sometimes do so in such an aggressive manner that their efforts become counterproductive,
because, as will be discussed in the next section, it makes him apply greater skepticism to their
claims.
Appointees were also said to have a keener sense of what was most newsworthy.
According to Reporter 2, “if you rely on civil servants for your topics, you’ll end up with a lot of
boring topics.” Meanwhile, according to him, appointees “tend to be more attuned to what
people are actually discussing as the hot issue of the day, because they’re not drowning in
decades of background.”
However, most reporters (Reporters 1, 3, 4, and 6) were clear that appointees were often
not successful in shaping the tone and content of their stories because their attempts to do so
were so aggressive and overtly political that, in the words of Reporter 3, their efforts “can
backfire” and cause reporters to become skeptical. The next section will explore this issue in
greater detail.
Thus, it seems clear that, unsurprisingly, appointees work harder to influence media
coverage and promulgate their preferred narratives. However, their efforts are often ineffective
because they lack credibility with reporters, as the next section will explore. Civil servants, on
the other hand, made less of an effort to pitch stories altogether, indicating that they are relatively
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ineffective in shaping the topics of coverage. The argument of Reporter 4 that civil servants are
not good at influencing stories when they try to manage them suggests that they may also not be
effective in shaping the tone of stories. However, the next section makes clear that civil servants
enjoy a credibility advantage which likely translates into an efficacy advantage in influencing the
content of the stories they work on with reporters, because the information they provide is
viewed by the press as less biased than that of their appointee counterparts.

VI. Credibility with Reporters
To determine how the efforts of appointees and civil servants ultimately impact the
coverage of reporters, I asked the reporters whether they find themselves more skeptical
regarding the claims made by public affairs officers who are political appointees or civil
servants. In one of the clearest and most consistent findings to emerge from my interviews,
reporters indicated, without exception, that they discount the claims of political appointees,
because they believe that the raison d’etre of political staff is to make the president look good.
They indicated this to be the case not just in response to this specific question, but also
repeatedly throughout the course of our conversations.
Reporters were unequivocal that they judge appointees to have less credibility than their
careerist counterparts, simply by virtue of the positions they hold. Accordingly, appointees begin
every conversation and interaction with reporters at a disadvantage, because they are assumed
from the start to have political motives – making it more difficult for them to promulgate the
information and messages they seek to convey. Here are reporters in their own words:
“As you can imagine, for reporters, when we recognize that we’re being kind of sold a story by
the political appointees, we tend to take the opposite side because we’re thinking, what are they
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up to, what’s going on here? If it was a good, logical argument why some particular tax issue or
something was about to become a highlight of political discussion, yeah, that was fine, you
would have that discussion, but you were always a little suspicious. Maybe suspicious is
overstating it, but you always tried to determine whether there was some other side to the story
when a political offered it to you. With civil servants, no.”
- Reporter 1

“The arguments of civil servants almost always carry greater credibility than the arguments of
appointees, because we tend to view civil servants as people who have worked across
administrations and who will probably work in other administrations, and they want to maintain
some semblance of consistency on how they approach these issues… I’m more skeptical of
appointees for sure because they have more pressure on them and they are more concerned
about the political implications, and as a result they’re more likely to be selective in what kind of
information they provide and may not always give you the full picture of what you’re pursuing.”
-Reporter 2

“If I get a call from someone at Treasury pushing a narrative that the Secretary was very
influential in doing X, Y or Z, I don’t know how effective that is, because I’m instantly wary
they’re spinning. That doesn’t mean it’s not true. It could be both and worth writing, but I’m
instantly wary because I know it’s almost inconceivable an appointee would pitch a story or try
to get me to incorporate some angle that didn’t clearly have a benefit to the boss. They wouldn’t
suggest a story because they thought it was interesting or good journalism; they’re not thinking
that way.”
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-Reporter 3

“I’m definitely more skeptical of information put out by appointees. They’re political appointees,
they have it basically as their job to have a commitment to the president or to the administration
who appointed them, whereas the civil servant probably sees himself or herself as having more
of a commitment to the U.S. taxpayer, or the government as a whole, or to the country…”
-Reporter 3
“I think it’s true that appointees view themselves as in the service of a political party or of the
individual who appointed them or the administration they serve … they see stories through the
framework of political advantage, so that informs the things they are and aren’t willing to tell
you … It’s my view that the role and responsibility of public affairs officers is to make
information available to the public, and it’s my strong sense that they don’t share that
perspective about their job.”
-Reporter 4
“Appointees tend to be better at pursuing particular objectives in shaping a story, … but … they
don’t necessarily serve their own interests by doing so as aggressively as they do because the
aggressive effort to sell the story can and does lead you to doubt the merits of your story or make
sure you’re telling the other side or push back on what you’re told, and, one, that frustration can
influence the tone and content, and, two, it undermines their credibility. The facts presented you
view through a little more of a jaundiced eye and wonder whether they’re true and it leads you to
do a little more due diligence on whether you’re getting the full and complete version of the
answer to the question you asked.”
-Reporter 4
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“It’s the government, these guys are spending three trillion dollars a year and it’s a democracy,
so they’re answerable to the public and public opinion, so therefore they will always try to tailor
their message. It’s like a car company trying to sell cars, they’re selling a service which is
government service, so they’re going to tailor it to whatever the view of politics is just because
this town is run by people who get elected, so therefore that’s a driving force in what they think
and their worldview. No one elects the Treasury Secretary, but they elect the President, and the
Secretary works for the President, and the President has to face re-election…”
-Reporter 5
“Appointees make arguments and they are heavily discounted because they’re advocates, they’re
coming from a point of view and their prime objective is to defend the perspective of the person
who appointed them at the expense of all other perspectives and other facts and what’s a fair
rendering of a set of circumstances.”
-Reporter 6
“I try to take the posture that I’m not giving more or less weight to what any person says, but
there’s just a natural hesitancy to give much weight to what appointees say just because you
know they’re coming from that advocacy perspective and there’s an ulterior motive in everything
they do.”
-Reporter 6
“The U.S. may have had more influence there [in Europe, during the sovereign debt crisis] than
we reflected in stories, because we thought it was a load of heap.”
-Reporter 6
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“You’re probably a little more skeptical of something coming out of Treasury’s Office of Public
Affairs [which is staffed by appointees] than something like the OCC Public Affairs office [the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s public affairs office is staffed by civil servants]
because they don’t have the political pressures or don’t see the same political pressures that an
Undersecretary of Public Affairs sees or imagines.”
-Reporter 7 (For the record: the title of the Treasury’s top appointee for public affairs is Assistant
Secretary, not Undersecretary.)

However, one reporter indicated that this suspicion decreased over time, while another
reporter indicated that it increased, indicating that appointees are at least able to influence the
degree of reporters’ skepticism through their individual actions. Additionally, Reporter 4 noted
that sometimes the narratives the appointees sought to promulgate were helpful, because “I am in
the business of telling stories and it can be useful to deal with people in the storytelling business,
because they have an awareness of what is or isn’t useful, or an adversarial relationship can force
you to think more clearly about the conclusions you’re reaching.”
Furthermore, multiple reporters noted that civil servants themselves may be concerned
with protecting their offices; in the words of Reporter 5, “even though they can’t be fired,
everyone wants to please the boss and do well in these organizations.” On the other hand,
Reporter 4 noted that “some [civil servants] appear genuinely committed to increasing public
understanding,” using as an example a Securities and Exchange Commission press officer whose
main goal appeared to be expanding knowledge of the office’s function and activities as opposed
to putting his office in a position of advantage in every story – which Reporter 4 argued was an
effective long-term strategy for building media influence.
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To be sure, it is clear that the arguments of civil servants do not escape the scrutiny of
reporters. However, the responses above indicate that most reporters assume that appointees have
particular political motives in everything they do and are almost always trying to spin for their
bosses. As a result, in the words of Reporter 6, the arguments of appointees are “heavily
discounted” and met with a level of suspicion that significantly exceeds that which reporters
apply to the information they receive from civil servants. This low level of credibility that
appointees hold in the eyes of the press can only serve to handicap their ability to serve as
effective advocates for the president – giving them a significant effectiveness disadvantage.

VII. Skill At Providing Requested Information to Reporters
Next, I consider how reporters described their ability to access the information they
sought for their stories from both appointees and civil servants. While it would certainly be in an
administration’s interests to sometimes withhold information from the press, effective public
relations officers would be expected to generally provide reporters with helpful information for
their stories. Otherwise, they would damage their relationships with the press and cede control of
the message to the other sources to whom reporters would turn.
Appointees
Although appointees were perceived as knowing more about what was happening in the
upper echelons of the Treasury, every reporter with whom I spoke vociferously argued that
political appointees fail to give them the requisite background and context to shape their
reporting. This complaint was emphatically made by every reporter with whom I spoke, despite
the fact that I did not ask a direct question on the subject. The reporters indicated that they
needed more conversations that were either on background (meaning that sources are not named
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directly but rather referred to by agreed descriptions such as “Treasury official” or
“administration official”) or off-the-record in order to explain issues, what might be happening in
the future, and perhaps even discuss areas of disagreement. This situation was contrasted sharply
by the majority of reporters with the Bush administration, in which Treasury officials were
described as significantly more willing to engage in such discussions than the Obama appointees.
Reporter 2 reported that “in this administration versus others, there is … less fruitful
conversation on the front end to shape stories and thinking than there is in other administrations
where you’re just kind of talking back and forth. In this administration, not just at Treasury but at
numerous economic agencies, it may be the case that there is an administration-wide cultural
approach to not risking information getting out, not volunteering information.” Reporter 3
concurred that:

the current administration is way too closed, way too afraid to walk, way too reluctant to
even sort of give basic information. … One of the problems with having a lot of
appointees is that it’s harder for them to see and really get their head around, like, if I call
and say can I talk to someone in the TARP [Troubled Asset Relief Program] office about
TARP, they’re just afraid to do that. They’re afraid the guy or woman isn’t political, they
don’t know if they’ll say something they don’t want to say, and I’m not going into the
political, I’m just trying to get information, I just want a briefing from someone who can
explain how it works. They’re just afraid, they figure, ‘what do we have to gain, the
person talking could fuck it up.’

Similarly, Reporter 5, a veteran Treasury reporter, explained that “we cover very
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complicated issues, so so many of our questions are just, ‘can you help me understand this, how
does this particular thing work,’ and the politicals often feel constrained to be so on message
with whatever the political point is that they’re either unwilling to go off the talking points just to
help us understand an issue or they don’t know, just because they don’t know the issue
themselves.” Reporter 7 indicated that, in contrast to other federal economic agencies who will
“acknowledge the other side of an issue or the other arguments and explain them,” the Treasury
responds to critical questions “in like a combative way.”
Two reporters speculated that this caution stemmed from the trauma of Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner’s widely-perceived-as-poor performance and lack of clarity
announcing a plan to stem the country’s financial crisis on February 10, 2009, which caused the
Dow Jones Industrial Average to immediately tank, dropping by about 300 points. “They got a
little gun shy after that,” Reporter 3 said. Reporter 5 also attributed the diminished access
afforded to reporters by appointees in the Obama administration to differences in the styles of
their principals. “Paulson and Geithner were different; Geithner because he had been staff [civil
service] at Treasury saw things in a different way than Paulson, who hadn’t served in
government. Paulson was used to running Goldman, so if you wanted to talk, he talked – and he
was rather forceful.”
By contrast, Reporter 5 indicated that, to get information from this administration, he
needed to engage in “hostage taking.” “It’s often how this administration seems to run,” he said.
“If you get a fact they may be willing to talk to you, but you’ve got to get it from a lobbyist or an
opposing political party on the Hill and then present it to them as your hostage.” The reporter
used an example of a story I was involved in, when Geithner made a short trip to Europe in
September 2011 without press, in order to discuss the region’s sovereign debt crisis with
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European finance ministers. When the Austrian Finance Minister made remarks critical of
Geithner at the meeting, the reporter said, “she was our hostage” because it forced the Treasury
to reach out to him to provide the U.S. version of events.
Reporters indicated that this approach left them “constantly puzzled” (Reporter 4). “It’s
just a very, very, very cautious way of going about the exercise of public affairs, and it’s just
hard to see how it’s effective.” (Reporter 3). This is because, for reporters, one of the best ways
for a source to influence their reporting is by providing them with access. When asked about the
savvier things that federal economic agencies do in order to shape the coverage they receive in
the press, the majority of reporters indicated that providing access was the smartest thing they
could do (an argument which, as shall later be discussed, is also, of course, self-serving). The
reporters consistently argued that the lack of access provided by Obama appointees made the
appointees less effective advocates for the administration, because they voluntarily forfeited
opportunities to include their facts and point of view in stories and to shape the thinking of
reporters. For example, Reporter 5 explained that one story he wrote which the Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs had complained about resulted from the fact that he was not being
provided with sufficient information from the Treasury on an overseas trip and therefore had to
look elsewhere to come up with something to satisfy his editors’ demand for stories.
Reporter 7 likewise explained that “if there’s an issue … you know is going to come up,
giving reporters early access to not only lay out the issue but lay out the agency’s or
department’s approach to it is invaluable, because reporters innately when tackling a topic will
defer to that approach, so if you explain an issue to a reporter from your point of view before
anyone else, they will default in a time crunch, and from then on approach the issue with that in
mind … It’s amazing how easy it is to shape reporters’ perceptions.”
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Reporter 3 argued that the lack of information and access he receives from the Obama
appointees makes it harder for him to write positive stories about the administration.
Additionally, he explained, “one advantage to giving journalists interviews and access is that it’s
harder to write scathing pieces about people you’ve gotten to know. It’s easier to be more critical
of someone a group you’ve never sat down with. It’s just human nature.”
Two reporters emphasized that the current appointees have foregone opportunities to
build strong relationships with members of the press which foster trust and influence. One
reporter contrasted this approach with that of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, which
held a “reporter day” to allow the press to engage with officials, made its principals available for
lunches and background conversations regularly, and worked to educate reporters about their
work. “They built these relationships under less stressful circumstances, and then when they
needed those relationships [during the financial crisis] they were able to draw on them,” he said.
“There’s this fear of being burned by talking to a reporter and I understand it, but the benefits get
overlooked.”
Reporters 3 and 5 were perhaps most critical of the performance of Treasury appointees
in this regard, because the argued that this lack of access reflects a fundamental incompetence on
the part of public affairs staff. For example, Reporter 3 used the example of the Treasury’s
December 9, 2013 announcement that it had sold its final shares in General Motors, which were
purchased during the financial crisis in order to stabilize the country’s automobile industry, as an
example of a “lack of savvy and lack of experience” among its public affairs staff:

They announce an hour beforehand a conference call with [Treasury Secretary] Lew and
senior officials on background late in the day. Here’s, this is where they undoubtedly
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have a good story to tell and almost nobody is on the other side of this now saying it was
a huge failure, people say the people lost $10 million, but for the most part opposition to
the auto bailout has dissipated or been beaten into submission, it’s a good story to have to
tell and they know it and want to tell it, but they don’t know how to tell it, so they do a
call with Lew, make a big announcement, and there’s no visual, there’s no photos, it’s a
call, there’s no ‘there,’ there’s no physical place, there’s no press conference, there’s just
a call. Someone has to explain to me how that’s effective, even if your motivations are
purely political. They’re not doing a good job of even representing themselves, often.
They aren’t good at explaining when they have a good story to tell.

Of course, such event creation has long been understood by sophisticated public relations
professionals; Daniel Boorstin defined the “pseudo-event” as a human creation which, in contrast
to a “train wreck or an earthquake … is planned primarily … for the immediate purpose of being
reported or reproduced. Therefore, its occurrence is arranged for the convenience of the reporting
or reproducing media.” (1992, 11).
Reporter 5 likewise indicated that the story in which he used the Austrian finance
minister as a hostage was an example of a time when appointees were “kind of being inept.”
“Someone should have told the Secretary that others will talk and you’ll be interpreted through
others’ voices,” he said.
Both Reporter 3 and Reporter 5 blamed the fact that appointees often failed to provide
access in a strategic way on their lack of journalism experience. “You can’t have an entire office
of people dealing with the media who have never worked in the media,” Reporter 3 said. “It’s
illogical. The lack of experience shows. You can see it in their inability to pitch stories or even
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time them appropriately.”
Reporter 7 attributed the lack of access to several things: “Some of it’s arrogance. Some
of it is the unfair treatment they’ve received. And some stems from the knowledge gap [of
appointees on the issues they cover.]”
For Reporter 5, this lack of access isn’t just aggravating to reporters and
counterproductive for appointees. It also poses a problem for democracy. “Oftentimes what we
see as the public’s right to know bumps up against the view of appointees of what is good for
their bosses,” he said. “Therefore, they’re … trying to either manage the message or limit
whatever information they’ll let out. That’s a constant conflict.”
Civil Servants
Just as appointees were perceived by reporters to not be forthcoming with the political
information to which they had greater access, reporters indicated that civil servants likewise did
not wield their greater policy knowledge to effectively influence reporting. “They’re … very
reluctant on the record but I was always struck by how much, even off-the-record, civil servants
are reluctant to shoot the shit,” Reporter 2 said. For Reporter 1, civil servants are often “unclear
or suspicious, I think, of what reporters’ intents are, so I would have to spend quite some time
trying to explain that ‘I’m not trying to get you to say something that will get you in trouble.’”
Reporters 3, 5, and 6 argued that this is the case because civil servant spokespeople are
often not authorized or empowered to speak to press a great deal. “It’s the political people who
have been authorized to talk more, so you’re probably having a longer conversation with them,”
Reporter 5 said. Civil servants “know the issues, but often – this whole town has gotten so much
over the years about message control that they often feel that there’s just no benefit in talking to
reporters because the only thing that will happen to them is they’ll get in trouble, so they can feel
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constrained.” Reporter 5 did, however, indicate that “the ones who’ve been around a while and
know how things work are usually more forthcoming.”
Meanwhile, Reporter 2 complained that civil servants sometimes fail to grasp how their
subject matter connects to the stories reporters are writing. According to Reporter 4, civil
servants “tend to just be less invested in the political consequences of a story, which sometimes
means they lack the incentive to talk to you, but sometimes means they lack the disincentive.”
Reporter 4 found civil servants to be generally less savvy than appointees in dealing with the
media, reporting that “to the extent civil servants felt the need to defend their agency, they’re
generally not very good at it.”
Reporter 6 concurred that civil servants seem less interested in attempting to influence
reporting altogether. “I think they view themselves as facilitators only … I don’t think they care
about the outcome always, they view the request as an intrusion on their day as opposed to being
their job. But they tend to be in much more of a neutral posture with questions, where they
realize they’re dealing with facts and data and one of their jobs is to get it out to you, so if you’re
calling about stuff like that, they tend to be a bit more useful. At the Bureau of Labor Statistics or
Census, they’re good with data. If you ask them if you’re drawing the right conclusions, or
crunching data and you call them up and say you’re having trouble extracting this, they’ll put it
together, and a day later, it’s in your inbox. That’s what they’re trained to do and they’re really
good.” Reporter 2 likewise found civil servants to provide better informational content.
Thus, reporters indicated that civil servants might sometimes be helpful at providing raw
data, with the exception of Reporter 4 (who indicated that civil servants might sometimes not be
politically motivated enough to have disincentives to providing information). However, reporters
generally indicated that civil servants were, like their appointee counterparts, cautious and

182

unhelpful about providing the context, backgrounds, and explanations that they sought for their
reporting. Of course, this could partly be the case because appointees prevented the civil servants
from sharing such information; as will be discussed in the next section, Civil Servant 5 was
adamant that if a civil servant was speaking on the record and sharing information of which the
administration did not approve, the administration would stop the civil servant from speaking.
Of course, these complaints of reporters must likewise be discounted, at least to a degree,
given the natural tension inherent in their jobs. As Reporter 5 explained, “we’re paid to find out
things and tell our readers about them.” Obviously, reporters will always advocate for greater
access to information.
The fact that reporters consistently argued that the Bush administration provided better
access, however, does call for consideration of the possibility that the Obama appointees are less
skilled or are withholding more information than the Bush administration. Of course, this
narrative is particularly self-serving for reporters because it suggests that the current
administration’s practices are abnormal and improper, and should thus be changed. However, the
consistency with which this allegation was volunteered to me by reporters made it evident that
the matter merited consideration. It will be discussed in detail in chapter 6.
Overall, however, while it would certainly not be in the interests of the administration to
grant the completely free and open level of access that reporters desire, at the same time, it seems
reasonably clear that both appointees and civil servants are missing opportunities to exert
influence by providing explanations – even off-the-record – that might inculcate their worldview
and strengthen their relationship with reporters. In this regard, neither group holds an
effectiveness advantage. This finding is particularly striking in the case of the appointees, who,
as we have seen, overall exerted significantly greater efforts to attempt to shape media coverage.
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Nevertheless, reporters universally and consistently indicated that they were unable to access
information from the appointees which, they argued, would have allowed them to better convey
the administration’s perspective on key issues.
VIII. Who Appointees and Civil Servants Perceive to be More Effective Administration
Advocates
For additional insight into the question of whether appointees or civil servants are more
effective advocates for the president in Treasury public affairs positions, I asked both the
appointees and civil servants which group they thought was more effective at conveying the
administration’s messages in the press. Perhaps unsurprisingly, appointees overwhelmingly (but
not universally) believed they were more effective, while civil servants overwhelmingly (but not
universally) believed they were most effective.
Appointees indicated they were more successful because civil servants do not
“understand the broader political architecture” (Obama Appointee 1), while “a big part of
succeeding in government is political instinct. With reporters, we’re good at reading situations
very quickly, and that’s something careers don’t have any of, zero, and it’s not just careers, there
are some Assistant Secretaries at Treasury who aren’t political and lack that quick instinct that
will help you to be effective” – a skill that appointees offer their principals (Obama Appointee
5). Additionally, appointees “may be more invested and more concerned with how the
administration is portrayed (Obama Appointee 2) because they “truly believe in the president,
administration and people they’re working for” (Bush Appointee 1), and “you can be more of an
effective advocate because you’re on the same side” (Bush Appointee 2), while the priorities of
civil servants “are not the same as the appointees’ priorities.” (Obama Appointee 4). However,
Bush Appointee 3 noted that appointees enjoy better access, while civil servants are “kind of
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behind the scenes … just by design.”
Bush Appointee 4 likewise explained that it is necessary for appointees to serve as
spokespeople because policies change under different administrations:

You can’t forget that the administration, the executive branch is a political body. The
departments and agencies are not independent. They serve at the pleasure of the
president. It matters who the president is. You’re part of an administration and the policy.
I don’t believe a spokesperson can be credible who on a dime on January 20 at noon can
go from being the voice of one policy and then at 12:01 go to being the voice of the
opposite policy. That’s just not credible, and to me the most important characteristic of a
really effective spokesperson is credibility.

Obama Appointee 5 also noted that “it’s nothing against civil servants, but there’s limits
on what a civil servant can do. They can’t work the same hours as we do … whereas a political
person has come up through the political ranks, so you’re just used to working round the clock,
dealing with high level principals, talking to them succinctly … You’re battle tested coming
through the political machine.” Bush Appointee 1 likewise argued that appointees “know we’re
here a short time, we’re hungry, so many came off the campaign so you’re used to working
round the clock, so … you go.”
The exception among appointees was Obama Appointee 3, who thought that “people
underestimate career folks” who enjoy “subject matter expertise; they’ve seen stories before on
particular subjects. They may not be as savvy media wise, but in a lot of cases that’s not true.
People really underestimate them.” Bush Appointee 5 said he did not know who was more

185

effective.
By contrast, civil servants generally argued that they conveyed the administration’s
messages in the press more effectively than appointees. Civil Servant 5 disagreed with Bush
Appointee 4’s claim that civil servants cannot credibly speak to political matters. He argued that
“to the average mom or dad, they identify more with the agency and federal government than
with the administration … Within the beltway and among reporters, they assume if you’re
speaking for the agency and have clearance to do so, you are speaking for the administration …
if you’re in a political agency, you’re doing and saying what the political want or they will stop
you from speaking.”
Civil Servant 6 likewise pushed back on the conventional wisdom that civil servants are
politically tone-deaf. He argued that “civil servants are almost always at least partially
supervised by a political communicator … and as a civil servant, I’m sensitive to what the
political spokespeople are concerned about and certainly make an effort not to screw things up
and get people pissed at me.”
Civil servants also argued that their greater efficacy stemmed from their greater
experience. While Civil Servant 3 did not feel comfortable pronouncing which group was
ultimately more effective because the two groups worked well together, he indicated that he
thought “appointees are at a disadvantage if [their subject matter portfolio] wasn’t a particular
focus in college, grad school, or somewhere they worked.” Civil Servant 1 likewise explained
that “civil servants often have twenty years plus working in an organization, which doesn’t
necessarily make them wonderful, but a lot of times you’re looking at people that have incredible
background.” By contrast, he explained,
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There is a bumper sticker that says ‘hire a teen while they still know everything.’ In many
ways, I see politicals like that. A lot of them are very young with very little experience
and they think they know everything. They’re coming from a campaign mode, so they
think in terms of ‘us’ versus ‘them,’ but you have to be one or the other, and that’s why if
you express doubts of something … you’re probably perceived as being ‘them,’ and they
wouldn’t trust you, which would mean they would do everything they could to take you
out of the loop completely, ‘cause that’s the way they work. And I’m just not sure how
you get to a political and say, ‘no, that’s not how it works, 80 percent of people in the
world are not interested in politics at all. They’re here trying to do a good job. They’re
not trying to make the administration look bad; if they do their job well, then your
administration will look well.’ Most people I work with want the current administration
to look good because it reflects on them. So if people are saying the government is doing
a good job, we’re happy because it means we’re doing a good job.

Civil Servant 1 also argued that the proclivity of appointees to cover up information was
actually damaging to the administrations they served:
Appointees have a separate motivation, let’s put it that way, and there really isn’t any
difference in the Obama administration than in the Bush administration. Politicals hate,
absolutely hate, to take responsibility for anything. ‘Oh my god, you mean something
went wrong and it was our fault?’ My thought is always, hey, when you start out you’re
not trying to do the wrong thing, you had a set of reasons for making a decision, it didn’t
go the way you wanted, to me the appropriate response is why you made the decision and
what you’ll do now, and if you approach it that way it’s a reasonable approach and both
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the media and the public would look at it and say it’s reasonable. Instead, politicals say
we can’t tell them that everything didn’t go perfectly, so don’t say anything to anybody,
and that’s to me … I mean, they’re in charge so I do what they say but I really, really
don’t think it’s the right answer a lot of times because if you don’t say anything the
assumption is going to be the worst possible scenario, which probably isn’t the case and I
think you’d get off a lot lighter if you explain.
Civil Servant 7 made a similar argument that civil servants are more likely than political
appointees to be “objective about a situation.” For him, this not only better served the American
people’s right to know, but also translated into greater efficacy with reporters because “there’s
no spin. I think reporters perceive appointees as, there’s always sort of a shadow of a doubt, are
they coming totally clean, are they conveying everything, what are they not telling me, is there
something that is missing?’”
Civil Servants 2, 4, and 6 both argued that appointees are better at communicating the
administration’s priorities or talking points, while civil servants are better at “communicating the
substance that supports the policies.” (Civil Servant 4). Interestingly, Civil Servant 2 reported
that he was “definitely more effective in explaining how an inclusive economy in which low
wealth individuals have an opportunity to get credit and capital is critical to the economy as a
whole in moving forward. I can probably articulate that better, with more nuance and examples
than a political, just because it’s something I live and breathe, where they’ll often boil it down to
talking points that will work for them, that they understand and at times may also be colored by
the overarching administration message.”
The policy substance Civil Servant 2 was attempting to convey, of course, was a
powerful argument on behalf of Democratic policies. Given what we know about the “appointee
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discount,” I would argue, in fact, that the Obama administration might be better served by a
spokesperson making such an argument which would be perceived by reporters as more neutral
given its source, yet would actually make a more nuanced and compelling argument for the
administration’s priorities than Civil Servant 2 seems to suggest political appointees are even
capable of crafting. Of course, this would not necessarily be the case if the current administration
was Republican. However, the example is a striking indication of a situation in which a civil
servant might actually better advance an administration’s priorities.
While the appointees generally believed that they made more effective administration
advocates, at other points during in our conversations, two Obama appointees shed light on
additional factors that may diminish the effectiveness of the particular individuals who serve as
appointees. Obama Appointee 3 argued that the administration was “incredibly insular” and
divided its own staff into “true believers and non-true believers.” He argued that the
administration favored hiring individuals who had worked on the campaign, and placed them in
senior positions even when they might have found others who were more qualified. Meanwhile,
he said, “cabinet [secretaries] hire people from the campaign for White House access.” President
Obama has elsewhere been accused of being insular in his staff picks (Nicholas 2010), while
others have also questioned the power afforded to his White House aides. For example, in his
memoir, former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates expressed dismay at the prerogatives
asserted by White House staff, arguing that “for an [National Security Staff] staff member to call
a four-star combatant commander or field commander would have been unthinkable when I
worked at the White House – and probably cause for dismissal. It became routine under Obama.”
(2014, 566).
However, Obama Appointee 5 shed light on part of the reason why the administration
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may have relied so heavily on campaign aides in top posts, arguing that “there were a lot of
extraordinarily smart people they were looking at to be Assistant Secretary [of Public Affairs at
the Treasury] but the process of vetting and ridiculous information they needed to turn over,
about spouses and kids and taxes, just became such a huge pain, that they missed out on some
really, really good appointees. The process becomes so nasty … [that] really smart, successful
professionals don’t want to go through that … the process was just such a turn-off, it’s hard to
get people.” The impact on government efficacy of a vetting process widely perceived to be out
of control has, of course, been well documented by other scholars (Mackenzie 2001).
Of course, the findings of this chapter on the political experience of civil servants cast
doubt on the assertion of appointees that careerists lack political savvy. The next chapter will
further call into question the appointee claims that civil servants are less loyal. On the other
hand, the responses of reporters on the knowledge of civil servants and the “appointee discount”
appear to affirm the claims of civil servants to serve as stronger advocates in the press.
VIX. Relative Savvy
Finally, I considered whether the officials appeared to utilize savvy tactics in order to
advance the administration’s goals.
During the course of my interviews, I likewise detected a lack of sophistication on the
part of two of the civil servants whom I interviewed. Civil Servant 3 came to his position without
any previous media relations experience, as was evident in his anomalous, yet nevertheless
surprising, assertion that nothing could be done when a reporter for a major, mainstream
publication wrote an inaccurate story. I found another Civil Servant whom I interviewed to be
tediously verbose, at times continuing to drone on after I indicated to him several times that “I
got it” in response to his lengthy answers. At one point, when after exhausting my subtler cues I
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finally politely suggested we should perhaps not spend too much more time on a particular point
he was making, he raised his pointer finger in the air and indicated he needed to finish reading
me a passage from a book he had produced in his office before we moved on. However, both
civil servants worked in lower-level posts – not the heads of public affairs positions that were
most common among my interview subjects – and the latter civil servant worked in a position in
which the law required that only very limited and technical information be released, perhaps
justifying his more stereotypically bureaucratic behavior. Furthermore, I found their
insufficiently sophisticated approaches to be significantly less of a threat to the administration
than the truly inappropriate behavior of Bush Appointee 5, which is discussed in Appendix B.
On the other hand, I found the formidable skill and qualifications of Civil Servants 1 and 5 to be
especially remarkable. One civil servant who brought particularly strong policy background to
his job described Treasury as his ideal post and had waited for years for a position to open up
within the Department. Of course, the variability of the skill of my interview subjects is to be
expected, as in any organization there are likely be particularly weak and particularly strong
individuals.
However, while, as previously discussed, the reporters indicated that civil servants rarely
pitched stories and were ineffective at making arguments, in other ways they appeared to employ
savvy tactics to advance the administration’s goals. For example, I asked the government
officials whether they utilized public opinion polls in their work – a tool which requires
sophisticated planning and savvy analysis in order to utilize the results to inform a public affairs
officer’s work. While none of the appointees indicated that they had utilized public opinion polls
in their work, four of the seven appointees indicated that they had used or were planning to
utilize public opinion polls.
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I also asked the government officials whether they ever tried to appeal to the emotions, as
opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted – a tactic which
evidences a sophisticated approach to attempting to shape how people will receive messages.
Civil servants were also more likely to utilize this technique. While four of ten appointees
indicated that they attempted to appeal to emotions, five of the seven civil servants reported
doing so. The responses to these questions are described in greater detail in chapter 6, as they are
also germane to the question of the permanent campaign.
This evidence suggests that civil servants may conduct their work with more savvy than
that for which they are given credit by reporters – perhaps because reporters believe bureaucrats
to be stereotypically unsophisticated and/or erroneously assume that the civil servants’ lack of
overt partisan goals causes them to make less sophisticated efforts to advance the messages of
the administrations they serve.
Possible Causal Factors
I next considered possible factors that could influence the relative efficacy of the two
groups.
Previous Professional Experience
Despite the fact that political appointees tend to serve as spokespeople for the issues
generally considered to be most high-profile and critical to the administrations for which they
serve, as expected, civil servants brought significantly more professional experience to their jobs.
While the average appointee whom I interviewed had just over five years of experience before
his appointment as a Treasury spokesperson, the average civil servant had more than twenty-four
years of previous experience before he started working in his Treasury public affairs position
(including previous positions within the Treasury in offices other than public affairs). This means
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that the average civil servant had more experience than more than four appointees combined.
Half of the appointees had four or less years of work experience prior to becoming a Treasury
spokesperson; two had just two years of experience. The Bush appointees overall had slightly
more professional experience than the Obama appointees.
Without exception, every political appointee had previously worked in public affairs on a
partisan basis – for elected officials, political campaigns, and/or a political party committee.
Although a few of the appointees had limited private sector experience as well, overall the
appointees had little previous professional experience beyond these political communications
posts. Only two appointees reported having previous knowledge of the policy portfolio for which
they were responsible.
Contrary to the conventional understanding of civil servants as technocratic and
apolitical, the vast majority of the civil servants, like the appointees, had previous political
experience. Surprisingly, the great majority of the civil servants had also previously worked in
political roles – such as holding elected office or working as a lobbyist or for a political party
committee, member of Congress or political campaign.
While the civil servants all brought a great deal of varied professional experience to their
posts, unlike the appointees, the direct relevance of the previous experience of civil servants to
their Treasury public affairs posts was more mixed. While four of the seven civil servants had
previous experience working for the federal government in public affairs, three had no previous
media relations experience at any organization before beginning their Treasury public affairs
roles (although the latter civil servants all had significant policy experience). Still, because civil
servants had so much more aggregate experience than the political appointees, the civil servants
had on average more years of prior experience working in media relations positions than the

193

political appointees. Additionally, five of the seven civil servants reported having previous
experience working on the policy issues for which they were responsible.
At the same time, three of the seven civil servants lacked any previous media relations
experience – an art and science which does require prior training. Of the four remaining civil
servants, one had very impressive media relations experience but no previous exposure to his
subject matter portfolio. The evidence regarding how their previous professional experience
impacted their efficacy is therefore mixed. The majority of the civil servants had previous
experience in the policy areas for which they were responsible, which likely bolstered the
efficacy advantage they enjoyed in their greater knowledge of their subject matter portfolios. On
the other hand, the lower previous media relations experience of nearly half of the civil servants
was likely a factor in their lower propensity to attempt to shape media coverage.

Education
Whereas the Bush appointees tended to have slightly more previous professional
experience, the Obama appointees possessed more elite educational qualifications. The majority
of Obama appointees attended national universities, with an average ranking by U.S. News and
World Report as the thirty-eighth best college in the country, and the Obama appointees held two
graduate degrees. By contrast, the average ranking of the national universities attended by the
Bush appointees was ninety-second in the country, and the Bush appointees held no graduate
degrees. About half of the civil servants attended national universities, and these institutions had
an average ranking of eighty-sixth best in the country. The other civil servants all attended
regional universities. Among the regional universities attended by civil servants for which U.S.
News and World Report rankings are available, the average ranking was thirty-third best

194

university in the region.
Overall, then, the appointees attended more elite undergraduate institutions than the civil
servants. The subjects that the appointees studied were also more germane to their work. The
great majority of appointees studied subjects I consider to be highly relevant to the work of a
Treasury public affairs official, such as communications, public relations, journalism,
economics, political science or government, with no significant differences between the Bush
and Obama appointees. By contrast, some civil servants majored in areas with no relevance to
their line of work. Less than half of civil servants studied subjects relevant to their work as
undergraduates.
However, the civil servants were significantly more likely than appointees to hold
graduate degrees. While the ten appointees brought just two graduate degrees to their jobs, more
than half of the civil servants held graduate degrees. This is likely attributable in part to the fact
that civil servants tended to be significantly older than the appointees. Half of the four graduate
degrees held by the civil servants were relevant to their work; by contrast, both of the appointee
graduate degrees were relevant and were earned at significantly more elite universities than the
graduate schools attended by the civil servants.
Nevertheless, I concluded that, because the differences in the educational qualifications
of the groups were relatively minor, they did not likely play a significant role in differences in
the relative efficacy of the two groups.
Tenure
As expected, the tenure of civil servants was significantly longer. The average civil
servant had served in his Treasury public affairs post for six years at the time of interview
(excluding time served in other Treasury and/or government positions), and the vast majority
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were still serving in their posts. By contrast, the average political appointee worked at the
Treasury for 2.55 years, and the vast majority of appointees were not still serving at the
Treasury. The majority of appointees worked for the Treasury for two years or less; the average
is skewed upwards by a couple of appointees who worked in Treasury public affairs for an
unusually long period of time, and did not necessarily remain in Schedule C positions or in the
role of spokesperson for their entire tenure. The Bush appointees whom I interviewed had a
slightly longer average tenure than the Obama appointees.
It appeared that the dramatically longer tenure of the civil servants gave them a decided
efficacy advantage in their greater knowledge of the policy portfolios for which they were
responsible.
Workloads
Finally, I attempted to ascertain whether the heavier workloads and longer hours of
appointees influenced their efficacy by querying the officials about how they spent their time. As
Table 1 (which is also considered in chapter 6) indicates, the heavier workloads of appointees did
not appear to preclude them from engaging in the tactics of proactive, effective communications
professionals, including pitching stories to reporters and crafting and implementing strategies to
attain desired media coverage. Appointees reported spending an average of 18 percent of their
time pitching stories – double the percentage of time spent by civil servants. Furthermore, while
civil servants estimated spending 30 percent of their time crafting and implementing strategies to
attain desired coverage – 2 percent more than appointees – this likely represented less overall
time, because (as will be described in chapter 6) appointees reported spending more hours on the
job. While Obama appointees in particular reported not having as much time as they would have
liked to pitch stories, and therefore their heavy workloads likely diminished their overall
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efficacy, the results indicate that their workloads did not preclude them from advancing the
administration’s arguments in comparison with than civil servants.
Table 1: Distribution of Work Time for Public Affairs Officials at Treasury

Percent of time spent

Average for Obama

Percent of time spent

crafting and

responding to

implementing

Percent of time spent

inquiries from

strategies to attain

pitching stories

reporters

desired coverage

17%

53%

31%

24%

38%

25%

18%

46%

28%

9%

28%

30%

appointees
Average for
responding Bush
appointees
Combined average for
responding appointees
Average for civil
servants

197

I also asked the government officials whether their workloads were manageable, in
another effort to ascertain whether workloads may have accounted for differences in their
relative efficacy. As will be described in greater detail in chapter 6, it was clear that appointees
were often overwhelmed, and that this lack of time to think was likely a factor in diminishing
their efficacy. For example, Obama Appointee 3 explained that he was “totally frayed by the end
… It’s hard to drink from a fire hose and learn at the same time. That I found the most difficult
part.” Obama Appointee 5 explained that there were “times where it felt like I couldn’t breathe
because I couldn’t figure out what to do next.” He explained that “there were definitely some
boneheaded things they asked me to do at Treasury, but I think I was probably so tired, I said
‘fine, I’ll do it your way.’” Bush Appointee 2 compared his “normal workload” of twelve to
thirteen hour days before the financial crisis favorably with his work during the crisis, because
beforehand “it was nothing where I was going too out of my mind.”
While the civil servants likewise generally described their jobs as demanding, it was
evident that they were not working around the clock or finding their jobs to be “insane” or
causing “scary” personal problems. Civil Servant 1 explained that he generally stopped checking
his Blackberry at 7:00 pm on weeknights; Civil Servant 3 explained that he “probably put in nine
or ten hours a day, but I know there are public affairs people who work twelve hours a day; I’m
just not willing to do that anymore.” Civil Servant 4 described his workload as “reasonable; it’s
manageable;” Civil Servant 6 explained that his workload was reasonable because his policy
portfolio was “pretty narrow” and therefore “I rarely work weekends or need to respond then …
and I’m usually home by 6:30 or seven and rarely respond in the evening,” with no early
mornings, either. Civil Servant 7 explained that “it’s a lot less intense of an environment here”
than in his previous public affairs positions.
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This lack of time that appointees had to think likely accounts for part of their lower
overall efficacy.
Conclusions and Analysis: The Most Effective Administration Advocates
I attempted to ascertain whether appointees or civil servants serve as better administration
advocates, by testing the relative efficacy of my interview subjects. The results confirmed my
hypothesis that civil servants in Treasury public affairs positions better advance the interests of
the president than appointees, because civil servants were indeed found to be more effective than
their appointee counterparts.
I had hypothesized that civil servants would be more effective, in part, because their
longer tenure would give them greater knowledge of their policy portfolios, allowing them to
make more convincing arguments to reporters. My interview subjects who were civil servants
indeed reported having greater knowledge of their portfolios when they started in their positions.
This appeared to give them an efficacy advantage, both because appointees spent more time on
the job learning the substance of their portfolios and because reporters were, at least initially,
skeptical of the knowledge of appointees in their interactions. Furthermore, civil servants had
longer tenure in their posts, contributing to their knowledge advantages. The responses of both
groups to the questions of whether they could conduct interviews in place of their principals and
whether reporters had a knowledge advantage suggested that civil servants enjoyed greater
overall knowledge of their portfolios, as well. While I had hypothesized that this greater policy
knowledge would allow civil servants to make more convincing arguments to reporters, it
actually appeared that civil servants engaged in less of an effort to make polemical arguments to
reporters than appointees. However, paradoxically, this made the information they conveyed
more convincing to reporters.
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This is because, as I had also hypothesized, reporters were skeptical of the claims of
appointees. Reporters believed that the raison d’etre of appointees was to bolster the partisan
goals and political fortunes of the president, even if it came at the expense of other values, such
as transparency and accountability. The apolitical nature of civil servants, combined with the
lesser efforts they made to “spin,” therefore, allowed them to build significantly greater
credibility with members of the press, dramatically enhancing their efficacy.
I had further hypothesized, however, that appointees might have a slight efficacy
advantage in one regard: they might have better access to information, work on more highprofile issues, and their superiors might make more time for them because they place greater
importance on the press. The appointees certainly worked on more high-profile issues, and,
therefore, had better access to the information generally most in demand by reporters. While civil
servants reported that they had the access to their principals which they needed to do their jobs,
appointees were slightly more emphatic that they enjoyed particularly high levels of access,
perhaps giving them an additional efficacy edge – but not one which overcome the overall
significantly greater effectiveness of civil servants.
Several of my other hypotheses, however, were not confirmed. I had hypothesized that
the shorter tenure of appointees would give them weaker relationships with the reporters who
covered their agencies. While I judged appointees to have weaker relationships with reporters,
this was bred by the reporters’ perceptions that appointees were driven by purely partisan
motivations and were providing insufficient information and access – not by their shorter
tenures. Indeed, because the reporters appeared to have more interactions with the appointees
than with the civil servants, any advantages civil servants had in knowing reporters for a longer
period of time did not appear to be the cause of the weaker relationships the appointees enjoyed
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with the press. (It is, however, reasonable to presume that the knowledge civil servants had of
reporters’ previous stories gave them an efficacy advantage in anticipating the directions and
content of their future stories).
I had further hypothesized that the massive workloads of appointees would explain the
greater efficacy of civil servants, because appointees would be left lacking time to engage in
proactive or manipulative strategies. While the workloads of appointees were found to diminish
their overall efficacy, giving them less time to pitch stories than they would have liked, in one
regard, it did not give them an advantage in comparison with civil servants. This was the case
because, despite the large volume of incoming press queries they received, appointees still
managed to pitch significantly more stories to reporters than their civil service counterparts.
Furthermore, civil servants indicated that they spent only two percent more of their time than
appointees crafting and implementing strategies to attain desired coverage – which, as previously
discussed, reflects rough estimates and may have represented less overall time, since appointees
worked longer hours. Nevertheless, the workloads of appointees helped explain the greater
efficacy of civil servants in another regard: appointees reported that their massive workloads
often left them with little time to think; Obama Appointee 5 described executing strategies
against his better judgment, simply because he did not have the energy to argue with his bosses.
This did not appear to be the case for appointees’ civil service counterparts.
My results indicate that civil servants were generally more effective in advancing the
goals of the administrations for which they worked. Perhaps most critically, civil servants
appeared from both their own descriptions and from the accounts of reporters to have better
knowledge of the policies for which they advocated. While this differential could perhaps have
been overcome if appointees, after learning on the job, stayed in their positions for a long period
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of time, of course the opposite was true. It is difficult to see how a public affairs official can
influence media coverage in a sophisticated manner without deep knowledge of the subject
matter for which he or she is responsible. Without understanding a policy in significant detail, it
is difficult to explain it convincingly to others, or to rebut the arguments of critics.
While the previous finding was expected, on certain measures, civil servants displayed a
level of sophistication in their work which contravened traditional stereotypes. In one of the most
remarkable findings of this project, civil servants were more likely to attempt to appeal to the
emotions of the American people and to utilize public opinion polls in their work – evidencing a
level of sophistication that exceeded that of their appointee counterparts on these measures.
Of course, the effectiveness of civil servants is often contended to be undercut by their
lack of political savvy, as Obama Appointees 1 and 5 alleged. However, the results of this study
cast doubt on this conventional wisdom. Surprisingly, the vast majority of civil servants had
previously served in hyper-partisan positions, which appeared from my interviews to have given
them such political skills. (To be sure, if their partisan backgrounds and skills caused them to
attempt to sabotage administration efforts, this would have made them particularly dangerous
actors from the perspective of the president; however, chapter 5 will not find this to be the case).
Throughout my interviews, numerous civil servants made comments which indicated that, while
they are legally prohibited from engaging in political activity, they nevertheless apply their
appreciation of political nuance in ways that would be helpful to the president. Civil Servant 6
explained that if he did not conduct himself in a politically astute manner, his bosses would be
upset with him. Civil Servant 2 explained that when he developed talking points, he worked to
ensure that they would be consonant with the political perspectives of his bosses. Civil Servant 5
explained that he was aware that, if he had contradicted the political messages of appointees in
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any way, the appointees would have stopped him from speaking.
To be sure, however, all political appointees had prior political experience, in comparison
with most of the civil servants. And, reporter 2 was explicit that he sometimes found civil
servants to be incognizant of political factors. Furthermore, presidents cannot count on future
civil servants to necessarily have political experience, nor can they control for this outcome,
since civil service rules are designed explicitly to prohibit such factors from influencing hiring
processes.
Additionally, other evidence pointed to a somewhat lower level of sophistication among
civil servants in dealing with the media. Civil servants seemed downright passive in comparison
with appointees in attempting to counter negative media coverage, and they appeared to exert
lesser overall efforts to make arguments. Civil servants also made significantly less efforts to
pitch stories to reporters than appointees – a discrepancy that is especially remarkable given that
the workloads of civil servants were so much lighter than those of their appointee counterparts.
Some reporters complained that, in addition to lacking political savvy, civil servants also lacked
a sense of what was newsworthy and interesting, or were incapable of making convincing
arguments when they tried (ironically, as will later be discussed, this lack of sophistication may
have some ways redounded to the administration’s advantage).
As a group, however, the appointees possessed other effectiveness advantages. They had
somewhat more access to key principals, and it also seems reasonable to presume that they may
have been afforded more trust by senior administration officials, given their partisan credentials.
As previously indicated, they pitched many more stories in an effort to proactively influence
media coverage, and they made greater attempts to make arguments to reporters.
Accordingly, the evidence indicates that the appointees were in fact better advocates for

203

the administration than civil servants in one key area. When a reporter pursued a story that the
administration did not like, appointees worked much more aggressively to change it. They even
attempted to “edit” stories once they had been published – even if, as Reporter 5 explained, a
story was not technically inaccurate and appointees simply took issue with the “adjectives.” This
behavior appeared to serve the interests of the administration, since the reporters indicated that
they sometimes did edit their work when they found merit in the complaints of appointees.
Furthermore, the appointees were generally able to engage in this behavior without alienating
reporters to the detriment of future coverage. Reporters clearly indicated that the appointees
worked harder in an effort to influence their coverage on less contentious stories, as well, and
seemed to sometimes have a greater sense of what was newsworthy. Appointees also appeared to
be somewhat faster to respond to reporters.
Nevertheless, when the actual outcomes of their work were investigated in greater detail,
it was clear that all of the efforts and advantages of appointees did not result in greater
effectiveness in influencing media coverage to the benefit of the administration, for two critically
important reasons.
First, this project discovered the existence of a previously unreported “appointee
discount.” Reporters were adamant that they judged appointees to be deeply lacking in
credibility, because they viewed their motivations as too overtly political. As a result, even when
appointees had a good story to tell, the reporters indicated that they were simply reluctant to
believe it. Reporters considered anything and everything that appointees attempted to convey as
an attempt at partisan advantage. They generally indicated that they found it inconceivable that a
pitch or argument made by an appointee would be motivated by a desire to serve interests
beyond those of the president, such as making information available to the American people.
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Reporter 6 even indicated that, although he tried to keep an open mind when speaking to sources,
he simply found this to be impossible with appointees! Reporters were clear that they saw civil
servants as more credible and trustworthy sources. By contrast, appointees entered into
conversations with reporters at a disadvantage compared to other sources. This obviously
significantly handicapped their ability to do the core function of their jobs, which is to advance
the administration’s positions in the press.
It is ironic that, in this sense, the lower sophistication that reporters perceived on the part
of civil servants may actually have benefited the president. This case was made directly by Civil
Servant 1, who noted that he thought his bureau received better media coverage when appointees
did not attempt to overtly shape stories that reporters were working on, because in such cases the
bureau made less attempts to spin, and reporters appreciated this. Civil Servant 1 also explained
that he felt that, when his bureau had negative news to report, coverage was more favorable if he
was forthcoming with the rationale for what had happened and how it would be fixed, but
appointees often rejected such strategies. Civil Servant 7 was likewise clear that his lack of
“spin” allowed him to achieve greater influence with reporters.
Civil Servant 2’s explanation for why he could explain economic fundamentals that
actually justify the administration’s programs better than appointees was a particularly striking
example of how the knowledge of civil servants can also be a powerful weapon in advancing
administration priorities. The fact that we now know that reporters would have viewed his
arguments with greater credibility than those of appointees makes him a doubly powerful
advocate for the president.
The respect and credibility that reporters afford civil servants was also evidenced by the
responses of reporters. Reporter 1, for example, was explicit that he is suspicious only of
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appointees, and not of civil servants. Reporter 3 was likewise clear that he considered civil
servants to be motivated by the aims of serving their country, as opposed to the president. This
positions civil servants to be particularly powerful agents on behalf of an administration, because
they are viewed as credible in the eyes of the media.
Second, appointees appeared to be unskilled at providing information to reporters. While
the complaints of reporters must be interpreted in light of their own interests in obtaining access
to maximum information, reporters were also clear that they often could have better conveyed
the administration’s perspective, if only they had understood it. They repeatedly emphasized that
appointees had continually forgone opportunities to shape the thinking of reporters by simply
explaining the rationale for their policies and positions. Reporter 3 argued that getting to know
senior administration officials better would have, by virtue of human nature, hampered his
inclination to be overly critical of them. Reporter 5 explained that if the administration had fed
him information, at times he would not have had to go looking elsewhere for stories the
administration ultimately disliked. And, when appointees did provide information, reporters
often found it to be unhelpful, because it was political rather than substantive.
I suspect that the decision of appointees to be cautious in granting access to information
was, at least in part, calculated. Appointees can only have been keenly aware that they were
operating in a hyper-partisan climate in which anything they said might be used against them,
and may simply have judged that they had more to lose than to gain in providing greater
information to reporters. Their emphasis on caution in releasing information to the press can only
have been heightened by the fragile state of the U.S. recovery and the global economy. As
appointees explained, when the Treasury spoke, markets could move – and they were therefore
justifiably concerned to avoid roiling them. At the same time, the examples that reporters
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provided made it clear that there were instances in which the administration could have done a
better job of providing access in savvy ways which would likely have advanced the president’s
interests without appreciable risk of partisan or economic harm.
It seems clear that, for appointees, part of the problem may have been that they simply
did not have much time to think. However, I also suspect that if they had understood the
substance of their issues in greater detail, they might have better been able to identify
opportunities and confidently calibrate the (sometimes low) levels of risk involved in the more
innocuous requests of reporters. They also would have been able to themselves provide
explanations of Treasury policies, programs, and thinking to reporters on the myriad technocratic
matters that did not pose risks to the country’s economic stability or the president’s political
fortunes.
In sum, it appears clear that civil servants are generally better positioned to advance an
administration’s positions. By contrast, appointees are viewed by reporters as having truly
suspect motivations, and therefore lacking credibility. A spokesperson with such a handicap can
most certainly not effectively do his or her job. (As Bush Appointee 1 explained, “to me the most
important characteristic of a really effective spokesperson is credibility.”) Thus, despite the
perhaps less sophisticated approach of civil servants in some areas, it was clear that the civil
servants served as more effective advocates for the president than the appointees studied in
Treasury public affairs posts.
This study also investigated possible causal factors for this greater efficacy. Civil
servants brought significantly more extensive previous professional experience to their jobs. For
example, at their time of hiring, civil servants were more than four times more likely than
appointees to have at least five years of experience, including relevant media and policy
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experience. The average civil servant had significantly more previous professional experience
than four appointees combined (which is especially striking when considered in light of the fact
that there are only seven appointees currently serving as Treasury spokespeople). While some of
the prior professional experience of civil servants was less relevant to their jobs than the more
limited and targeted experience of appointees, the civil servants still had many more years of
relevant professional experience than their appointee counterparts, and their aggregate years of
experience can only have contributed to their maturity and judgment.
Furthermore, the average civil servant had already served in his position much longer
than the tenure of two appointees combined and was still serving, which appears to have
enhanced their mastery of their positions. As Obama Appointee 3 explained, civil servants have
“seen stories before on particular subjects,” allowing them to predict the types of questions
reporters would ask and arguments reporters would make, when covering those subjects in the
future. These two factors likewise contributed to their greater efficacy.
One of the causal mechanisms which I investigated did not appear to influence the
efficacy of the officials. While the appointees had just slightly stronger and more relevant
educational backgrounds, this did not appear to give them an efficacy advantage, as civil servants
possessed greater mastery over the subject matter for which they were responsible.
Likewise, the greater workloads of appointees may not necessarily have rendered them
less effective in one regard. The appointees’ greater workloads did not reduce their ability to act
proactively in comparison with civil servants. Having more free time to implement proactive
strategies would have possibly actually diminished the efficacy of reporters, since reporters
viewed their claims with such suspicion. (Of course, on the other hand, if appointees had reduced
workloads and used the extra time to learn the substance of their policy issues better, this would
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have improved their efficacy). However, appointees indicated that they were so overwhelmed
that they sometimes did not have time to think, or moved forward on strategies despite their
better judgment – likely also explaining the greater efficacy of civil servants.
The results, then, suggest that civil servants may be more effective than their appointee
counterparts. As chapter 7 discusses in greater detail, this questions the wisdom of the policy of
politicization pursued by modern presidents.
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Chapter 5: Results: Loyalty of Appointees vs. Civil Servants
Introduction
This chapter reviews the results of my interview questions designed to assess the relative
loyalty of political appointees and civil servants in Treasury public affairs positions. I have
defined loyalty as the pursuit of the president’s goals – even when they conflict with an official’s
own personal goals. A key concept in this chapter is “leaks,” which I have defined as information
given without attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the administration
and would not be approved by an official’s supervisors. I hypothesized in chapter 3 that political
appointees would be no more loyal to the president than civil servants, because appointees would
have greater incentives to leak information in order to build relationships with reporters and
bolster their future career prospects.
I used six instruments to measure which group is more loyal to the presidents they serve.
First, I asked the appointees and civil servants what someone in their position should do
if asked to advocate a policy with which he or she personally disagreed. Second, I asked both
groups of government officials how often they personally disagreed with an administration
policy they were required to advocate and how they reacted in such circumstances.
Third, I asked the officials whether leaks to the press occurred in their offices, and if they
were aware of whether the officials responsible for the leaks were appointees or civil servants.
Fourth, I asked the officials whether they personally had ever been tempted to leak information
to the press. Fifth, to corroborate the accounts of the appointees and civil servants, I asked the
reporters how often both groups of officials leaked information to them.
I also examined two possible causal factors for differences in the relative loyalty of the
two groups. First, I asked both groups of officials whether their personal political views impacted
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their work. Second, to gauge the degree to which support for the president is critical to their
work, I asked only the appointees whether they would consider serving as a Treasury
spokesperson under an administration of a different political party. I hypothesized in chapter 3
that many of the duties of appointees are not very political, and therefore civil servants could
easily replace such officials.
I. What Public Affairs Officials Should Do If Asked to Advocate a Policy With Which They
Personally Disagree
I first asked both groups of officials what they thought someone in their position should
do if asked to advocate a position with which he or she personally disagreed, as a way of
measuring whether they believed acts of disloyalty would ever be appropriate.
Appointees universally indicated that if someone serving in their position disagreed with
a policy they were responsible for advocating, he or she should nevertheless communicate the
administration’s position faithfully. Two Obama appointees and two Bush appointees indicated
that, in such a position, an appointee should first voice their disagreements internally, but if they
were overruled, they had a responsibility to advocate the administration’s policy. Two Bush
appointees indicated that the exception to this rule would be if the disagreement were “so severe”
(Bush Appointee 3) or “crosses an ethical or moral line, in which case you refuse to do it, but
that’s a really tough standard.” (Bush Appointee 4). Obama Appointee 5 was the sole appointee
who said that “often the teams are big enough that you can say you’re not comfortable handling
that one and ask a colleague to take it.” But the response of Bush Appointee 1 was typical: “you
can’t cherry pick what you want to talk about. If you aren’t comfortable with it, that’s fine;
maybe this isn’t the correct job for you.”
The responses of six of the seven civil servants were strikingly similar to those of the
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appointees. These civil servants were quite adamant that, in the words of Civil Servant 3, “if it’s
not gonna kill you, if they’re not asking you to lie, then you do it, because you are here, you
work for who you work for.” Civil Servants 3, 6, and 7, like several of their appointee
counterparts, indicated that a civil servant in this position should first voice his or her
disagreement to their boss, but then fall in line if overruled. Civil Servant 2, however, suggested
that, if he were in this position, the reason for sharing his concern with his supervisor would be
that “in that instance it might be appropriate to have my boss … speak to the [reporter] because
[my disagreement] could potentially come through.” Sadly, Civil Servant 1 advised the opposite,
explaining that “in government you probably don’t want to have a conversation with the political
[appointee] telling them you think it’s a bad idea, because it’s not well taken, it’s not taken as
constructive criticism, but a lot of it is because they’re very young people that don’t have a lot of
experience. In the political realm, if you express misgivings, it’s taken more as, ‘you’re not on
board and I can’t trust you.’”
The striking exception to these responses that the official in question should advocate the
administration’s policy was that of Civil Servant 7, who indicated that the official could “talk to
reporters off the record to explain [why the administration’s policy was wrong] … let them find
other sources to quote; point them in the direction of other reports.” He used an example of an
instance in which he personally had done so, because he and other career staff in his bureau felt
that the administration was bowing to special interests instead of implementing a policy which
could save taxpayer money. I found his argument as to why the administration was wrong in this
instance to be compelling. However, Civil Servant 7 noted that, in conveying messages that
question administration policy off-the-record, he was not sharing his personal opinion with the
press, but rather that of the head of his bureau. Additionally, the example he used was not an
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issue on which there was partisan disagreement, further suggesting that he was motivated by a
desire to improve his bureau’s policy rather than political aims. I also happened to know that,
when I worked at the Treasury, the policy to which he referred had caused significant
disagreement and argument among appointees – something I had overall rarely witnessed,
suggesting the anomalous nature of the situation.
These findings indicate that most civil servants are similar to appointees in believing that,
even when they disagree with an administration policy, their position requires them to loyally
convey the administration’s beliefs. Nevertheless, not all civil servants will do so. In this study,
one out of seven civil servants expressed a willingness to speak out when he felt the
administration was wrong – but only to express the beliefs of the bureau for which he worked.
Of course, this number comes from a small sample. However, I suspect that it likely
overstates the propensity of civil servants to convey their disagreement with an administration to
the press, due to selection bias. As discussed in chapter 3, although I reached out to nearly every
Treasury bureau to request interviews with career public affairs staff, not all civil servants agreed
to my request for interview. It is reasonable to project that the civil servants most cautious about
sharing information would have declined my request for interview, while those most willing to
be open about their views (and thus also most likely to share their concerns or disagreements
with the press) would have been more likely to agree to participate in this project, resulting in a
sample which over-represents individuals who might convey their disagreements to the press.
Nevertheless, the results demonstrate empirically that not all civil servants will be completely
loyal to the president – a factor which must be given serious consideration in determining which
group more effectively advances the president’s interests. This finding is also logical, since it is
reasonable to presume that individuals personally appointed by the president due at least in part
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to their ideological agreement would behave more loyally towards the administration than
individuals who go through no such selection process and are protected from being fired for
political reasons.
Likewise, one out of seven civil servants volunteered the fact that he could not share his
concerns with appointees – an indication of poor leadership amongst appointees which is clearly
bad for the American people. However, based upon the examples he used in our conversation,
Civil Servant 1’s particularly scathing opinion of appointees – which were anomalous in their
intensity – appeared to have been influenced significantly by his prior experience in a different
government agency.
II. How Often Government Officials Disagreed with the Policies They Advocated
To measure the potential for acts of disloyalty, I next asked the officials how often they
disagreed with policies they were responsible for advocating. Both the Bush and Obama
administrations appeared to have succeeded in hiring true believers for their political posts. The
appointees who worked under both administrations were clear that, in the words of Obama
Appointee 2, “actually, I really agree with the policies we were pursuing at the time. I still do.”
Bush Appointee 1 concurred: “I drank the Kool Aid.” Accordingly, the appointees reported
rarely, if ever, disagreeing with a policy they were responsible for advocating. Asked to provide
examples, only two Obama appointees and one Bush appointee could think of examples of
administration policies to which they would have made adjustments. The only Bush appointee
who was able to come up with an example served in his post the longest of any appointee. (Later
in our conversation, a second Bush appointee also acknowledged that “with TARP, however, I
think all of us, being more free market inclined, didn’t enjoy what we did, but we knew for the
greater good of the country and for the financial system that we had to do what we had to do. But
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I don’t think any Republican at Treasury was happy bailing out the banks, but we were in a
situation where that was the only thing we could do.”)
Civil servants reported that it was more common to have been placed in a position in
which they were responsible for advocating a position with which they disagreed. However, even
among this group, such situations were very infrequent. Five of the seven civil servants reported
previously advocating a position with which they disagreed. However, one of the civil servants
had done so in a previous federal government position and said such a situation had never
occurred in his Treasury post. Of these five civil servants, four indicated that they had faithfully
communicated the administration’s views to the media, despite their personal disagreement. As
discussed in the previous section, the exception to this rule was Civil Servant 7, who indicated
that he had communicated his boss’ disagreement confidentially to reporters. Of course, among
these civil servants, such situations were exceedingly rare. As previously discussed, Civil
Servant 1 said it had occurred in a previous post but never at the Treasury; Civil Servant 3 said it
had happened “once or twice” in his post; Civil Servant 5 said it happened “occasionally;” Civil
Servant 6 said it happened “a few times a year;” and for Civil Servant 7, it was “not that often.”
Civil Servant 1 recounted an incident in which a different government agency paid a
large private contractor tens of millions of dollars to produce a product that never worked, was
“bending over backwards not to make [the contractor] look bad,” and, following the debacle,
went on to award the very same contractor an even larger contract to produce a different product.
Later in our discussion, he also shared another example from the other government agency, in
which the Obama administration was attempting to prove that they had done a better job on a
particular initiative than the Bush administration. “Virtually every civil servant in [the agency]
would have said they weren’t, but the administration was like, ‘we want you to produce numbers
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that say we’re doing [better], so even though every civil servant I know would have said
privately [that] this is crap, they didn’t go to press, what they did is they did everything they
could to support the request and find numbers, even though everybody was like, ‘yeah, right.’”
The other examples all came from the Treasury. Civil Servant 2 used the example of a
Treasury policy which saved taxpayers money but made it harder for Americans to access a
service. Civil Servant 5 explained that he sometimes rolled out programs when he believed that it
was obvious from the outset that they could not work. Civil Servant 6 used the example of an
operational decision not to release information which he considered to be important. And, as
previously discussed, Civil Servant 7 used an example in which he felt the Treasury was wasting
money in the service of special interests.
To be sure, it is possible that the American people would have been better served in
these situations if the civil servants had leaked so that there could have been a national debate
about these issues. In such cases, the civil servants’ views of the public interest conflicted with
that of the present administration. However, arguments could also be made for the positions of
the administrations they served. For example, the Obama administration has laid out reasonable
arguments for the position they have taken on the issue on which Civil Servant 7 disagreed and
subsequently leaked to the press. Furthermore, the civil servants in some sense enjoyed a
privileged position in that their ability to make judgments that did not need to account for the
political factors which often hamper the executive. As discussed in chapter 2, the president
requires political support in order to govern; other actors take account of the level of support the
executive enjoys when assessing the consequences they will face for disagreeing with him
(Neustadt 1991). Therefore, even if a president believes a certain policy to be correct, he may
nevertheless be unable to advance it if it will cost him support which will make it impossible to
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achieve other goals which he judges to be more important. Presidents also have a tendency to
conflate their own self interest in remaining in power with the national interest.
Of course, appointees are generally responsible for advocating the more controversial
policies, but personal disagreement among this group of officials appears to have been headed
off by their ideological agreement with the administrations they served. Civil servants are not
selected by the executives for whom they work and serve in their positions for much longer
periods of time, which we should expect to increase their instances of disagreement with the
administrations they serve. On the other hand, the policies for which they are responsible are less
controversial to begin with.
However, I wondered whether factors explored elsewhere in this project also contributed
to the greater propensity of civil servants to have personal disagreements with the administration
they served. For example, when I asked Bush Appointee 4 whether he had ever disagreed with a
policy he advocated, he could not recall such an occasion, but then responded, “maybe I didn’t
even understand the policy. Just kidding.” I suspected that his joke might actually have been
revealing. I established in chapter 4 that civil servants appear to have significantly greater
expertise in their subject matter portfolios, due to both the greater policy experience they bring to
their posts and their longer tenure. As a result, civil servants might disagree more with
administration policy simply because they understand it to a significantly more technical and
nuanced degree than their appointee counterparts.
An additional reason why civil servants might have greater disagreements with an
administration would be if they had more time to think about the policies they are advocating. As
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 6, the heavier workloads of political appointees
likely leave them lacking time for reflection. For example, as will be again considered in the
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following chapter, when I asked Obama Appointee 3 whether he ever disagreed with
administration policy, he replied, “when you’re drinking from a fire hose, you don’t have the
ability to think about it for too long. I was drinking from a fire hose, I was always at my fucking
desk, I literally had no time.” Likewise, while Obama Appointee 5 indicated that he had never
disagreed with administration policy, he said that he sometimes disagreed with the media
strategies his bosses wanted to pursue, but “I’d say in this job you’re so exhausted and there’s so
much to do, that you just want to move on … there were definitely some boneheaded things they
asked me to do at Treasury, but I think I was probably so tired, I said ‘fine, I’ll do it your way,
and when this blows up it’s not my frickin’ fault.’”
Thus, the fact that appointees are more loyal to the administration’s policies seems at first
blush to benefit the president, since we have seen that, although cases of civil service
disagreement appear to be quite rare at the Treasury, and instances in which civil servants
communicate their disagreement to the press are even rarer, it nevertheless does happen.
However, to the extent that part of the greater loyalty of appointees stems from the fact that they
do not fully understand the policies they are responsible for advocating and do not have the
bandwidth to actually think about the actions they are taking, this ostensibly greater loyalty
appears significantly less attractive to a chief executive. In this sense, the president might be
better served by tolerating the small number of civil servants who on rare occasions will share
their disagreements with the press, if careerists bring other significant benefits to the table – such
as the ability to better explain the policies they are responsible for advocating because they
understand them better, and the greater sense of clarity and strategy that comes from time to
think.
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III. Knowledge of the Identities of Leakers
To determine whether civil servants or political appointees leak information to the press
more frequently, I asked both groups of government officials whether leaks to the media
occurred while they were serving in their Treasury posts, and if so, whether they knew if the
leakers were appointees or civil servants. I defined “leaks” for my interview subjects as
“information given without attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the
administration – as opposed to plants, which further the interests of the administration.”
Of the political appointees I interviewed, only one had actually determined the identity of
a leaker, and the leaker was an appointee. This Obama appointee, who handled two major leaks,
learned that one of the leakers was an appointee but indicated that, although he and his public
affairs colleagues were surprised by the leaks, he “can’t guarantee they weren’t signed off on by
someone else” in the administration, perhaps to give reporters information that the Treasury
would not officially release because it was too sensitive and market-moving.
Additionally, one Obama appointee handled leaks that he suspected came from the White
House or another government agency, but he was unsure whether appointees or civil servants
were responsible. A Bush appointee who handled the same portfolio as the previously-discussed
Obama appointee suspected that leaks came from a different government agency than the agency
suspected by the Obama appointee, but was likewise unclear of the identity of the leaker(s).
One Bush appointee discussed a particularly egregious leak of a counterterrorism
initiative which the Treasury did not wish to announce, but was unaware of the identity of the
leaker (who could have been an outside party). This event will be discussed in detail in the
following chapter. Another Bush appointee recounted an incident which first appeared to be a
leak but which he later discovered to be the result of poor coordination, because the White House
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released information without his knowledge, while his principal was overseas communicating a
different message.
Of the civil servants, four were aware of the identities of individuals responsible for
events which I considered to meet my definition of leaking, and all of the leakers were political
appointees. However, the fourth civil servant described a period of numerous leaks which could
have only been conducted by appointees, suggesting perhaps a greater number of appointees who
leaked.
One civil servant reported that a leak occurred when an appointee had access to
information about an upcoming announcement and sent it to someone in Congress.
Two other civil servants described two separate instances in which appointees had
shared information with outside audiences that they had not been approved to discuss. The first
of these two civil servants indicated that an appointee discussed a program in a speech before the
administration had officially launched the initiative. The civil servant indicated that the
appointee did so in order to gain personal credit for the initiative. (In a particularly brash move,
the appointee did not provide the information to the press anonymously, per the terms of the
definition of leaking I gave to the government officials. I nevertheless consider this event to be a
leak because the appointee provided information to the press which did not serve the
administration’s interests, which gets to the heart of the issue. Such information is typically
provided anonymously simply in an effort to protect the leaker). The civil servant indicated that
this leaker received a “slap on the hand” from the administration. The other civil servant
described a similar situation in which an appointee provided information the administration was
not yet ready to announce to an outside group, and assumed that the appointee did so to make his
office look good.
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A fourth civil servant described a period of intense leaking as the administration
attempted to decide the future of particular policies in response to the financial crisis. He said
that “everybody was looking for a magic bullet; different politicals were looking for different
ideas, which they’d try to float up the food chain, and one or two tried to float ideas with the
media as trial balloons to see if they would work.” He indicated that the leaks could only have
come from appointees because there were only a small group of appointees in the room when the
discussions which leaked occurred. This indicates that while at least one appointee was
responsible, it is possible that other appointees were leaking, as well.
A final civil servant discussed some initiatives his bureau undertook in which “it’s come
to a point where it’s unusual for these actions not to leak,” however he was unaware of the
identity of leaker(s) and indicated that the leaker(s) could have been third parties with whom his
bureau was in negotiations.
A single civil servant described a situation in which he and his civil service boss had
“leaked” information. However I did not consider his description to meet my definition of
leaking. This civil servant described a situation in which someone in his bureau had made a
mistake which caused a problem, and public affairs appointees wanted him to simply tell
reporters that there had been a technical problem. To allay concerns reporters raised about the
possibility of future technological errors, he and his boss both indicated that the problem was
“rare” or “unusual.” This angered the appointees, who had not wanted them to share further
information beyond the fact that a technical error had occurred, but the civil servant said he
genuinely did not realize that this would upset them. He said that “leaks” like this happen a few
times per year, “frequently because there’s a lack of understanding of where the administration is
coming from, why that would be bad to be out there. Politicals might see it more as ‘they’re
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undermining our position,’ whereas civil servants are like, ‘why do you care? It’s not that big a
deal.’” He indicated that, in such instances, “usually you find out afterwards” from appointees
that they did not want particular information to be shared, indicating that when he receives
instructions from appointees, “even if I disagree with it, if that’s what they want to say, we’ll say
it.” He was also clear that “I haven’t run into anything where the civil service is literally trying to
undermine the administration in any way, shape, or form.” I judge the fact that this civil servant
truly was unaware beforehand that appointees did not want him to share particular pieces of
information and that he did not believe such information to be damaging to the administration to
disqualify these examples from my definition of leaks.
Finally, Bush Appointee 3 revealed later in our conversation that he “knew lower-level
White House people who leaked. It’s known within our circles. The motivation was to curry
favor with reporters and burnish their own coolness.” Bush Appointee 3 found this to be odious,
describing it as “a sign of weakness, not strength.”
Thus, I encountered five specific situations in which officials were able to identify
leakers of Treasury information as appointees, although in reality this number is possibly greater
because the civil servant who described the leaks of information that was discussed in small
meetings attended only by appointees indicated that such leaks occurred quite frequently, for a
period of time, suggesting that more than one appointee may have been involved. A Bush
appointee also claimed to be aware of Bush White House appointees who leaked. By contrast,
the government officials did not report a single event that met my definition of leaking by a civil
servant (although, as previously discussed, Civil Servant 7 previously admitted to personally
leaking information). Of course, such leaks by appointees never appeared to be attempts to
undermine the administration for whom they worked, but rather to be efforts to make themselves
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look good and/or to advance their preferred policies. I next asked the government officials
whether they themselves had ever been tempted to leak information to the press.
IV. Whether the Officials Were Personally Tempted to Leak
I next asked the officials whether they personally had ever been tempted to leak
information, as a way of determining whether they had in fact ever leaked information to the
press. Every political appointee said no, with the exception of Obama Appointee 3, who
indicated that he had been tempted to leak but could not tell me more than this. I took this as an
indication that he might have leaked information to the press. Obama Appointee 3 had told me
previously in the interview that “I didn’t really ever leak anything because, with leaks, the whole
point is to move something you can’t move through normal [channels],” suggesting that he
already enjoyed power within the administration which made leaking unnecessary. However, in a
previous conversation when I first requested an interview with a different Obama appointee who
participated in this project, this other Obama appointee volunteered to me that he suspected
Obama Appointee 3 of leaking information to reporters.
Additionally, during the course of our interview, Bush Appointee 3 volunteered to me,
without provocation, that he suspected that Bush Appointee 5 had leaked information to
reporters. As previously discussed, I did not believe that Bush Appointee 5 trusted me, nor did I
trust his answers, so I do not believe that he would have told me if he had in fact been tempted to
leak or leaked information to reporters.
As previously discussed, Civil Servant 7 previously admitted to leaking to the press. Five
of the other six civil servants indicated that they had never been tempted to leak in their Treasury
posts, although one civil servant indicated that he had leaked in a previous federal government
job. In this instance, he was attempting to keep pressure on another government agency but was
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told to issue his announcement on the Friday of a holiday weekend. He chose to instead give
reporters the information in time to publish it on that Friday. Accordingly, he was yelled at by
two senior officials. Asked whether he was glad he did so, he replied that “in retrospect, I don’t
think I achieved anything. I don’t think the world is a safer place because of it. I wouldn’t do it
again. I’m also ten years older; I have a bigger mortgage. Perspectives change.”
A final civil servant indicated that he had been tempted to leak information during the
Bush administration, but had not done so. The example he used was of Treasury data which
pointed toward the impending subprime mortgage crisis of 2008. “It just seemed the Treasury
leadership was really slow to catch on to the mortgage crisis and some of the facts and data we
had here were kind of alarming and I thought more attention should be paid … the administration
line was this is simply a market correction, but you could just see it building up.” However, he
indicated that he ultimately did not leak the information because “they’re my boss; right or
wrong, I work for the administration and I’m loyal to my employers, and I think I probably took
an oath or something along the way and said I wouldn’t do it.” The position in which he served
made me judge his claim to have identified early warning signs of the crisis as credible.
Ironically, however, such a leak would have not only served the American people but arguably,
ultimately, the Bush administration as well.
Nevertheless, the findings here document a single admission of a civil servant who leaked
information to the press and no such admissions by appointees. Most of the claims of leaking by
appointees came from civil servants. While I would have judged the results unreliable if I had
simply asked the civil servants in the abstract which group is more likely to leak, the fact that
they described very specific examples and circumstances made me judge their responses as very
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credible. To corroborate this finding, however, I also asked reporters who interacted frequently
with these officials whether civil servants or appointees leaked to them more frequently.
V. Reporters on How Often Appointees and Civil Servants Leak
When asked how often both groups leak, several reporters described a strikingly similar
pattern among civil servants of being willing to acknowledge viewpoints beyond those of the
administration.
Reporter 6, who reported least on the Treasury, indicated that no appointee or civil
servant had ever leaked to him, but he believed this to be the case because he had not been
pursuing stories that would lend themselves to leaking. Reporter 5, a veteran Treasury reporter,
indicated that while neither group had ever leaked to him, when talking to civil servants,
“sometimes you get a sense, not directly but perhaps in talking to them, … they’re not too keen
on whatever policy’s being pursued, but that’s rare ... Normally they’re pretty much on board.”
Like Reporter 5, Reporter 1 indicated:

I do not recall a really hard and fast single example of a civil servant leaking to me, but I
have had them say to me, you should take a look at this or that area that would balance
out what you were being told elsewhere. They weren’t leaks. They were steers. I don’t
think it was intended to steer you towards something negative, but towards a balanced or
more nuanced look. … I don’t think people were doing it out of any sense of
vindictiveness. I think they were doing it because they could tell you were trying to
understand or explain something; they were trying to give you a fuller picture of a whole
situation so that you wrote about it more knowledgably and understood better what was
going on. Nobody ever came to me and said, ‘I want to bring this person down or tear
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down some institution.’ It was always in the context of … ‘that’s the position we’re
taking, but you could make an alternative case too,’ which would lead me to broaden out
my own look at a particular situation.

Reporter 1 estimated that this might only happen once every three to four years. Reporter
7 described a very similar scenario, in which civil servants are “willing to acknowledge that they
aren’t as team cheerleady about [the issue] or as defensive; they state the case but they can also
acknowledge there’s another side to things.”
Like Reporters 1 and 5, Reporter 3 estimated that civil servants leak slightly more than
appointees. Reporter 3’s description of instances in which civil servants convey their
disagreement was similar. He indicated that civil servants “will sometimes leak because [he or
she] feels there isn’t sufficient publicity to an issue or the agency isn’t being sufficiently
transparent – not so much in my experience to embarrass anybody. There’s a feeling there’s not
being enough attention paid to this and they want to get it out. It doesn’t happen often; it happens
occasionally.”
However, unlike Reporters 1 and 5, Reporter 3 indicated that appointees will sometimes
(though rarely and less frequently) leak as well. He indicated that this has happened only a
handful of times, and only under two specific types of circumstances. The first was to undermine
other administration officials. “I don’t know of an appointee leaking something to me that
undermined the Treasury Secretary or the President,” he said. “They may have leaked me
something that undermined another agency – maybe the Chairman of the FDIC … but not their
boss.” The second set of circumstances in which he indicated appointees would leak would be to
explain that they disagreed with the administration’s strategy. “I would say what I’ve gotten for
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the most part is indications they don’t agree with the strategy, not so much a broad policy.
Especially in public affairs, it wouldn’t be that uncommon for someone … to say, ‘I really think
we should have done a press conference, but I was overruled.’ But … I don’t get stuff like, ‘I
don’t think we should be doing outreach to Iran,’ and don’t think I will.”
While Reporter 3 speculated that appointees engage in the latter kind of leaking because
they are frustrated (and, as previously indicated, reported that such incidents were uncommon),
Reporter 4 indicated that such “leaks” were actually “pretty frequent” in his interactions with
appointees, and he believed that they could actually serve the interests of the administration.

It’s a personal style for some people: ‘Between you and me, I have great concern about
X. But the official position is Y.’ … Though it may be because my perspective was
obvious, so it’s an open question to the extent to which they believed that or were trying
to manage me. … It creates an intimacy, I guess; it’s a method of sort of distancing the
subject and bringing the two of you closer. … When done well, it can be very effective. It
creates a sense of common ground. It’s a natural way of disarming a critical question, that
insertion of personal perspective. One of the most frustrating things is when there’s
obviously a problem and the agency simply denies it exists. It’s infuriating and, really,
it’s true in life, they teach you in psychology. Saying ‘yes, but’ is much more effective
than saying no. When a PR person says ‘yes, but now that we’re on the same side, let’s
think about this more carefully,’ I think it’s much more effective than negating the
premise.

Accordingly, when Reporter 7 described civil servants as sometimes willing to
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acknowledge the other side of things, I asked him if he thought this might actually improve the
coverage they received. He agreed with Reporter 4 that “showing honesty is not always a
weakness. It is appreciated. As opposed to a political who insists this is the way things are and
you’re being ridiculous by not accepting our take on things.” To the extent this is true, such
incidents should be categorized not as leaks but rather as sophisticated (and seemingly
efficacious) public relations tactics.
Also like Reporter 3, Reporter 4 suspected that civil servants leak more frequently than
appointees; however, he reported a significantly higher incidence of leaks among both groups.
Reporter 4 indicated that leaking intensifies during periods of major change, describing the 2008
financial crisis and its aftermath as a period of “intense leaking” during both the Bush and
Obama administrations. “The stakes were high and the futures of agencies hung in the balance,”
he explained. “In particular, civil servants were fire hoses because they perceived real risk to
their agency mission and were not convinced the administration had the best interests of their
agency in mind and saw real advantage in advancing their cases. When an agency comes to feel
at odds with the administration, a civil servant will almost always identify with the agency …
[During the financial crisis] agencies perceived significant advantage in trying to shape the
narrative and many sought to do so quite aggressively.”
This account is strikingly consonant with Durant’s theory, discussed in chapter 1, that
civil servants will only involve outside actors such as the press in agency battles when they
perceive a serious threat to their agency’s core mission. During the financial crisis, Reporter 4
indicated that appointees leaked “a little less” about these internal battles because “their bosses
had the upper hand … so they could argue internally and prevail, so they saw less advantage in
talking to media.” However, he said, “appointees wanted to respond to leaks by independent
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agencies … so both did it a lot, but if I had to pick, maybe during that period, civil servants
[leaked] more.”
While he described leaks as infrequent among both groups during more pacific times,
Reporter 4 said he did not “know if [leaking] happens more often [among civil servants] but it
feels like a higher rate because many of those agencies have interests discreet from those of the
administration and see opportunities to advance particular agendas at the expense of or with
indifference to the goals of the administration.” However, he was careful to indicate that the only
time civil servants leak is to advance the beliefs of their agencies—not themselves personally (a
stipulation also described by Civil Servant 7, the sole official who admitted to leaking in my
interviews). “In instances where the agency felt the administration was wrong about a policy,…
they would say the agency disagrees, but they wouldn’t disagree with an agency position. That’s
very rare. I can’t even think of an example. It’s a sharp contrast.”Among appointees, Reporter 4
described the infrequent leaks occurring during calmer times as occurring when “interests of two
parts of the administration are in conflict and one part sees advantage in leaking.”
Unlike the four other reporters who reported receiving leaks, all of whom perceived civil
servants to leak somewhat more than appointees, Reporters 2 and 7 indicated that appointees and
civil servants had about the same propensity to leak information. Reporter 7 indicated that both
groups leaked a “handful of times a year:” appointees would leak when they disagreed about
policy outcomes, at times to criticize other approaches or to influence their bosses by floating
trial balloons in the press. Civil servants leaked when agencies disagreed amongst themselves.
Interestingly, Reporter 7 used an example in which, like Reporter 4, he indicated that civil
servants were representing “their agency’s perspective” – as opposed to their own personal
points of view.
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Reporter 2 was careful to note that he would “almost never get a call that is a true leak,
where somebody says, ‘you should do a story on X because so and so is a jerk.’” However, he
indicated that he “regularly” – on average a couple of times per month – would receive leaks in
the course of other conversations. While he reported no difference in the frequency of leaking
among the two groups, he contrasted their differences in intent. While appointees leak “with a
specific goal of advancing their interest, or of who they’re representing, and pushing a particular
angle, often to undermine someone else or to accomplish a political goal,” civil servants,
according to this reporter, will leak “to point out how so and so is a bozo, look what they’re
talking about, they’re wrong, here’s why I’m right and the other side isn’t going to get
anywhere.”
This was the most dramatic description of leaking by civil servants that I encountered,
since every other reporter tended to describe civil service leaks as being designed to show the
other side of a debate or to advance agency interests. However, it is important to keep in mind
that this reporter was clear that such leaks happened only in the course of other conversations;
civil servants did not actively approach him with such claims. Interestingly, the description was
made by Reporter 2, who worked for a media outlet popularly perceived as more conservative.
Reporter 4, who provided the other rather dramatic account of leaking during the financial crisis,
reported for a media outlet popularly perceived as more liberal. It therefore makes sense that
these two reporters would provide the more “extreme” accounts of leaking, since leakers are
likely to share information with reporters who they perceive to be sympathetic.
The results nevertheless point to more leaks by civil servants. Two reporters indicated
that only civil servants “leak,” while four indicated that both groups of officials leak, but two
indicated that civil servants leak more, while two indicated that the frequency of leaks was about
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the same. However, with the exception of the epic upheaval of the financial crisis, leaks by civil
servants were always described as rare. Furthermore, reporters’ descriptions of these “leaks”
were not very dramatic.
Civil servants did not appear to be dialing reporters to lodge complaints about the
administration for partisan purposes. Rather, reporters almost always described situations in
which they were already talking to civil servants and the careerists seemed more willing to
acknowledge the possibility of alternate points of view than their more partisan appointee
counterparts. The information shared by civil servants in these situations typically represented
the viewpoints of their bureaus, not than the civil servants’ personal views. Furthermore, the
degree to which some of these instances meet the definition of leaking is therefore somewhat
questionable, since, in cases where the civil servants were willing to acknowledge alternate
points of view while communicating the administration’s position and accordingly reporters
found their claims to be more credible and persuasive, they would have served the
administration’s interests by advancing their goals in the press. Nevertheless, their actions in
such cases would likely not have been approved by their political superiors, or by the president.
While it would certainly be naïve to believe that this was always the case, nevertheless,
reporters did indicate that, in some cases, the willingness of civil servants to acknowledge other
points of view may actually have helped the administration’s cause, because, as Reporter 4
explained, “it’s infuriating” when spokespeople try to deny the existence of an obvious problem.
In fact, the greater willingness of civil servants to acknowledge alternate arguments could be part
of the explanation for the low credibility that appointees hold in the eyes of reporters – which
appears to significantly hamper their ability to do their jobs, as described in the previous chapter.
Ironically, then, this behavior of civil servants might actually redound to the long term benefit of
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an administration, if it causes reporters to perceive government officials as more transparent and
trustworthy.
Of course, leaks by appointees appeared to be even rarer. As expected, they were driven
by attempts to undermine other administration officials or to try to advance their policy interests
during internal disputes.

Possible Causal Factors
I next asked questions designed to determine whether the officials’ political views impact
their willingness to engage in acts of disloyalty to an administration.

VI. Whether Political Views Impact their Work
First, I asked the government officials whether the political views of the people who
work in their public affairs office have an impact on the work they do, and whether their personal
political views impact their own work. Unsurprisingly, of course, appointees indicated that their
partisan beliefs positively impact their work because they act as a driving motivation. More
significantly for this test of loyalty, however, civil servants were adamant that their personal
political beliefs played no role in their work.
With the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who said he declined to comment, the majority
of appointees said that their political views impacted their work and the work of their colleagues
in a positive manner. The response of Obama Appointee 1 was typical: “Unsurprisingly, the vast
majority of people I worked with were liberal Democrats … I can’t think of an instance in which
we acted against the public interest to advance the administration, but that’s partly because we’re
appointees and view the public interest through the prism of what we believe in … I think our
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political views enhanced [our] work in some cases, because we believed in what we were doing,
the righteousness of it, so in those circumstances, we might work even harder.” Bush Appointee
1 likewise reported that the appointees in her office “all believed in the charge, in the work we
were doing.” This appears to have driven the appointees to work harder, perhaps making it easier
for them to cope with their massive workloads, which will be discussed in the next chapter.
The majority of civil servants, by contrast, were unwavering that their political views did
not affect their work. In the words of Civil Servant 1, “all I care about is policy, and it’s all I ever
cared about.” Civil Servants 3, 4, 6, and 7 explained that politics simply did not come into play
in the areas in which they worked. In the words of Civil Servant 6, “a lot of what we do is very
fact-based and there’s really not a lot of room for political interpretation.” Likewise, Civil
Servant 7 explained that he focused on simply telling the story of the relatively apolitical work of
his agency. Civil Servant 5 added that while his job “wasn’t so much about politics,” in fact
politics did impact his work because he wanted to see the administration be successful. Finally,
Civil Servant 2 acknowledged that politics did affect his work but said that “we’re pretty
collaborative, so if a person above me espouses a belief I don’t agree with, I can say ‘here’s why
I don’t agree,’ so it hasn’t impacted working with reporters or getting a good story out.”
Of course, it is much easier for civil servants to make such claims in the abstract – and
perhaps difficult for any individual to truly disentangle the nuanced ways in which their beliefs
might affect their behavior. Nevertheless, the civil servants were certainly clear in reporting that
their political beliefs did not impact their work, and their claims are consonant with all of the
other findings of this research which point to the conclusion that, while civil servants will not
always be loyal, their acts of insubordination against an administration tend to be motivated by
the goals and beliefs of their bureaus, as opposed to personal partisan views.
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VII. Whether Appointees Would Do Their Work for a President of the Opposite Party
I next asked only the political appointees whether they would consider doing their
Treasury public affairs job under the administration of a different political party (this question
would obviously be irrelevant to civil servants, who serve across administrations).
Six of the ten appointees indicated that they would not consider doing their job under the
administration of a different political party or that it would be “highly, highly unlikely” (Obama
Appointee 1), because “there was a real sense of camaraderie, a team atmosphere: this was our
team, our guy” (Bush Appointee 3) and “I was really proud to serve for an administration I
agreed with.” (Bush Appointee 5). Obama Appointee 4, whose portfolio was the site of epic
partisan battles, explained that “my political views did impact my work and I do this work to try
to help advance those views.” A seventh appointee, Bush Appointee 2, was basically also in this
camp, indicating that he would only serve a different administration if the executive’s views
more closely matched his personal policy positions than the Republican party.
Revealingly, however, two of these appointees indicated that their own policy portfolios
would likely not differ significantly under the administration of a different party. The problem
for these two appointees was rather that “probably 90 percent of other issues I’d have a different
view on, so it would be tough to hold myself up as a spokesperson for the administration” (Bush
Appointee 1) and “taken as a whole I don’t like what the Bush administration was doing, so I
don’t feel like I would be as motivated. You want to feel like you’re having a positive impact.”
(Obama Appointee 3).
Two Obama appointees indicated that they would consider serving in an administration
of a different party because their portfolios were “pretty apolitical” (Obama Appointee 3) or “a
little less political” (Obama Appointee 2). Bush Appointee 4 likewise indicated it would depend
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on the policies of the administration, but he respected the policies of certain past Democratic
Treasury Secretaries. Interestingly, then, while all of the previous evidence we have examined
indicates that appointees were particularly loyal to the administrations they served, a full half of
these otherwise very partisan appointees were clear that they would not necessarily expect the
policies they advocated to change under administrations of a different party – indicating that the
specific portfolios they covered were not very political.
While it would certainly not make sense for a president to actually hire appointees of an
opposing party given the evidence we have previously examined about how the affiliations of
appointees affects their motivations, the relatively apolitical nature of these portfolios suggests
that civil servants might be slotted into them without detriment to the president. While some
Treasury portfolios, such as Tax Policy, are hyper-political, others – such as TARP, Terrorism
and Financial Intelligence and International Affairs – are simply not the locus of major partisan
disagreement. These results speak to our ultimate question of how presidents should staff
agencies for maximum performance, which will be addressed in chapter 7.
Conclusions and Analysis
This study confirmed my hypothesis that civil servants would be no less loyal to the
president than appointees. I hypothesized that this would be the case in part because appointees
would have greater incentives to leak damaging information to the press, in order to bolster their
less-certain future career prospects. Therefore, I expected to find that appointees would leak
more information to reporters. In fact, however, appointees and civil servants appeared to leak
with roughly the same frequency.
I further hypothesized that the president does not necessarily need appointees in some of
the positions they currently fill, because their duties are not very political. This expectation was
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also confirmed. As previously discussed, half of the appointees whom I interviewed indicated
that they would not expect the policies they advocated to change significantly under an
administration of a different political party.
Finally, I hypothesized that civil servants would be unlikely to engage in politicallymotivated acts of disloyalty to an administration, because the civil servants would not have
particularly partisan views in the first place. One civil servant was clear that he only cared about
policy. However, the fact that the great majority of civil servants had previously worked in
partisan political roles disproved this hypothesis.
As discussed in chapter 1, civil servants would emphatically not have served as effective
administration advocates if their personal views caused them to attempt to secretly undermine
the work of presidents with whom they disagreed – a charge leveled at them by legions of
scholars and political operatives. However, my findings on the loyalty of appointees and civil
servants indicate that, contrary to the assumptions of Moe and other scholars, civil servants are
not significantly more likely than appointees to engage in acts of disloyalty to the administrations
they serve.
One civil servant admitted to leaking information to the press that did not serve the
administration’s interests during our interview. While no appointees admitted to leaking, I had
reason to question the veracity of the responses of two of the appointees. Coincidentally, two
other appointees independently volunteered to me, without provocation, that they suspected these
very same officials of leaking.
However, with the exception of Civil Servant 7, appointees and civil servants alike were
adamant that their jobs required them to advance the views of their superiors, regardless of their
personal beliefs. Additionally, both groups reported that it was unusual for them to disagree with
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an administration in the first place, suggesting that, at least within the Treasury, presidents rarely
face even the possibility of acts of disloyalty (although, of course, such instances of
disagreement occurred more frequently in the case of civil servants, which would be expected
given their longer tenure and apolitical selection processes.).
When I asked the government officials whether they were aware of the identities of
leakers in their offices, no public affairs official had identified a single civil servant who had
leaked information to the press. However, they provided evidence of leaking by a minimum of
five appointees.
On the other hand, the responses of reporters (who should know the identities of leakers
with greater accuracy) indicated that civil servants were more likely to leak. However, upon
closer examination, many instances of purported “leaks” by civil servants appeared to reflect a
simple willingness on the part of civil servants to acknowledge alternate points of view – which
perhaps strikes reporters as remarkable simply because appointees are so unwilling to sometimes
acknowledge the obvious. As we have seen, such dialogue may actually serve the
administration’s interests, because reporters view such sources with greater credibility. It is also
reasonable to believe that acknowledging other arguments may give government spokespeople
valuable opportunities to rebut them. Nevertheless, appointees appeared more loyal in this regard
as they did not proactively share alternate views with reporters, and it clear that such actions on
the part of civil servants would not have been acceptable to their political superiors or the
president.
In other cases, it was clear that civil servants did engage in the more literal definition of
leaking. However, reporters emphasized that such events happened rarely. Such leaks were
described by Reporter 4 as happening most dramatically when the very existence of agencies was
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at stake, as the government crafted its response to the 2008 financial crisis – which is hardly a
normal set of circumstances (although presidents do from time to time shutter or radically overall
agencies). While the greater weight that should be accorded the views of reporters (who
unquestionably know the identities of leakers) suggests that civil servants might in fact leak more
than appointees, the results reported by the reporters were so close (of the reporters who received
leaks, four believed that civil servants leaked more, including one reporter who was not entirely
sure whether there was a difference between the two groups, and two reporters believed that
appointees and civil servants leaked with roughly the same frequency) that it is not possible to
definitively arrive at this conclusion.
Perhaps the most remarkable finding of all, however, is the willingness of civil servants
to stay quiet. They described doing so even when they witnessed administrations wasting
millions of dollars, attempting to make false claims for partisan advantage, and ignoring data
warning of a grave, impending recession. The civil servants were also universally clear that their
personal political views did not impact their work.
Of course, these mixed results are approximate; it would be impossible to quantify with
precision actions which government officials have an enormous stake in concealing.
The results are nevertheless clear: civil servants and appointees both leak to the press. And both
groups appear to leak with roughly the same frequency.

238

Chapter 6: Results: The Permanent Campaign

Introduction
The previous two chapters measured whether appointees or civil servants are more
effective and loyal advocates for the president. I now turn to the question of how well appointees
and civil servants serve the interests of the American people. In chapter 3, I hypothesized that I
would find little difference between political appointees and civil servants in the degree to which
they are engaged in the permanent campaign, and that this would largely be a result of the fact
that heavy workloads prevent appointees from being as proactive as they might otherwise want
to be. This chapter reviews the results of my interview questions designed to determine the
degree to which Treasury public affairs officials are conducting a “permanent campaign.” I have
defined the permanent campaign as using “government as an instrument designed to sustain an
elected official’s public popularity” (Blumenthal 1982, 23). I have identified tactics of the
permanent campaign as utilizing public opinion polls to govern, playing to the emotions of the
American people, and withholding and distorting information.
Of course, as discussed in chapter 2, there is nothing inherently nefarious in the
president’s attempts to build support; indeed, doing so is necessary in order for the chief
executive to achieve his goals, since other actors consider the level of support the president
enjoys when assessing the consequences they will face for contradicting his wishes (Neustadt
1991). However, the use of the tactics of the permanent campaign in order to build this support is
potentially problematic. If an administration attempts to play too heavily to the emotions, as
opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they craft, it might fail to convey
facts which are essential for citizens to understand the state of the economy and hold their
leaders accountable. Likewise, if an administration bases its governing decisions solely on public
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opinion polls, they might fail to sometimes make the difficult decisions that serve the long-term
interests of the nation. (Of course, such decisions themselves are themselves subject to active
partisan debate, such as, for example, paying down the nation’s debt). Furthermore, if an
administration withholds or distorts information requested by the media, it might prevent the
American people from obtaining the information they need in order to hold their government
accountable and participate in key governance decisions.
I therefore used nine measures in order to investigate whether the officials were
conducting such a campaign.
First, I asked the officials how much time they spent focusing on the profiles and images
of the officials for whom they work, and whether it was a good use of their time. Of course,
Blumenthal charged presidential aides with conducting a permanent campaign in order to boost
the popularity of the president. Even though the Treasury Secretary and other senior officials are
not elected, if the permanent campaign tactics were to have been extended into government
agencies, it is to be expected that public affairs officials would focus on the images of their most
senior principals.
Second, I asked the officials about the most sophisticated techniques they used to shape
what reporters covered. To independently corroborate their claims, I also asked reporters about
the savvier things that federal economic agencies did to shape the coverage they received in the
press.
Third, I asked the government officials whether they ever attempted to appeal to the
emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted.
Fourth, I asked the government officials whether they ever utilized public opinion polls in
their work and, if so, how.
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Fifth, I asked the government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for
someone in their position to withhold information requested by the press, what the circumstances
would be, and whether this happened often or rarely in their work. To independently corroborate
their responses, I also asked reporters whether they became aware of practices public affairs
appointees engaged in which they felt were inappropriate. If reporters did not respond by
indicating that the officials had withheld information, I asked them directly whether they thought
that the officials had done so.
Sixth, I asked the government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for
someone in their position to shade the truth, what the circumstances would be, and whether this
happened often or rarely in their work. To independently corroborate their responses, I used the
responses of reporters to my question of whether they became aware of practices that public
affairs appointees engaged in which they felt were inappropriate. If reporters did not respond by
indicating that the officials had lied to them, I asked them directly whether they thought that the
officials had done so.
Seventh, I asked the government officials whether they believed that it would be possible
for someone in their position to tell untruths to make the president look good, and whether they
or their colleagues had ever attempted to do so.
Eighth, I asked the government officials what percentage of the messages they sought to
promulgate they would describe as ideas and narratives, as well as how they developed and
sculpted narratives to make their points, in an effort to determine how they attempted to shape
information to their advantage.
Ninth, and finally, I asked the government officials how their offices determined how to
handle information that was potentially damaging or embarrassing.
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Measuring Causal Factors
I next investigated possible factors that could explain why the government officials were
or were not conducting a permanent campaign. To determine the extent to which the potential for
a permanent campaign existed, I first queried the government officials about their workloads, in
an effort to determine how much time they had to engage in proactive tactics. Second, I
attempted to determine how much of their time was spent proactively attempting to influence the
media, and how much of it was spent reactively responding to requests from reporters.
To determine whether the officials were motivated by the goals of a permanent campaign,
third, I queried the appointees and civil servants about the end goals of their work and, fourth, I
asked them to what degree their end goal was to build public support for the president.
Finally, I considered whether those officials who studied journalism were less likely to
engage in the tactics of the permanent campaign.

Possible Differences Between the Obama and Bush Administrations
Finally, because reporters overwhelmingly indicated in chapter 4 that the Obama
appointees were significantly less forthcoming with information than the Bush appointees, I
attempted to ascertain whether there are differences in the practice of the permanent campaign
among the two administrations I studied by asking many of my interview subjects what they
thought accounted for this difference.
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I. Time Spent Burnishing the Profiles of Government Officials
As previously discussed, Blumenthal described one of the key tenets of the permanent
campaign as attempts to bolster the images of elected officials. To measure whether a permanent
campaign was being conducted in the Treasury, I first asked the officials how much time they
spent attempting to burnish the personal profiles of their principals. Such efforts would be a
logical extension of the permanent campaign within government agencies. While Treasury
officials are not elected, the images of the president’s most senior appointees bear directly on the
reputation of the president.
Appointees generally indicated that they spent “some time,” “not a ton,” or, at most, 1520 percent of their time focused on the images of the individuals for whom they worked. I found
their arguments for doing so to be compelling.
Obama Appointee 1 explained that it “is a good and appropriate use of time because it is
the nature of things that principals are identified and intertwined with the institution.” Obama
Appointee 2 explained that “your principal has to be seen as knowledgeable and accountable,
[that] they know what they’re doing, so I think building up a public profile is part of that. It also
helps with their interactions with foreign officials, … members of Congress, … [and] members
of the private sector.” For Obama Appointee 3, “it reminded people that there was a human
element” to his work. Likewise, Obama Appointee 5 indicated that “my thinking is that a public
servant is paid by taxpayers, and any chance for them to get to know whose working on their
behalf is probably something we should participate in, so when the chances came in, I worked
hard for us to participate.” Obama Appointee 4 explained that “it was a great use of my time
because … having principals who are so well-respected and so good in their issue area is
definitely hugely beneficial and they were people who could talk to reporters and reporters didn’t
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feel like they were being spun around.”
Bush Appointee 1 likewise explained that people trust officials more when they see “the
human interest side of things” and that if reporters like a principal, they are more likely to get
positive media coverage – a belief also echoed by Bush Appointees 2 and 4. Bush Appointee 5
claimed that he could not understand the question.
The question was not relevant for one civil servant, because the job responsibility for
managing the reputations of principals fell to others on his team. Civil Servant 7 explained that
he spends “zero” percent of his time focused on the image of his principal and it would not be a
good use of time because it would be “serving [the principal]; it’s not serving the organization.”
He explained, “I think that’s where appointees become too focused on themselves and worried
about their next life.” Another appointee who spent “not very much” time on the image of his
principal said he thought having a more low-key image allowed his principal to better advance
his agency’s work, which I considered to be a reasonable assessment given the nature of his
bureau’s work which required projecting a degree of independence.
Every other civil servant saw value in such work. For example, Civil Servant 2 explained
that “the more [his principal] is out there and looked at favorably, it raises the organization and
the visibility we have in our programs.” Another civil servant explained that if a principal was
seen as unfriendly to a particular group, it would negatively impact views of the agency’s
programs. The amount of time they spent on the images of the officials for whom they worked
varied, from one percent to five percent, to at “certain points quite a lot” and at others less so.
Another civil servant explained, “I don’t know if I don’t spend any time on it or if I spend all my
time on it. It’s just part of everything we do and I don’t make a distinction between making my
agency look good and making a principal look good. I think it’s all connected.”
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Thus, while I had hypothesized that appointees might spend an inordinate amount of time
focusing on the images of the officials for whom they worked – which would both be an
indication of the permanent campaign and an indicator that they were less effective, because the
president would ultimately be better served if they spent their time promoting his policies – I did
not find this to be the case. The amount of time both groups spent focusing on images appeared
to be reasonable and, in doing so, appointees were clear that their end goal was to build
credibility for their organizations, which would allow them to advance the administration’s work.
Furthermore, the sophistication with which the civil servants likewise approached such work also
served as an indicator of their overall level of competence. Thus, this measure did not provide
evidence of a permanent campaign.

II. Most Sophisticated Techniques
In an effort to identify any permanent campaign techniques in which they might be
engaging, I asked the appointees and civil servants to tell me about the more sophisticated
techniques they used to shape what reporters cover. The most striking thing about their responses
was that they could all be found in most Public Relations 101 textbooks. Of course, this
observation is not meant to diminish the difficulty of their work. The appointees, in particular,
explained and defended some of the government’s most difficult decisions and high-profile
policies – including extremely complex economic and financial matters – and attempted to calm
global markets amidst the panic of the Great Recession and a particularly partisan national
climate. The skill required to carry out such responsibilities should not be underestimated.
However, the actual tactics they described employing in their work in no way struck me as
particularly diabolical nor as different in kind from the strategies with which most public
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relations professionals are familiar.
For example, Obama Appointee 1 explained that his more sophisticated strategies were
giving information to reporters as a “source familiar.” “This is more subtle or sophisticated to
move or shape stories – the sausage-making that may not seem obvious to the public at large.”
Obama Appointee 2 explained that “managing a principal’s time” was the most sophisticated
thing he did, explaining that he could generate coverage by making his principal available to the
press. Obama Appointee 3 said the two keys to his job were being responsive to reporters on
deadline and being nice. He also described being targeted and thinking “about who the best
person is to write a story, creating a favor bank … [and] giving them information and they give
you information. Make it a two-way process.” Obama Appointee 4 described doing sophisticated
economic analysis to prove why his policy was right and providing it to a top reporter. Obama
Appointee 5 explained that “it starts with the relationship. You need to understand what a
reporter is thinking, what other sources are telling them, and then figure out what to do: do you
need to bring someone in to talk, [do you need a] third party validator, [do you need to] do
research for them because we thought they didn’t understand it. So, it’s almost like we were
doing their work for them. We would do anything we could to make it easier to get our point of
view in their story.”
Bush appointees focused heavily on building relationships with and educating reporters
about their worldview. “A lot of it was personal relationships, trying to build relationships with
reporters so they knew the issues,” Bush Appointee 1 explained. “You got them interested in
issues [so] they wanted to cover you, or it was as simple as, ‘I see you writing on this issue, you
haven’t called us, come in and meet our Assistant Secretary’ or ‘we have a new person in our
office you should get to know’ [and] have coffee, start a dialogue.” Bush Appointee 2 explained
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the importance of “just making them understand the whole process” by explaining how and why
things were being done. He used an example of a “roadshow” that Vice President Dick Cheney,
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson, and other administration officials took to every site in the
country that was printing stimulus checks in 2008 in order to highlight for reporters how the
process would work. Bush Appointee 3 explained briefing the press before trips by Treasury
officials and following up afterwards to stimulate stories.
Bush Appointee 4 likewise focused on educating reporters. “It’s that Dale Carnegie stuff
on how to win friends. Educate them. Don’t always call reporters when you need them, call
when you don’t need them and help them do their jobs. Help them cultivate sources. None of that
is sophisticated; it just means you have to do it every day.” He explained that “sophisticated is,
like, doing some original research and presenting it … [you] could give that exclusively, that
kind of stuff” but he indicated that this would not be enough to generate “those hits” of larger
press coverage. He also said “finding third parties to help influence a story also helps a lot.”
Bush Appointee 5 said he could not remember, but said “I don’t think a lot of what we did was
so sophisticated. A lot of what we did was trying to simplify things, because this stuff was so
complicated.”
Civil Servant 1 explained that he would “try to understand what a reporter is after and
counter-offer what we can do for them.” When reporters made an argument, he would also make
counterarguments to defend his bureau’s position. Civil Servant 2 explained trying to find
specific examples of people who have been helped by his bureau’s programs and giving those
stories to reporters, and also pitching stories to reporters on why a new program of his bureau
represented a particularly sophisticated approach. Civil Servant 3 likewise explained that when
his bureau wanted reporters to cover a particular story, he would launch national campaigns and
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“we’d bend over backwards to get them information and if they hadn’t done a story on this or
that, we would call them and we always had a good relationship [and] … we had people trained
to work with reporters across the country to get the story out.”
Civil Servant 4 reported being particularly responsive by responding via email to
questions from reporters as an event was happening. He also tracked the comments of reporters
on Twitter and blogs during the event and let them know when they wrote things that were
incorrect. Civil Servant 5 explained using messaging to make clear that the administration
understood the needs and challenges of ordinary Americans and also using data to tell stories.
Civil Servant 6 explained building relationships of trust with reporters which allowed him to
share information on background or under embargo (meaning the reporter could not publish it
until a specified future time), steering reporters to other sources, and providing exclusives to
larger publications. Civil Servant 7 likewise described building relationships with reporters,
pitching them stories, and giving them liberal access to his staff to help them write their stories.
Thus, the responses of the appointees and civil servants did not evince particular
differences in their level of sophistication – evidence which is also germane to the question
considered earlier of the relative efficacy of both groups. Neither group of officials described
engaging in tactics of the permanent campaign, such as tailoring their messages in response to
public opinion polls, or withholding or distorting information. To corroborate these findings, I
also asked reporters about the most sophisticated strategies they witnessed both groups employ.

Reporters on the Savviest Strategies Government Spokespeople Use
When asked about the savviest things federal economic agencies do to shape their
coverage, the most striking thing about the responses of reporters is that the strategies they
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described were likewise not particularly sophisticated or Machiavellian. All were variants on
simply providing information to reporters. In the words of Reporter 5, the savviest strategy
government officials employed was when they were “as open and forthcoming as possible about
whatever issue [they were] confronting and … [getting] the most competent people to talk to
reporters, whether they’re appointees or civil servants, whoever knows the issue.”
Reporter 1 described the “savviest thing of all” as talking to reporters on background and
off-the-record “so they [could] write more clearly” because they handle such complex issues.
Reporter 6 likewise described such informal meetings as “most influential in shaping coverage”
because it gave reporters a sense of how policy was being made and how the U.S. was
prosecuting its interests around the world. Reporter 4 contrasted the Treasury negatively with the
Federal Reserve in this regard, reporting that because the Federal Reserve sees itself as less
political, officials there were much more willing to explain their thinking and decision-making
processes on background, whereas “Treasury takes seriously the idea that they want you to look
at the cupcake and not come into the kitchen.” He argued that while this approach does not
always serve the Federal Reserve well on every story, in aggregate, the Federal Reserve benefits
because their staff are able to shape the thinking of reporters.
For Reporters 2 and 3, the savviest strategy was to give exclusives to reporters. In the
words of Reporter 2, the savviest strategy was to “generate buzz and force others to follow up
when they think they will get a certain outcome from a certain outlet, because you’ve already
shaped the narrative early on” or to “plant a story in a less prominent outlet to create the crumb
that needs to be followed by someone else.”
Reporters 3 and 4 also described the savviest thing government officials did as simply
providing access to the press. In the words of Reporter 4, “the agencies best at managing the
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media tend to recognize we need to eat something, and if they serve us filling meals, then we’re
less likely to be hungry and wandering around looking for other things to eat.” He described the
public affairs office of the Federal Reserve as an example of spokespeople who “do a good job
[of] providing information proactively and encouraging interactions with their officials, so you
don’t feel like you’re on the outside trying to get in. You’re getting a story, it’s the one they’ve
packaged for you, and they’re occupying your attention.”
Finally, as discussed in chapter 4, Reporter 7 emphasized the value of explaining issues
to reporters early on in order to shaping their thinking, because, according to him, reporters will
defer to the first version of events they hear, especially when they face deadline pressure.
Of course, as discussed in chapter 4, reporters were clear that Treasury officials did not
generally provide them with the access they desired in ways that could have allowed the officials
to better shape coverage. Rather, they described access as the most sophisticated technique they
saw public affairs officers in economic agencies ever employ.
Thus, it seemed evident from the responses of both the appointees and civil servants that,
while government officials might execute their work with sophistication, the particular strategies
they used to influence media coverage were not extraordinary – and certainly did not include the
permanent campaign tactics described by Blumenthal, Heclo, and McClellan.

III. Appealing to the Emotions of the American People
One of the tactics of the permanent campaign described by Blumenthal is playing on the
emotions of the American people, as opposed to appealing to their reason. I therefore asked the
appointees and civil servants I interviewed whether they ever attempted to appeal to the
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emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in the messages they crafted. The
results of this question, as well as the following question on the use of public opinion polls, were
also utilized as measures in my investigation of the relative efficacy of appointees and civil
servants in chapter 4.
Although, as was discussed in the introduction, most citizens do not carefully follow the
information released by the government, at the same time, it is important for the audiences which
do follow the Treasury carefully to be able to accurately assess the state of the economy and
work of the Department. These publics include investors who make decisions in part based upon
information released by the Treasury and thought leaders, such as members of the media who
heavily influence consumer perceptions of the economy. Of course, the Treasury might release
sophisticated information for such audiences while targeting less-knowledgeable citizens with
emotional appeals that could have positive effects (for example, by convincing American
citizens to save more for their children’s college educations or for retirement). On the other hand,
it would be problematic if the Treasury appealed to unsophisticated consumers with self-serving
messages. For example, if the Treasury attempted to bolster support for the president with
emotional appeals projecting confidence in the economy but actual economic conditions were
less rosy than the Department conveyed, this could cause consumers to make irresponsible
decisions about their personal credit and spending.
Obama Appointees 2 and 4 indicated that they did not appeal to emotions; according to
Obama Appointee 2, “I don’t think I was, like, sophisticated enough to have thought of that.”
Obama Appointee 1 said he never “appealed in a demagogic way” but he was “aware of the
emotional overlay of the way people consume news.” Obama Appointee 3, by contrast, argued
that “it’s all emotion. In politics, reason doesn’t get you anywhere. If there was reason, Social
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Security would be different; all of my hopes and dreams would actually come true.” Likewise,
Obama Appointee 5 indicated using emotion because “I think sometimes reason would be lost on
them. If you can say, like, ‘remember what it was like to lose your house or watch your 401K
disappear overnight or lose your job,’ those are things people can relate to. I don’t think it was
trying to make them feel like crap, but to say, ‘these are the things we’re trying to prevent, we
understand how hard it was and we don’t ever want it to happen again.’”
Bush Appointees 2, 3, and 4 likewise indicated that they did not appeal to emotions. Bush
Appointee 2 explained that “we placed a premium on trying to be factual and accurate, especially
considering we were dealing with a lot of numbers. Numbers don’t lie.” Bush Appointee 4
explained, “I think analytically.” However, two other Bush appointees indicated that they used
emotional appeals for foreign audiences on issues such as terrorism and financial intelligence. In
a response resonant of Obama Appointee 5, Bush Appointee 5 explained that, in communicating
with the American people, he sometimes appealed to emotions as he was “trying to explain
things in ways that people relate to. You have different ways of communicating to financial
market professionals than ways of communicating to your mom and dad.”
Surprisingly, civil servants were much more likely than appointees to indicate that they
attempted to appeal to the emotions of the American people. While Civil Servants 1 and 4
indicated that they did not do so (for Civil Servant 1, this was because “I tend to be a financial
person who thinks of people in terms of logical reasons”), five of the seven civil servants
indicated that they did in fact play to emotions. Civil servants indicated that at times they
appealed to emotions because they were trying to convey how people could be impacted by very
real financial threats to consumers, or why taking particular financial steps was important to the
futures of Americans and their children. At other times, they did so because they felt that they
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would be more successful at encouraging citizens to take action if they showed that they
understood how Americans had been impacted by the financial crisis. One civil servant
explained, “I always thought that was great; you felt like you were really helping the public.” At
other times, they did so by using “success stories to pull the emotional string of the person
reading the story but have it be enriched with real data so you can quantify how the [program] is
making a difference.”
Surprisingly, then, civil servants were much more likely than appointees to practice this
technique of Blumenthal’s “permanent campaign.” This interesting and counterintuitive finding
might be attributable in part to the fact that civil servants were more likely to be responsible for
communicating information targeted to consumers than appointees, who focused on portfolios
such as tax policy and domestic finance and may have tended to work with more elite economic
and financial reporters. Nevertheless, the fact that the majority of civil servants attempted to tap
into emotions while conveying their messages suggests a level of sophistication and savvy
among this group which also speaks to their efficacy. Of course, the reasons why both the
appointees and civil servants explained that they sometimes used such appeals – to communicate
in terms that the ordinary American could understand – also hardly feels like a threat to
democracy. Although ultimately such efforts by appointees would likely have helped to build
support for the president’s policies – and, by extension, the president – both groups appeared to
do so in an effort to connect with the American people and explain policy rather than to overtly
advance partisan agendas. I therefore did not judge such efforts to be evidence of a permanent
campaign.
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IV. Use of Public Opinion Polls
Of course, a key tactic of the permanent campaign as alleged by Heclo is using public
opinion polls to craft messages designed to maximize public support for the president, even if
this requires advocating policies which are damaging to the nation over the long term. I therefore
asked the government officials whether and how they used public opinion polls in their work.
While McClellan acknowledged that the Bush administration sometimes governed based
upon public opinion polls, the Treasury appointees indicated that the practice had not penetrated
their department (2008). Obama and Bush appointees universally reported that they had never
once commissioned a poll to guide their messaging. One Bush appointee did indicate, however,
that the Treasury Chief of Staff Christopher Smith brought Republican pollster David Winston to
the Treasury on more than one occasion to brief very senior Treasury officials on polling he had
conducted on economic issues. Additionally, almost every appointee indicated that he was aware
of polling reported in the media.
Obama Appointee 2 and Bush Appointee 3 both indicated that the thought never even
crossed their minds to commission a poll. Bush Appointee 3 explained that “we’re not going to
change our policy because of polls,” while Bush Appointee 2 explained that “whether explicit or
implicit, we all knew from a Public Affairs standpoint where things were [in terms of public
opinion] but I don’t think, at the end of the day, it influenced things much. TARP was hugely
unpopular, but we continued to just do our job on that.”
Obama Appointees 1, 3, and 4 said that polling would happen more at the White House,
while the Treasury’s “focus is on thought leaders” (Obama Appointee 4) and “in an agency you
are less overtly political.” (Obama Appointee 1). Obama Appointee 3 indicated that it would not
make sense to commission polls at Treasury about how to communicate with the American
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people because “the things Treasury deals with are too complex; you’ve lost everybody.” (Of
course this would not preclude possible benefits of conducting public opinion polls of key
constituencies which follow Treasury issues, such as business leaders and investors, but the
appointees indicated that they did not do so). Obama Appointee 5 indicated that he “sometimes
would reference them in conversations with reporters … more of like, ‘the American people
want this done. Why won’t Congress do it?’”
Obama Appointee 5 and Bush Appointees 3 and 5 explained that the government simply
did not have the resources to commission polls; Bush Appointee 3 indicated that it would not be
a good use of resources even if the money were available. One appointee described a scenario in
which banking trade associations would be “putting hundreds of thousands if not millions behind
their campaigns [against Treasury efforts to regulate the industry, presumably by utilizing
sophisticated polling] and we had people making fifty to 115 K that had to go up against that ….
A team of four people at Treasury … had to respond to that on top of everything else we were
doing.”
Particularly surprisingly, while no appointee had ever commissioned a poll, the majority
of civil servants had or were planning to conduct public opinion polling. One civil servant
indicated that polls would not be relevant to the work of his bureau, and two other civil servants
had never commissioned them. However, four of the seven civil servants had or were planning to
commission such studies. One civil servant indicated that he had done so “often,” for many
years. All of these polls focused or would focus on Treasury products, in order to determine
whether consumers understood and liked them. One civil servant who held focus groups with
consumers to test messages reported that he “was asked not to talk about that because the
administration didn’t want it to look like we were polling or testing efficacy. I didn’t agree with
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that, because it’s pretty typical to test [marketing campaigns] and shows we were being
responsible with our money.”
Nevertheless, in a particularly fascinating and counterintuitive finding, while none of the
appointees had ever used this central tool of the permanent campaign, a majority of civil servants
were found to have done so. Of course, they did not do so to build support for the president or
even for his policies, and therefore cannot be alleged to have actually conducted a “permanent
campaign.” Their use of such polls is, however, likely evidence of their efficacy and further
indication that they approached their work with some degree of sophistication. Nevertheless, this
second unexpected finding that civil servants are more likely to engage in the tactics which
Blumenthal and Heclo charged political campaign operatives with importing into government is
striking.

V. Withholding Information Requested by Reporters
Of course, perhaps the most disturbing depiction of the permanent campaign was
McClellan’s claim that government officials withhold and distort information requested by the
press. I therefore first asked the government officials whether they believe it is ever appropriate
for someone in their position to withhold information requested by the press. I then asked under
what circumstances these actions would be appropriate, and whether this happened often or
rarely in their work.
Obama Appointee 1 indicated that it was acceptable to withhold information for several
reasons. He explained, “we were in a unique place at Treasury in that what we did was market
sensitive, so there were certain instances in which providing certain information can influence
markets in unpredictable ways.” (Of course, other agencies, such as the Departments of Defense
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and Agriculture also make announcements with market implications.) Like Bush Appointee 1,
who, as previously discussed, had reported giving less time to reporters who he found to be
irresponsible, Obama Appointee 1 likewise argued that it is “more justified to withhold or be less
helpful to purely ideological outlets rather than people who are true journalists.” Obama
Appointee 1 also indicated that it was acceptable to withhold information about Treasury actions
that impact financial institutions.
Obama Appointee 1 was clear that “you might omit a data point … you don’t want to
make someone else’s case for them. Political communications is different from detached
academic analysis in which you would have the responsibility to not omit relevant data points or
factual assertions. You have a job to do, in terms of advancing a particular viewpoint. You
shouldn’t view the job as a platonic ideal of searching for truth.” Later, when asked how he
handled potentially damaging information, he explained that “you can sometimes be aggressively
unhelpful to a reporter. If they are specifically writing something you think is unfair and don’t
accurately present the truth, don’t think or feel an obligation to always be helpful.”
Obama Appointee 2 likewise argued that “you don’t have to tell the whole truth.” He
indicated that “if there’s information I’m aware of that would result in a negative story, there’s
no way I would make that available to a reporter,” and described withholding as “an unavoidable
part of the job” that was a “regular occurrence, even in the sense that if a reporter doesn’t ask a
question that I know the answer to, I’m not going to steer them in the direction of answering.” If
a reporter did ask a question that Obama Appointee 2 did not wish to answer, he indicated, “I
think the whole point is to do your best to tell the truth, but not the whole truth. You can stop at
the point at which it will become damaging.”
Obama Appointee 3 concurred that “withholding is easy, you just don’t give it to them,
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you point them somewhere else. They can’t yell at you for omitting things.” He explained, “I’m
under no obligation to give out information unless it’s, like, obviously in the public domain. If
it’s in a press release, you have to share. If it’s not, you’re under no obligation to do so.” He
indicated that he withheld information “regularly,” explaining that “you’re playing a game, at the
end of the day. That’s too simplistic, but you’re always evaluating your options and constantly
recalibrating.” He also stipulated that “withholding when someone asked doesn’t mean I didn’t
give it to someone else,” indicating a willingness to selectively provide information based upon
how he believed reporters would use it.
Obama Appointee 4 explained that withholding was acceptable “in a situation where it
could potentially be a very damaging story, where there are numerous Congressional
investigations and we’re timing out the release of information, knowing that it will probably get
out eventually, but holding while we figure out all the facts and a strategy.” He indicated that this
happened “occasionally – like, sometimes, not daily, but it’s not rare, either.”
Obama Appointee 5 explained that “that’s kind of what the job is. I tried to be as upfront
and transparent as I could, but I think there are legitimate times when it doesn’t make sense to
offer up everything you’re thinking at that time prior to when a decision is made, things that
could be market-moving events; there’s times when you’re not ready to talk about everything. I
think good PR people are good at walking that fine line of never lying but just leaving out details
to reporters’ questions, answering truthfully and honestly but just making decisions about what’s
included in an answer and what will not be.” He indicated that this happened “somewhat
frequently, especially around really tense, difficult topics.”
Bush Appointee 1 explained that withholding was “fine” because “you’re trying to
implement a strategy and showing all your cards at any given time is not the way to go about it.”
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He explained that “when reporters call and ask, ‘will you do X, Y or Z,’ I would say I would
never speculate. Some would get mad later if [we] did, but … yes, you are serving the people,
but at some level you have to implement work, have a strategy, and get through it, and you can’t
necessarily do that by having everything that goes on in the public domain.”
Bush Appointee 2 initially said it was appropriate to withhold information when “lives
are at stake, it’s a sensitive or classified issue, that kind of genre,” but, when pressed, he
indicated it was acceptable to withhold if “something was not primed for market, if it will be
released but the reporter got a leak or inside track, I would not give that, confirm those numbers
or give out accurate numbers until the situation was solidified that we were in a position to do
so.” He indicated that such situations generally happened “rarely.”
Bush Appointee 3 likewise withheld, but “not too often.” He explained, “it’s a public
affairs spokesperson’s job to guide a reporter in the right direction. Don’t lie, but it’s not their
job to be open kimono and tell them everything. It’s a reporter’s job to get that information and
there’s got to be a certain level of transparency, because you do have a relationship with this
reporter, and that’s part of the trust with a reporter and, by larger extension, the public, but you
don’t have to tell them everything. It’s on a need-to-know basis, but don’t send them in the
wrong direction.”
Bush Appointee 4 indicated that “there are lots of times when it might be appropriate” to
withhold information. He explained, “let’s say you know a person will be nominated for a job
tomorrow. Just because you ask a question doesn’t mean it’s right for me to give the
announcement today.” Obama Appointee 4 explained, “the term of art was, ‘I have nothing for
you on that,’ but I would frequently say ‘I’ll let you know when we have something.’”
Bush Appointee 5 initially indicated “I don’t want to answer that,” but later explained
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that, “no, of course you don’t have to tell a reporter everything they ask you.”
On the other hand, while most civil servants indicated that they would sometimes
withhold information, it was clear that they were more likely to provide information requested by
reporters when they could. In chapter 3, I explained that I was not previously acquainted with the
civil servants who I interviewed and reached out to six of my seven civil service interview
subjects without an introduction from a friend or colleague. Several other civil servants declined
my request for interview. Thus, as described in the previous chapter, I consider it probable that
my sample of civil servants is somewhat more likely than the average civil servant to be open
and forthcoming with information, by virtue of the fact that they agreed to be interviewed for this
project. Just as I believe that this could have over-represented civil servants who leak
information in my sample, I likewise believe that this selection bias may have over-represented
civil servants who eschew the withholding of information. Nevertheless, the views of civil
servants were so similar, and so starkly different from those of appointees, that I consider it
likely that they represent a true point of difference between the two groups, even if the responses
of the civil servants who I interviewed may slightly overstate the degree of the difference.
Civil Servant 1 explained that “in terms of withholding, there’s often times when a
reporter calls and asks, and I would say, ‘I have nothing to tell ‘ya right now.” He indicated that
this happens “rarely” at Treasury; asked under what circumstances it was appropriate, he
indicated “rank has its privileges; if [a] Treasury [appointee] tells me not to say anything, I
won’t.” However, it was clear that he was uncomfortable with this because, when asked if he
shades the truth, he responded that “anytime I stick to just one statement … in that sense, yeah, I
guess I do. There’s too many times when I don’t tell the entire story to say I don’t shade the
truth.”
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Civil Servant 2 indicated that he would “rarely” simply not return a phone call in order to
not provide information a reporter was requesting. Civil 3 likewise characterized such situations
as rare, explaining that “97 or 98 percent of the time we’ll give reporters what they’re asking for
if we have it or can get it for them correctly.” While he was clear that it is sometimes appropriate
to withhold information “if you’re protecting the organization and you think it’s the right
perspective to give on the situation,” his definition of when such circumstances are warranted
seemed to be significantly narrower than that of appointees.
For example, Civil Servant 3 recounted the same story told by a different civil servant in
chapter 5, in which Treasury appointees wanted to refer to a “technical error” and not share
further information about an event with reporters, explaining that the appointees “wanted to
shade the truth and we thought it would be better just to tell the whole truth and be done with it;
it wasn’t that shocking. So they definitely shaded the truth.” In general, he explained, “if I have it
and I know it, we will give it,” explaining that “there’s nothing that makes us look bad, I don’t
think. It’s the way people could manipulate information that makes us look bad.”
Civil Servant 4 was more constrained by law than most other officials in what he could
provide to reporters, and indicated that it was generally appropriate to share what was in the
public record as opposed to the analysis, background and context often requested by reporters.
He was clear that “I don’t always tell everything I know, but I don’t consider that shading the
truth.” If Civil Servant 4 was most conservative, Civil Servant 5 was most liberal, explaining that
“the only reason someone wouldn’t have gotten [information they requested] would have been if
it was determined by FOIA. That decision would have been above my pay grade, determined by
lawyers. In this day and age, you would probably have a blog written by reporters one second
later saying you didn’t do it, so it’s probably not worth it.” However, he did indicate that “spin is
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okay, to give the facts [and] still be truthful, but spin it a particular way.”
Civil Servant 6 explained that “usually the rules are pretty clear about … what we can
provide and what we can’t. Because we are less well known, I tend to be as transparent as
possible, I try to provide as much [information] as I can, because I think it’s generally good for
the [bureau].” He indicated that he therefore withheld information “rarely,” however he indicated
that “shading” is acceptable in the sense that “I would like to direct reporters to the most positive
part of every story and usually there’s a dark side to every story and I try to avoid [it] and try to
anticipate the bad questions we’re going to get and try to avoid or steer to the more positive.”
Civil Servant 7, who I previously determined had leaked information to the press, was the
sole government official who did not believe withholding information was appropriate. For him,
“it has an impact on your integrity, and once you’ve compromised your integrity and people here
have been covering the Treasury … for fifteen, twenty years who know behind-the-scenes
things, if they know you withheld information, you lose your integrity and you never get it back.
Never. Or it’s a long road to hope.” Interestingly, Civil Servant 7’s standards in this regard were
significantly higher than those of reporters themselves.

Reporters on Withholding
To independently corroborate the responses of the government officials, I also asked
reporters whether they became aware of practices which public affairs officials engaged in which
they felt were inappropriate. If reporters did not respond by indicating that the officials had
withheld information, I asked them directly whether they thought that the officials did so.
Very surprisingly, reporters seemed to accept the withholding of information from
reporters by government officials as legitimate. For example, when I asked Reporter 7 whether it
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was acceptable for government officials to withhold information, he responded, “yes, of course.
It’s my job to ask the right questions, where you are put in a spot where either you have to
answer or you have to be, like, ‘I can’t answer that.’ It’s my job to be smart about how I ask
questions.” He used an example of a time when he had worked hard to understand how the
Federal Reserve thinks about an issue “so that when they were working on a new issue I can
work backwards from where I think they want to get, to figure out how they will get there, and in
that circumstance I can ask their public affairs staff much more incisive questions, where even if
they can’t answer me, I get the information I need.”
Reporter 6 indicated that he understood that sometimes it is not in the government’s
interests to give reporters details of negotiations underway with other actors, for example. “I
don’t think it’s their job to give us access to stuff that might hurt what they’re trying to do and I
don’t resent them over that,” he said. “None of this information is critical to the functioning of
the democratic process, but in terms of telling the story of how the U.S. responded to Europe’s
[sovereign debt] crisis … there’s so much more I’m sure they could have told.” The reporter
indicated that, if he ever wanted a detail that the government was withholding badly enough, he
could always find a way to get it from other sources who were involved. “If it felt like there was
a good story there, I would push, push, push,” he said. “It depends how much time you want to
invest. You can almost always get information if you figure in workarounds.”
Reporters even seemed to accept the withholding of information from one reporter when
it was provided to another as legitimate, describing such a situation as merely frustrating as
opposed to outrageously inappropriate. For example, Reporter 1 explained that “from time to
time, I would get frustrated, I would have spoken with a civil servant or an appointee and I’d see
something appear in another publication, and I’d say, ‘wait a second, you didn’t tell me that’ and
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sometimes they’d say ‘well, you didn’t ask’ or ‘well, I didn’t have it at that time.’” Reporter 2
even characterized situations in which he told a public affairs officer about a story he was
working on and they gave it to another reporter who they thought would write the piece more
sympathetically as “bad form but not outrageous.” “If I’ve told someone information, they’re
free to do what they want with it,” he explained. “But the consequence is that public affairs
people have less time to respond to stories because of that risk and there are longer-term
consequences. It’s almost always the appointees who do this.”
Reporters indicated that government spokespeople withheld information as a matter of
course; Reporter 3 described withholding as “sort of like the main job” of government public
affairs officers. “That’s what they do: withholding information,” he said. According to Reporter
2, “any public affairs official will share information beneficial to the interests of an
administration and not draw attention to other information” but, again, “you can get some of that
unfavorable information from other officials.”
Reporter 2 indicated that “politicals certainly do it more than civil servants, but both do.”
Reporter 4 also judged civil servants to be somewhat less likely to withhold, explaining that “at
times, a particular piece of information not advantageous to the agency is helpful in
understanding what happened … Civil servants are more likely to provide you with that kind of
information.” In a statement resonant of the responses of reporters to the question of whether
government officials leak information, he explained:

It’s not infrequently the case that, if I go to an agency and say, ‘I want the following
information, I know I can obtain it through FOIA [the Freedom of Information Act] but
you have it in hand and it’s easy to provide, let’s skip that,’ the odds that a civil servant
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will give that are pretty decent. It works a fair amount of the time. The odds an appointee
will are vanishingly small, even when the benefits to them would exceed the costs.
Appointees are really afraid to transact on the basis of damaging an agency in small
ways, even if it might benefit the agency in the long term. They don’t want to give out
bad information, even if it might strengthen the relationship with me … [and they could]
capitalize on that down the road. That’s not a trade most of them are willing to consider
… whereas there really are civil servants that will give you information; they’ll just do it.
They don’t seem to do the calculus in the same way.

However, Reporter 5 indicated that he believed civil servants to ultimately be subjected
to the same pressures as appointees, who are, after all, their bosses. “A lot of the forces that are
driving the appointees are often driving the civil servants because the civil servants work for the
appointees,” he argued. “They don’t want their agency to look bad even if they’re civil servants,
so they’re often limiting the information they’ll allow us to get about whatever subject we’re
interested in or trying to cover.”
Thus, it is clear that both appointees and civil servants sometimes withhold information
requested by the media. However, it is evident from the responses of both the government
officials and reporters that civil servants seem to do so much more infrequently, while at least
some appointees have no problem with withholding information simply for the reason that it will
not make the administration look good. To be sure, as the government officials indicated, there
will certainly be times when it is truly not appropriate to release information. While President
Wilson, who disliked secret negotiations, called in his Fourteen Points statement for agreements
that were “openly arrived at,” the Constitutional Convention clearly set a precedent for the
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government to engage in debates behind closed doors before making proposals open for public
debate (1918). However, the descriptions of some of the appointees made clear that they made
their decisions much more capriciously, at least sometimes withholding information purely in an
effort to achieve partisan advantage.
Of course, as discussed in the Introduction, there are many legitimate reasons for the
government to withhold information. Much of the Treasury’s work gathering terrorism and
financial intelligence, for example, is highly classified. In the case of the Treasury, judgments of
when it is appropriate to withhold non-classified information are particularly difficult and
subjective because the department possesses information which could cause short-term panic in
global markets, but which also might point to risks which it is in the interests of the country to
understand. This is because, as discussed in chapter 3, the strength of the economy depends in
large part on confidence, which is heavily affected by statements and signals from the Treasury.
For example, Reporter 2 raised the possibility that U.S. Treasury officials and their global
counterparts, in attempting to project optimism about Europe’s current sovereign debt crisis in
order to keep markets strong and avert greater spillover effects in the U.S. economy, are
currently propping up a “house of cards” in Europe. They could be downplaying the current
warning signals about the weakness of the European economy, setting up the U.S. to suffer much
more gravely if Europe’s economy ultimately collapses. The incentives for Treasury officials to
attempt to calm and strengthen markets by withholding information or downplaying risk might
be particularly strong in election years, since, as discussed in chapter 3, a president’s re-election
prospects are closely correlated with the economy.
A similar dynamic could help to explain why warning signs of the U.S. financial crisis in
2008 were not appreciated earlier. When I asked Bush Appointee 2 about this, he indicated that
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the administration “could see things starting to bubble, but we never anticipated the extent to
which everything would melt down.” However, he argued that the administration had incentives
not to share warning signals with the public early on, because “from a Treasury-Fed perspective,
you don’t want to be the cause of any significant … market or economic situation. You don’t
want to run into a crowded movie theatre and yell ‘fire’ and then you end up being wrong. You
don’t want to say, ‘we’re concerned about this area,’ because then either you’re wrong, so your
credibility overseeing the market is diminished, or there could have been problems but you’ve
just accelerated that process [by panicking markets] and created a bigger issue for yourself than
if you had kind of let it go its course.”
In other words, as a result of the ideational nature of the market, Treasury decisions to
release any negative information could potentially inflict actual and serious harm on the nation’s
economy – making it highly understandable, and on one hand good for the country, that Treasury
officials take the cautious approach to providing reporters with access that was identified in
chapter 4 and sometimes withhold information. On the other hand, as we have seen, withholding
information might not serve the long-term interests of the nation in understanding the nature of
extant economic threats. Furthermore, the responses of at least some of the appointees suggested
that they considered it their prerogative to withhold information for reasons that go far beyond
concerns about market stability. As Obama Appointee 1 explained, “you have a job to do, in
terms of advancing a particular viewpoint.” This suggests that they may be withholding for
purely political purposes, which raises serious questions in a democracy designed to allow
citizens to pass informed judgment on their leaders.
Thus, at least some appointees appeared to be willing to withhold information for
purposes not ostensibly justified by market stability or other legitimate aims – evincing the fact
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that they may withhold information for partisan purposes, a classic component of the permanent
campaign described by McClellan. To be sure, McClellan was clear that deception has always
existed in politics; what is new is the larger volume of such deception today. The question of
whether appointees are withholding more information than in the past is, however, outside of the
scope of this study.

VI. Lying to the Press
McClellan also describing lying as another tool of deception in the permanent campaign.
I therefore asked the government officials whether they believed it is ever appropriate for
someone in their position to shade the truth, what the circumstances would be, and whether this
happened often or rarely in their work.
Nearly every appointee indicated that it was unacceptable to lie to reporters. Obama
Appointee 1 indicated that “it’s always fair to present your case in the most forceful way
possible, [but], as a spokesperson, there’s a definitive line you don’t cross, in that you don’t lie,
you never lie. You do present your case in a tailored way, of course, but you should never
straight out lie or mislead, partly for your own personal protection, because the reporters you
deal with are going to be there for a long time afterward, and if they don’t trust you, you
significantly hamper your way to do your job … and for public interests.” He also described
lying as “an unethical thing to do.”
The exception was Obama Appointee 4, who indicated that it was acceptable to “shade
the truth,” but I judged his definition of shading to be more like spinning than lying, because
when I asked when such shading would be appropriate, he gave the answer discussed in section
9, explaining a circumstance in which he knew information would eventually get out but he was
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still gathering facts and determining strategy. (Obviously he could not lie if he knew the truth
would eventually get out, because he would otherwise soon be exposed in the lie, nor could he
lie about facts he did not yet know because he was still gathering them). However, appointees
were otherwise clear that lying was unacceptable. In the words of Obama Appointee 3, “never
shade the truth, because you’ll get found out.” Obama Appointee 5 explained, “the closest I’ve
gotten and I assume most of us have gotten, is if a reporter asks you a question you do know the
answer but you don’t feel at liberty to disclose it, to say, ‘I’m going to have to get back to you on
that one’ and then maybe never get back to them, but not to say ‘we’ve never had a conversation
on that,’ that would be something I’d never do, but I might say ‘I can’t have this conversation
with you.’”
Bush Appointee 1 explained that it is “absolutely, absolutely wrong to ever lie.” Bush
Appointee 5 added that not only is it “never appropriate to lie to a reporter,” but it was also never
appropriate to “overtly mislead them.”
Like the appointees, civil servants stressed that it was never appropriate to lie to
reporters. In the words of Civil Servant 1, “I’ve never been asked to say something I know is
false, and I wouldn’t.” Or, as Civil Servant 5 put it, “I think there’s a difference between being
truthful and not being truthful, and I don’t think it’s okay to not be truthful, and I don’t want to
be on the record not being truthful, and I don’t think I ever was. Never.” Finally, Civil Servant 6
concurred that “the first rule is, don’t lie, and I think everybody in public affairs learns that. You
can never lie, you can not confirm, you can do other things, but you just can’t lie.”
Thus, the government officials were adamant that they did not lie to reporters. However,
the responses of the majority of reporters tell a different story.
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Reporters on Lying
To independently corroborate the responses of government officials on whether they ever
lied to reporters, I used the responses of reporters to my question of whether they became aware
of practices that public affairs appointees engaged in which they felt were inappropriate. If
reporters did not respond by indicating that the officials had lied to them, I asked them directly
whether they thought that the officials had done so.
Interestingly, reporters had widely divergent views of whether public affairs officials lie
to them. Three reporters believed public affairs officials did not lie, one reported that it happened
very rarely, and three believed they lied fairly frequently.
Reporters 1 and 6 did not believe that a government public affairs official had ever lied to
them. For Reporter 1, “sometimes they would be adamant in presenting their position and
somewhat unwilling to even concede there might be alternative viewpoints, but no one ever lied
to me, that’s for sure, or if they did, I certainly didn’t know it.” Similarly, Reporter 6 indicated
that he “can’t think of an instance in which anything anyone told me was outside the bounds of
interpretation you’d take if you were in that person’s shoes, and the person on the other side had
his fingers crossed, saying, ‘I hope he doesn’t realize what’s really going on.’” Reporter 5
indicated that government spokespeople engaged “more in just withholding information” and
therefore they “may not … outright lie, but by not telling me particular things they do know, the
story I write is less factual, because I haven’t gotten the information.”
Reporter 7 indicated that, on average, once every two years a government public affairs
official had engaged in a practice he would describe as untruthful, including a few cases where
officials had “actively denied something they definitely knew was happening” or had
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misrepresented the terms under which they were providing him with information he believed to
be exclusive.
By contrast, Reporters 2, 3, and 4 believed that public affairs officers lied rather
regularly, although Reporter 3’s definition of “lying” was very similar to Reporter 5’s definition
of withholding. Reporter 3 indicated that often he would know from other sources that the
Treasury was about to do something or a decision had already been made, but appointees would
say that it was not final or complete because their definition of something being complete was
when the press release was issued:

Sometimes it was not big stuff, so I’m giving you a mild one to make the point. The
Secretary will travel to Chicago and I ask and they say nothing is final or complete, but
it’s bullshit, because it has been [finalized]. Two hours later, they put out the release
announcing it. The decision was made [when he asked]. Is that lying? It’s up to you, it’s
pretty damn close, but it’s completely disingenuous, it’s not honest, let’s put it that way.
Usually most of the time people who are speaking to press are careful not to say a
technical lie, for fear it will come back. One, they could get caught and, two, it really can
hurt their credibility, but you don’t want to word something in such a precise way you’re
clearly lying, so [appointees] talk around it.

Reporters 2 and 4 were even clearer that the behavior of public affairs officers met the
literal definition of lying. “I don’t understand how you can survive in that role without shading
the truth in some way, because if you were to simply stick to pure fact, everything you say would
sound like it came out of a CBO [Congressional Budget Office] report,” Reporter 2 said. When I
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asked if he found such shading to be disingenuous, he answered affirmatively. “There’s no way
someone can come up with a budget and claim they truly believe it will lead to a balanced budget
in five years,” he argued. “In that case, they are lying. And it happens in both [Democratic and
Republican] administrations.” He reported that he had had “many” such experiences.
Like Reporter 3, Reporter 2 also indicated that appointees, but not civil servants, would
occasionally misdirect him and indicate that something was not going to happen shortly before it
did actually happen. At times, this would be the case because the appointees did not know what
was happening, and, at other times, it was deliberate. Sometimes, according to Reporter 2,
appointees would do this so that they could release the information he had in a different
publication. By contrast, he said civil servants would typically release information to all
reporters at the same time.
Finally, while Reporter 4 indicated that he did not know how often civil servants working
in public affairs had lied to him, it was “certainly not an uncommon experience” to be lied to by
a political appointee, and it was “endemic” during the financial crisis:

It was not infrequent during the financial crisis that a public affairs official would assert
or deny something, and it would turn out to be the opposite. I’m willing to accept [that]
sometimes they were ignorant and, in good faith, telling what they knew or concealing a
fact they didn’t know, but … Not infrequently, they were willfully attempting to mislead
and steer away from stories and alter coverage not just by arguing for an interpretation
but by representing that there were facts I needed to consider even when those details
were not true.
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Reporter 4 indicated that his news organization came to distrust the Treasury and the
Federal Reserve so deeply that, while his media outlet would still report what officials said on
the record, they would no longer believe officials who told them off the record that they were
wrong. “Whereas, at the beginning of the crisis, we would have given significant pause to
moving forward if Treasury or the Fed said ‘you’re headed in the wrong direction,’ we simply
wouldn’t accept it from Treasury or the Fed, because we had been lied to too often,” he said.
Reporter 4, who reported for a media outlet popularly viewed as liberal, indicated that “some of
the worst lies” were told under the Bush administration at the start of the financial crisis, and
while there was an initial “honeymoon” period under the Obama administration, “in time, we
reached the same conclusion. There was a fundamental problem of trust.” (The government, of
course, faced the same problem of lack of media trust during the Vietnam war, when military
briefings came to be referred to by reporters as the “five o’clock follies.”) (Connable, 7).
Reporter 4 indicated that the problem had diminished simply because the crisis has
receded and there is less “context of crisis or new policies moving forward.” He indicated that
such outright lying seemed to be less prevalent among civil servants, because “they are willing to
say a lot less; the degree of dialogue is very different. They tend not to be players in the great
game in the same way. Not that it never happens, but it’s less frequent, because of both their
means and [their] motive.”
It therefore appears that about half the reporters who cover the Treasury seem satisfied
with the ethics of the government spokespeople with whom they work. Reporter 6, for example,
described a “real sensitivity to the ethics rules” among both appointees and civil servants, “to the
point where people wouldn’t even let you buy them a coffee.” He emphasized that there were no
attempts at “trading access, [such as suggestions that] ‘we could get you this access to this
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person, but you have to guarantee the story will look this way.’” But especially for Reporter 4,
and to an important extent for Reporter 3 and a significant extent for Reporter 2, the information
they received from government spokespeople was often not to be trusted, and they were much
more likely to blame appointees than civil servants for lying.
This suggests that, contrary to the claims of the government officials, appointees may in
fact sometimes engage in the mistruths that McClellan described as being part of the permanent
campaign in government.

VII. Lying to Make the President Look Good
As a further test of the presence of a permanent campaign, I asked the government
officials whether they believed that it would be possible for someone else holding their position
to tell untruths to make the president look good, and whether they or their colleagues had ever
attempted to do so.
Bush Appointee 5 claimed not to know, and one Obama appointee and one Bush
appointee believed that this would not be possible. Otherwise, all of the appointees believed that
it would, in fact, be possible for a Treasury spokesperson to do so. In the words of Bush
Appointee 4, “yeah, I guess it’s absolutely possible for people to lie to the press without getting
found out, because some people are really good at lying and unethical.” However, many
appointees acknowledged that the repercussions could be severe because, as Obama Appointee 1
explained, “you run the risk of getting caught if the truth comes out later.” Bush Appointee 2
explained that “as a spokesperson, your job is built on trust, trust of the people that work with
you and [of the] reporters you interact with, and once you cross that barrier and give out false
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information, that trust is ruined, and you’re no longer capable of effectively doing your job.”
Obama Appointee 2 used the example of when State Department spokesperson Jen Psaki
told reporters in July 2013 that Secretary of State John Kerry was not on his boat in Nantucket as
a crisis unfolded in Egypt, and photographs later emerged of Kerry on his boat. Obama
Appointee 3 indicated that a Treasury spokesperson could lie “very easily” but indicated it would
be “harder about the President,” while Obama Appointee 5 predicted that a spokesperson could
lose their job for doing so. Bush Appointee 3 likewise argued, “it’s D.C., this kind of crap
happens all the time, but I think that person should be held accountable.”
Obama Appointee 4 indicated that it would not be possible, because “I don’t think you’d
be able to get through the level of clearance you’d be required to get through to put out
something, because Treasury is a … building that prides itself on putting out good facts.” Obama
Appointee 4 indicated that reporters had told him that Treasury does not put out the kind of
“spin” they get from the White House. Later in the conversation, he explained, for example, that
a Treasury spokesperson had refused to go along with a White House attempt to claim that the
country had recouped all of the money it lent to General Motors under President Obama but not
under President Bush – a claim that was “ridiculous” and “stupid.”
While all of the Obama appointees indicated that their Treasury colleagues had never
made such an attempt to lie for the President, several of the appointees volunteered that they
suspected others in the administration of doing so. Like Bush Appointee 3, who said these things
happened frequently in Washington, Obama Appointee 4 indicated that “there were certain
things said by the White House that were not technically true, on numerous occasions, regarding
one of the President’s signature initiatives.” Bush Appointee 4 said “there are people who think
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lying is part of the job – some people in other parts of the administration.” Bush Appointee 1 told
me to “call [the Department of] State, they would have done anything to make Bush look good.”
Most of the seven civil servants believed that it would be possible to lie for the president,
though all indicated that they had never done so and were not aware of instances in which
colleagues had done so. Civil Servant 1 believed that it was possible and that “politicals… do it
all the time.” Civil Servant 4 concurred that “anything’s possible,” while Civil Servant 5
concurred, “as long as they never got caught.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6, using the example of
Lara Logan’s interview on CBS’s “60 Minutes” with a security contractor who falsely claimed to
have been present during the attack on the U.S. embassy in Benghazi, Libya, explained that
“anytime anyone has access to a reporter, they can tell whatever they want and if they can back it
up enough, then it’ll get written about … it’s just a matter of relationships, you can get away
with it.” Civil Servant 7 initially said it would not be possible, but was later able to envision a
scenario in which his boss met the president and he shared what the president said. Although
Civil Servant 7 had previously admitted to leaking during our interview, he indicated that in such
a circumstance, “my attitude is, that’s a personal conversation [between his boss and the
president] and I have no business” sharing it.
Two of the civil servants indicated that it would not be possible to lie for the president.
Civil Servant 2 explained that “we hardly ever deal with anything related to the president as far
as the press. We definitely support what the president is trying to do from an economic
standpoint, but if someone is looking for comment such as that, they go to [the appointees at]
main Treasury.” Civil Servant 3 explained, “we’re not in the business of trying to make people
look good; we’re just trying to do our jobs.”

276

These responses call into question the claims of government officials that they had never
lied to the press – claims which were disputed by most reporters. Here, the majority of both
appointees and civil servants indicated that it would be possible to lie for the president. While
they all claimed to have never done so, interestingly, appointees in both administrations
indicated that they had knowledge that their colleagues had done so. Thus, while the particular
appointees who I interviewed may have never personally lied to the press, it is evident that
appointees under both administrations did so – although unclear whether these appointees were
in government agencies and/or the White House.

VIII. Crafting Narratives
Next, in an effort to determine how the government officials attempted to shape the
information they provided to reporters to their advantage, I asked them what percentage of the
messages they sought to promulgate they would describe as ideas (like ways of viewing
particular things) and narratives, as well as how they developed and sculpted narratives to make
their points. This measure was designed to determine whether they ever distorted information in
the process.
Most appointees indicated that narratives and ideas were very important. Obama
Appointee 1 explained that “virtually everything presented you try to shape with some aspect of
narrative. There are very few points where it’s a pure data point divorced from any context or
narrative.” Obama Appointee 2 would say to reporters, “here’s our idea and here are the facts to
back it up,” and Obama Appointee 5 likewise explained that he would share “both a story and a
fact.” Obama Appointee 3 explained, “you’ve got to put everything in context … putting it in a
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way people understand … matters more than anything else.” The Obama appointees’ estimates
of how much of the information they shared consisted of ideas and narratives (as opposed to
straight facts such as numbers) included under fifty percent (which I counted as 49 percent) and
“virtually everything” (which I counted as 99 percent), for an average of 53.1 percent.
With the exception of Bush Appointee 5, who declared that he could not remember
before I had an opportunity finish asking the question aloud, the responses of the Bush
appointees were broadly similar. They estimated that, on average, 48.75 percent of their
messages consisted of ideas and narratives. Bush Appointee 1 explained that he “split my time
between almost acting as a data processor for reporters calling with generic questions they need
answers to, versus getting out there and doing more suasion through ‘here’s what we believe and
think, here’s our goal in all of this.’”
Appointees varied in the tactics they used to develop and sculpt narratives to make their
points. Obama Appointee 1 explained that the way to sculpt narratives is to “make
announcements which are colored with your message, infused with your message, make an
announcement you did [X], which is a natural news hook, but infuse it with quotes and other
surrounding information which makes a case for why the actions you took were correct, so each
news hook is an opportunity to infuse your [messages].” Obama Appointee 4 explained, “we
looked for one-off stories to show how [an outcome they opposed] was bad, tried to find points
in the data we could present to folks.” Obama Appointee 5 explained that “a small group would
have a conversation about what we thought a good story would be and how to tell the story and
then develop tactics, like write a press release, write a fact sheet or blog post, find a real person
validator, put someone else in the administration on the phone, [think about] who are the best
spokespeople for this, and, of course, do we want to do background, on the record, whatever, and
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it would vary from issue to issue, but there were a whole slew of tactics. We could write an oped … what would reporters be open to or find most useful on the issues?”
Bush Appointee 4 explained that, to sculpt narratives, he “thought of a reasonable person
in my head and [would] tell a story … and include hard, presentable facts [and] good analysis.”
Bush Appointee 1 likewise explained that “usually some person would come up with a good
narrative or example, let’s say … that helps to explain the issue [we were] working on … It’s
usually very helpful to reporters to have a common sense example. It started out as a team effort;
I would take notes.” Bush Appointee 2 explained that sculpting narratives required “obviously
always keeping the administration’s position overall in line and trying to put it in the context of
what will support economic growth and job creation.”
The percent of messages promulgated by civil servants that were ideas or narratives
ranged from zero to “almost all” (which I counted as ninety-nine percent in my calculation), for
an average of nearly forty-three percent. However, Civil Servant 1, who replied “almost all,”
clarified that “it’s almost all narratives, meaning ‘here’s the story without interpretation.’” This
may have therefore overrepresented the amount of actual narrative in the average, since I
considered narratives to generally include interpretation and believe the other civil servants did,
as well.
To sculpt his narratives, Civil Servant 1 explained that he would approach his principals,
“asking them, ‘what would you like the newspaper to say about you, if you could write the
story?’” For Civil Servant 2, it was about looking “for end beneficiaries, real life stories,” a
strategy also echoed by Civil Servant 5. Civil Servant 3 would “write the best press releases we
can. Factual, to the point, here’s what we do, here’s the benefit to the public, [here’s] why we
want the public to do what we want them to do.” Similarly, Civil Servant 6 would “build
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narratives around the trends and patterns” in data. Civil Servant 4 would add context based upon
his bureau’s previous work. Civil Servant 7 would put his bureau’s work in the context of the
“traditions and values of the country.”
The descriptions of both groups regarding their work generally did not evince permanent
campaign tactics. For example, with the exception of Bush Appointee 2, none of the government
officials indicated that they sculpted narratives by considering what would work to the
president’s advantage or what the American people wanted to hear. Many made clear, by
contrast, that their messages were ultimately grounded in facts. Of course, their descriptions do
not definitively prove that they did not engage in permanent campaign tactics which they chose
not to share in these descriptions of their work, but they were generally not evident in my
discussions of this question with the government officials. The fact that nearly as much
information released by civil servants consisted of ideas and narratives in comparison with their
appointee counterparts also suggests a perhaps unappreciated degree of sophistication among the
careerists.

VIX. How the Government Officials Handled Damaging Information
In a final attempt to measure permanent campaign tactics, I asked the government
officials how their offices determined how to handle information that was potentially damaging
or embarrassing. Nearly every official indicated that they began preparing immediately for the
release of the information. An exception to this was Bush Appointee 5, who first indicated “we
had meetings” and then changed his story and stated with a straight face that, during his time as a
spokesperson for the Treasury during the height of the nation’s financial crisis, he had never had
to handle negative information.
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The other Treasury spokespeople generally began preparing for the information to come
out. They believed that even classified information might leak; one Bush appointee recounted
how a Treasury official spent three years preparing for information to leak on a top-secret
Treasury initiative tracking the finances of potential terrorists by using data from the Society for
Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (SWIFT). In Juan Zarate’s account of this
incident in Treasury’s War, he explained that when the highly-sensitive and classified operation
finally leaked to the press, the Treasury’s top public affairs appointee, Tony Fratto, “was
surprised it had taken so long.” (2013, 269).
Appointees differed in their views of whether the release of sensitive or damaging
information was inevitable. Obama Appointee 2 explained, “I don’t think we have power in
those positions to stop negative stories from coming” out. However, Obama Appointee 1
explained that, if it was judged likely a story would go public, it often made sense to release it
preemptively. To do this, a spokesperson would “just release it yourself … with the, spin is a
loaded word, but its … best face or argument attached, so the first way someone counters it is
accompanied by your message.” At other times, “if you think you can continue to avoid a story,
you might take that chance and hope it doesn’t detonate.” Obama Appointee 4 concurred that “if
there was something terrible, we wouldn’t necessarily release it ourselves, but prepare, assuming
it will come out.” However, Obama Appointee 1 explained that “often you get out in front,
because if it detonates unexpectedly in ways you don’t expect or understand, that’s a much
higher risk, particularly in an election year.”
Interestingly, when asked how they would handle damaging information, three of the
seven civil servants indicated that would confer with Treasury appointees, while a fourth civil
servant indicated that he would confer “up the chain of command” within his own bureau. Civil
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Servant 3 explained, “we will always seek guidance from the political public affairs staff and see
how they want to handle it, and follow what they say to do. I would never say something they
didn’t want us to say.” Civil Servant 2 indicated that he would approach Treasury public affairs
appointees with a recommended course of action.
The other three civil servants indicated that they would release the information. “In my
experience,” Civil Servant 5 explained, “the way the administration always starts is with a plant.
Give it exclusively to one reporter to get the story out in a way they think will be more favorable,
or at least more fair.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6 explained, “usually the best tactic is to get
everything out as soon as you can. It’s worse to have the story bleed out than to at least get some
credit for being transparent and honest and as open as possible.” Civil Servant 7 also indicated
that “we’re full disclosure, if we have problems … we tell the truth,” although, when pressed, he
explained that “we don’t go out and say, ‘guess what happened?’ but if they ask the question,
absolutely.”
Two of my interview subjects who were familiar with the 2013 scandal in which the IRS
was accused of conducting politically motivated investigations into organizations which applied
for tax-exempt status recounted the incident in a way that suggests that the strategy of
preemptive release has become such an article of faith among spokespeople that they sometimes
do so even when it may not serve the interests of their organizations. In this instance, with an
Inspector General preparing to release a report requested by Congress into the matter, Lois
Lerner, Director of the IRS Exempt Organizations division, decided to proactively announce the
allegations against her agency publicly.
One appointee made clear that Lerner did so against the advice of Treasury public affairs
appointees, who had advised the IRS repeatedly that it would be better to wait for the Inspector
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General’s report, which exonerated the agency. While the final discussions prior to Lerner’s
announcement happened among more senior administration officials who did not work in public
affairs, it is interesting that the Treasury public affairs appointees were aware that Lerner would
speak publicly and tried to deter this action numerous times, but ultimately did not prevent her
from doing so. One appointee told me that this was the case because Treasury “still wanted them
to be their own agency” and therefore “would just strongly discourage or strongly encourage.”
On the one hand, this suggests that appointees ultimately exert less control than we might expect
over the actions of career staff; on the other hand, the situation was so damaging to the
president’s reputation that it seems reasonable to suggest that appointees might have learned a
lesson and be even more assertive with their bureaus in the future.
Additionally, the incident illustrates how the interests of appointees and civil servants
will not always align. One appointee was clear that, during the IRS scandal, Treasury appointees
tried to direct blame towards the IRS as opposed to the administration, though he argued this was
warranted because “I mean, they just really, really fucked up.” This was not the only example of
such conflicts. An appointee also described how, during the 2013 government shutdown, a
Treasury bureau wanted to avoid highlighting the fact that citizens could not access its services,
while appointees “loved those stories because we were like, ‘see, this is awful,’ so there were a
few occasions like that and times when agencies were used as a scapegoat … a little bit ‘cause it
was politically advantageous.” However, this appointee emphasized that “generally, like, you try
to protect your bureaus, even if they don’t think you’re trying to help them.”
I judged another example of this practice of pre-emptive release of negative information,
this time shared by a Bush appointee, to be one of the most ethically questionable tactics of
which I learned in this project. A Bush appointee described how, as discussed above, the New
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York Times learned that the administration was tracking financial transactions through SWIFT as
part of its anti-terror efforts, without obtaining Congressional approval or individual warrants or
subpoenas. The appointee indicated that Treasury public affairs appointees and attorneys worked
for months with the Times to convince the paper that the practice was legal and that they should
not run the story because it would jeopardize their counter-terrorism efforts. The appointee
familiar with this incident believed the Times was publishing it “just to be assholes, frankly.”
When the Bush administration learned that the paper had decided to move ahead with the story,
they gave the story to the Wall Street Journal in an effort to achieve more favorable coverage.
The appointee indicated that the decision to give the story to the Journal was personally
approved by President Bush, making it clear that it was not undertaken lightly.
I nevertheless considered the practice to be ethically questionable, since the Times had
clearly invested significant staff time and expense in order to obtain the story. The story
published by the Times indicated that they had interviewed “nearly twenty current and former
government officials and industry executives.” (Lichtblau and Risen 2006). A subsequent letter
by Times Managing Editor Bill Keller evinced the extent of the work the paper had invested in
the piece, explaining that “our decision to publish the story of the Administration’s penetration
of the international banking system followed weeks of discussion between Administration
officials and The Times, not only the reporters who wrote the story but senior editors, including
me. We listened patiently and attentively. We discussed the matter extensively within the paper.
We spoke to others – national security experts not serving in the Administration – for their
counsel.” Furthermore, Zarate, who served as deputy national security adviser during the
incident, wrote that he believed that the Times “thought they had found another … program
worthy of … perhaps another Pulitzer prize.” (2013, 272). Reporters build their careers and
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media organizations earn their reputations and revenue in part through such enterprise
journalism. In this sense, it appears unjust for appointees to take the work of one company and
give it for free to another company which it prefers on a partisan basis – although in this case the
Bush administration likely felt justified in undertaking such strong-arm tactics by their belief that
the Times’ decision to publish the story was politically motivated and endangered the nation. As
previously discussed, more than one reporter indicated that government public affairs officials
will do this. However, while I consider this tactic to generally be wrong, it does not fall under
my definition of the permanent campaign.
In general, however, while many of the government officials indicated that they often
released damaging information because they believed it was in the best interests of their offices
to do so on their own terms, it was also clear that appointees sometimes withheld this
information and hoped the media would not uncover it. Of course, since nearly all of the civil
servants indicated they would either defer to Treasury public affairs appointees or release the
information (with the exception of a single civil servant who would elevate the issue within his
bureau, which has political leadership), it appeared that this practice of withholding damaging
information was practiced mainly by appointees. To be sure, it is unsurprising that any individual
or organization might not wish to proactively promote information that sullies their reputation.
Indeed, what is perhaps most remarkable is the major proclivity of Treasury spokespeople to
preemptively release such information. Nevertheless, the responses also offered some evidence
of withholding by appointees – a central component of McClellan’s permanent campaign.

Possible Causal Factors

285

As expected, there was little difference in the degree to which the appointees and civil servants
engaged in the tactics of the permanent campaign (although appointees were significantly more
likely to withhold information from the press). This section will next consider whether, as
hypothesized, the reason that appointees did not engage in more permanent campaign tactics was
because their large workloads precluded them from doing so. I then explore whether or not the
government officials were motivated by the goal of the permanent campaign, which is to build
support for the president. Finally, I will consider whether those officials who studied journalism
in school were less willing to withhold or manipulate information requested by the press.

I. Workloads
I next sought to determine whether the reason why appointees did not practice most
permanent campaign tactics was because they lacked the time to do so. This data in this section,
and the following section on how the officials allocated their time, was also considered as a
possible causal factor for the relative efficacy of appointees and civil servants in chapter 4. I first
asked the government officials whether their workloads were reasonable. Although I asked this
as a serious question, many of the appointees responded by laughing, because the suggestion that
their workload might be manageable was such an outlandish proposition for them.
As Obama Appointee 2 explained, “from the day you signed on, to the day you left, you
were never not on the clock. Not to complain about it, because I enjoyed it, but it’s not
reasonable, it’s not normal.” Obama Appointee 3 concurred, “I enjoyed it, but it was insane.
Absolutely insane.” Sharing gossip about a senior administration communications official who
he heard had just been quietly hospitalized, not for the first time, he argued, “it’s scary in this
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administration. Scary.” He explained that he, too, was “totally frayed by the end … It’s hard to
drink from a fire hose and learn at the same time. That I found the most difficult part.” Obama
Appointee 5 explained that there were “times where it felt like I couldn’t breathe because I
couldn’t figure out what to do next.” He explained that he would “work weekends, until the
minute you close your eyes at night until you pick up your Blackberry at 6 a.m. and start” and
that because such overtime was never compensated, the work was “half volunteer, but it does
great things for our careers and its exciting work.” Obama Appointee 4 explained that his
portfolio “was so broad that … there were all kinds of things that you could focus on, that
oftentimes it was overwhelming.”
Bush Appointee 1 explained, “in government you worked your butt off all the time” and
he was “crazy busy, but also look at what you are doing.” One Bush appointee also reported that
he found his present, demanding position with a major Wall Street firm to be “normal” in
comparison. Bush Appointee 2 compared his “normal workload” of twelve to thirteen hour days
before the financial crisis favorably with his work during the crisis, because beforehand “it was
nothing where I was going too out of my mind.” Bush Appointee 3 explained that “I loved the
job … there’s very high expectations and you don’t really have an option, because you’re there
to work your tail off.” Later, when I asked him whether he or his colleagues had ever attempted
to tell untruths to make the president look good, he explained that he did not “have much time to
think about [doing] that” in his job.
While the civil servants likewise generally described their jobs as demanding, it was
evident that they were not working around the clock or finding their jobs to be “insane” or
causing “scary” personal problems. Civil Servant 1 explained that he generally stopped checking
his Blackberry at 7:00 pm on weeknights; Civil Servant 3 explained that he “probably put in nine
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or ten hours a day, but I know there are public affairs people who work twelve hours a day; I’m
just not willing to do that anymore.” Civil Servant 4 described his workload as “reasonable; it’s
manageable;” Civil Servant 6 explained that his workload was reasonable because his policy
portfolio was “pretty narrow” and therefore “I rarely work weekends or need to respond then …
and I’m usually home by 6:30 or seven and rarely respond in the evening,” with no early
mornings, either. Civil Servant 7 explained that “it’s a lot less intense of an environment here”
than in his previous public affairs positions.
It seemed clear from these responses that civil servants were generally hardworking, but
the workloads of appointees were of a very different order. Of course, appointees generally
indicated that they loved and were happy to be doing their jobs; one appointee in particular who
later went on to another post considered very enviable in his field described his time at Treasury
as “one of the happiest times of my life.” Nevertheless, the responses of appointees made it clear
that their workloads were, at least at times, unmanageable. As discussed in chapter 5, Obama
Appointee 3 also indicated he did not have time to think, while Obama Appointee 5 described
executing strategies requested by his superiors against his better judgment because, “in this job,
you’re so exhausted and there’s so much to do, that you just want to move on.” (While
proclaiming to work long hours is often a point of pride and even an assertion of one’s
importance in Washington, D.C., the appointees often indicated that they found their workloads
to be too large to reasonably manage – a claim which I would not expect to be driven by pride.)
To further investigate my hypothesis that the massive workloads of appointees precluded
them from engaging in a permanent campaign, I next asked the government officials to estimate
how they spent their time.
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II. Time Spent Pitching, Responding, and Crafting Strategy
For insight into how they spent their time and another measure of the capacity of the
individuals to engage in the proactive tactics of the permanent campaign, I asked the government
officials how much of their time they spent pitching stories to reporters, how much time they
spent responding to inquiries from reporters, and how much time they spent crafting and
implementing strategies to attain desired coverage. (I indicated to my interview subjects that I
did not necessarily expect their percentages to add up to one hundred, since I realized that they
might also do other things with their time).
The average Obama appointee estimated that he spent just seventeen percent of his time
pitching stories. While Bush Appointee 5 could not recall how much time he spent on any of
these activities, the other Bush appointees estimated that they spent on average twenty-four
percent of their time pitching stories to press, a number skewed upwards by one appointee whose
policy portfolio was new and therefore indicated that he needed to spend more time pitching.
Obama appointees on average reported spending fifty-three percent of their time responding to
reporters’ inquiries and thirty-one percent of their time crafting strategies to achieve desired
coverage. Bush appointees on average estimated that they spent 37.5 percent of their time
responding to reporters and twenty-five percent of their time crafting and implementing strategy.
Civil servants spent on average nine percent of their time pitching stories, twenty-eight percent
of their time responding to media inquiries, and thirty percent of their time crafting and
implementing strategy. These numbers are skewed downwards by a civil servant who had
numerous other responsibilities and therefore spent only about eighteen percent of his time on
media relations. (See chapter 4, table 1).
As previously discussed, Obama Appointee 4 explained that his portfolio “was so broad
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that … there were all kinds of things that you could focus on, that oftentimes it was
overwhelming, plus we rarely even got to do any of the proactive stuff on this because so much
of what I dealt with was incoming questions from reporters.” Obama Appointee 5 concurred that
“this is probably a shortfall of the department – there was very little time spent thinking about
proactive stories.” He explained that “we don’t have resources to be creative. We don’t have
time to talk about things different from what’s happening during the day. There’s a job to do, it’s
a terribly difficult one; you just have to focus on doing it and not screwing up. There’s no time to
do anything else and no resources.” Obama Appointee 1 also indicated that “we didn’t do enough
pitching,” while Obama Appointee 2 explained, “a lot of it was so reactive … there’s just so
much incoming” and Obama Appointee 3 explained, “I played a lot of defense.”
Bush Appointee 1 likewise explained that “you want to say [that] being proactive is
ninety percent of the job, but it isn’t. You’re trying to keep your head above water in that job.
You just have very little time in the day left to say, ‘let’s get proactive, who should we call?’ At
the end of the day, it’s what you have the least time for.”
Civil Servant 1 explained that he did almost no pitching because every time he suggested
it, the idea was shot down by his civil service superiors; “it may be a civil service mentality, they
don’t feel like we want to push anything, we’re happy to respond but don’t see that as our job to
push an issue.” He did indicate, however, that Treasury appointees made major announcements
on behalf of his bureau and that they sometimes utilized outside contractors for promotional
purposes, who pitched stories. The actual strategy he described using when his agency did pitch
stories, however, was particularly sophisticated. He explained that he used a platform which
employs Boolean logic to target reporters across the nation who have previously reported on
similar topics and therefore might be most interested in writing about his programs.
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In sum, appointees claim to have spent, very roughly, 45.25 percent of their time
responding to reporters. This still seemingly left the majority of their time to act proactively.
They spent 20.5 percent of their time pitching stories and twenty-eight percent of their time
pursuing proactive strategies, seemingly leaving time for them to engage in permanent campaign
tactics. By contrast, despite their more manageable workloads, civil servants spent less time
responding to media inquiries (twenty-eight percent of their time) and significantly less time
pitching (just nine percent of their time), however they spent slightly more of their time crafting
and implementing strategy (thirty percent of their time). Of course, these estimates are rough;
nevertheless, despite the at times “overwhelming” amount of work appointees faced, it appears
that opportunities nevertheless remained to implement the permanent campaign. Therefore, my
hypothesis that the massive workloads of appointees precluded them from engaging in a
permanent campaign was not proven.

III. End Goals of their Work
To assess their motivations and to what degree they were focused on the goal of the
permanent campaign, which is to build public support for the president, I first asked the
appointees and civil servants to describe the ultimate goals of their work and what they were
trying to achieve each day. Both the Obama and Bush appointees were clear that key goals were
to inform the people about their work and to promote the work of the administration for which
they served, while civil servants generally reported that they informed the people and promoted
the bureaus for which they served.
Obama Appointee 1 explained that his goal was “making sure the public was informed
about the work of the agency but also advancing the administration and president I believed in.”
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For Obama Appointee 2, “the ultimate goals were definitely to preserve a favorable opinion on
what we were doing – to communicate but to do it in a favorable way.” Obama Appointee 4 said
“the ultimate goal was twofold, especially given the time period … First, to defend the
administration’s response to the Great Recession and, second, to show how the administration’s
economic policies were best for our economy and our nation.” Obama Appointee 5 explained
that he pursued twin goals of “trying to explain in plain English” what the Treasury was doing
and “to dispel all the myths, rumors and misinformation out there on a lot of the initiatives.”
However, later in our conversation, Obama Appointee 5 explained that “there is no
sophistication, no targeting, no message testing, but in the end, your goal is to not fuck up. There
were times we could see the splash ad in the re-elect [campaign] and that was something we
were very conscious of avoiding: could this have a negative impact in the next campaign?
Everyone just wants to avoid that and Republicans want to find it. Civil servants have never
thought that way, but no appointee didn’t think a number of times, ‘is this going to be used
against the president?’”
The responses of the Bush appointees were very similar. Bush Appointee 1 explained that
his goals were to “educate, inform, and support the administration.” Bush Appointee 4 explained
that “I thought about just faithfully representing the views of the administration. That was really
important. The second part, really … is education. I always thought we had an obligation to try
to educate, [but] if I’m being honest, one came first, [and] education second, but it was really
important.”
Civil servants, by contrast, described their goals as being to inform the people and, often,
to present their bureaus favorably. Civil Servant 1 explained that his job was to explain “here’s
what we do, here’s why we do it.” While he explained that “the big thing, ideally [what] I want
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people to understand [is] what we do,” he added that he also had a “wish list: I would really like
people to understand the commitment in my organization to good government, to trying to do the
best they can all the time, finding better ways to do things. In the civil service, there are so many
people committed to doing things better, regardless of political leanings.” Later in our
conversation, he explained that “I don’t think, for me, it’s ever appropriate to try to help or hurt
an administration.”
Civil Servant 2 explained that his ultimate goal was to help people understand the work
his bureau was doing, but “underneath that would be the message” about why his work was the
right thing to do. Civil Servant 4 explained his end goals as “very bland: to educate and inform
about the agency’s mission and activities.” Civil Servant 6 indicated “we’re trying to make sure
that my agency is represented fairly, perceived fairly, and the work it does on behalf of the
American people is recognized in a positive way.”
In this sense, like the political appointees, the civil servants were not only attempting to
inform the American people about their work, but also to convince them why their work made
sense and to build support for the government. The only difference, then, was that civil servants
were trying to burnish the images of their bureaus, while appointees focused on the president and
the administration’s partisan goals. Nevertheless, because the president is responsible for the
functioning of the entire government, the efforts of civil servants to promote the good work of
their bureaus clearly stood to ultimately redound to the chief executive’s benefit. Ultimately,
however, it appeared from these responses that appointees, but not civil servants, shared the goal
of the permanent campaign: building public support for the president, despite the fact that they
did not largely avail themselves of permanent campaign tactics.
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IV. Building Support for the President
To understand the motivations of both groups more deeply, and how they related to the
goal of the permanent campaign, I followed up on the above question by asking outright, “in
doing your job, to what degree is your end goal to build public support for the president?”
Obama Appointee 1 described it as “fifty-fifty of advancing the president versus keeping
the public informed about the agency’s operations.” Obama Appointee 2 said building support
for the president was “definitely at the heart of the end goal. At the end of the day he is the big
boss, so of course that’s part of my role. The steps would be to do my job and make sure I’m
getting as much positive coverage as possible, dealing with the negative stories, trying to
mitigate the potential for those to have a bad impact.” Obama Appointee 4 explained that “a lot
of the work we did was to try to show how dumb the [Republican presidential candidate Mitt]
Romney” economic proposals were.
Bush Appointee 2 explained, “absolutely, if you are part of an administration and
especially a major cabinet agency, you’re always responsible for forwarding the president’s
agenda, and so my role would be to not only explain the administration’s position, but also to get
down to the level where reporters, whether they agreed with a position or not, understood where
we were coming from.” For Bush Appointee 4, “I thought the best way to earn support for the
president was to earn support for his policies, so I thought about the policies, I was a true
believer on the policies, and if we could really just sell them on the policies, some of that would
accrue to the president.” Bush Appointee 3 explained that “I think, yeah, everything we did, in a
small part of everything was, ‘is this going to reflect poorly on the president’s administration or
not?’” The exception was Bush Appointee 5, who indicated that he could not remember.
Obama Appointee 5 was the only appointee to respond that he did not “feel like any of
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the goal was to build public support for the president, because I think that’s up to Organizing for
America and the political arms of the organization. I think the job was more to make sure the
public knew what the president was working on and the secretary, why they made this decision
based on how it would impact lives, and to help them understand, especially given how complex
the issues were that we talk about. If this doesn’t happen, the interest rate on your car could go
up.” Here, however, the difference appeared to be semantic, since, as Bush Appointee 4
explained, it is reasonable to assume that building support for the president’s policies should
ultimately result in increased support for the president.
By contrast, almost all of the civil servants indicated that building support for the
president was not their goal. In the words of Civil Servant 4, “that’s not a factor;” in the words of
Civil Servant 5, “Lordy, thank God” that is not part of the job description. Civil Servant 7
explained, “you know, I’ve never even thought of it that way. What we do is so apolitical,” while
Civil Servant 3 explained that the work of his bureau is “essential to just the good functioning of
government” and “we have to do [the bureau’s work] whether there’s a Democratic or
Republican administration.” Civil Servant 1 indicated, “whether under Obama or Bush, I never
felt like my job was to build support for the president or even to build support for the
government as much as, ‘here’s the organization I work for and here’s the work we do. You may
have heard rumors, but here’s how we do it.’ If people saw the inner workings, I believe what
they’d see is a lot of reasonable people trying hard to do a good job.”
Nevertheless, several civil servants evinced an awareness of political realities and two
explained explicitly that they try to support administration priorities. Civil Servant 2 explained
that he is responsible for “developing flexible talking points that are true and real but can be
utilized with whatever political perspective we’re dealing with.” Likewise, Civil Servant 6

295

explained:

I understand how it works, where the bureaus feed into Treasury, which feeds into the
White House … We’re certainly trying to keep up to date and stay aware of the
administration’s policies and … support their priorities where we can. Treasury has this
weekly report … and it’s a ‘what have you done for us lately’ report, and one of the
things in there is presidential and administration priorities, and we don’t often have
anything to include on that, only because it’s often the Affordable Care Act or something
we don’t have anything to do with, but we remain cognizant of the administration
policies and try to support them when we can. We’re happy to. It’s good for the agency
when we can produce something for the administration.

Likewise, Civil Servant 5 explained that he did defend Obama’s policies: “I explained
them, I knew that was the job I was being asked to do,” though he indicated that his role was
unique and most civil servants were not asked to defend administration policies. Nevertheless, he
argued, “there are smart civil servants at every agency who know that’s an expectation of them if
they’re dealing with the outside world and wouldn’t be speaking publicly unless they were doing
that, and if for any reason they went off message, it’s been my experience they will no longer be
allowed to speak publicly.”
Thus, somewhat surprisingly, several of the purportedly apolitical civil servants
explained that they were aware of and attempted to contribute to the administration’s political
goals – a further indication of their loyalty to the chief executive. It likewise seemed clear from
these responses that appointees were motivated by the goals of the permanent campaign, despite
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the fact that they did not largely engage in the tactics of a permanent campaign.

V. Study of Journalism
I had hypothesized that those government officials who studied journalism would be less
willing to withhold or distort information because of the values they acquired during the course
of their journalism training. Five of the seventeen government officials studied journalism as a
major or minor at the undergraduate or graduate level. However, I did not find the practices of
these officials, as a group, to differ significantly from those of their appointee or careerist
counterparts who did not study journalism, and therefore concluded that this hypothesis could
not be supported.

Differences Between Obama and Bush Administration Tactics
As discussed in chapter 4, reporters overwhelmingly indicated that Obama appointees
were significantly less forthcoming with information than the Bush appointees. I therefore
investigated whether there were differences in the practice of a permanent campaign between the
two administrations by asking many of my interview subjects what they thought accounted for
this difference.
Reporters offered a variety of explanations for why this might be the case. Reporter 1, a
veteran Treasury reporter, had an interesting hypothesis that reporters actually have an easier
relationship with Republican administrations than with Democratic administrations, because
Republicans perceive a liberal media bias:
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With a Republican administration, there’s a sort of understood adversarial relationship;
sometimes with the Democratic administrations, we [would] get the feeling that they
want us to give their side and they don’t want to argue with us, they just want to tell us.
It’s easier to clarify a position by arguing it; a reporter is just naturally adversarial. We
sometimes felt Democratic administrations didn’t understand the value in an adversarial
position as did the Republican administrations, and therefore it took longer and was
sometimes more contentious to sort out and get a full understanding of any issue.

Reporter 7 concurred that “in some ways, Republicans on a superficial level play the
press game a bit better … Which is odd, given the fake belief that the media has a liberal bias.
Maybe it’s compensation for that, or something.”
Reporter 4, who worked for a media outlet popularly perceived as liberal, agreed with the
hypothesis that the adversity Republicans assumed they would face from a more liberal press
actually resulted in better relationships with members of the media:

Republican administrations tend to view the media as more adversarial from the outset
and to treat it – to have a more formal relationship with it … Democrats tend to regard
the media as friendly, or think it ought to be friendly, and to respond with disappointment
and anger when it behaves otherwise. They like the idea and hate the reality of the media
with more intensity than Republican administrations. Republican appointees tend to have
a transactional relationship with the media … They believe you are not on their side and
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aren’t therefore as angry when you are not on their side. The emotional content of the
relationship is much lower with Republican administrations. There is less expectation,
less disappointment, less emotional volatility in the relationship. They understand each
other in a way more accurately. … Republicans don’t expect to have that relationship as a
potential ally, so to the extent we’re less adversarial than they expect, that works to our
advantage, whereas with a Democratic administration we were inevitably a
disappointment, because there’s that expectation of shared sympathies, goals, and
worldview, but the realization that the media has different goals tends to come as a
perpetual shock.

Of course, another possibility not mentioned by the reporters is that, if it is indeed true
that the media has a liberal bias, the reporters themselves were predisposed to like the Obama
administration, and therefore were more surprised and angered when the Obama appointees
withheld information than they would have been with a conservative administration which they
might expect from the outset to be secretive. This might cause the reporters’ criticisms of the
Obama administration to be exaggerated.
Interestingly, Reporter 2, who worked for a media organization popularly perceived as
conservative, was especially critical of the Bush appointees. He believed that higher-level Bush
appointees (who did not work in public affairs) “were more frequently interested in spinning and
shading the truth than the Obama officials” and their spokespeople would convey these points on
behalf of their principals and also provide more opportunities for their principals to make their
cases directly to reporters. Reporter 2 suggested that Republican operatives may have worked
harder to influence the press because they were “trained with the idea of media bias early on”
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and felt that they needed to try especially hard to overcome it. For Reporter 2, this was not a
good thing. He speculated about whether the Bush administration was “so good at spinning, even
on financial and economic issues, that they prevented bad coverage even when the economy was
turning and looking bad,” which caused the media to fail to report earlier warning signs of the
impending 2008 financial crisis. When asked about Bush Appointee 1’s characterization of the
last two years of President Bush’s second term as a period when the administration faced major
hostility from the press, Reporter 2 suggested that the administration might have brought it on
themselves, and it might have reflected backlash from the administration’s earlier excessive spin.
Reporter 2 indicated that he had not perceived differences in the level of sophistication
with which Democrats and Republicans approached the press in covering politics outside of the
presidency and therefore suggested that the differences between the two administrations might
just reflect an “administration-wide cultural approach to not risking information getting out, not
volunteering information” in the Obama administration. Reporter 7 likewise described the
Obama administration as having “a very tightly controlled messaging machine, where there are
not as many people as …. in the Bush administration … empowered to provide actual
information.”
This argument was also recently made in an influential Politico article which alleged that
“conservatives assume a cozy relationship between this White House and the reporters who
cover it. Wrong. Many reporters find Obama himself strangely fearful of talking with them and
often aloof and cocky when he does. They find his staff needlessly stingy with information and
thin-skinned about any tough coverage. He gets more-favorable-than-not coverage because many
staffers are fearful of talking to reporters, even anonymously, and some reporters inevitably
worry access or the chance of a presidential interview will decrease if they get in the face of this
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White House.” (Vandehei and Allen 2013).
As discussed in chapter 2, the Obama administration has also been accused by the press
of being particularly secretive. In 2013, the administration set a record in citing national security
concerns to withhold information from the public 8,496 times (Nicks 2014). The use of this tool,
along with the administration’s pursuit of investigations of the identities of leakers, also led New
York Times editor Jill Abramson to call the Obama administration “the most secretive White
House that I have ever been involved in covering” and former Washington Post editor Leonard
Downie Jr. to describe the administration as the “most secretive and restrictive” administration
since Nixon. (Mirkinson 2014; Dodson 2014).
However, the evidence considered in chapter 2 – including the admissions of President
Bush’s own press secretary – make it difficult to argue that the withholding of information is
confined to the Obama White House. Indeed, Reporter 5 – a veteran of the Treasury press corps
– concurred with Reporters 2 and 7, arguing that “the biggest problem now is that the Treasury
PR strategy is not run by the Treasury, it’s run by the White House and that just adds another
layer and slows down responses to issues oftentimes,” however he indicated that this was not
unique to the Obama administration; “it’s [been happening in] administrations for a long time.”
What may, in fact, be new in the Obama administration is a strategy described by Politico
in which “the president has shut down interviews with many of the White House reporters who
know the most and ask the toughest questions. Instead, he spends way more time talking directly
to voters via friendly shows and media personalities. Why bother with The New York Times beat
reporter when Obama can go on ‘The View’?” Jim Vandehei and Mike Allen argued that new
media and technology has given the Obama administration more options for bypassing the
traditional media, while decreased media budgets have given the mainstream pressed decreased
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bargaining power vis-à-vis the administration (ibid.) However, this does not appear to be a
plausible explanation in the case of the Treasury Department. While the Treasury does utilize a
robust blog to promulgate its views, the financial beat reporters and press still remain the
Treasury’s main vehicle for sharing its news; The View and late-night comedy shows might be
useful in helping the president reach the American people, but they are simply unlikely to cover
the minutiae of economic and financial policy.
Reporter 5 had an alternate hypothesis, however, suggesting that the different
relationships the administrations enjoyed with the press resulted heavily from the levels of
experience of their spokespeople, as opposed to differences in partisan approaches to the press.
He indicated that there were particularly strong spokespeople who had served in both
administrations who had previously served as journalists, and therefore understood what
reporters needed in order to do their jobs. With the exception of during the financial crisis, in
which he found Bush spokespeople to be at the top of their game because “they had to be” given
the gravity of the situation, he did not see overall differences in the sophistication of the Obama
and Bush appointees. He found the idea that the Bush administration’s sophisticated spin could
have precluded reporters from recognizing the impending 2008 financial crisis as laughable,
arguing that “it was not an event that anybody was seeing … none of us working today had
covered the 1929 crash, so we hadn’t experienced the tidal wave that was about to hit us.”
One Bush appointee was adamant that, as Reporters 2 and 7 suspected, Republican
political operatives work harder to influence the press because they perceive themselves to have
a disadvantage. The appointee argued that being a Republican is “like being a woman. You have
to work twice as hard being a Republican, because there’s already a prevailing narrative … so
we try to overcompensate.” This appointee believed that the impact of such Republican efforts
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was ultimately limited, however, because “they’re still gonna prefer Dems at the end of the day.”
However, the appointee indicated that Bush appointees were extremely social with the press,
indicating that “we had a lot of fun with them. We had our own DMZ [de-militarized zone] …
where we could hang out. That was us helping them help us.”
Another Bush appointee agreed with the assertion that Republican press aides work
harder to influence the press, arguing that “whether it’s actual or perceived bias, we always try to
work harder because we thought that we had to explain [our] policy positions.” He also
acknowledged that President Bush’s “popularity was not that high and didn’t provide enough
political capital to get things done. When an administration’s unpopular, you have to end up
working harder to get things done.”
Civil Servant 5, who served under both the Bush and Obama administrations, clarified
that part of the differential might be explained by his belief that the Bush administration had
sharper policy positions to communicate in the first place. He argued that “part of it [is] that this
administration hasn’t been as clear on what they want to achieve under cornerstone legislation
like [the] Dodd-Frank [Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.] It has taken a long
time to roll out regulations and move on housing finance reform, so [the administration] doesn’t
know what [they] want to say.” He argued that this caused administration officials to attempt to
avoid the press altogether, explaining that a Wall Street Journal editor who had been trying to
reach the White House called him at one point and said “you’re the only person who will pick up
the phone and talk to me.”
Of course, one possible problem with the argument that the Bush appointees were
fighting an uphill battle in the press is the fact that their economic views were actually broadly
popular. Gallup polls from 2001, when President Bush took office, through 2013, show that
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Americans have always been much more likely to describe their views on economic issues as
conservative than as moderate or liberal. In 2013, forty-one percent of Americans described their
economic views as conservative – a record low for this time period which was still significantly
above the thirty-seven percent of Americans who described their economic views as moderate
and the nineteen percent of Americans who described their economic views as liberal (Dugan
2013). This likely made it easier for the Bush appointees to sell their views, though of course this
advantage would have been diminished if the reporters who were their interlocutors themselves
had more liberal views – a question which is outside the scope of this project.
Bush Appointee 4, however, disagreed with the contention that Republicans work harder
to overcome a liberal media bias, describing the idea as “bullshit.” He argued that the differences
in access and reporter satisfaction between the two administrations were likely attributable to
“differences in talent at the top,” indicating that he understood that Stephanie Cutter, who
initially oversaw Treasury public affairs before moving to the White House and later serving as
Deputy Campaign Manager on Obama’s 2012 re-election campaign, initially alienated reporters
(a complaint also made by Reporter 4) whereas the previous top Treasury public affairs officials
under the Bush administration possessed serious economic credentials. This of course echoed
Reporter 5’s explanation for the differential.
However, Civil Servant 5, who, as noted, worked with Treasury spokespeople in both
administrations, perceived an overall experience gap between the Bush and Obama White
Houses. He noted that he was a Democrat and was therefore dismayed to observe that Obama
“got the Millennial crowd all jazzed up [during his election campaign] and then … hired them!”
By contrast, he reported that Bush White House appointees tended to have experience in
previous administrations. Civil Servant 5 found this differential to be the case at the level of
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Treasury spokespeople as well, reporting in an observation resonant of Heclo that “the Obama
people were cycling in very quickly, and I was surprised how people were assigned beats
randomly, and didn’t come in with experience on the issue, and left so soon that even after they
learned, they would be gone. I never felt that way dealing with Bush spokespeople.”
In sum, there are a variety of possible explanations for the complaints of reporters that the
Bush Treasury was more open than the Obama Treasury. For starters, as discussed in chapter 4,
these complaints need to be approached with some degree of skepticism. As Obama Appointee 5
explained, “reporters will always say you’re not doing a good enough job so you will do more
for them. There’s a certain level of almost manipulation that has to happen in these transactional
relationships and we need to protect and advocate for our principals. They’re never going to
think it’s all done great. … If they weren’t saying you’re doing a bad job, then reporters would
be doing a bad job.”
A different appointee, for example, described an “ongoing battle” in which reporters
wanted to be given advance warning of upcoming Treasury designations freezing the assets of
individuals with links to terrorist activities. Of course, such information was classified prior to
release; the appointee explained to me that he could have been subject to jail time if he had
acquiesced to the requests of the press. Furthermore, if an individual were to receive advance
warning of a designation, he or she could pull their assets before banks were notified of the
designation – indicating the sheer unreasonableness of reporters in this instance, and the degree
to which the media will advocate for greater access even when the government has highly
legitimate reasons for withholding information.
However, the alleged differential between the two administrations was so widely
described that it nevertheless is likely to have some degree of merit. It may be true that some
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Republican press operatives perceive themselves to have a disadvantage that compels them to
work harder to explain themselves. Nevertheless, to the degree that the greater access they
provide actually simply represents greater attempts to spin the press and shade the truth, as
Reporter 2, who worked for an outlet popularly perceived to be conservative, alleged, it is
unclear that this difference redounds to the benefit of the American people.
Another possibility is that the Bush Treasury spokespeople were simply better than the
Obama spokespeople. For example, it is true that the top Treasury public affairs officials during
the Bush administration, Michele Davis and Tony Fratto, both had academic backgrounds in
economics, unlike their counterparts in the Obama administration. Additionally, the Bush
appointees interviewed for this project had slightly longer tenures and previous experience than
their Obama administration counterparts, although this finding is also reflective of the fact that
two of the Bush appointees later served in higher-level Treasury public affairs posts. On the
other hand, the Bush administration had been in office for seven years before the 2008 financial
crisis, allowing time for their Treasury spokespeople to learn the ropes of their jobs under more
pacific circumstances, while the Obama spokespeople inherited a global economic crisis with no
modern precedent and its aftereffects – circumstances which can only have made it more difficult
for them to master their jobs.
The fragility of the U.S. and global economy during the period in which the Obama
appointees is another possible explanation for any differential that may have existed in the level
of access afforded to the press under both administrations. As Obama Appointee 5 explained, “in
government, there’s no reason to be cavalier.” The Treasury is generally considered to be one of
the more conservative press shops in Washington; amidst a still shaky economic recovery, and
with knowledge that a single statement (even if accurate) could hurt that recovery by tanking
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markets and damaging confidence (as they had all seen occur during Geithner’s 2009 speech,
discussed in chapter 3) it seems unsurprising that the Obama appointees would exercise caution
in their work. (Though, as discussed, the Obama administration has used national security
concerns to withhold a record amount of information – suggesting that the practice of
withholding is not unique to the Treasury Department – the fragility of the economy could
account for why the Obama appointees were overall less forthcoming in their interactions with
reporters. The level of access afforded reporters by Obama appointees in other agencies falls
outside the scope of this study.)
Of course, the answer to whether this served the interests of the American people is
mixed. Releasing information with caution in order to avoid roiling markets is good for the
people; withholding information for partisan purposes or failing to highlight threats to economic
stability is bad. To be sure, there is a strong precedent in American history for presidents of the
United States to restrict the rights of citizens in times of emergency. This has especially been the
case during times of war; President Lincoln set the precedent for this by beginning the Civil War
without Congressional authorization, expanding the Army and Navy, suspending the writ of
habeas corpus, and declaring martial law in parts of the country. In his 1864 letter to Albert G.
Hodges, Lincoln argued that “measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by
becoming indispensable to the preservation of the constitution, through the preservation of the
nation.” It is arguably the case that the preservation of the nation in the aftermath of the 2008
financial crisis required the Treasury to take measures to stabilize our financial system.
There is also certainly precedent for the expansion of presidential power during economic
crises. In response to World War I, for example, President Wilson expanded his control over the
economy by fixing prices and regulating industries. However, this study suggests that the
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Treasury may have expanded its power in response to the 2008 financial crisis in part by being
less transparent with the press. While many scholars have charged the government with overclassifying information, particularly during times of emergency, the withholding of nonclassified information for the protection of the country has not previously been identified or
discussed in the literature (Herman 2004). My findings suggest that, during times of crisis,
government agencies may respond in part by being less open with the press – a proposition that
should be tested with additional case studies. Of course, there will always be the potential for
abuse in such circumstances, raising important questions about government accountability during
times of crisis. As David Pozen has written, “state secrecy can deny citizens the ability to
exercise their rights and liberties, to be free from the unjust and coercive exercise of power, and
to understand the world around them. It threatens the project of collective self-determination.”
(2010, 286).
Ultimately, the question of whether there are broader partisan differences in press tactics
would also require additional evidence outside of the scope of this project, including data from
other Democratic and Republican administrations. Nevertheless, it is a question worthy of future
research, to which the findings of this project could contribute.

Conclusions and Analysis
This project investigated the question of whether appointees or civil servants better serve
the interests of the American people in Treasury public affairs positions, by considering whether
either group was conducting a permanent partisan campaign. The evidence is unmistakable that
civil servants better serve the interests of the American people because, while they appreciate
that it is sometimes legitimate to withhold information, they are significantly more inclined to
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provide information to the press. By contrast, some appointees expressed a belief in their
prerogative to withhold any information that did not make the president look good. Perhaps most
shocking and disheartening about these findings was that reporters themselves generally
appeared to accept that appointees were within their rights to do so.
While the “right to withhold” asserted by appointees was perhaps the most disturbing
finding of this study, in keeping with my hypothesis, it nevertheless does not appear that
government officials in the Treasury are largely conducting a permanent campaign. In chapter 3,
however, I hypothesized that the large volume of responsibilities of appointees would be found
to preclude them from engaging in the more sophisticated techniques of the permanent campaign
– providing a rather extraordinary mechanism of democratic protection. While I discovered that
the workloads of the appointees I studied did, in fact, inhibit their ability to engage in proactive
tactics, they nevertheless did find a significant amount of time to pitch stories and to craft and
implement strategies to attain their desired levels of coverage. The tactics they utilized in
undertaking this work, however, did not include elements of the permanent campaign.
Furthermore, it did not appear from their responses that the reason that appointees did not
appeal to the emotions of the American people in their messages or use public opinion polling
was because they lacked the time to do so. They simply did not appear to believe that such
tactics would be helpful or appropriate, because they advocated policies crafted by policy experts
even when, especially in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, they were unpopular.
Appealing to emotions appeared to happen in the context of attempting to explain policies to the
average person – and not in an effort to stimulate the unthinking, irrational support for the
president described by Blumenthal. They declined to make emotional appeals even when it
arguably could have been effective for them to do so, in order to respond to allegations, for

309

example, that the administration was bailing out banks but not ordinary citizens in the wake of
the 2008 financial crisis.
I further hypothesized that those government officials who studied journalism would be
unwilling to withhold or distort information because of the values imbued during the course of
their education. Five of the seventeen government officials studied journalism as a major or
minor at the undergraduate or graduate level. (In order to protect their identities, I will not break
down whether they were appointees or civil servants). However, I did not find the views of these
officials, as a group, to differ significantly from those of their appointee or careerist counterparts.
Thus, this hypothesis was not supported, although the sample was certainly small.
Finally, I had hypothesized that the government officials would report that attempts to
convey mistruths would be counterproductive. Indeed, the officials all reported that they
eschewed lying, and often reported that it was likely that such untruths would be uncovered.
While the appointees were willing to withhold information, they were unwilling to convey
outright mistruths.
My results indicated that appointees, but not civil servants, were clearly motivated by the
goals of the permanent campaign: to build support for the president. They considered doing so to
be a legitimate end of their work. Both groups also had the opportunity to engage in permanent
campaign tactics, since they spent a significant percentage of their time crafting and
implementing strategies in order to achieve their desired media coverage. However, the
appointees nevertheless did not largely engage in the tactics of the permanent campaign, with the
exception of withholding information.
Neither appointees nor civil servants appeared to be devoting excessive resources to
burning the images of top officials, or to be engaging in other unexpected or diabolical public
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relations tactics. While the appointees, in particular, may have carried out their work in a
sophisticated manner, the specific techniques they reported using have long been common
among public relations professionals. Likewise, when they crafted narratives, the appointees
generally (though not always) described building their cases based upon facts.
In a particularly surprising finding, two of the key tools alleged by Blumenthal and Heclo
to be utilized by appointees for partisan advantage – public opinion polls and appeals to the
emotions of the citizenry – were widely eschewed by appointees, but utilized by civil servants in
an effort to communicate generally non-partisan information to the American people
efficaciously. By contrast, the appointees had never utilized public opinion polls and did not
appear to believe that they would be helpful to their work. Although the appointees were aware
of public opinion through reading reports of polls in the media, various appointees explained that
such activity was the provenance of the White House, that their programs were designed with the
aims of good policy, and that, in any event, the issues they worked on were too complex to take
the opinions of the American people as a whole into account. When appointees did attempt to
play to the emotions of the American people, they reported that they did so in an effort to explain
complex policies in terms an ordinary person could understand. While support for a president’s
policies may ultimately result in support for the president, the appointees’ descriptions of the
cases in which they appealed to emotions differed in kind from the descriptions by Blumenthal
of political operatives attempting to bypass the reason of the American people in order to gain
partisan advantage.
They key area in which it is possible that a permanent campaign is being conducted is in
the withholding of information requested by reporters. Appointees frequently reported that they
liberally withheld information requested by the media, for purposes which did not appear to fit
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into categories of legitimate reasons, such as protecting the market or national security. Some
appointees suggested that they withheld any information which did not reflect favorably on the
president. Remarkably, reporters seemed to accept this state of affairs as merely frustrating – not
as illegitimate. This suggested that appointees could potentially be withholding an enormous
volume of information from the American people – a prospect which cries out for further
research. Ultimately, however, the question of whether the Bush and Obama appointees withheld
more information than previous Treasury spokespeople falls outside of the gamut of this study.
While the evidence regarding the withholding of information was stark, this study also
uncovered more limited evidence that appointees may also be lying. While the subjects of my
interviews reported that they had never personally done so, both Obama and Bush appointees
indicated that other appointees within their administrations had conveyed untruths. Furthermore,
a majority of reporters believed that Treasury public affairs officials were guilty of lying to them.
Finally, I considered whether there are partisan differences in the use of permanent
campaign tactics, because the reporters had overwhelmingly indicated that the Obama appointees
provided less information and more restricted access than the Bush appointees. Although I
suspect that the differential may reflect the fact that the Obama appointees operated in the
context of a significantly more fragile economic environment than the Bush appointees had for
the majority of their tenure, it is possible that there were also differences in the skill sets of the
Bush and Obama appointees. Another possibility, which is also ripe for future research, is that
some Republican press operatives work harder to achieve positive media coverage and make
greater attempts to explain their positions to reporters than Democratic press operatives. Both
groups may perceive the media to have a liberal media bias, which may cause Republican
operatives to exert greater efforts to overcome this handicap and cause Democratic operatives to
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underestimate the degree to which they need to provide information and access to reporters, and
even spar with members of the press. While such a question could only be studied in the context
of several administrations, it was nevertheless clear from my own interviews that the Bush
appointees placed greater emphasis on building relationships with and explaining themselves to
the reporters with whom they worked than the Obama appointees. The reporters whom I
interviewed also vehemently proclaimed this to be the case.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and Implications
This study set out to answer two questions: Do political appointees or civil servants serve
as more effective advocates for the president of the United States? And how do these officials
serve the interests of the American people?
This chapter will first summarize my results. I will then assess the accuracy and validity
of my results. Next, I will consider how representative the results likely are of government
officials in other positions and agencies, and offer suggestions for future research. I will then
discuss the contributions this research makes to the literature. Finally, I will assess the
implications of the results for presidential staffing decisions.
Summary of Results: Efficacy
The findings suggest that civil servants are more effective in advancing an
administration’s arguments in the press than their appointee counterparts. My results indicate
that, as is to be expected, civil servants have an effectiveness advantage in their significantly
greater knowledge of their policy portfolios. It is of course vital for a public affairs officer to
understand the policy they are communicating in order to effectively advance and rebut
arguments. Also especially critically, civil servants enjoy greater credibility with reporters, who
indicate that they approach the claims of civil servants with less skepticism than those of
appointees.
On the other hand, appointees appear to be more effective in reversing the course of
potentially negative press coverage, because both they themselves and reporters indicate that
they more aggressively attempt to counter claims with which they disagree, while reporters
indicate that they are open to such arguments and that this behavior does not generally poison
their relationships or future coverage. Additionally, appointees appear to be somewhat faster at
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responding to reporters; have somewhat greater access to key principals; and have somewhat of
an advantage in shaping media coverage simply by virtue of the fact that they make more
strenuous efforts to do so. (Of course, appointees may have worked harder overall to overcome
their lack of prior knowledge, but this could not account for their greater efforts to actively shape
media coverage).
However, the effectiveness advantage these factors give them is diminished by the fact
that the information they provide is often unhelpful; they often withhold information to which
they have access; and reporters view their claims skeptically. The latter finding is a particularly
devastating handicap. While reporters must recognize that all of their sources have biases and
information in the interests they provide, reporters were adamant that they view appointees to be
particularly biased, and therefore lacking in credibility. This suggests that civil servants enjoy a
major efficacy advantage in their ability to convey information with credibility in the media.
To be sure, reporters also perceived civil servants to be generally unsophisticated; they
indicated that civil servants made few efforts to pitch stories and were not skilled in making
persuasive arguments. However, other evidence uncovered in this study suggests that reporters
may have underestimated the level of sophistication of civil servants, perhaps confounding it
with the careerists’ lack of overt political goals. For example, civil servants described engaging
in two tactics which require a particularly high degree of savvy – utilizing public opinion polls
and appealing to the emotions of the American people – with greater frequency than appointees.
Of course, appointees may have eschewed such tactics because they believed that they would be
seen as inappropriate attempts to achieve partisan gain, and therefore this measure does not
suggest that civil servants are more sophisticated than appointees. It rather suggests that they
approach their work with a level of savvy which may be underestimated.

315

The evidence thus indicates that the sophistication of civil servants may be
underappreciated, while careerists enjoy a level of knowledge and trust with the press that their
appointee counterparts severely lack – suggesting that civil servants may be more effective than
the president’s own appointees in advancing administration goals in the press.

Summary of Results: Loyalty
The results indicate a roughly similar number of acts of disloyalty conducted by
appointees and by civil servants.
Unlike the appointees, when civil servants disagreed with the administration they served,
a small number (one of the seven civil servants interviewed) indicated a willingness to share
points of policy disagreement with the press. Perhaps more remarkable, however, is the large
number of civil servants who insisted that it was not their place to do so – even when they
witnessed what they believed to be large-scale waste of taxpayer dollars, believed the
administration was making unsupportable claims for partisan advantage, or saw warning signs of
an impending global financial meltdown! Furthermore, as previously discussed, my sample
likely over-represents individuals who are inclined to leak, since more cautious public affairs
officials likely would have declined my request for interview.
However, it is clear that appointees leaked, as well. While the appointees who I
interviewed claimed never to have leaked, I had reason to question the claims of one Bush
appointee and one Obama appointee. Coincidentally, two sources independently volunteered to
me, without provocation, in discussions in which I had not mentioned the individuals in question,
that they suspected these two appointees of leaking, as well. In addition, the government officials
were not themselves aware of a single instance in which a civil servant had leaked information to
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the press. However, they were aware of numerous instances in which appointees had been
identified as the sources of leaks.
These claims are seemingly contradicted by the accounts of reporters. Four reporters who
received leaks indicated that civil servants “leak” more, while two indicated that appointees and
civil servants leak with roughly the same frequency. However, upon closer examination, the
majority of instances of purported leaks by civil servants appeared to be somewhat innocuous.
First, such instances were very rare. Second, in such instances, civil servants were almost
always, in the course of conversations that were already occurring, simply more willing to
acknowledge the fact that reasonable individuals might have a point of view other than that of
the administration (a state of affairs which cannot have been shocking to reporters). Of course,
the greater ideological and political agreement among the president and appointees appears to
have caused appointees to argue the administration’s position more narrowly and forcefully
However, the evidence of the “appointee discount” discussed in chapter 4 suggests that this
behavior on the part of civil servants might have earned them credibility in the eyes of the press
which ultimately allowed them to serve as stronger spokespeople – even though their superiors
would have been unlikely to approve such a strategy and the president would be likely to view
their acts as ones of insubordination.
This project ultimately identified no evidence of major insubordination by appointees nor
by civil servants. I saw the actions of leaks by both groups unearthed in this project as certainly,
at least at times, unhelpful to the president, but not posing significant threats to the
administrations they served. Based upon the knowledge of government officials, appointees leak
more, but based upon the feedback of reporters, civil servants leak more. Based upon the claims
of government officials regarding their own behavior, civil servants leak more, however I had
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reason to question the veracity of two claims by appointees that they never leaked. While the
responses of reporters should be more reliable since they unquestionably know the true identities
of leakers, and therefore it is possible that civil servants leak more, this cannot be concluded
from the relatively small difference in the responses of reporters (one of whom reported that
neither group leaked, four of whom reported that civil servants leaked more, and two of whom
reported that they leaked with the same frequency. Indeed, reporter 4, who was among the group
who believed that civil servants leaked more, was clear that he was not entirely sure; if he had
concluded that appointees leaked with the same frequency, the results would have been evenly
split. Though, to be sure, it is also revealing that none of the reporters believed that appointees
leaked more.) I therefore concluded that both groups leaked with roughly the same degree of
frequency, though it does remain possible that civil servants leak more.
Obviously this estimate is approximate based upon the results; it would be nearly
impossible to precisely quantify the occurrence of such events given the interests leakers by
nature will have in shielding their identities and the interests of reporters in protecting their
sources. However, these findings do provide significantly more specific insight than the largely
anecdotal descriptions of leaking otherwise available in the academic literature, and it appears
from these findings that any differences that may exist in the frequency of leaking between the
two groups are relatively marginal. As hypothesized, civil servants appear to be no less loyal to
the presidents they serve than their appointee counterparts.
Of course, the causal factors examined suggested that, in areas other than leaking,
appointees were particularly loyal to the president; additionally, the study of the permanent
campaign found that appointees are much more protective of information that could be
potentially damaging to the president. This may help explain why presidents hire appointees in
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the first place. However, the evidence examined in the previous chapter suggests that this
zealousness may actually be detrimental to appointees in public affairs positions, by weakening
their credibility with the press.

Summary of Results: The Permanent Campaign
In keeping with my hypothesis that the massive workloads of appointees leave them
lacking the time to engage in a permanent campaign, the appointees were clear that the large
volume of incoming requests they received from reporters prevented them from engaging in
more proactive tactics. Nevertheless, appointees still spent the majority of their time engaging in
proactive tactics. Interestingly, appointees still spent much more time pitching stories to reporters
than civil servants and only two percent less of their time than civil servants crafting proactive
strategies (a number of hours that may still have been greater than that of civil servants, since
appointees work longer hours).
The appointees were also clearly motivated by the end goal of the permanent campaign,
which is to build public support for the president. However, when both government officials and
the reporters with whom they frequently interacted described the tactics that the officials
employed, none were particularly sophisticated or diabolical, and none of the descriptions
suggested that they were utilizing the tools of the permanent campaign. Unexpectedly, civil
servants were much more likely than appointees to engage in two classic tactics of the permanent
campaign as described by Blumenthal and Heclo: appealing to the emotions, as opposed to the
reason, of the American people, and utilizing public opinion polls. However, neither group
utilized these tools in order to build support for the president, thus disqualifying them as
examples of the permanent campaign. The descriptions of both groups regarding how they craft
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narratives likewise did not provide significant evidence of a permanent campaign.
However, this project did uncover potentially very disturbing evidence of the withholding
of information. Some appointees did not appear to believe that the public had the right to any
information which would not reflect favorably on the president. This evidence is troubling;
perhaps most surprising about it is the fact that reporters do not find the state of affairs to be all
that surprising or alarming.
Of course, McClellan was clear that deception (measured in this study by withholding
and lying) has always been present in Washington; what was new, for him, was that the level of
deception had reached unprecedented levels. It is outside the scope of this study to determine
whether the Bush and Obama appointees withheld more information than their Treasury
predecessors under previous administrations. This project therefore registers the views of the
appointees as a potentially very significant threat to democracy, but cannot conclude that it is
evidence of a permanent campaign.
This project also uncovered limited evidence of lying by appointees; this practice was
denied by every government official but alleged by a majority of reporters. Appointees in both
administrations believed that their counterparts were guilty of lying, though it is not clear that
this necessarily occurred outside of the White Houses of both administrations. Given the
evidence examined in chapter 2 of lying by previous administrations, it appears unlikely that the
“shading” uncovered in this project exceeds that of previous administrations, although this
cannot be determined definitively under the scope of this project. It is nevertheless clear that
appointees withhold and distort information, and that they do so to a much greater degree than
civil servants – suggesting that civil servants better serve the interests of the American people in
Treasury public affairs roles.
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Finally, this project considered the allegations of reporters that the Obama appointees
withheld information to a greater degree than the Bush appointees. It appears likely that some of
these charges by reporters are self-serving; some may point to differences in the skill sets of the
two groups. The explanation I find most probable is that the Obama appointees approach their
work with a particular caution because they inherited a deeply unstable economy which is still in
a fragile state of recovery. Nevertheless, this project also unearthed evidence suggesting that
Republican press operatives may make greater efforts to influence media coverage because they
perceive a liberal media bias and that Democratic operatives may underestimate the degree to
which they need to spar with the press – a fascinating proposition worthy of future research.

Accuracy and Validity of the Results
I will next address the accuracy and validity of my results, by considering the reliability
of the responses of my interview subjects and the representativeness of my sample of Treasury
appointees, civil servants, and reporters. The following section will consider how accurately the
officials who were studied might represent appointees and civil servants in other federal
positions.

Reliability of the Responses of Interview Subjects
The results of my interviews left me confident in the general accuracy and validity of my
results. As discussed in chapter 3, I felt a comfortable rapport with twenty-three of my twentyfour interview subjects. With the exception of Bush Appointee 5, my interview subjects all
seemed to take my project seriously and to genuinely want to provide thoughtful and accurate
responses. They appeared to think deeply about my questions, and provided nuanced, detailed,
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and insightful answers.
In part, their openness was clearly fostered by the fact that I pledged to keep their
identities confidential. I considered many of the responses of the government officials (from the
admission by one civil servant that he leaked information to the press to the candid responses of
appointees regarding the sometimes strong-arm tactics in which they engaged or lack of
influence they felt they enjoyed) to not necessarily reflect glowingly on the individuals
describing them. I considered this to evince the willingness of my interview subjects to, at least
often, be honest about their performance.
As indicated in chapter 3, because I worked with so many of the Obama appointees
(which consisted of working in a shared office and attending daily meetings in which my fellow
spokespeople summarized their work), the Obama appointees likely realized that it would have
been particularly hard for them to make false assertions, because I was already broadly familiar
with their work. Of course, this safeguard was somewhat diminished for the Bush appointees.
However, the Bush appointees can only have been aware that I had an understanding of the
general workings of the Treasury department, and was also, of course, acquainted with numerous
civil servants who served under both administrations who I could have contacted with questions
if I doubted their claims (with the exception of Bush Appointee 5, however, I had no such
doubts). Of course, these circumstances would certainly not have made it impossible for either
group to make false claims – it would have only made it harder. Nevertheless, my personal
circumstances likely improved the accuracy of my results, and gave me a significant advantage
in conducting this research.
The Bush appointees may also have had greater reason to be cautious in our interviews,
since they were all aware of my identity as a previous Democratic appointee and would not have
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wanted to share information that could be used in a partisan attack. However, I felt that such
concerns on the part of the Bush appointees were likely partly assuaged by the fact that I was
introduced to most of the Bush appointees through President Bush’s former speechwriter, who is
a personal friend.
To be sure, as discussed in chapter 2, individuals can generally be expected to attempt to
present themselves favorably in social situations (of course, the exception, in my experience, was
the remarkably gauche behavior of Bush Appointee 5). I consider many of the Obama appointees
who I interviewed to be personal friends, and all of the appointees and reporters whom I
interviewed were likely keenly aware that we moved in the same social and professional circles.
I conducted my interviews during the November-December holiday season, and one Bush
appointee whom I interviewed greeted me by saying that my project was the talk of all of the
holiday receptions he was attending. This therefore might have given the appointees whom I
interviewed, in particular, reason not to share information which they felt would reflect
abominably upon themselves, because they had reason to anticipate that they would encounter
me in future professional and/or social situations.
I would also be remiss not to note that, in my interviews, so many of the appointees
expressed a comfort with withholding information from reporters, raising the possibility that they
also withheld information from me. An official who engaged in particularly egregious behavior
would certainly have no incentive to share such information with me. While I attempted to
corroborate the responses of the government officials by also querying the officials about the
behavior of their colleagues, as well as by interviewing reporters, it nevertheless remains
possible that the officials engaged in practices which I was unable to identify. However, I judge
this possibility to have been unlikely to have significantly impacted my results. For example, if
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an appointee had lied to me about public opinion polling, it is almost certain that other Treasury
appointees would have been aware that polling had been conducted by their office. I consider it
wildly unlikely that all of the appointees would have lied to me about such behavior, especially
since they did not know the identities of my other research subjects, nor the questions I would
ask in advance, making it practically impossible for them to have coordinated their responses. It
is, of course, still possible that there might be a general unspoken understanding to the effect that
certain conduct would never be acknowledged.
I consider the queries to which my interview subjects would have had most reason to give
me dishonest answers in order to protect themselves to be the questions of whether they ever lied
to a reporter or leaked information. Of course, if they had lied to a reporter and not been exposed
and chose not to share the information with me in our interview, I would have no way of
detecting it. However, I consider it likely that if an official had lied to a reporter, this fact would
eventually have been exposed, if not in the course of this project than by one of the many other
interested parties that would have an incentive to do so, such as reporters or members of the
opposition party (a view shared by so many of my interview subjects). Furthermore, even if the
officials lied to me about whether they had personally leaked, I should nevertheless have been
able to accurately measure the overall degree to which appointees and civil servants leaked in the
responses I obtained from reporters.
The questions of whether officials withheld information, how they handled damaging
information, and whether they were motivated by partisan goals were also particularly sensitive.
However, the appointees were transparent that they in fact regularly withheld information
(including damaging information) and were in fact driven by partisan aims, leaving me reason to
conclude that they were honest in their responses. All of the other questions I asked were by

324

comparison innocuous; the fact that my interview subjects appeared to be honest about these
more sensitive questions left me with a high degree of confidence that they would have been
truthful in their other responses.
While the reporters whom I interviewed discussed the behavior of other individuals, and
therefore were not likely to have been concerned to protect their own reputations, it is possible
that they would have been inclined to dampen their criticism of appointees in order to avoid
offending me, since I previously served as an appointee. For example, in the course of our
conversations, reporters sometimes used phrases such as “you guys” to refer to appointees, and
one reporter told me he hoped I would not be offended by his comments. However, I did not
believe significant sugarcoating actually occurred, because reporters were generally so critical of
appointees, and of the Obama appointees in particular, in our interviews.
Of course, the exception to my confidence in the overall veracity of the responses of my
interview subjects was Bush Appointee 5, whom I did not feel answered my questions in good
faith. However, I accounted for this judgment when drawing my overall conclusions. In general,
however, there is reason to feel confident in the accuracy of my results.
Representativeness of the Sample
Because I interviewed a large percentage of the officials who work or worked in public
affairs for the Treasury under the Bush and Obama administrations, as well as a large percentage
of the reporters for the most elite media outlets who regularly interact with Treasury public
affairs officials, I have a very high degree of confidence that my results are representative of
Treasury public affairs staff.
For example, as previously indicated, there are currently seven appointees serving as
Treasury spokespeople (though of course, as previously discussed, there is a significant degree of
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turnover in such positions). I interviewed five such appointees from the Obama administration
and five appointees from the Bush administration, all of whom were also asked to address the
behavior of their public affairs colleagues. Likewise, the Treasury website lists ten bureaus. I
interviewed civil servants who worked in seven different offices, all of whom were likewise
asked to address the behavior of their public affairs colleagues.
Furthermore, there are only a handful of elite national newspapers and wire services in
the United States. I interviewed seven reporters, representing seven different media
organizations, who covered the Treasury for such outlets. This of course excluded broadcast
reporters and bloggers, with whom Treasury public affairs officials also work, but should
nevertheless provide a reliable sample of the impressions of the press. This was confirmed by the
fact that the descriptions by reporters of the two most important findings regarding the relative
efficacy of appointees – the “appointee discount” and the lack of access they felt they enjoyed
under the Obama administration – were strikingly similar. (Of course, reporters differed in their
responses on other measures, such as which group leaks more frequently, but I consider it
credible that officials had different patterns of leaking to different media organizations. The fact
that the media outlets popularly perceived as most liberal and most conservative reported the
most frequent and dramatic occurrences of leaking is eminently logical).
As previously discussed, I approached all but one of the civil servants without prior
acquaintance with or introductions to them, and many civil servants declined my request for
interview. I therefore considered my sample of civil servants to represent those who were
perhaps most open about their work. This likely skewed my results to over-represent the
presence of leaking within the civil service. It may also have impacted my findings on the
withholding of information, by over-representing the civil servants least likely to withhold.
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Finally, Reporter 3 reported that he had more limited interactions with civil servants than
the other reporters, likely making his impressions of civil servants as a group somewhat less
precise. Additionally, Reporter 6 interacted less frequently with the Treasury officials than the
other reporters, but I nevertheless considered his perspective to be important because of the
publication for which he worked.
Representativeness of the Results and Suggestions for Future Research
I have established that my results appear to well represent the practices of Treasury
public affairs officials. How likely is it that the results are representative of appointees and civil
servants who work in other government positions and other government agencies?
Of course, it is only possible to speculate on this matter. For example, future research
should examine whether the “appointee discount” identified in this study applies to appointees in
other positions, as well. It is logical to project that this problem might particularly bedevil
appointees in externally-facing positions, where a key aim is to build outside support – such as
cabinet heads and other senior officials, as well as appointees in offices of legislative affairs,
public affairs, and public liaison. The beliefs of these appointees’ interlocutors regarding their
partisan motivations might actually enhance the ability of such appointees to advance the
president’s goals with like-minded politicians and organizations, while especially hampering
their negotiations with entities which do not support the president. On the other hand, if other
actors who share the partisan goals of the administration nevertheless view appointees as
motivated by the goal of advancing the chief executive at the expense of all other values, this
could hamper their ability to work with all other actors, regardless of political affinity. In this
study, for example, reporters were universally found to apply the “appointee discount” under
both the Obama and Bush administrations, regardless of the perceptions of their media outlets as
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liberal or conservative. However, this may simply reflect the fact that reporters for mainstream
newspapers and news wires do not approach their sources with liberal or conservative biases.
The findings of this study regarding the loyalty of civil servants generally confirmed the
results of numerous other researchers that civil service insubordination is isolated and rare, but
nevertheless real. This suggests that the results of this study regarding civil servants are likely
applicable in other agencies and positions, as well. If anything, we should expect the results on
the loyalty of civil servants to overstate the amount of careerist disloyalty in the government-atlarge, because the time period studied included the Great Recession of 2008, and interview
subjects were clear that this upheaval provoked a larger-than-normal amount of leaking by both
civil servants and appointees (although, as discussed in chapter 1, other researchers have also
measured the loyalty of civil servants in circumstances that would have been expected to
provoke especially high levels of civil service insubordination). However, as discussed in chapter
3, the Treasury bureaus are, under more pacific circumstances, not typically the site of the kind
of the partisan disagreement that has occurred in the EPA and social service agencies, where
Democratic and Republican administrations tend to pursue dramatically different, and often
controversial, goals.
Previous studies of the loyalty of civil servants have focused on whether civil servants
faithfully implement the administration’s policies. My research addresses this question by
ascertaining whether civil servants and political appointees in public affairs positions faithfully
communicate the administration’s positions even when they disagree with them. However, it also
utilizes an additional measure of loyalty (leaking) because previous anecdotal evidence
suggested that this might be an area in which appointees are less loyal to the president than civil
servants.
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Unfortunately, few researchers have ever attempted to measure the loyalty of appointees,
leaving us without a baseline with which to compare the results of this study. The information
we have about leaking by appointees is largely anecdotal. Clearly, further research is called for
in this area. However, unlike the results of this study on the relative efficacy of public affairs
officers, the results on loyalty are certainly applicable to the entire Treasury (not just officials
who work in public affairs), since my interview questions probed government officials on the
practice of leaking anywhere within their organization, and queried reporters on the practice of
leaking by any appointees or civil servants in federal economic agencies. This makes it more
likely that the results would be reflective of other government agencies, as well. While
appointees will likely always have incentives to leak damaging information in order to weaken
rival staffers and/or grant favors to members of the press upon which they can later capitalize,
the Great Recession likely gave the appointees studied in this project greater-than-normal
incentives to leak in order to float trial balloons or advance their policy proposals internally
within the administration. This project likely therefore overrepresented the typical amount of
leaking we should expect by appointees (however, it also overrepresented the typical amount of
leaking we should expect by civil servants for the same reason, which should therefore not have
affected the ultimate conclusion that both groups do a roughly similar amount of leaking).
The findings of this study that a permanent campaign is not largely being conducted in
the Treasury are likely, but not certainly, representative of other government agencies, as well.
This is because, as discussed in chapter 3, if a permanent campaign were to be conducted in any
government agency, the Treasury appears to be the most likely place to find it being waged,
given the importance of the economy to the president’s political fortunes and public approval
ratings. This was especially the case during the time period studied, as the legacies of Presidents
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Bush and Obama both depended heavily on their responses to the 2008 financial crisis. The
Treasury was also responsible for advocating signature initiatives of both presidents. President
Bush’s tax reform, attempted Social Security reform, and landmark efforts to track the finances
of terrorists after the attacks of September 11, 2001, all fell under the purview of the Treasury.
Likewise, the Treasury is also responsible for President Obama’s signature reform of the
financial industry in an effort to prevent a future financial crisis, under the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act. While Treasury therefore provides a particularly
tough case of the presence of a permanent campaign, this finding should nevertheless be
corroborated by studies of other agencies. Because President Obama’s legacy is also perceived to
be tied up in the success of his signature initiative, the Affordable Care Act, and because the Act
has been the site of protracted and especially rancorous partisan disagreement and allegations of
White House deception, the Department of Health and Human Services would also provide a
particularly difficult test of the broader applicability of this finding.
There is reason, however, to both expect and hope that the practice of withholding
information by appointees discovered in this project might be particularly severe at the Treasury.
As explained in the previous chapter, the market-moving nature of much of the information
possessed by the Treasury is truly anomalous among government agencies. Likewise, as
explained in chapter 3, the economy is particularly critical to a president’s public approval
ratings and re-election prospects, which likely makes appointees particularly cautious about the
release of economic information. The caution that can only have been engendered amidst the
2008 financial collapse and a still shaky and uneven recovery likely made Treasury public affairs
officers particularly cautious regarding the release of information in the time period
encompassed by this study. Nevertheless, the cavalier manner in which some appointees
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responded that they only released information which was advantageous was striking and clearly
calls for future research. This future research should probe more deeply into exactly how much
information public affairs officers withhold, and under what circumstances. It should also study a
wider body of government agencies.
Of course, because I studied public affairs officers, this study cannot account for the
possibility that other officials in the Treasury are conducting a permanent campaign. For
example, appointees in policy positions might be tailoring their programs to public opinion as
reported in the media. They might also be timing their decisions around the electoral cycle, for
example, by announcing popular policies and decisions in the lead-up to elections and saving
unpopular decisions for after re-election campaigns.
Finally, my research unexpectedly uncovered another fascinating hypothesis, worthy of
future research. Several of the Bush appointees and reporters whom I interviewed indicated that
Republican political operatives work harder than Democrats to attempt to influence press
coverage, because they perceive themselves to start out with a disadvantage because of a liberal
media bias. Additionally, the results indicated that reporters were overall more satisfied with the
level of access they enjoyed under the Bush administration than under the Obama administration.
As previously discussed, this correlation does not necessarily prove causation; there are
numerous other potential explanations, including differences in the skill sets of spokespeople and
the vastly different economic circumstances during the majority of the time under which both
administrations served. Nevertheless, this finding calls for future research into whether
Republican operatives approach the press differently and whether, as some of my interview
subjects suggested, this, ironically, helps them achieve better media relationships and better press
coverage.
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Key Contributions to the Literature
My results make several important contributions to the literature. First, the findings on
the “appointee discount” add a new factor to be considered in future studies of political
appointees. As discussed in chapter 1, previous studies have contended that, to the degree that
appointees are ineffective, the explanation lies in their less-detailed policy knowledge and
shorter tenures. The findings of this study confirmed the relevance of these factors. However, I
also identified a new phenomenon that may further diminish the efficacy of appointees: the
“appointee discount.”
Reporters were clear that they viewed political appointees as less credible actors simply
by virtue of their positions. They assumed that appointees were motivated by the near singleminded goal of advancing the president’s partisan interests, while civil servants were motivated
by other goals, such as serving their country. As a result, they heavily discounted the claims of
appointees. When an appointee made an assertion, reporters worked especially hard to consider
possible alternative points of view. Two reporters indicated that the tenor of their skepticism
towards appointees changed over time, suggesting that appointees have some influence over the
degree of handicap this discount causes them. However, it was also clear that reporters
approached all appointees, simply by virtue of their positions, with heightened suspicion. This
can only have served to significantly inhibit the ability of appointees to act as effective advocates
for the president.
Because the raison d’etre of public affairs officials is to communicate the
administration’s messages, the “appointee discount” can only cripple the ability of appointees in
such positions to do their jobs effectively. This points to a need for researchers examining the
efficacy of government officials to pay closer attention to ideational factors, such as how the
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motivations of appointees are perceived by others, and how this impacts their efficacy. For
example, as discussed in chapter 1, the major piece of recent evidence regarding the relative
effectiveness of appointees and civil servants was conducted by Lewis, and measured how the
programs each group runs were internally evaluated (2008). One possibility for the lower scores
of programs run by appointees, which was not considered by Lewis, is that the existence of such
an “appointee discount” could have made it harder for appointees to build the support from
external actors necessary to the success of many government programs. Additionally, Lewis’
work cannot account for the fact that appointees in positions that do not strictly involve policy
management – such as cabinet heads and other senior officials, and appointees in offices of
legislative affairs, public affairs, and public liaison – may be especially hampered in their
efficacy by the ways in which their motivations are perceived by external actors whose
cooperation is often essential to their work.
Second, this study casts doubt on the conventional wisdom that political appointees are
more loyal advocates for the president than career civil servants. An enormous problem with past
studies of the loyalty of civil servants is that scholars have generally not also simultaneously
measured the loyalty of appointees, in order to consider acts of careerist insubordination in
perspective. This study corroborated the findings of many previous scholars that a small number
of civil servants will engage in acts of disloyalty. However, the significance of this result, and its
implications for presidential staffing, can only be understood when the behavior of civil servants
is studied in comparison with that of their appointee counterparts. Previous scholars have simply
assumed that appointees will be loyal to the presidents they serve. This study finds that such
assumptions are mistaken. In fact, in the case of Treasury officials, both groups of officials
appear to engage in a roughly similar number of acts of leaking information which does not serve
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the president’s interests to the press.
As a result, this study calls into question the contention advanced by Lewis (2008), which
has by now essentially attained the status of conventional wisdom, that presidents face a
“loyalty-competence trade-off” in deciding whether to place civil servants or appointees in
particular positions. No such trade-off can exist if civil servants are no less loyal to the president
and more effective than their appointee counterparts – a possibility not afforded significant
consideration by scholars who have not sufficiently tested the first part of this proposition.
This study also evinces the major limitations of past research which has attempted to
ascertain whether civil servants are loyal by studying external indicators of agency actions. The
results obtained in this study – including admissions by appointees and civil servants of behavior
which arguably reflected rather poorly on themselves and their colleagues, such as leaking and
withholding any information requested by the press which does not reflect well on the president
– are by design shielded from public view and could only be learned through the establishment
of trust and detailed conversations. Meanwhile, as argued by Cook in chapter 1, myriad factors
influence the eventual output of government agencies beyond the simple loyalty of their
careerists. To understand whether officials are loyal to the president requires isolating their
specific actions in situations in which they disagree with the president – and thus cannot be
accomplished without interacting with the subjects under study.
The methodology employed in this study of using outside actors – in this case, reporters –
to corroborate and enhance the reports of government officials, is likewise unusual in the
literature. However, the feedback of the government officials’ interlocutors in the press was
critical to identifying the “appointee discount” and the other opportunities the officials missed to
advance the administration’s positions in the press. This study could not have begun to
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accurately measure the claims of the government officials about their behavior without
understanding the impact of their actions on their end recipients (in this case, reporters).
This project also contributed to the literature by studying specific positions in order to
determine whether appointees or civil servants best serve the interests of the president and the
American people in them. As discussed in the Introduction, there is a remarkable lacuna of
evidence-based research to guide presidents in their staffing decisions. If future research were to
replicate this approach, political scientists could begin to develop a body of work that would
provide guideposts to administrations on the types of positions in which appointees serve best
and the types of roles in which civil servants serve best.
In particular, my work began to build a much-needed literature on appointees in Schedule
C positions. As discussed in the Introduction, there is such a dearth of knowledge regarding the
individuals who serve in such positions that they have been dubbed by two of the pre-eminent
scholars of political appointees as the “invisible presidential appointments.” (Lewis and
Waterman 2013). However, it is precisely these lower-level appointments which are most
interchangeable with civil service positions. By studying appointees in other Schedule C
positions in comparison with civil servants, scholars can begin to achieve a clearer picture of
what staffing arrangements work best across the government.
Third, and equally significantly, this study began to measure, for the first time, whether a
permanent campaign is being conducted in government agencies. The findings suggest that the
Treasury’s public affairs officers are not, in fact, conducting a permanent campaign (although, as
previously discussed, it remains possible that other Treasury officials are doing so by making
policy decisions based upon what they know to be popular). Unexpectedly, the sophisticated
tools of political campaigns that critics have charged appointees with improperly employing in
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government were actually utilized not by appointees, but rather by civil servants, in the pursuit of
decidedly non-partisan aims. The one tactic of the permanent campaign that was clearly
employed to a significant degree by appointees – but not civil servants – was the withholding of
the information from the press. Some appointees appeared to believe that they had the right to
withhold any information that was potentially damaging to the president. While it is unclear
whether such withholding has increased over time, now that it has been identified as the key
permanent campaign tactic being employed by appointees, further research is in order, to
understand how the practice of withholding is conducted more specifically, and across other
government agencies. Finally, while this project uncovered some evidence that some appointees
would tell untruths to make the president look good, such behavior appeared to have been much
more limited, and it was not at all clear that it was conducted outside of the White House.
Finally, this study began to develop deeper knowledge of the practices of government
agency public affairs officers, who had not been studied in detail since the pre-digital era. While
the Treasury public affairs officers were not found to engage in particularly sophisticated or
Machiavellian techniques, some were evinced to believe that they do not have an obligation to
share information with the American people unless it serves their interests. This finding was
shocking, and indeed begs for further research. The possibility identified in this project that
Republican operatives work harder to achieve positive media coverage, while Democratic
operatives underestimate the degree to which they need to engage in sometimes antagonistic
exchanges with the press also presents a tantalizing proposition for future researchers. If true,
such a finding could help to explain the widely discussed puzzle of why President Obama was a
superior communicator as a candidate but, in office, his administration has failed to
communicate effectively with the American people. It would also be a particularly interesting
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finding to practitioners, because it would begin to identify a source of possibly significant
partisan advantage.
Recommendations for the President
My results suggest that efforts by modern presidents to improve their efficacy by hiring
more political appointees have been counterproductive. The findings suggest that the president
would be wise to reduce his reliance on appointees in the roles of Treasury spokespeople, given
the fact that civil servants overall serve as more effective and no less loyal administration
advocates in such positions. Of course, some of the policy portfolios for which Treasury
spokespeople are responsible include policies which are the site of major partisan disagreement
(such as tax and economic policy). In such positions, it would not be appropriate to utilize a civil
servant. However, as discussed in chapter 5, many of the Treasury portfolios, including TARP,
Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, and International Affairs, encompass policies which
change little over the course of different administrations.
Utilizing civil servants in such roles would allow these spokespeople to develop the
detailed expertise in their subject areas, which would help them to better explain policies to
reporters. This would likely at least partially address the major complaint of reporters that they
feel that they are in the dark on administration thinking and the technical operations of Treasury
programs. The ability of civil servants to make more detailed and nuanced arguments on behalf
of such policies would likewise engender greater support for them. Civil servants would also
enjoy better credibility with reporters, paradoxically allowing them to better advance the
president’s arguments in the press. To be sure, civil servants in such positions would continue to
report to Deputy Assistant Secretaries of Public Affairs – who would continue to provide
political oversight and input into their work, even though the appearance of it would be reduced.
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Of course, civil servants tend not to work the same particularly long hours as appointees,
suggesting that using civil servants in such positions might slightly raise personnel costs. On the
other hand, civil servants may be able to work more quickly than their appointee counterparts if
they develop the detailed policy knowledge that allows them to respond more rapidly to
reporters, as Bush Appointee 4 described in chapter 4. Additionally, such public affairs officers
would likely not be too tired to think or argue back – providing an additional effectiveness boost.
The results also suggest that the administration should also look at public affairs posts in
other government agencies, to likewise replace Schedule C appointees with civil servants in
positions responsible for advocating policies that are not the nexus of major partisan
disagreement.
Presidents would likely also win plaudits from good government groups for initiating
such changes – including the legions of groups and scholars who have called for reducing
appointees over the past several decades. Such changes would almost certainly be seen as a win
for the American people, perhaps beginning to restore the record low levels of faith in our
government which would likely further boost support for the president.

Conclusion
This study found evidence suggesting that modern presidents have been misguided in
their decisions to hire increased political appointees. Paradoxically, much-maligned civil
servants were found to better promote the economic agendas of Presidents Bush and Obama in
the press than their own political appointees. On the other hand, Treasury political appointees
were not discovered to largely be engaged in the “permanent campaign,” which their White
House counterparts have been charged with conducting. Appointees were, however, found to
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withhold significantly more information from the press than their civil service counterparts,
suggesting that the interests of the American people are also less well-served by appointee
spokespeople. The evidence of the “appointee discount” and the roughly similar levels of loyalty
exhibited by appointees and civil servants should cause presidential administrations to re-think
the conventional wisdom that political appointees best advance the president’s agenda. The
results of this study suggest that both the American people and presidents of the United States
would be better served by such an outcome.
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Appendix A: Interview Questions
A. Interview Questions for Political Appointees and Civil Servants
My first set of questions is designed to help me understand the differences between political
appointees and civil servants who work in government public affairs positions.

1. How long have you been in your current position?
2. I’m interested in your background, but please keep in mind that these questions are only
designed to help me draw comparisons between my interview subjects, and I will not include any
information that could be used to identify you in my publication. How many years of experience
did you have before you started your current job? What did you do in the past?
3. Where did you go to school and what did you study?
4. What is your subject matter portfolio in your current job?
5. Is your overall workload reasonable?
6. How did you learn the subject matter of your portfolio, and was it easy or hard? At what point
did you begin to feel comfortable with your subject matter portfolio?
7. How well would you say you know the policy substance of the portfolio you cover now: very
well, pretty well, or it is easy to feel a little behind the curve here?
8. I know that you arrange media interviews for your principal(s). If you were to do the
interviews yourself, how well do you think you’d do?
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9. Many of the reporters who cover economic issues have been doing so for a long time. Do you
think that gives them an advantage over you? How do you handle it?
10. Is it important for you to coordinate with other government spokespeople? How much time
do you spend doing so?
11. How well do you get along with the reporters you work with? Do things ever become heated?
If so, how often? How do you handle such situations?
12. When a reporter sends you a question, how long does it typically take you to respond?
13. How satisfied are you with the access you have to the principals for whom you work? How
does your level of access affect your work?
14. Who do you think is more effective in conveying the administration’s messages in the press:
civil servants or political appointees? Why?
15. How much influence do you think you have in shaping the topics covered by the reporters
who you try to influence?
16. How much influence do you think you have in shaping the tone and content of stories you try
to influence?
I would imagine that sometimes people who work in your position would be asked to advocate a
position with which they didn’t personally agree. My next set of questions is designed to help me
understand whether that happened to you and if so how you coped with it. Please keep in mind
that I will not publish any details you might share that could be used to identify you.
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1. What do you think someone in your position should do if asked to advocate a position with
which he or she personally disagrees?
2. Does/did this ever happen to you? If so, how often and how did you react? Would you be
comfortable giving me an example?
3. One of the things I’m interested in is leaks. I think of leaks as information given without
attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the administration – as opposed to
plants, which further the interests of the administration. In your experience, do leaks happen
often? Who does the leaking that does happen? Do you think appointees or civil servants leak
more frequently? Why?

4. Have you even been tempted to leak information to the press? Can you tell me a little about
the circumstances?
5. I’d like to talk a bit about the political views of the people who work in your public affairs
office. Do you think they have an impact on the work they do? How about for you personally?
6. [Asked to political appointees only:] Would you consider doing this job under an
administration of a different political party? Why or why not?
My final set of questions is designed to help me understand the strategies you use in
communicating with the American people about the economy.
1. How would you describe the ultimate goals of your work? What are you trying to achieve each
day?
2. In doing your job, to what degree is your end goal to build public support for the president?
What steps do you take to achieve it?
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3. I’m interested in the ways you try to influence media coverage. Can you tell me about the
more sophisticated techniques you use to shape what reporters cover?
4. Do you ever try to appeal to the emotions, as opposed to the reason, of the American people in
the messages you craft?
5. Do you ever use public opinion polls in your work? If yes, how do you use them and how
often do you use them? If no, why not?

6. What percent of your time would you estimate you spend doing each of these three things:
responding to questions from reporters, pitching them stories, and crafting and implementing
strategies to attain desired coverage?
7. Do you believe it’s ever appropriate for someone in your position to withhold information
requested by the press or to shade the truth? What would the circumstances be? Does this
happen often or rarely in your work?
8. Let’s say someone else had your position and he or she wanted to tell untruths to make the
president look good. Would it be possible for him or her to do so? Have you or your colleagues
ever attempted to do so, and if so, were the attempts successful?
9. Every administration tries to avoid negative press coverage. How does your office determine
how to handle information that is potentially damaging or embarrassing?
10. I’m interested in the mix of messages you work to convey in the press. What percentage of
the messages you seek to promulgate would you describe as ideas (like ways of viewing
particular things) and narratives?
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11. How do you develop and sculpt narratives to make your points?
12. How much time do you spend focusing on the profiles and images of the officials for whom
you work? Is it a good use of your time?
B. Interview Questions for Reporters
My first set of questions is designed to help me understand whether civil servants or political
appointees are more effective advocates for the administrations they serve.
1. How long have you been reporting on the Treasury?
2. I’m interested in the public affairs officials at economic agencies with whom you work. What
would you say the strengths and weaknesses are of the political appointees? What are the
strengths and weaknesses of the civil servants?
3. How convincing to you are the arguments the political appointees make to you? How
convincing are the arguments of the civil servants? How do they compare?
4. To what degree do the political appointees influence the topics on which you ultimately
report? To what degree do the civil servants influence the topics on which you ultimately report?
How do they compare?
5. To what degree do the political appointees influence the tone and content of what you
ultimately report? To what degree do the civil servants influence the tone and content of what
you ultimately report? How do they compare?
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6. How well do you think the political appointees know the subject matter they’re responsible
for? How well do the civil servants know the subject matter they’re responsible for? How do
they compare?
7. Do political appointees or civil servants respond to you more quickly? Which group is better
at getting you the information you need?
8. Do you generally think you know more about the issues that federal economic agencies work
on than the political appointees and/or the civil servants in public affairs? Is this an issue for
you? How?
9. Do you find yourself more skeptical regarding the information put out by public affairs
officers who are political appointees or civil servants? Why?
My next set of questions is designed to help me understand whether political appointees or civil
servants are more loyal advocates for the administrations they serve.
1. One of the things I’m interested in in this research is leaks. I think of leaks as information
given without attribution to reporters which does not further the interests of the administration –
as opposed to plants, which further the interests of the administration. In your personal
experience, how often do the political appointees in federal economic agencies leak information
to you? How often do the civil servants leak? Is there a difference in the nature of the things they
leak?
2. What do you think the motivations of the leakers typically are? Does this differ for civil
servants and appointees?
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3. Has any political appointee ever indicated to you that he or she personally disagreed with the
position he or she was required to officially advocate? How many times has this happened? Over
how many years? How about civil servants?
My final set of questions is designed to help me understand the techniques that public affairs
officers use in attempting to shape media coverage.
1. What percentage of the information you receive from political appointees would you say has
an interpretive element, as opposed to being more directly factual? What is the corresponding
percentage for civil servants?
2. Do you get the sense that appointees often alter their messages in response to public opinion or
to try to shape public opinion, and do you get the sense that civil servants do so?
3. Have you ever become aware of practices public affairs appointees engaged in which you felt
were inappropriate? How about civil servants? If so, which group did so more often and can you
give some examples?
4. What do you think are some of the savvier things federal economic agencies do to shape the
coverage they receive in the press?
5. What do you think it would serve the interests of the Treasury for their public affairs officers
to do differently?
6. What do appointees do when they’re upset with your coverage, and what do civil servants do?
How, if at all, do their responses affect your coverage?
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Appendix B: Bush Appointee 5

As indicated in Chapter 3, I enjoyed a warm and productive rapport with every research
subject except Bush Appointee 5. While I felt that my other twenty-three interview subjects took
my project seriously, attempted to consider and offer detailed, helpful answers to my questions,
and treated me with respect, the disposition of this interview subject surprised me considerably.
Bush Appointee 5 insisted repeatedly that the questions I asked him were “bad,” and
often refused either to answer them or to provide a reason for not answering them. He indicated
that he could not understand many of my questions, including these:
∙“Many of the reporters who cover economic issues have been doing so for a long time.
Do you think that gives them an advantage over you?”
∙“How do you develop and sculpt narratives to make your points?”
∙“How much time did you spend focusing on the profiles and images of the officials for
whom you worked? Was it a good use of your time?”
Often, he tried to pejoratively explain to me why my questions could not be answered in
black or white terms; I replied that I would welcome a nuanced response explaining the
circumstances under which his answer might vary; however, he would typically instead turn back
to making his original point about why my question was dumb.
For many questions, such as how much influence he had over the topics covered by
reporters or the tone and content of media coverage, he indicated that he could not remember,
because his service in the Bush administration was so very long ago, but he did so rapidly
without seeming to exert any effort to think. When I attempted to ask what percentage of the
messages he sought to convey were ideas and narratives, he indicated that he could not
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remember long before I had an opportunity to finish stating the question out loud.
It was also abundantly clear that Bush Appointee 5 simply did not trust me enough to
answer my questions. For example, when I asked how he got along with reporters, he indicated
that he did not want to answer and would not provide a reason for not answering. When I asked
him whether his political views impacted his work, he replied “I don’t feel comfortable, I just
decline to comment.”
At other times, I felt that his rapidly-fired responses were blatantly disingenuous. For
example, when I asked him how his office determined how to handle information that was
potentially damaging or embarrassing, he indicated that he had never been involved in such a
situation, despite the fact that he worked for the Treasury during the height of an unprecedented
financial crisis that threatened the entire global economy.
Furthermore, he snapped his responses in a tone that can only be described as downright
hostile. I attempted to re-set by lowering the volume of my voice below the level of normal
conversation with which I had previously spoken to Bush Appointee 5, and twice asked whether
it would be helpful for me to stop and explain my project in greater detail and answer any
questions he might have about it, in an effort to put him at greater ease regarding my intentions.
However, he declined my offer.
I found it perplexing why, if he truly could not remember the details of his work at
Treasury and he did not find me to be trustworthy, Bush Appointee 5 had agreed to grant me an
interview in the first place. My best supposition is that he granted the interview under good
intentions, but then had a terrible day. We had originally been scheduled to meet at 10:00 am, but
he indicated that morning that he needed to re-schedule without providing an explanation. We
ended up meeting at 5:30 pm that evening in a conference room in his office, and he was clear
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that “I’m just trying to get out of here.” However, because he clearly conveyed that he thought so
little of my questions, I did not think that it would have been productive for me to suggest that I
return at a different time. Since I had already started the interview, I needed to account for his
responses in my results, so I judged it best to make the most of the situation that I could, while
realizing that his responses would be significantly less helpful than those of my other interview
subjects.
In part, I imagine that his distrust of me stemmed from the fact that, unlike almost all of
the other appointees, I had no previous connection to Bush Appointee 5. As previously
explained, I had been connected with one Bush appointee through a mutual friend and former
colleague, and this Bush appointee in turn connected me to other Bush appointees. However, I
identified Bush Appointee 5 by researching the names of the Bush Treasury appointees online
and reaching out to him.
Of course, this fact alone cannot account for his suspicion of me, since the other Bush
appointee who I approached blindly was among the most polite and loquacious of my interview
subjects. Additionally, I approached six of the seven civil servants whom I interviewed without
introduction from a mutual friend or colleague, and the civil servants were unfailingly helpful
and forthcoming.
However, I found the fact that the Bush appointee who connected me to most of the other
Bush appointees did not suggest that I speak with Bush Appointee 5 to be potentially revealing.
Perhaps he is considered by the others to reflect poorly on the administration. This supposition is
further supported by the fact that one of the Bush appointees whom I interviewed indicated to me
that she suspected Bush Appointee 5 (and no other Bush Treasury appointee) of leaking
information to the press.
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Ultimately, I concluded that Bush Appointee 5 can only be assumed to have been having
a terrible day because I did not think it possible that he could have achieved his impressive
professional and educational credentials if he treated everyone with whom he came into contact
with the insolence he exhibited in our interview. At the same time, I did consider his behavior to
be relevant to my study of the qualifications of the government officials because it indicated that,
at least at times, he exhibited behavior in his interactions with other professionals which I
consider to be highly inappropriate. While he must have interpreted my interview questions as
potentially threatening, such situations would of course have been a regular occurrence in his
interactions with reporters at the Treasury. I therefore found his inability to comport himself
appropriately in the situation to be truly remarkable – and to reflect terribly on the administration
for which he served.
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